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Controversy surrounds the upstream petroleum industry.  Although the benefit of 
petroleum resources is beyond dispute, the exploitation of petroleum resources comes 
at a price, as history has shown time and again.  Not only does petroleum exploitation 
have detrimental effects on the environment, but host countries often are worse off than 
countries with little or no petroleum resources.  This “resource curse” is partially the 
result of flawed regulatory frameworks for petroleum resource extraction in host 
countries.   
This thesis identifies three elements that must be present in a country’s regulatory 
framework for petroleum extraction if the resource curse phenomenon is to be avoided 
and benefits from petroleum are to be maximised.  These elements are: transparency, 
accountability and a balance of interests between the petroleum companies and the host 
nation.    
Namibia and South Africa are not yet major players in the international upstream 
petroleum industry.  There is accordingly not much academic engagement with 
petroleum law in these two jurisdictions. The courts have also not yet had the 
opportunity to scrutinise the legislation regulating the upstream petroleum industries of 
South Africa and Namibia. There are, however, indications that both countries may 
possess viable quantities of petroleum resources.  In anticipation of the possibility of 
finding commercially viable quantities of petroleum, South Africa and Namibia have 
enacted legislation to regulate the upstream petroleum industry, but the efficiency of the 
legislation, specifically how it reflects the elements of transparency, accountability and 
balance of interest, have not yet been considered.   
The research for this thesis is driven by the question of how the regulatory framework 
for petroleum exploitation in South Africa and Namibia embraces the elements of 
transparency, accountability and balance of interest.  The purpose of this thesis is to 
examine the regulatory frameworks for upstream petroleum resources in South Africa 
and Namibia in anticipation of the demands that will be placed on law as the sectors 




determine the extent to which the three crucial elements of transparency, accountability 
and balance of interest between the petroleum company and the host nation are 
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Chapter One:   
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Problems Caused by Petroleum 
The petroleum industry is big.  It has been the biggest industry in the world for the last 
century.1 It is worth multiple trillions of dollars.2 It shapes economies and exerts great 
influence on politics.3 Natural oil and gas – referred to here jointly as petroleum4 – have 
been used by the human race since 4,000 BC.5  Crude oil is the most important source 
of energy in the world and is by far the largest single commodity in international trade.6  
It is likely to continue to be a key driver in the world economy for the foreseeable 
future.7     
Despite attempts to address the energy needs of the world by diversifying into 
renewable energies, the demand for petroleum is still on the increase.8  As existing 
petroleum sources are depleted, new technology drives the petroleum industry to areas 
previously unexplored or thought not to be viable reservoirs for petroleum.9  The 
attention of the world’s petroleum companies is now on Africa and its petroleum 
resources, where there may still be new openings in the petroleum industry.10   
                                                          
1  Ross ML The Oil Curse (2012) New Jersey Princeton University Press at 1; Alramahi M Oil and 
Gas Law in the UK (2013) West Sussex Bloomsbury Professional Limited at §1.14. 
2  Hammerson M Upstream Oil and Gas (2011) London Globe Law and Business at 31.   
3  Hammerson (note 2) at 31.  
4  See Chapter Two for a more detailed discussion of the meaning of petroleum.  Throughout the 
thesis, reference will be made to petroleum and in certain instances to natural gas and natural oil 
or crude oil.  Where reference is only made to oil or gas, it is a reference to natural oil and natural 
gas.   
5  See for example Downey M Oil 101 (2009) La Vergne Wooden Table Press LLC at 1. 
6  Ikenna N "'International Petroleum Law': Has it Emerged as a Distinct Legal Discipline?" 1996 
(8) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 428 at 428; Parra F Oil Politics:  A 
Modern History of Petroleum (2010) New York I.B. Taurus & Co Ltd at 1.   
7  Picton-Turbervill G "Preface" in G Picton-Turbervill (ed) Oil and Gas: A Practical Handbook 
(2009) London Globe Business Publishing Ltd at 5.   
8  Picton-Turbervill (note 7) at 5. 
9  See for example Chapter Two.  See also Picton-Turbervill (note 7) at 5; Ross (note 1) at 9. 








Notwithstanding the scale and importance of the petroleum industry, petroleum comes 
at a high price.11  This valuable resource is typically found in regions that are 
geologically or politically speaking most risky.12  Human rights violations are frequent 
in the petroleum industry, which is perceived to be driven by greed and characterised 
by violence.13  One author comments that “[t]he annals of oil are an uninterrupted 
chronicle of naked aggression, genocide and the violent law of the corporate frontier.”14   
Oil wealth also gives rise to a paradox.15  All through history, countries well-endowed 
with mineral and petroleum resources generally (but not always)16 tended to end up 
worse off economically and/or politically than those less endowed.17  This is commonly 
referred to as the “resource curse” and is particularly visible in Africa18 and in the 
Middle East.19  References to “the resource curse” often entail the observation that 
countries rich in natural resources tend to fail to show the rapid economic development 
one may expect;20 and such references highlight the anomalies created by large-scale 
personal poverty in resource-rich countries.21   
The paradoxes of resource wealth, and the possible causes of the resource curse must be 
understood against the backdrop of natural resource wealth being different from other 
forms of wealth.22  Unlike other sources of wealth, the generation of natural resource 
wealth is, so to speak, “enclaved”; the exploitation of natural resource wealth is 
separated from other industrial sectors and can take place without the participation of 
                                                          
11  Roberts J "A Primer on Oil" in S Tsalik and A Schiffrin (eds), Covering Oil: A Reporter's Guide 
to Energy and Development (2005) New York Open Society Institute at 31. 
12  Roberts (note 11) at 31 
13  Watts M "Economies of Violence: More Oil, More Blood" 2003 (38) Economic and Political 
Weekly 5089 at 5089; Ross (note 1) at 1.   
14  Watts (note 13) at 5089. 
15  Ross (note 1) at 2 referes to the “irony of oil wealth”. 
16  Norway, Canada, United Kingdom and to some extend the United States are examples of 
countries with few ill effects as a result of oil.  See Ross (note 1) at 2. 
17  Sachs J and Warner A "The Curse of Natural Resources" 2001 (45) European Economic Review 
827 at 828.   
18  Soros G "Foreword" in Humphreys M, Sachs JD and Stiglitz JE (eds), Escaping the Resource 
Curse (2007) New York Columbia University Press at xi.   
19  Stiglitz J "Making Natural Resources into a Blessing rather than a Curse" in Tsalik S and Schiffrin 
A (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporter's Guide to Energy and Development (2005) New York Open 
Institute Society at 13; Ross (note 13) at 2.   
20  Sachs and Warner (note 17) at 828; Ross (note 1) at 1.   
21  Stiglitz (note 19) at 13. 
22  Humphreys M, Sachs J and Stiglitz J "Introduction: What is the Problem with Natural Resource 
Wealth?" in Humphreys M, Sachs JD and Stiglitz JE (eds) Escaping the Resource Curse (2007) 








major sectors of the domestic labour force.23  In fact, petroleum exports often exclude 
other promising sectors.24  A government can access this wealth without the co-
operation of its citizens or institutions.25  The reason for this is that there is so much 
money in petroleum resources that the exploitation of the resource can fund itself, 
resulting in a situation where the government draws sufficient revenue from the 
resource so that it is unnecessary to tax ordinary citizens.26  This, in the long run, is an 
unsustainable situation, as no taxation leads to no representation by the government.27  
The resultant weak linkages between the government and its citizens lead to an 
unaccountable state, as citizens often have less information about state activities and 
states have less need to engage their citizens.28  In fact, it has been held that a lack of 
reliance on tax revenue in favour of a dependence on external revenue sources hinder 
the development of resource-rich countries.29  
Weak linkages of the petroleum industry with other sectors are also caused by the fact 
that in many countries, petroleum exploitation operations are large-scale, capital 
intensive and foreign-owned, which results in countries frequently not getting the full 
value of their resources.30  The reason for this can be traced to the fact that these 
countries, specifically those with viable quantities of petroleum, often do not have the 
financial or technological capacity to extract the resources.31  Petroleum extraction is a 
capital-intensive exercise and states therefore have to rely on private entities to extract 
the resources.32  This, however, gives rise to a conflict: while states will want to ensure 
that the benefit of their petroleum resources resorts to the country as a whole, private 
entities will seek to ensure their own income or benefit, using a country’s resource 
                                                          
23  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 4. 
24  Karl T "Understanding the Resource Curse" in Tsalik S and Schiffrin A (eds) Covering Oil: A 
Reporter's Guide to Energy and Development (2005) New York Open Society Institute at 24. 
25  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 4. 
26  See for example Nakhle C Petroleum Taxation (2008) Oxon Routledge at 10.   
27  Nakhle (note 26) at 10; Ross (note 1) at 5 – 6. 
28  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 11. 
29  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 12. 
30  Stiglitz J "What Is the Role of the State?" in Humphreys M, Sachs JD and Stiglitz JE (eds) 
Escaping the Resource Curse (2007) New York Columbia University Press at 24; Karl (note 24) 
at 24; Ross (note 1) at 6.     
31  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 4-5.   
32  Easo J "Licences, Concessions, Production Sharing Agreements and Service Contracts" in Picton-
Turbervill G (ed) Oil and Gas: A Practical Handbook (2009) London Globe Business Publishing 








wealth for their own interests.33  As a result, there are few productive links with the rest 
of the country’s economy.34    
A second key problem underlying the resource curse is that wealth emanating from 
natural resources, especially from petroleum, is invariably impacted by the fact that the 
source of such wealth is non-renewable.  As such, these resources are more like an asset 
than source of income.35  Once the resource is depleted, the revenue generated from the 
resources typically ceases as well.36  The extraction of petroleum resources therefore 
has economic consequences for the host state.37  Petroleum exploitation “liquidates the 
assets, and the State can no longer realise revenue from this asset”.38  Host states must 
therefore also promote the sustainable extraction of the resource by establishing a 
legislative framework for petroleum exploration and production that provides enduring 
social and economic benefits for the host state and its people.39 
The fact that the petroleum sector is detached from the domestic political and economic 
processes and the concomitant non-renewable nature of petroleum resources has given 
rise to the emergence of a major risk, namely “rent-seeking behaviour”.40  Economic 
rent, as it applies to petroleum, refers to the surplus revenue of the resource after 
deducting the capital and labour costs.41  The economic rent which exists between the 
value of the resource and the costs of extraction is also referred to as a gap.42  The 
prospects of substantial economic rent create incentives for individuals (whether private 
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34  Karl (note 24) at 24. 
35  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 4. 
36  Hunter T Legal Regulatory Framework for the Sustainable Extraction of Australian Offshore 
Petroleum Resources: A Critical Functional Analysis (unpublished PhD-thesis, University of 
Bergen, 2010) at 64. 
37  Hunter T “Sustainable Socio-economic Extraction of Australian Offshore Petroleum Resources 
through Legal Regulation: Is it Possible?” (2011) Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 
209 at 210. 
38  Hunter (note 37) at 210. 
39  Hunter (note 37) at 210–211. 
40  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 4. 
41  Nakhle (note 26) at 17; Nakhle C "Petroleum Fiscal Regimes: Evolution and Challenges" in 
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sector actors or politicians) to use political mechanisms to capture the rents.43  This in 
turn may create opportunities for rent-seeking by corporations and corrupt practices 
which compound the negative economic and political consequences of natural resource 
wealth.44 
With the above in mind, the “resource curse” may be a result of various factors.  One 
factor may be the so-called “Dutch Disease”, which refers to the negative effect that the 
increase in currency value as a result of the resource income has on the competitive 
position of other industries in the country.45  As stated above, petroleum exports often 
act to exclude other promising export sectors, especially manufacturing and 
agriculture.46  This makes economic diversification particularly difficult47 as the 
increase of currency value as a result of the petroleum income renders other industries 
in the country internationally uncompetitive.48  Policymakers, in response, adopt strong 
protectionist policies to sustain increasingly non-competitive economic activities.  This 
places a funding burden on the oil sector.49  As other sectors become more dependent 
on the transfers from petroleum, dependence on petroleum is reinforced, which in turn 
removes incentives for more efficient use of capital and over time this may result in a 
permanent loss of competitiveness.50  The foreign exchange earned from petroleum 
operations are often used to source internationally traded goods, which reduces demand 
for locally manufactured goods.51  Domestic resources (such as labour and materials) 
are pulled into the petroleum sector, increasing the price of these resources in the 
domestic market which in turn increases the costs to producers in other sectors.52  All 
this sets in motion a dynamic whereby the importance of the petroleum and 
                                                          
43  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 4; Broadway R and Keen M “Theoretical Perspectives 
on Resource Tax Design” in Daniel P, Keen M and McPherson C (eds) The Taxation of 
Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice (2010) Oxon Routledge at 15.   
44  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 4. 
45  Soros (note 18) at xi; Ross (note 1) at 47.   
46  Karl (note 24) at 23. 
47  Karl (note 24) at 23. 
48  Downey (note 5) at 67. 
49  Karl (note 24) at 23-24.   
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construction sectors are elevated above the importance of other, more established and 
traditional export sectors.53 
Another factor that may contribute to the resource curse is the disruptive effects that 
fluctuation in commodity prices may have.54  The oil market is arguably the most 
volatile market in the world.55  Policymakers are faced with the difficulty of effectively 
managing the sudden rise and fall of oil prices.56  The high volatility of petroleum 
income makes long-term planning difficult.57  The problem is exacerbated by 
international lending: when prices and outputs are high, the host country often borrows 
from international lenders, but when prices fall, international lenders demand 
repayment.58 
The resource curse may also result from the failure to enforce property rights; in other 
words, a failure by a host government to recognise that natural resources ultimately 
belong to the nation and that the benefit of these resources must accrue to the nation 
may add to the resource curse.59  The lack of transparency in recognising property 
rights gives rise to issues of accountability of a state towards its citizens in enforcing 
property rights.   
Another possible contributor to the resource curse is the effect of petroleum resources 
on the political conditions in a host country.60  An overdependence on petroleum 
exports is strongly associated with weak public institutions that lack the capacity to 
handle the challenges of petroleum development.61 Institutions must be strong to handle 
the influx from petroleum rents, otherwise a “rentier state” is formed, ie one that lives 
of the petroleum profits.62  Timing is important.  Proper institutions must already be in 
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55  Karl (note 24) at 23. 
56  Karl (note 24) at 23. 
57  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 6. 
58  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 22) at 6. 
59  Wenar L "Property Rights and the Resource Curse" 2008 (36) Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 at 
9. 
60  Soros (note 18) at xi.  After oil was discovered in Venezuela, the country went from a functioning 
democracy with the highest per capita income in South America to a state of near-civil war and a 
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Fortune Magazine (03.02.2003) . 
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place when called upon to deal with the challenges of petroleum development.  
“Institutions” include a strong, functioning democracy,63 proper control over corruption 
and environmental protection64 and a recognition of citizens’ property right in 
petroleum resources.65  For example, recent discoveries of natural gas and coal in 
Mozambique and gold in Tanzania have led to a focus on proper institutions in these 
two countries as measures of avoiding the resource curse.  Both countries have signed 
on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which may help in controlling 
corruption and fostering public debate.66  Mozambique is already considering setting up 
a sovereign wealth fund, while Tanzania’s president has undertaken to do so.67 There is 
also already a call for legislating transparency in Mozambique and a commitment by 
the Mozambiquan government to manage public finance in a responsible, accountable 
and transparent manner.68 
Host countries also often have to deal with the issue of the pace at which resources 
should be extracted.  Extracting valuable resources by itself lowers a country’s wealth, 
as these resources are non-renewable.  This loss can only be recovered by maximising 
revenue received from the exploitation of these resources and properly applying the 
revenue.69 Extracting resources too quickly may not be in the country’s best interest and 
a better option may in fact be to leave the resources in situ until value has increased as a 
result of an increase in demand.70   
Finally, secrecy is also a contributing factor to the resource curse and is a key reason 
why petroleum revenues are often squandered by host countries.71  For example, during 
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66  Shankleman J “Avoiding the Resource Curse in East Africa’s Oil and Natural Gas Boom” New 
Security Beat 14 February 2013, available at http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/02/avoiding-
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67  Shankleman (note 66). 
68  Jackson J “News Analysis: Resource Curse Casts a Shadow on Mozambique’s Door” Business 
Day Live 13 March 2013, available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/world/africa/2013/03/13/news-
analysis-resource-curse-casts-a-shadow-on-mozambiques-door [accessed 25.02.2015].   
69  Stiglitz (note 19) at 14. 
70  Stiglitz (note 19) at 14. 








the reign of Saddam Hussein, more than half or Iraq’s expenditures were channelled 
through its national oil company, whose budget was kept secret.72 
Various international movements aimed at addressing and curing the resource curse 
have emerged.  These movements identify transparency in the extractive industries and 
accountability of states in regulating natural resources as key in addressing the resource 
curse.73  There are also a number of publications, aimed at breaking the resource curse 
by promoting transparency and accountability in the extractive industries.74  Several 
difficult policy questions for the host governments and for the international community 
arise because of the “perverse effects” that natural resources have on economic and 
political outcomes in developing states and the conflicting interests between parties.75  
States have to determine how to engage with petroleum companies (mostly from 
developed countries) to ensure that on the one hand the resources are exploited for the 
benefit of the country as a whole, while on the other hand the entities actually doing the 
exploitation are rewarded for their endeavours.76  In the process of engagement, the 
choice of an enabling and suitably protective legal framework is crucial. This is what 
this thesis is about.  
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2. Research Question and Objectives 
This thesis deals with state regulation of petroleum resources.  It pursues the question 
of how the role of the state, as regulator of access to petroleum resources and as agent 
of its people, should be understood and reinforced in law, in matters pertaining to the 
exploration and production of petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia.   
Despite the unmatched size of the global petroleum industry, there is a notable lack of 
case law and academic discussion about petroleum law.77  This is particularly true for 
South Africa and Namibia.  The petroleum industries of South Africa and Namibia are 
still relatively young and underdeveloped and the potential of petroleum resources in 
these two countries are unconfirmed.78  Despite this, some of the problems related to 
petroleum discussed above show the importance of having a proper regulatory 
framework for petroleum exploitation in place from the outset.  In the light hereof, this 
thesis takes a forward-looking approach as opposed to a reactive approach and 
evaluates the framework should viable quantities of petroleum be found in either or 
both countries.   
In line with the global trend in respect of petroleum resources, both South Africa and 
Namibia vest the control over petroleum resources in the State.79  Unlike many other 
countries, however, South Africa and Namibia are post-colonial and post-apartheid 
countries marked by racial inequity and unequal access to the economy and specifically 
to natural resources.80  The legislative framework within which petroleum exploitation 
operates takes this into account and is designed in such a way that it redresses past 
wrongs and aims to ensure that the people of South Africa and Namibia share in the 
benefit of the exploitation of petroleum resources within the national boundaries.81  To 
encourage the development of the petroleum industry, however, the regulatory 
framework for petroleum must also be attractive to investors.   
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The thesis proceeds from the assumption that to achieve a balance between ensuring a 
benefit for the nation as a whole and private entity interest in respect of the exploitation 
of petroleum resources, it is important for a state to have a proper regulatory framework 
within which petroleum exploitation takes place.  This depends on various measures 
which are put in place to regulate ownership of, control over and access to petroleum 
resources within a host country.  All these measures must act in concert to ensure the 
existence of a proper regulatory framework; one that balances the rights of all interested 
parties and that ensures that the country as a whole benefits from the exploitation of 
petroleum resources. 
The research is undertaken to determine and evaluate the regulatory framework for 
petroleum in South Africa and Namibia.  The evaluation of the regulatory framework 
for petroleum is in turn aimed at determining how the balance is struck in both of these 
jurisdictions between the interests of petroleum companies exploiting petroleum 
resources, and the interests of the Namibian and South African people, through their 
elected representatives in government.  Central to the primary purpose is the role that 
the state plays in the exploitation of the petroleum resources of South Africa and 
Namibia.  
Another purpose of the research is to determine what the main features of a law should 
be if it is expected to ensure that a host government, acting as the agent of its citizens, 
must ensure the best possible benefit for the people while protecting investment in the 
industry.  This is done by identifying certain elements that are crucial in a petroleum 
regulatory regime in the light of the problems caused by petroleum.   
2.1 Motivation 
The discussion above has, in very broad terms, flagged the problems caused by 
petroleum.  In short, without proper regulation, petroleum exploitation may give rise to 
numerous problems for a country and the resource wealth of a country may in fact be to 








measures to increase the chances of obtaining more revenues and ensuring revenues are 
well spent.82   
2.1.1 Transparency 
Possibly the most important set of policies regarding natural resources are those that 
deal with increased transparency.83  For a petroleum regulatory system to function 
properly, the system has to be transparent.84  Transparency means that there has to be 
an openness and certainty in respect of the framework under which rights to petroleum 
are granted and managed.  Transparency also means that there must be an availability 
of information.85  Both petroleum companies and the public must have a clear 
understanding of the procedures set out for obtaining rights, content of rights and 
obligations of holders.86  There must also be transparency as regards the amounts 
received by government in exchange for access to petroleum, how government uses 
these amounts, how much resources are produced and where these resources go once 
produced.87  It is also important to know what exactly the role of the state is in respect 
of petroleum resources88 and how the state’s powers in respect of petroleum are 
limited.89 Promoting transparency will in turn assist to control corruption by limiting 
the scope for corruption90 and will generally improve government credibility.91   
2.1.2 Accountability 
The principle of sovereignty is what empowers a state to assume control over the 
petroleum resources within its boundaries.92 In terms of the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources, each state is entitled to exercise control over the 
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natural resources within its boundaries.93  Ownership of petroleum resources is an 
attribute of sovereignty.94  Sovereignty, however, ultimately serves the people.95  When 
a host country exercises control over access to petroleum resources, it does so as agent 
of its people.  Governments therefore cannot act in their own interests when granting 
access to petroleum resources, but must faithfully serve the interest of the people whom 
they represent.96  Petroleum companies, on the other hand, are concerned with 
furthering the interests of their shareholders. They accordingly have a very different 
motivation for extracting the resources, compared to governments. There also, 
frequently, seem to be a natural tension between the varying interests of governments, 
and those of the petroleum companies, who will want to obtain extractive rights on the 
most favourable terms, perhaps even if this means resorting to practices corrupting 
weak governments.97   
Measures must be in place to hold the host government accountable to its people where 
it fails to exercise control over petroleum resources for the benefit of its people.  
Therefore, another important policy choice with regard to the regulatory framework for 
petroleum resources is how governments are held accountable to their citizens.  Related 
to accountability is how the powers of government in respect of petroleum resources 
are limited.98  The state’s powers may be limited by entrenching the right to just 
administrative action, promoting access to information and criminalising corrupt 
practices.99      
2.1.3 Interest Balancing 
Finally, states have an obligation to ensure that their petroleum resources are exploited 
for the long-term benefit of its people.100  Petroleum resources will have no benefit for 
the host state and its people if it remains in its natural condition.  But, as stated earlier, 
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host countries need to rely on investors (petroleum companies) to do the exploitation.101  
It is therefore important for the petroleum regulatory framework, especially as regards 
fiscal and financial aspects, to be attractive for investors.102  Care must be taken that the 
interests of the host country and its citizens are not pursued to such an extent that the 
interests of the petroleum companies, who go to great lengths to exploit the resources, 
are ignored.  A petroleum regulatory framework must, therefore, take into account the 
rights of the citizens of the host country as well as the interests of the petroleum 
company.103  For example, a petroleum company must be rewarded for its efforts in 
exploring for and producing petroleum.  Typically, this reward takes the form of a share 
in or full ownership of the produced petroleum,104 which depends on the regime chosen 
by a state to grant access to petroleum.105  However, since the citizens of the host nation 
are the ultimate beneficiaries of the petroleum resources, they must share in the benefit 
of the petroleum resources.  In regimes where the petroleum company acquires 
ownership of the produced petroleum, a host state will typically ensure that its people 
benefit in some way by imposing royalties and taxes on petroleum operations.106  The 
regulatory framework for petroleum operations may also promote socio-economic 
empowerment as a means for the host nation to benefit.107  Merely ensuring financial 
benefits for the host state is, however, not enough.  Petroleum exploitation usually 
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affects the social fabric of the community where the activities are taking place and 
often citizen rights are not taken into account or the affected citizens are not consulted 
properly or at all.108  It is therefore also in the host nation’s interest that its rights are 
protected, in particular its right to a clean environment109 and its right to be heard.110          
From the above, certain conclusions may be drawn regarding what characteristics a 
proper regulatory framework for petroleum must contain.  A proper regulatory 
framework for petroleum resources, as Figure 3 below illustrates, is one that balances 
the interests of the petroleum company with the interests of the host government and its 
citizens.  Furthermore, the regulatory framework must provide for transparency and 
accountability in the regulation of petroleum resources.  By ensuring this trifecta in 
respect of petroleum regulation, the Namibian and South African governments will be 
one step closer in ensuring that petroleum exploitation in these two countries operate 








Figure 3: The Model Petroleum Regulatory Framework 
 
The regulatory framework for petroleum in South Africa and Namibia remains largely 
untested by the courts and by practice.111  The potential of petroleum resources in these 
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two countries creates a need to determine whether the petroleum frameworks in South 
Africa and Namibia are suitable for petroleum exploitation.  In particular, it needs to be 
ascertained whether the regulatory framework for upstream petroleum resources in 
South Africa and Namibia reflect the three elements of transparency, accountability and 
balance of interests.  To date, discussions about transformation, black economic 
empowerment and nationalisation of mines have been dominant, especially in South 
Africa, but these discussion have not really been driven by express attempts at 
promoting transparency and accountability within the extractive industries.112 The focus 
has therefore been predominantly on only one of the factors, namely creating a benefit 
for the citizens.  This is particularly true in respect of the former apartheid-regime – 
characterised by a “constitutional and policy environment of opacity and non-
accountability” – where the interests of a select ruling class were pursued.113  As this 
thesis aims to demonstrate, however, all three factors have to be present and equally 
pursued in a petroleum regulatory regime.    
2.2 Legal Comparison 
This thesis comprises a comparative analysis of the regulatory framework for petroleum 
resources in South Africa and Namibia.  Namibia and South Africa share a legal history 
as a result of the shared political history for most of the twentieth century.  Briefly, in 
1915 the Union of South Africa occupied Namibia (then South-West Africa) and in 
1919 South-West Africa became a mandate of South Africa.  Roman-Dutch law applied 
to both countries.  Even though Namibia gained independence from South Africa in 
1990, pre-independence South African law still applies in Namibia and post-1990 law 
has persuasive power in Namibia. 114   
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The shared legal and political histories of these two countries provide a good starting 
point for a comparative study.  It is made all the more interesting and useful by the fact 
that, while the Namibian legal system has closely followed the South African legal 
system for the most part, its treatment of its mineral and petroleum resources has 
always been different from the South African treatment.  This is discussed in more 
detail below.     
With South Africa and Namibia surrounded by established and emerging petroleum 
states (for example, Angola to the north of Namibia and Mozambique north-east of 
South Africa), international focus is on Namibia and South Africa as potential 
petroleum countries.  In South Africa, for example, the potential of vast sources of 
shale gas in the Karoo has been heralded as a potential “game changer” for South 
Africa.115  In fact, since the discovery of oil in the Falklands a few years ago, interest in 
South Africa as a petroleum destination is at an all time high, with major international 
oil companies applying for and being allocated offshore blocks in South Africa.116   
In Namibia, there has been promising signs of potential offshore oil resources117 with 
Namibia being viewed as a “new frontier” in the search for oil.118  The oil extracted 
from the Wingat-1 prospecting well in the Walvis Basin has also been described as a 
potential game changer for Namibia, as it confirms previous speculation that Namibia 
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exploration-will-be-game-changer-says-zuma [accessed 25.02.2015].   
116  Planting S “An Energy Game Changer on our Doorstep” Moneyweb 27 June 2014, available at 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-south-africa/an-energy-game-changer-on-our-doorstep 
[accessed 25.02.2015]; Lo C “Offshore South Africa: Taking a Second Look” 
OffshoreTechnology.com 26 February 2014, available at http://www.offshore-
technology.com/features/featureoffshore-south-africa-taking-a-second-look-4184032/ [accessed 
25.02.2015].   
117  Oredein O “Oil Companies’ Interest Returns to Namibia” E&P 25 April 2014, available at 
http://www.epmag.com/oil-companies-interest-returns-namibia-715421 [accessed 25.02.2015]; 
Staff Reporter “A Mine of Different Outlooks” Insight: Mining in Namibia 2014 at 3.  








may have offshore oil potential.119  A number of large, international companies have 
applied for exploration licences, including HRT Oil & Gas, Labreo Petroleo and 
Petrobras.120  Some companies have indicated that they intend to commence drilling by 
2016.121  The Kudu Gas Field is also estimated to hold at least one trillion cubic feet of 
gas, although the future of this field is uncertain because of the withdrawal of its 
operator, Tullow Oil PLC.122  There has also been an indication of potential hydraulic 
fracturing in Namibia’s future, although geologists hold the view that there is little 
shale gas potential in Namibia.123 
Aside from the above, South Africa’s economic and political leadership role within the 
African continent makes it a key jurisdiction for an African comparison.124  On the 
other hand, and despite its general tendency to follow the South African example, 
Namibia’s treatment of its petroleum resources has for the most part been more in line 
with international practice than South Africa.125  These two jurisdictions – similar as 
regards their common law roots, but different insofar as it relates to the regulation of 
petroleum – therefore form the basis of the legal comparison in this thesis.     
2.3 Delimitation 
This thesis focuses only on petroleum resources. It excludes a thorough discussion of 
minerals.  Despite this, and due to the underdeveloped nature of the petroleum 
industries in these two countries, brief references will be made to the minerals industry 
and the regulation of certain aspects of the minerals industry.   
Furthermore, this thesis will focus only on the upstream petroleum industry.  The 
concept of “upstream” petroleum industry is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.  
Suffice it to say here that scope constraints mean that this thesis can only deal with the 
                                                          
119  Alexander J “Oil Exploration in Namibia” The Namibian 21 July 2014, available at 
http://www.namibian.com.na/indexx.php?archive_id=125865&page_type=archive_story_detail&
page=1  [accessed 25.02.2015].   
120  Titus ID and Van den Berg HM “Namibia” in Picton-Turbervill G (ed) The International 
Comparative Legal Guide to: Oil and Gas Regulation 2015 London Global Legal Group Ltd at 
272.   
121  Staff Reporter “A Mine of Different Outlooks” Insight: Mining in Namibia 2014 at 3. 
122  Staff Reporter “Tullow, Itochu Pull out of Kudu” Insight: Mining in Namibia (2014) at 27.   
123  Staff Reporter “Oil and Gas” Insight February 2013 at 31.   
124  Hughes (note 112) at 9. 








exploration and extraction part of the petroleum industry and not the transport, 
manufacturing and distribution of petroleum and petroleum products.   
The preceding discussion highlighted various economic and political issues in respect 
of petroleum regulation.  From this cross-sweep of the economic and political issues, 
three issues that have an impact on the efficacy of the legal and regulatory framework 
emerge.  They are: transparency, accountability and the balancing of interests.  The 
research scrutinises the broader legal framework for the upstream petroleum industry in 
Namibia and South Africa and how these three themes are addressed in the regulatory 
framework for petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia.  It is therefore a 
purely legal analysis with reference to how certain policy choices have made their way 
into the legislation regulating the upstream petroleum industries in South Africa and 
Namibia.  How states use the wealth created by petroleum exploitation is an issue that 
cannot be addressed in detail in this work, due to its limited scope, but is referred to 
briefly in Chapter Eight.   
3. Historical Background: Petroleum Regulation in 
South Africa and Namibia 
The relationship between the political histories of South Africa and Namibia and 
development of its mineral and petroleum industries provide an insightful view of the 
role of the ruling authority in the development of the mineral and petroleum industries 
of these two countries.  The legal histories of South Africa and Namibia have been 
intertwined for the largest part of the twentieth century and the South African legal 
system remains a major influence on the Namibian legal system. However, Namibian 
mineral and petroleum law regime has managed to escape the influence of the often 
changing South African mineral and petroleum law system.  Unlike its South African 
counterpart, the basic principles of the Namibian mineral and petroleum law regime has 
remained constant for more than century.  The paragraphs below explore why South 
African mineral and petroleum law has been subject to frequent major fundamental 
changes, while its Namibian counterpart remained fundamentally unchanged. 
The principle of cuius est solum eius est usque ad caelum et ad inferos was introduced 








Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope from 1652 onwards.126  The implication of 
this for mineral and petroleum resources on private land was that the owner of the land 
became the owner of all minerals and petroleum on and below the surface of the land.  
The Roman-Dutch law remained the common law of South Africa even after the British 
took control over the Cape of Good Hope in 1765.127  For mineral law, the first 
significant alteration to the Cape’s civilian system of law to align it with English 
practice came in the form of the Sir John Cradock Proclamation of 1813,128 which 
converted all loan farms into freehold or perpetual quitrent holdings and provided that 
land granted by the Crown would be subject to a reservation to the Crown of the rights 
to gold, silver and precious stones.129  The Proclamation of Sir John Cradock was the 
first step away from private mineral rights to state-owned mineral rights and paved the 
way for modification in the exclusivity characteristic, or absoluteness, of mineral rights 
ownership.130  All other minerals (including petroleum) remained vested in the 
landowner.   
Despite the exception under the Sir John Cradock’s Proclamation, the general approach 
under the common law in South Africa was that the owner of the land owned all 
minerals under the surface of the land in line with the principle of cuius est solum.131  
Landowners could permit others to mine the minerals, which was done through 
                                                          
126  Dale MO "South Africa: Development of a New Mineral Policy" 1997 (23) Resources Policy 15 
at 15; Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA) at [32].  See also 
Chapter Three below for a discussion of this principle.       
127  Davenport TRH and Saunders C South Africa: A Modern History 5 ed (2000) New York 
Macmillan at 40; Hahlo HR and Kahn E The South African Legal System and its Background 
(1968) Cape Town Juta at 575.  This was in line with the rule of capitulation as set out in the case 
of Campbell v Hall, which provides that the laws of a conquered country will remain in place until 
the conqueror decides to change it.  See Campbell v Hall 1774 1 Comp 204 at 209, 98 ER 1045 at 
1047. 
128  Proclamation on Conversion of Loan Places to Quitrent Tenure (6 August 1813).  See Cawood FT 
and Minnitt RCA "A Historical Perspective on the Economics of the Ownership of Mineral Rights 
Ownership" 1998 The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 369 at 370.   
129  Section 4 of the Proclamation on Conversion of Loan Places to Quitrent Tenure (6 August 1813).   
See Dale (note 126) 16 and Hahlo and Kahn (note 127) at 576. 
130  Cawood and Minnitt (note 128) at 370.  Many of the white Afrikaners (boere) at the Cape were 
unhappy with the British rule.  This resulted in a mass exodus (known as the Groot Trek) of the 
white Afrikaners from the Cape.  Between 1834 and 1840, 15,000 persons (called the 
Voortrekkers) left the Cape and travelled inland and to the South and took their slaves with them.  
New Boer republics were established throughout South Africa, being Natal, Orange Free State 
and the Transvaal (Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek or ZAR), each with their own legislative powers.  
See Davenport and Saunders  (note 127) at 52 and 80 – 90.  Natal was established in 1839,  ZAR 
in 1852 and the Orange Free State in 1854.  See Giliomee H The Afrikaners: Biography of a 
People (2003) Cape Town Tafelberg at 166 and 175. 








contract.132  This system, however, severely lacked security of tenure for the miner.  
The use of contract created various difficulties, since it only created personal rights 
which could not afford the miner proper security.  Furthermore, the lack of separate 
ownership of minerals made transfer thereof difficult, which further hampered 
investment.133   
The private ownership of minerals, lack of security of tenure for investors and new 
potential in the minerals industry in South Africa set the stage for development of the 
minerals regulatory regime.134  Because of a lack of mineral and mining law in the 
Roman-Dutch law system, the South African court and legislature developed a system 
of mineral rights.135  “Mineral rights” were traditionally characterised as “quasi-
servitudes”136 and entailed the entitlements to go on to the property to which the relate 
and to search for, sever and remove minerals.137   
The discovery of diamonds in 1867138 and gold in 1886139 opened the door for further 
state interference in the control of minerals.140  The legislature of the Boer republics 
(which excluded the Cape of Good Hope, which was still under British control)141 
feared that the possible benefits of development of the mineral for the whole 
community could be curtailed if the landowner had the exclusive right to the 
minerals.142  For the legislature in the Boer republics to be in a position to exercise 
control over minerals, the entitlements in respect of mineral rights, ie the rights to 
search for and extract mineral and petroleum resources, had to be separated from the 
underlying mineral rights.  In other words, the entitlement to search for and extract 
minerals had to be separated from the ownership of the minerals.  The legislatures in 
                                                          
132  Minister / Agri South Africa (note 126) at [34]. 
133  Minister / Agri South Africa (note 126) at [34]. 
134  Minister / Agri South Africa (note 126) at [34]. 
135  Trojan Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others 1996 
(4) SA 499 (A) at 509; Minister / Agri South Africa (note 126) at [26].   
136  Van Vuren and Others v Registrar of Deeds 1907 TS 289 at 294.  
137  Van Vuren / Registrar (note 136) at 294; Trojan / Rustenburg (note 135) at 509. 
138  Giliomee H and Mbenga B New History of South Africa (2007) Cape Town Tafelberg at 159. 
139  Giliomee and Mbenga (note 138) at 200. 
140  Minister / Agri South Africa (note 126) at [35]. 
141  In the Cape Colony, the Cradock Proclamation still applied.  Rights to precious stones, gold and 
silver were reserved for the Crown.  Minister / Agri South Africa (note 126) at [36]; Section 4 of 
Sir John Cradock’s Proclamation on Conversion of Loan Places to Quitrent Tenure, 1813. 
142  Wessels JW The History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) Grahamstown African Book Company 








the Boer republics attempted to exercise some control over the mineral entitlements 
through various enactments which intended to protect and reward the interests of 
private enterprises, but at the same time impose a system of state control over the 
mining industry.143  The treatment of minerals depended on the province in which it 
was situated, the type of minerals and whether the minerals were found on or under 
private land or state / crown land.144  None of these legislative measures expressly dealt 
with petroleum, with the exception of the Mineral Law Amendment Act 16 of 1907 of 
the Cape of Good Hope, which included natural gas and oil under the definition of 
“base mineral”.145   
The gist of the common-law system of mineral rights is that the ownership remained 
vested in the landowner.  Once the holder removes the minerals, it became his 
property.146  The legislature’s policy regarding the exploitation of the mineral resources 
of the area fell between the two absolutes of complete state monopoly and 
unencumbered private enterprise.147  The state’s policy was to promote the prospecting 
and exploitation of the country’s mineral wealth148 and this was achieved either by 
reserving the mineral rights for the state, or by reserving the mineral entitlements for 
the state.149  This treatment of minerals was based on the desire to ensure a greater 
benefit for the nation as a whole from its mineral wealth. 
After its victory in the Anglo-Boer War, Britain had control over all four provinces and 
established the Union of South Africa.  The colonial mining legislation remained in 
force in the Provinces after the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910.150  As with 
                                                          
143  Wessels (note 142) 487.  See also Dale (note 126) at 16.  The legislation included: Law 1 of 1871 
(Transvaal), the Precious Stones and Minerals Mining Act 19 of 1883 (Cape), the Precious 
Minerals Act 31 of 1898 (Cape), the Mines and Colleries Act 43 of 1899 (Natal), the Mineral Law 
Amendment Act 16 of 1907 (Cape) and the Precious and Base Metals Act 35 of 1908 (Transvaal).     
144  Franklin BLS and Kaplan M The Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa (1982) Durban 
Butterworths 1; Mostert (note 80) at 26 – 44.   
145  Section 33 of the Mineral Law Amendment Act 16 of 1907 (Cape).  It may be argued, however, 
that the Mines and Colleries Act 43 of 1899 of Natal could have included petroleum, as 
“minerals” were defined in this Act as “[a]ll substances which can be extracted from the earth by 
mining operations for the purpose of profit…”   
146  Trojan / Rustenburg (note 135) at 509. 
147  Franklin and Kaplan (note 144) at 1. 
148  Franklin and Kaplan (note 144) at 1.   
149  Badenhorst and Mostert (note 111) at 1-16 – 1-27.  See also Minister / Agri South Africa (note 
126) at [35] – [52]. 
150  Section 123 of the South Africa Act of 1909.  This section conferred all mining and mineral rights 








the colonial era, the extent of state control over mineral resources in the union varied 
according to the nature of the mineral in question and according to the province in 
which mining operations were conducted.151  The Union era, however, saw the first 
separate treatment of petroleum.  Because the prospects of commercial quantities of 
natural oil in the Union of South Africa were unfavourable, the Natural Oil Act 46 of 
1942 was promulgated in an attempt to encourage and control the exploitation of 
natural oil.152  This Act vested the right to prospect and mine for natural oil in the state, 
although ownership of natural oil remained vested in the landowner.153  Under this Act, 
only the state had the right to prospect for and mine natural oil, not the holder of the 
mineral rights, but the state could grant prospecting and mining leases for natural oil.154  
This Act was therefore the first provision in South Africa to reserve the right to exploit 
natural oil for the state.   
Even with the extensive regulation of the rights to prospect and mine, the mineral and 
petroleum rights remained vested in the owner of the land.  The owner thus still 
remained the owner of the unsevered minerals and petroleum as well, but his 
entitlements flowing from this ownership were separated from the mineral and 
petroleum rights in most instances and were controlled by the state.  The colonial and 
Union eras were also marked by a refusal to acknowledge the claims of black people or 
indigenous communities to land and minerals, a thorough discussion of which is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  The statutory institution of racial segregation and 
recognition of group areas only reinforced the exclusion of black people and indigenous 
communities from mineral exploitation.  155   
When the Union of South Africa became the Republic of South Africa in 1961, all laws 
in force in any part of the Union of South Africa remained in force until they were 
repealed or amended.156  New legislation regarding mining and mineral rights was 
                                                          
151  Hahlo and Kahn (note 127) at 764. 
152  Hahlo and Kahn (note 127) at 770.   
153  Section 2 of the Natural Oil Act 46 of 1942.   
154  Section 4 and section 5 of the Natural Oil Act 46 of 1942; Hahlo and Kahn (note 127) at 770. 
155  See Mostert (note 80) at 30 – 35.  The Natural Oil Act 46 of 1942 did not apply to areas of land 
scheduled as native areas of release areas in terms of the Native Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936.  
See section 14 of the Natural Oil Act 46 of 1942. 
156   Section 107 of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961.  According to section 
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passed by the National Party government.157  The Natural Oil Act was one of the 
legislative measures repealed.  The regulation of petroleum was reincorporated under 
the legislation dealing with minerals, being the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967.  This 
Act also reserved the right to prospect for and to mine natural oil for the state, who 
could grant prospecting leases in respect of natural oil to persons.158  Under this new 
legislation, the ownership of unsevered minerals and petroleum remained vested in the 
surface owner, while rights to minerals and petroleum could be separated from the 
dominium of the land, as was done with natural oil.159  Prospecting and mining leases 
could be granted by the state to private entities in respect of natural oil.160 
The discriminatory trend of the colonial and Union eras continued during the Republic 
era.161  The Minerals Act 50 of 1991, which came into force in January 1992,162 was a 
product of the National Party government’s policy of privatisation163 and attempted to 
restore the common law rights of the holder.164  According to this Act, mineral rights 
vested in the state were repealed and the common law rights of the holder of the 
mineral right were restored.165  The state was treated as equal to any other holder of 
mineral rights.166  The Minerals Act did not deal specifically with petroleum.167   
Although the state no longer reserved mineral rights for itself, it still had some form of 
control over mineral rights.  The Minerals Act introduced a system of authorisations 
                                                          
157  The four most important acts are the Precious Stones Act 73 of 1964, the Mining Rights Act 20 of 
1967, the Mining Titles Registration Act 16 of 1967 and the Atomic Energy Act 90 of 1967.   
158  Section 2(1)(a) and section 14 of the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967.  
159  See Franklin and Kaplan (note 144) at 5 footnote 8 and 6; Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert 
H Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 5 ed (2006) Durban LexisNexis Butterworths 
693 – 694; section 2(1)(a) of the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967. 
160  Section 14 and section 25(1)(g) of the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967.   
161  See Mostert (note 80) at 51 – 53.  So, for example, a prospecting permit could not be granted to 
any coloured person except in respect of any state land in the province of the Cape of Good Hope 
or private owned by a coloured person.  A prospecting permit could also not be granted to any 
black person except in respect of private land of which the South African Development Trust or a 
black person was the owner or which was held in trust for a black person.  See sections 7(3)(b) 
and 7(3)(c) of the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967 
162  Proclamation 123 of Government Notice 13682 of 20 December 1991.  
163  See White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa (1987).   
164  Badenhorst PJ "The Revesting of State-held Entitlements to Exploit Minerals in South Africa: 
Privatisation or Deregulation?" 1991 TSAR 113 at 113. 
165  This was achieved by means of section 5(1) of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991.   
166  Badenhorst (note 164) at 124.  
167  In terms of section 44(1)(a) of this Act, prospecting leases in respect of natural oil granted under 









over mineral rights.  No person could prospect or mine for any mineral without the 
necessary authorisation granted to him in accordance with the act.168  With this system 
of authorization, the state neither held the mineral rights, nor the entitlements flowing 
from the mineral rights. 
Shortly after the promulgation of the Minerals Act of 1991, a debate about the future of 
the South African mining industry arose in light of the political changes facing South 
Africa.169  Nationalisation of the South African mineral law system was both foreseen 
and proposed early in the 1990’s.170  The first Mineral Development Draft Bill was 
published for public comment in 2000,171 followed by a substantially revised Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 was approved and came into 
operation on 1 May 2004.172 
In Namibia,173 the earliest indications of mining dates back to the fifteenth century.174  
Mineral rights belonged to the communities within whose territories the ore deposits 
                                                          
168  Section 5(2) of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991.  
169  Badenhorst PJ et al "Proposed Nationalisation of Mineral Rights in South Africa" 1994 (12) 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 287 at 287.   
170  Badenhorst PJ Die Juridiese Bevoegdheid om Minerale te Ontgin in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
(1992) University of Pretoria LLD 311 – 312; Badenhorst (note 169) 287.  The historical roots of 
this idea of nationalisation can be traced back to the ANC Freedom Charter of 1955.  This charter 
provided that “[t]he mineral wealth beneath the soil … shall be transferred to the ownership of the 
people as a whole.”  See The Freedom Charter (26 June 1955) available at 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=72 [accessed 11.04.2015].   
171  Government Notice 4577 of Government Gazette 21840 of 18 December 2000.  The 
constitutionality of this Bill was questioned by certain scholars, especially as regards the omission 
of provisions relating to compensation where existing rights are infringed.  See Badenhorst PJ and 
Malherbe R "The Constitutionality of the Mineral Development Draft Bill 2000 (part 1)" 2001 (3) 
TSAR 462 and Badenhorst PJ and Malherbe R "The Constitutionality of the Mineral Development 
Draft Bill 2000 (part 2) " 2001 (4) TSAR 765.      
172  Proclamation 25 of 2004, Government Gazette 26264 of 23 April 2004.  See Chapter 3 for a 
discussion of this act.   
173  Namibia was intitially known as Transgariep, or land beyond the Gariep.  Gariep was a Hottentot 
name for the Orange River.  Early explorers also called it Namaland, Damaraland and 
Ovamboland.  Swedish explorer Charles John Andersson was the first person to call it South West 
Africa, a mere descriptive name.  During German colonial rule, the area was known as German 
South West Africa.  After South Africa took control over German South West Africa under 
mandate of the United Nations in 1920, the area was officially known as South West Africa.  See 
Levinson O South West Africa (1976) Cape Town Tafelberg at 6.    
174  Evidence shows that already at that stage, copper has been mined, smelted and traded by the 
natives for at least a couple of hundred years.  Dierks K Chronology of Namibian History: From 









were found and exploitation of such minerals was regulated by the chief or ruler of the 
community.175  
Early mining rights were obtained from local inhabitants by German traders through 
negotiation.176  Near the end of the 1880’s, the first semi-precious stones were 
discovered at the Kleine Spitzkoppe.177  In early 1888, the Mining Ordinance of 25 
March 1888 was promulgated under the guidance of German mining law.178  This was 
the first attempt at central regulation of mining activities within South-West Africa179 
and vested all mining rights in the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft für Südwest-Afrika 
under the supervision of the German Empire.180  At the same time, gold deposits are 
discovered near Walvis Bay.181 
On 15 August 1889, a new mining ordinance was promulgated which vested all mining 
rights in the Imperial Mining Office.182  The same principle underlines all mining 
legislation enacted after this ordinance up until now,183 with the exception maybe of the 
third mining ordinance.184        
                                                          
175  Bomani MD and Duggal NK Namibia: Legal Framework and Development Strategy Options for 
the Mining Industry Namibia Studies Series (1987) United Nations Institue of Namibia 64.   
176  In 1883, a German trader arrived in Namibia as an agent for businessman F.A.E. Lüderitz.  After 
lengthy negotiations with the Nama chief Joseph Frederick of Bethanie, Lüderitz received the 
rights over the area surrounding Angra Pequena.  All mining rights over this area were included in 
the sale.  This settlement was later renamed Lüderitzbucht (now known as Lüderitz) and opened 
the area to German economic and political interests.  This also led to the establishment of German 
colonial rule in 1884, as more land was bought from and protective treaties signed with the local 
tribes.  See Cockram G-M South-West African Mandate (1976) at 9.  Cockram G-M South-West 
African Mandate (1976) South African Institute of International Affairs at 9; Dierks (note 174) at 
57; Hahlo HR "The Great South-West African Diamond Case: A Discourse" 1959 (76) SALJ 151 
at 152 – 153; Katjavivi PH A History of Resistence in Namibia (1988) Paris Unesco Press at 7.   
177  Dierks (note 174) at 68. 
178  Bomani (note 175) at 65. 
179  Bomani (note 175) at 65. 
180  Hahlo (note 176) at 155. 
181  Dierks (note 174) at 66. 
182  In terms of the Imperial Mining Ordinance of 15 August 1889, the Imperial Mining Office could 
grant prospecting and mining permits to members of the public.  Hahlo (note 176) at 155. 
183  Dierks (note 174) at 67. 
184  The Imperial Mining Ordinance for German South-West Africa of 8 August 1905.  It is based on 
the General Prussian Mining Act of 1865 (Bergbaugesetz) and established the principle of mining 
freedom.  Title to all minerals vested in the Imperial Government, but a general right to prospect 
for precious and base metals anywhere in South-West Africa was granted to all persons, except 
“natives and coloureds”.  See Dierks (note 174) at 123; Hahlo (note 176) at 155; Bomani (note 








German rule over South-West Africa continued until 1915 when South African forces, 
acting on the request of the British Government, invaded South-West Africa and took 
control of the capital, Windhoek and the country was run under martial law.185  Control 
of minerals and the mineral industry was entrusted to the South African Government.186  
In 1919 South-West Africa became a mandate of South Africa.187  Section 1(1) of 
Proclamation 21 of 1919 stated that the Roman Dutch law will apply in South-West 
Africa as well.188  The period of martial law ended on 1 January 1921 when the League 
of Nations Mandate took effect.189   
The regulatory system formulated by the Imperial Mining Decree of 1905 remained in 
force until 1954.190  The Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance 26 of 1954 
consolidated all mineral legislation in the territory and established a full Mines 
Division.191  This Ordinance included natural oil and natural gas under the definition of 
                                                          
185  Katjavivi (note 176) at 13.  Martial law over German South-West Africa was declared by the 
Proclamation of Martial Law 15 of 1915.  The legal measures taken during the period of martial 
law were ratified by Proclamation 1 of 1921.  German laws remained in force during the period of 
martial law, unless they were specifically repealed.  Although the former German administrative 
system was abolished, both the German Civil Code and the German Criminal Code remained in 
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Johannesburg J. Ball Publishers at 47; Naldi GJ Constitutional Rights in Namibia (1995) Kenwyn 
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186  Bomani (note 175) at 66. 
187  This was in accordance with section 22 of the League of Nations Covenant.  The Mandate was 
given effect to by the Treaty of Peace and South-West Africa Mandate Act 49 of 1919.  After 
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these administrative powers were further delegated to the Administrator of South-West Africa.  
See Naldi (note 185) at 2.    
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the Cape of Good Hope at the date of the coming into effect of this Proclamation shall, from and 
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in conflict therwith shall, to the extent of such conflict and subject to the provisions of this 
Section, be repealed.”  Through this Act, the South African Union Government was authorised to 
do such things as might be proper or expedient for giving effect to any mandate that might be 
issued with regard to South-West Africa and to issue any necessary proclamation and regulations.  
The Act further provided that the grant of minerals, amongst other thing, may not be dealt with 
without the specific authority of the Union Parliament.  See Emmett E "The Mandate over South-
West Africa" 1927 (9) Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 111 at 117 – 
118. 
189  Katjavivi (note 176) at 13. 
190  The Imperial Mining Ordinance was amended by Proclamation 24 of 1919, Proclamation 59 of 
1920, Proclamation 11 of 1923 and the Mining Rights (SWA) Act 26 of 1932.  The lastmentioned 
act validated all rights and titles held in terms of the Imperial Mining Decree.  See Bomani (note 
175) at 68. 








mineral.192  This Ordinance was replaced by the Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance 
20 of 1968, which interestingly included a separate definition of natural oil, but did not 
deal with natural oil in the text.193   
After Namibia gained independence in 1990, the legislature quickly enacted new 
mining legislation to replace the colonial legislation.194  The legislature also opted for 
treating petroleum resources in a different statute, namely the Petroleum (Exploration 
and Production) Act 2 of 1991.   
From the brief historical overview set out above, it is clear that legislative attention in 
South Africa and Namibia focussed mainly on minerals, with only brief references to 
petroleum.  The reason for this is because the prospects of viable quantities of 
petroleum in South Africa and Namibia has mostly been bleak.  The discriminatory 
practices in the legislation has, however, been applied (mostly theoretically) to 
petroleum as well; this clearly shows a lack of proper transparency, accountability and 
interest balancing in the way petroleum was historically regulated in these two 
countries.  The benefit that minerals (and possibly petroleum) could hold for citizens 
was not applied equally to all citizens.  In the light hereof, the current legislative 
environment deals expressly with petroleum, emphasising specifically ways in which 
past injustices are envisioned to be remedied – in South Africa more so than in 
Namibia.   
3. Practical Significance of Research 
Neither of the countries under examination have been major players in the global 
petroleum industry, but there are indications of potentially viable petroleum resources 
                                                          
192  Section 1 of the Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance 26 of 1954, sv “mineral”. 
193  The only other reference to natural oil is in section 1(2), which states that “[t]he right of 
prospecting and mining for and disposing of base minerals, excluding natural oil and source 
material, in any Native reserve is vested in the South African Bantu Trust.”  The Mines, Works 
and Minerals Ordinance 26 of 1954 also exhibited the same discriminatory practices than the 
South African legislation.  Under this Ordinance, a prospecting licence may only be granted to 
companies and natural persons of European descent, except that in the Rehoboth Gebiet, burgers 
of the Rehoboth Baster Community, and in native reserves, natives lawfully resident therein 
possessed the same rights and were subject to the same obligations than Europeans.  The Mines, 
Works and Minerals Ordinance 20 of 1968 contained a similar provision.  Section 22(1) of the 
Mines, Works and Minerals Ordinance 26 of 1954 and section 21(1) of the Mines, Works and 
Minerals Ordinance 20 of 1968. 
194  Ministry of Mines and Energy "2001" White Paper on Mining and Minerals MME Newsletter 1 at 








in Namibia and South Africa.195 Since both South Africa and Namibia’s petroleum laws 
are (still) underdeveloped, as the need for sophisticated frameworks had not arisen in 
the past, there have not been proper judicial or practical opportunities to test the 
legislative frameworks for petroleum resources yet.  For example, the recent 
controversy caused by Shell’s proposed use of hydraulic fracturing in the Karoo 
illustrates the dilemma faced by the South African state in the regulation of petroleum 
resources.  On the one hand, petroleum companies are interested in exploiting the 
potential shale gas reservoirs of South Africa.196  On the other hand, the local residents 
vehemently object to the use of hydraulic fracturing, arguing that it will inter alia 
damage the environment and waste precious water resources.197  The entire debacle is 
characterised by misinformation, and reliance on fear tactics, or deflection of important 
questions. This situation illustrates the difficulties faced in the regulation of petroleum 
resources: balancing the rights and interest of the petroleum company with the rights 
and interest of the nation.         
If viable quantities of petroleum resources exist in South Africa and Namibia, these two 
countries need to attract investors to exploit these resources. As petroleum exploitation 
is at such an early stage in the countries under scrutiny, it is an opportune time to 
evaluate the current framework for petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia 
and to evaluate how it balances the rights of petroleum companies with the rights of the 
respective nations.       
4. Inquiry Outline 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine and define the regulatory framework for the 
exploitation of petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia and to evaluate 
                                                          
195  Clarke (note 10) at 340 and 347.   
196  Early in 2011, Royal Dutch Shell (“Shell”) applied for exploration rights in the Karoo to explore 
for shale gas (PASA Reference No. 12/3/219; PASA Reference No. 12/3/220; PASA Reference 
No. 12/3/221).  The applications cover three areas, Western Karoo, Central Karoo and Eastern 
Karoo. 
197  Cropley E “Karoo Fracking: Water, Wealth and White” 28 October 2013 Mail and Guardian 
available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-28-karoo-fracking-water-wealth-and-whites [accessed 
02.02.2014]; SAPA “Fracking Threatens Karoo Water Reserves: Conservationists” 06 September 
2013 Times Live available at http://www.timeslive.co.za/scitech/2013/09/06/fracking-threatens-
karoo-water-reserves-conservationists [accessed 02.02.2014]; Karoo Space “Threat of Fracking 
Unites Karoo Communities” available at http://karoospace.co.za/threat-of-fracking-unites-karoo-








whether it can balance the interests of petroleum companies with the interests of the 
people of South Africa and Namibia.  As stated above, this thesis looks at the broader 
legal framework for the upstream petroleum industry in Namibia and South Africa and 
how the three themes of transparency, accountability and balance of interest are 
addressed in the regulatory framework for petroleum resources in South Africa and 
Namibia.   
To facilitate a discussion on the regulatory framework for petroleum in South Africa 
and Namibia, this thesis is divided into three parts.  The first part provides a general 
overview of selected components of the upstream petroleum industry.  This part begins 
by providing some technical detail regarding petroleum and petroleum exploitation.  An 
overview of the basic principles of petroleum exploitation is essential to evaluate the 
framework for petroleum exploitation.  Petroleum law in South Africa and Namibia is a 
relatively unexplored area.  As certain aspects of petroleum regulation are technical, 
attempts at discussing the purely legal aspects thereof will be sterile unless 
accompanied by some background information.  Accordingly, this thesis begins with a 
short discussion of the basic aspects of petroleum and petroleum exploitation.  The first 
part of the thesis also deals with the basic principles of ownership of, control over and 
access to petroleum resources, as developed internationally.       
In the second part, the law and practice of the upstream petroleum industry in South 
Africa and Namibia is discussed with specific reference to the influence of the 
constitution and the role of the state in the regulation of petroleum resources in South 
Africa and Namibia.  Here, the ownership of and control over petroleum resources is 
discussed and an attempt made at defining the role of the state in respect of petroleum 
exploitation.  This third part of the thesis then moves on to a discussion of the 
regulation of petroleum in South Africa and Namibia.  First, the primary legislation 
dealing with petroleum is discussed.  The topics covered here are the meaning of 
petroleum and the nature and content of rights to petroleum are discussed.  It is 
important for transparency and accountability to have a clear and unambiguous system 
in place for ownership of and control over petroleum resources.  A thorough 
understanding of the nature and content of access to petroleum is, however, also 
important to determine whether a balance between the interests of the petroleum 








framework for petroleum resources is further amplified by three chapters dealing with 
the secondary regulation of petroleum, namely environmental aspects, fiscal aspects 
and socio-economic empowerment.   
The second part of the thesis is conluded with a discussion focusing on the extent and 
limitations on the states’ control over petroleum resources.  The control that the South 
African and Namibian states exercise over petroleum resources is curtailed by the 
constitutional right of every person to just administrative action, the right to 
information and the criminalisation of bribery and corruption.  The discussion here is 
important in view of the problems of lacking transparency and insufficient 
accountability that feature so strongly in the international petroleum community.  By 
entrenching a constitutional right to just administrative action, providing for a right to 
information and criminalising bribery and corruption, the South African and Namibian 
petroleum industries already show more transparency and accountability than some of 
its international counterparts.   
The conclusion contains an evaluation of the regulatory framework for petroleum 
resources in South Africa and Namibia.  It looks specifically at whether a balance is 
struck between the interests of petroleum companies and the interests of the people of 
South Africa and Namibia.  Recommendations are made as to how the regulatory 
framework for petroleum exploitation of each country may be changed or amended to 
ensure a greater benefit for the host countries without running the risk of losing 






PART A:   
CONTEXT:  SELECTED COMPONENTS OF 
THE UPSTREAM PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
 
The first part of this thesis deals with the basic aspects of petroleum extraction and the 
upstream petroleum industry.  Rather than providing a detailed exposition of the 
geology and occurrence of petroleum and all aspects of the upstream petroleum 
industry, the following chapters comprise a discussion of issues selected because of 
their fit to the central question about improvement of the regulatory and legislative 
framework.  The aspects discussed are: the division of the petroleum industry; 
petroleum geology and occurrence; the petroleum exploitation process; general 
principles of ownership of petroleum resources; and the allocation of rights to 








Chapter Two:   
BASIC OVERVIEW OF PETROLEUM AND 




Petroleum legislation often employ technical industry terms without properly defining 
them.1  To appreciate the framework and substance of the legislation and to evaluate it 
properly, some basic understanding of the technical aspects of petroleum and the 
petroleum exploitation process is needed.  This chapter provides a very basic discussion 
of the technical aspects of petroleum exploitation.  This will give further content to the 
statutory framework for petroleum exploitation and will assist in the evaluation thereof.  
This chapter also reviews the basic principles to be understood in examining  petroleum 
exploitation.  It considers the divisions in the petroleum industry briefly and an 
provides a short overview of the geology and occurrence of petroleum.  It then proceeds 
to a discussion of the petroleum exploitation process, including the exploration and 
production processes. Namibian and South African examples illustrate how these basic 
principles apply in the two jurisdictions being examined, paving the way for more 
detailed discussion subsequently.   
                                                          
1  For example, in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, a 
production right is required for production operations.  The Act defines “production operation” as 
“any operation, activity or matter that relates to the exploration, appraisal, development and 
production of petroleum”.  Similarly, in terms of the Namibian Petroleum (Exploration and 
Production) Act 2 of 1991, a production licence is required when a company intends to conduct 
production operations, which this Act defines as “any operations carried out for or in connection 
with the production of petroleum”.  Clearly, a layperson cannot, from this, know with certainty 
when a production right is required.  Some knowledge of production operations beyond the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 is required.   
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2. The Division of the Petroleum Industry 
The petroleum industry is typically divided into three streams: upstream, midstream 
and downstream.2  The upstream petroleum industry deals with the exploration for and 
production of petroleum resources.3  More specifically, it involves the searching for and 
extraction of petroleum,4 which includes the drilling of exploratory wells and the 
subsequent operating of the well to bring the petroleum to the surface.5      
Once petroleum is recovered and brought to the surface, it is transported by ship tanker, 
pipeline, railcar tanker or truck tanker to a refinery.6  This is referred to as the 
midstream petroleum industry.7  This stream also deals with the marketing and 
transport of recovered petroleum resources.8  Petroleum in its crude form, however, is 
not of much use.  Crude oil and natural gas must still be refined and the products 
derived from such refining sold as petroleum products.  The downstream petroleum 
industry involves the refining and manufacturing of petroleum into a marketable 
product,9 such as petrol, diesel fuel, jet fuel, propane and asphalt.10   
The upstream, midstream and downstream sectors of the petroleum industry are 
generally regulated separately.11 Most petroleum companies operate only in one of the 
three streams.12  A company that operates in all three streams is referred to as a 
                                                          
2  Downey M Oil 101 (2009) La Vergne Wooden Table Press LLC at 62.   
3  Badenhorst PJ and Mostert H Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1 ed (2004, Revision 
Service 10 2014) Wetton Juta at 34-1; Dale M, Bekker L, Bashall F, Chaskalson M, Dixon C, 
Grobler G, Loxton C, Ash M and Cox A South African Mineral and Petroleum Law 1 ed (2005, 
Service Issue 16 2014) Durban LexisNexis Butterworths at 481; Downey (note 2) at 62.    
4  See Downey (note 2) at 62.   
5  Trencome “Petroleum Industry” available at http://www.trencome.com/petroleumindustry.htm  
[accessed 03.02.2014]. 
6  See Downey (note 2) at 74. 
7  Downey (note 2) at 62; Alramahi M Oil and Gas Law in the UK (2013) West Sussex Bloomsbury 
Professional Limited at §1.10. 
8  Trencome (note 5). 
9  See Downey (note 2) at 74. 
10  Trencome (note 5). 
11  So, for example, the downstream petroleum industries in South Africa and Namibia are dealt with 
by the Petroleum Products Act 120 of 1977 and the Petroleum Products and Energy Act 13 of 
1990 respectively.  In South Africa, the midstream petroleum industry is partly regulated by the 
Petroleum Pipelines Act 60 of 2003.  See also Alramahi (note 7) at §1.10. 
12  See Downey (note 2) at 62. 
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vertically integrated company.13  Figure 4 below is a representation of the different 
streams of the petroleum industry. 
 
 
Figure 4: Division of the Petroleum Industry 
The focus of this thesis is only on the regulation of the upstream petroleum industry, 
that is the regulation of the exploration and production of petroleum.  Within this 
industry stream, South Africa is at a much more advanced stage than Namibia.  In 
Namibia, most petroleum exploration takes place offshore. No commercial oil 
discoveries have so far been made.  There is one declared gas field (the Kudu Gas 
Field), in the south-western offshore part of Namibia. A production licence has been 
issued in respect of this area.14  Many exploration licences (all mainly for offshore 
exploration) have been issued, and exploration activities are on the increase; so far 
fifteen exploratory wells have been drilled.15  Figure 2 in the preliminary pages shows 
the current exploration and production licences in Namibia. 
                                                          
13  See Downey (note 2) at 62. 
14  See Ministry of Mines and Energy Petroleum Exploration and Production 
http://www.mme.gov.na/energy/upstream.htm [accessed 19.10.2014].   
15  Ministry of Mines and Energy Petroleum Exploration and Production 
http://www.mme.gov.na/energy/upstream.htm [accessed 19.10.2014]. 
Upstream 
•Exploration 
•Drilling and Testing of Wells  
•Production 
Midstream 











In South Africa, on the other hand, over three hundred exploratory wells have been 
drilled offshore; gas and condensate were discovered as far back as 1969;16 some small 
oil and gas fields identified and some commercial production took place.17 There are 
two undeveloped gas fields and a further six gas discoveries in the Pletmos Basin and 
one oil and several gas discoveries have been made in the South African part of the 
Orange Basin.18  Figure 1 in the preliminrary pages shows the current exploration and 
production activities in South Africa. 
3. Petroleum Geology and Occurrence 
Before the more technical provisions of the upstream petroleum industry is discussed, it 
is necessary briefly to discuss petroleum geology and occurrence.  This is also 
necessary for a discussion of the regulatory aspects of petroleum.  Legislatures 
generally accept that a substance qualifies as petroleum if two requirements are met: 
firstly, it must be a hydrocarbon, whether solid, liquid or gaseous; secondly, it must 
occur naturally.19  This is certainly the baseline accepted in South Africa and 
Namibia.20  Accordingly, classification of petroleum sources as conventional or 
unconventional may have implications for the manner in which legal frameworks can 
regulate their extraction. Similarly, occurrence patterns influence the applicability of 
legislation. This section contains a brief explanation of petroleum geology and 
occurrence. 
3.1 Geology 
As primary sources of energy, hydrocarbons are used as combustible fuel sources. They 
are organic compounds of hydrogen and carbon that may exist in a solid, liquid or 
gaseous states, depending on molecular composition, pressure and prevailing reservoir 
temperature.21  Natural or crude oil is a liquid hydrocarbon; natural gas a gaseous 
                                                          
16  Petroleum Agency SA History of Exploration and Production 
http://www.petroleumagencysa.com/index.php/petroleum-geology-resources/exploration-history 
[accessed 19.10.2014]. 
17  E.g. from the Bredasdorp Basin. Petroleum Agency SA (note 16). 
18  Petroleum Agency SA (note 16). 
19  See the discussion of the statutory meaning of petroleum in Chapter Five below. 
20  See Chapter Five below. 
21  Taverne B Petroleum, Industry and Governments: A Study of the Involvement of Industry and 
Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum 2 ed (2008) at 1; Lowe JS Oil and Gas Law 
in a Nutshell 5 ed (2009) at 1.     
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hydrocarbon.22     Crude oil found in natural gas reservoirs are known as condensates.  
Reservoirs sometimes produce liquid natural gas (“LNG”), i.e. lighter liquid 
hydrocarbons, such as propane and butane.23     
In a strict sense, the term “petroleum” refers only to naturally occurring liquid 
hydrocarbon, i.e. natural oil.24  In a wider sense, the term “petroleum” includes all 
naturally occurring solid hydrocarbons (tar, asphalt), liquid hydrocarbons (natural oil or 
crude oil) or gaseous hydrocarbons (natural gas).25  “Unconventional petroleum” 
(misguidingly) does not refer to petroleum not occurring in its natural state, but rather is 
an indication of where the petroleum is found (i.e. in unconventional sources) and how 
it is produced (i.e. though unconventional methods: methods other than drilling). 
“Unconventional” petroleum resources include, for example, bitumen, which is not 
drilled, but mined from sand, sandstone or other sedimentary rocks.26  It also includes 
shale gas, which is recovered through the method of hydraulic fracturing.   
                                                          
22  Lowe (note 21) at 1.  Natural gas can be generated in association with some type of oil (in which 
case it is classified as ‘associated’ natural gas) or in association with coal (in which case it is 
classified as ‘non-associated’ natural gas).  The adjective “natural” distinguishes hydrocarbons 
that exist in natural conditions from “manufactured” hydrocarbons22 or “unconventional” 
hydrocarbons.  See also Taverne (note 21) at 1.   
23  Roberts J "A Primer on Oil" in Tsalik S and Schiffrin A (eds) Covering Oil: A Reporter's Guide to 
Energy and Development (2005) New York Open Society Institute at 32. 
24  Petroleum comes from the Greek petro, which means rock, and oleum, which means oil. Hyne NJ 
Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production 2 ed (2001) at 
1.  Narrow definitions are found in MacDonald JG, Burton CJ, Winstanley I and Lapidus D 
Collins Dictionary of Geology Revised 1 ed (2003) London HarperCollins Publishers at 337 
which describes petroleum as “a naturally occurring complex liquid hydrocarbon that, after 
distillation and the removal of impurities such as nitrogen, oxygen and sulphur, yields a variety of 
combustible fuels”.  The Glossary of Geology published by the American Geological Institute 
defines petroleum as “a naturally occurring complex liquid hydrocarbon, which after distillation 
and removal of impurities yields a range of combustible fuels, petrochemicals, and lubricants”.  
See Neuendorf KKE, Mehl JP and Jackson JA (eds) Glossary of Geology 5 ed (2005) Alexandria 
American Geological Institute at 485.  Allaby M (ed) Oxford Dictionary of Earth Sciences 3 ed 
(2008) Oxford Oxford University Press at 431 defines petroleum as “naturally occurring liquid 
hydrocarbons formed by the anaerobic decay of organic matter”. 
25  Neuendorf et al (note 24) at 485; MacDonald et al (note 24) at 337.  See also Jones C (ed) 
Illustrated Dictionary of Geology (2010) New Delhi Lotus Press at 143, where petroleum is 
defined as “any of a group of naturally occurring substances made up of hydrocarbons.  These 
substances may be gaseous, liquid, or semi-solid.”  See also Taverne B An Introduction to the 
Regulation of the Petroleum Industry: Laws, Contracts and Conventions International Energy and 
Resources Law and Policy Series (1994) London Graham & Trotman Limited at 1 and Omorogbe 
Y Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (2003) Lagos Malthouse Press Limited at 1.    
26  Roberts (note 23) at 33. 
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The legislative frameworks for upstream petroleum resources scrutinised in this thesis 
only applies to petroleum resources occurring naturally.27 A proper understanding of 
the natural occurrence of petroleum is important in dealing with the applicability of 
legislation to the upstream petroleum industry.   
Petroleum resources found in unconventional sources or requiring unconventional 
methods of production should be considered as petroleum occurring naturally for 
purposes of the legislative framework regulating upstream petroleum resources. If shale 
gas, for instance, were to be understood not to fall within the purview of the definition 
of a petroleum resource in South Africa, it would have implications for the manner in 
which this gas may be extracted. The unconventional method for capturing shale gas 
has already induced one South African commentator to opine that shale gas cannot be 
regarded as a petroleum resource, as it purportedly is “created” through hydraulic 
fracturing, rather than occuring naturally.28  This view is misguided. Shale gas is a 
petroleum resource in the narrow sense: a gas that occurs in natural conditions.29 It is 
not created by hydraulic fracturing. It therefore still qualifies as petroleum for purposes 
of the MPRD Act. However, it requires unconventional means of production, which are 
not fully subsumed by the South African legislative framework (yet). At present, 
regulations governing the hydrofracturing process are debated by the responsible 
parliamentary committee in the South African legislature. 
Petroleum is found in the sedimentary rock in the uppermost crust of the earth.30  
Sedimentary rock is composed of ancient sediments such as sand, shells and mud and is 
the source and reservoir rock for petroleum.31  Reservoir rock is a term used to describe 
sedimentary rock with billions of pores (a permeable rock)32 where petroleum 
                                                          
27  Whether the regulatory frameworks in South Africa and Namibia include manufactured and 
unconventional hydrocarbons, is an issue explored briefly in Chapter Five below.  
28  Bekker F Review of the Draft EMP in Support of an Application for Gas Exploration in the 
Western Karoo (Central Precinct) by Shell Exploration Company (2011) Report Prepared in 
Response to the Publication for Public Comment of Shell's EMP, Stilbaai Clean Stream 
Environmental Services at 37. 
29  See a full discussion in Chapter Five.   
30  Lowe (note 21) at 2; Hyne (note 24) at xxxiii. 
31  Lowe (note 21) at 2; Hyne (note 24) at xxxiii–xxxiv.    
32  Lowe (note 21) at 2; Hyne (note 24) at xxxiv.  See also Jones (note 25) at 157. 
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eventually accumulates.33 Petroleum is fugacious and flows (“migrates”) through the 
sedimentary rock along the path of least resistance, which is the reservoir rock layer.34  
For a reservoir rock to be a good source for petroleum, it must be porous and 
permeable.35  High porosity means that the amount of pore space is relatively large, 
which means that the rock contains a relatively large area where petroleum may 
accumulate.36  The permeability of a rock on the other hand is its characteristic to allow 
petroleum to float upwards through the original sea water in the pores, which is heavier 
than the petroleum, to collect at a trap and eventually to float towards a borehole.37  
This movement of the petroleum through the reservoir rock and up the rock angle 
towards the surface is called migration.38  Figure 5 below illustrates a typical 
conventional petroleum trap.   
 
Figure 5: Anticline Petroleum Trap39 
 
If no measure is in place to stop the migration of petroleum, the petroleum will 
eventually seep onto the surface and escape, where it either evaporates or accumulates 
                                                          
33  Smith E "World Energy Resources" in Materials on International Petroleum Transactions 2 ed 
(2000) Denver Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation at 8. 
34  Hyne (note 24) at xxxv. 
35  Lowe (note 21) at 2.  See also Hyne (note 24) at 519 and Downey (note 2) at 94.   
36  Lowe (note 21) at 2. 
37  Lowe (note 21) at 2. 
38  Hyne (note 24) at xxxv; Jahn F, Cook M and Graham M Hydrocarbon Exploration and 
Production 2 ed (2008) Amsterdam Elsevier BV at 19. 










as tar sands or asphalt lakes.40  However, over millions of years sedimentary rocks 
folded and faulted and formed traps, which contain salt water.41  A trap is an elevated 
area on the petroleum reservoir rock42 (such as a dome or reef) that is covered by 
caprock, a form of impermeable rock such as shale or salt.43  As petroleum moves along 
the reservoir rock up the angle of the rock towards the surface, it may encounter a trap 
and accumulate in the trap.44  These traps are called anomalies and are limited in size 
and may occur at depths of between several hundred feet to a few thousand feet.45  As 
the petroleum migrates into the trap, the fluids and gas are separated according to their 
density, with the gas on top forming the free gas cap, the oil in the middle forming the 
oil reservoir and the salt water on the bottom.46  This is illustrated in Figure 3 above.        
Petroleum exploration activities, discussed below, are aimed at locating these traps.  
Once a trap has been located, it is tested and, if it is believed that commercial quantities 
of petroleum exist, production operations commence; subject, of course, to compliance 
with the relevant legal rules. 
The need for a clear description of the meaning of “natural occurrence” as a definitional 
requirement is illustrated by the South African case of De Beers Consolidated Mines 
Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd and Others.47  One of the issues that the High Court had 
to consider was whether diamonds in tailing dumps created before commencement of 
                                                          
40  Taverne (note 25) at 1; Jahn, Cook and Graham (note 38) at 23.   
41  Hyne (note 24) at xxxv; Lowe (note 21) at 2. 
42  These traps are classified as either structural traps or stratigraphic traps. Structural traps are 
anticlinal traps, fault traps or salt dome (also salt-related) traps resulting from the deformation 
(folding and faulting) in the structure of the subsurface, which results in petroleum migrating to a 
certain point where it cannot go any further (the petroleum trap). Stratigraphic traps (such as 
carbonate reef traps and “updip pinchouts” of sandstone) accrue oil as a result of variations of the 
rock character, rather than faulting or folding of the subsurface. Apart from these so-called 
“primary stratigraphic traps”, angular unconformities (secondary stratigraphic traps) and may 
form giant petroleum traps. Further information is available in Hyne (note 24) at 168, 181; Smith 
(note 33) at 10 – 13; Allaby (note 24) at 556.  Crain ER “Structural Traps” available at 
http://www.spec2000.net/20-struct4.htm [accessed 02.02.2014]. See also Oil on My Shoes “”Oil 
and Gas Traps” available at http://www.geomore.com/oil-and-gas-traps/ [accessed 02.02.2014]; 
The Paleontological Research Institute “Structural Traps” available at 
http://www.priweb.org/ed/pgws/systems/traps/structural/structural.html [accessed 02.02.2014] at 
11.  
43  Hyne (note 24) at xxxvi and 540.  See also Lowe J Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell 5 ed (2009) St 
Paul West Publishing Co at 3 and Downey (note 2) at 95.     
44  Hyne (note 24) at xxxv and 540.  
45  Lowe (note 21) at 2. 
46  Hyne (note 24) at xxxv–xxxvi.   
47  De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd and Others [unreported judgment of 
the Orange Free State Provincial Division, delivered on 13 December 2007, Case No 3215/06].   
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the MPRD Act were minerals for purposes of the MPRD Act.  The respondents’ 
contention was that the diamond were still within the kimberlite found on the tailing 
dumps and therefore still occurred naturally and vested under the custodianship of the 
state.48  The applicants contended, however, that the ore containing the diamonds were 
severed from the land and a new thing (movable res) was created.49  Ownership of the 
ore, according to the applicants, passed when the ore was severed from the land.50  The 
court examined the definition of minerals in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002 and the nature and regulation of tailings51 and concluded 
that the diamonds, even though they are still in the kimberlite ore, no longer occurs 
naturally.  Furthermore, the Court held that these tailing dumps were also not residue 
stockpiles, as they were produced before commencement of the Act.52  As a result of 
the artificial nature of tailings, and given that the tailings were produced before 
commencement of the MPRD Act, they could not be considered to be “minerals” for 
purposes of the MPRD Act.  Accordingly, the court found, this Act did not apply to 
diamonds in tailing dumps.53 A legislative amendment was needed to correct the 
situation.  The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Amendment Bill of 2012 substituted 
the definition of “residue stockpiles” by including in this definition historic mines and 
dumps created before the commencement of the MPRD Act.54  “Mining area” was 
amended to include residue deposits and residue stockpiles55 and “mining operations” 
was amended to include operations on residue stockpiles.56  The intention of these 
amendments was to include minerals occurring in tailing dumps produced before the 
enactment of the MPRD Act under the definition of minerals.57 
Petroleum resources are different from minerals such as diamonds. They present in 
either fluid or gaseous from and exist in large quantities. Despite these differences, a 
similar argument could be constructed in the context of petroleum as well, by a party 
                                                          
48  De Beers / Ataqua Mining (note 47) at [52].   
49  De Beers / Ataqua Mining (note 47) at [53].   
50  De Beers / Ataqua Mining (note 47) at [53]. 
51  De Beers / Ataqua Mining (note 47) at [54] to [66]. 
52  De Beers / Ataqua Mining (note 47) at [68]. 
53  De Beers / Ataqua Mining (note 47) at [68]. 
54  Section 1(q) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Amendment Bill of 2012. 
55  Section 1(l) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Amendment Bill of 2012. 
56  Section 1(m) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Amendment Bill of 2012. 
57  Badenhorst and Mostert (note 3) at 13-14. 
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wishing to exclude certain types of resources from the purview of regulatory 
legislation. The argument could be that where the petroleum resources was subject to 
human interference, it may no longer fall under the definition of petroleum, as it no 
longer occurs naturally.  
The De Beers-case illustrates that a proper understanding of the natural occurrence of 
minerals (and petroleum for that matter) is necessary to determine the applicability of 
legislation governing these resources.  A knowledge of the technical aspects of 
petroleum and petroleum occurrence will assist in interpreting and applying the relevant 
legislation. 
4. The Petroleum Exploitation Process 
The petroleum exploitation process comprises exploration activities, drilling and testing 
of wells and production. It is followed by decommissioning. This section provides a 
brief overview, which will assist understanding of the type of activities for which legal 
regulation is needed. One may ask, for instance, what kind of licence is to be granted 
where a company wishes to employ hydraulic fracturing techniques during its 
operations.58  Closer scrutiny will reveal that it is rather difficult to bring such activity 
within the purview of a production licence, as the exploitation occurs already if 
exploration is successful.59  
4.1 Petroleum Exploration and Drilling 
In the early days of petroleum exploitation, drillers did not have the knowledge of 
subsurface petroleum deposits or the methods of exploration that exist today.60  
However, as a result of leaky traps that caused petroleum to seep onto the surface of the 
                                                          
58  Early in 2011, Royal Dutch Shell applied for exploration rights in the Karoo to explore for shale 
gas.  The application by Shell elicited controversy, especially with regard to the possible use of 
hydraulic fracturing and the impact thereof on the environment and on water resources.  See See 
for example Cropley E “Karoo Fracking: Water, Wealth and White” 28 October 2013 Mail and 
Guardian available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-28-karoo-fracking-water-wealth-and-whites 
[accessed 02.02.2014]; Prinsloo L “Fracking in the Karoo Takes a Big Step Forward” 20 October 
2013 Business Day Live available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/businesstimes/2013/10/20/fracking-
in-the-karoo-takes-a-big-step-forward [accessed 02.02.2014]; SAPA “Shell Karoo Fracking: An 
Eco Example” 19 July 2011 News24 available at http://www.news24.com/SciTech/News/Shell-
Karoo-fracking-an-eco-example-20110719 [accessed 02.02.2014]. 
59  See Chapter Six below.   
60  Hyne (note 24) at xxxvi.   
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land, they had some success in locating and drilling anomalies.61  Now, in the 
exploration phase, the holder of a right to explore for petroleum may attempt to locate 
anomalies by geological, geochemical or geophysical methods.   
Geological exploration include mapping,62 geological surveys63 and remote imaging 
methods.64   Geochemical exploration techniques involve taking water and soil samples 
from an exploration area and analysing them in laboratories,65 to test an existing 
exploration area.  These methods are premised thereon that hydrocarbons migrate 
upwards from subsurface petroleum deposits to the earth’s surface.66   Geophysical 
methods of exploration respond to variations in the physical properties of the earth’s 
subsurface67 and involve gravity exploration,68 magnetic exploration69 and seismic 
studies. 70   
                                                          
61  Hyne (note 24) at xxxvi; Horvitz L "Geochemical Exploration for Petroleum" 1985 (229) Science 
821 at 821.   
62  Mapping involves geologists recording on maps how sedimentary rock layers crop out on the 
surface of the ground, projecting these outcrops into the subsurface and attempting to locate the 
traps. Hyne (note 24) at xxxvi. 
63  Geological surveying entails that geologists collecting and analysing samples of rock to find areas 
where there might be sedimentary rocks. This method, however, is no longer in regular use, as 
most petroleum fields that can be found by picking up and testing rocks have been located. Most 
countries also have a Geological Survey that publishes reports and maps detailing the petroleum 
geology of the area. Geologists use mainly two types of maps, namely topographic maps, which 
show the elevations of the earth’s surface, and geological maps, which show where each rock 
layer crops out at the earth’s surface. Geologists may also use subsurface mapping, the three most 
important types of which are structural, isopach and percentage maps. These three kinds of maps 
use contours to depict the subsurface rock. Structural maps show the elevation of the top of a 
subsurface sedimentary rock layer, isopach maps show the thickness of a subsurface sedimentary 
rock layer and percentage maps plot the percentage of a specific rock type. Hyne (note 24) at 121–
128, 206. Downey (note 2) at 98-99. 
64  Remote imaging analysis involves the analysis of images taken from aircrafts and satellites, such 
as those taken by the six United States Landsrat satellites, the French SPOT satellites or the 
Canadian RADARSAT satellite. The advent of airplanes and aerial photography has made surface 
mapping more efficient. What explorers are looking for in the images are signs of traps. Hyne 
(note 24) at 199–120; Downey (note 2) at 98–99.   
65  Hyne (note 24) at 206.   
66  One method of geochemical exploration involves drilling shallow holes (between one and two 
metres), sealing the hole and then after one or two days taking samples of the soil air accumulated 
in the holes and testing the air. Soil air from a hole over a gas field will have higher 
concentrations of methane than soil air from holes beyond the border of the gas field. A second 
method, and one that can be conducted over all areas (including offshore areas), involves analysis 
of soil rather than soil air. Horvitz (note 61) at 821. 
67  Jahn, Cook and Graham (note 38) at 25. 
68  Gravimetric surveys, or gravity exploration techniques, test for minute variations in the earth’s 
gravitational field, which is caused by changes in density of subsurface rock. This may indicate 
the type of rock and any fluids underneath the surface. Downey (note 2) at 99; Hyne (note 24) at 
209–210; Jahn, Cook and Graham (note 38) at 26.     
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Drilling operations for purposes of testing in Namibia and South Africa fall under the 
definition of exploration operations.71  Drilling and testing of wells therefore fall under 
the explration right or licence issued in South Africa and Namibia respectively.   
The only way to test an anomaly is to drill a well, either with a rotary rig or a cable-tool 
rig.72  An exploratory (“wildcat”) well may be drilled to test a trap that has never 
produced; to test a reservoir in a known field that has never produced; or to extend the 
known limits of a producing reservoir. 73 
Once a discovery is made, wells must be drilled to ascertain the size of the field.74  
These wells are important to establish whether the discovery straddles national 
boundaries or the boundaries of the area over which a right to petroleum has been 
granted.75  It is also important to decide whether it will be feasible to proceed with 
production.76  Appraisal (or definition) wells and delineation wells are drilled around a 
producing well to determine the size of the well,77 while step-out wells are drilled 
outside the proven limits of a petroleum field to determine whether production can be 
expanded beyond a producing area.78                
Developmental wells drilled in the known extent of the petroleum field are used to 
begin production after a reservoir has been discovered and defined.79  Infill wells may 
                                                                                                                                                                         
69  Magnetic field surveys look at variations in the earth’s magnetic field caused by variations in the 
magnetic properties of rocks. Magnetic rock, such as igneous and metamorphic rock, does not 
contain petroleum.  Most petroleum can be found in non-magnetic rock. Therefore, magnetic 
exploration is used to explore for petroleum by determining whether rock is magnetic, in which 
case it will not contain petroleum. Jahn, Cook and Graham (note 38) at 26; Downey (note 2) at 99; 
Hyne (note 24) at 210–211. 
70  Seismic testing involves creating sound waves and bouncing them against subsurface material.  
The time it takes for the sounds to be picked up again is then measured. This creates an image of 
the shape of the subsurface sedimentary rock and locates petroleum anomalies. The greatest 
advancements in exploration in the last number of decades have been in respect of new seismic 
acquisition techniques and computer processing of digital seismic data. Downey (note 2) at 99; 
Hyne (note 24) at 213; Jahn, Cook and Graham (note 38) at 27. 
71  Section 1 of the MPRD Act, sv “exploration operation” and section 1 of the Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1991, sv “exploration operations”.   
72  Lowe (note 21) at 3. 
73  Hyne (note 24) at 241; Downey (note 2) at 101.  Where a wildcat well is drilled at least 3 km 
away from any known production, it is called a rank wildcat well. 
74  Hyne (note 24) at 241; Downey (note 2) at 101.   
75  See for example Hyne (note 24) at 241  
76  Hyne (note 24) at 241  
77  Downey (note 2) at 101; Hyne (note 24) at 241. 
78  Downey (note 2) at 101; Hyne (note 24) at 241. 
79  Hyne (note 24) at 241; Downey (note 2) at 101. 
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then be drilled between producing wells in an established petroleum field to increase 
the production rate.80 
A well must be properly tested to ascertain whether it will produce enough petroleum to 
make completion of the well worthwhile.81  After drilling and testing of a well, two 
options are available: if it is not feasible to continue, the well is plugged and abandoned 
as a dry hole or, if it is feasible to continue, the well is completed.82 
4.2 Petroleum Production 
Petroleum production is a capital-intensive exercise.  A petroleum company will only 
continue to the production phase if it is certain that production of petroleum from the 
located reservoir will be commercially viable.  Petroleum located in traps are produced 
using conventional production methods, or drilling.  Petroleum located in 
unconventional sources, such as shale rock, may be produced using unconventional 
methods, such as hydraulic fracturing.          
4.3.1 Conventional Production  
If a petroleum company decides to continue with production, the well must be cased.83  
This entails inserting a steel pipe, called a casing string and smaller in diameter than the 
well hole, into the well and pouring cement into the well hole outside the casing string. 
This process is referred to as casing or setting pipe.84  Casing ensures that the well is 
stabilised and that the sides do not cave in. It also ensures that surrounding fresh water 
resources are not contaminated and that the production itself is not diluted.85        
A perforating gun containing explosives is then lowered into the well and detonated to 
perforate the casing, cement and reservoir rock. The perforation allows the petroleum in 
the reservoir rock to drain into the well. Another pipe called tubing, smaller in diameter 
than the casing, is then inserted into the well.  If the permeability of the reservoir rock 
does not allow the petroleum to flow into the well, the well must be stimulated either by 
                                                          
80  Hyne (note 24) at 241. 
81  Hyne (note 24) at 297. 
82  Hyne (note 24) at 333. 
83  Lowe (note 21) at 5.   
84  Lowe (note 21) at 5–6; Hyne (note 24) at 333. 
85  Hyne (note 24) at 333. 
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hydraulic fracturing or by injecting acid to dissolve away some of the rock. If the 
natural pressure in the rock is high, the petroleum will be forced to the surface of the 
well through the tubing.  If the pressure is low, pumping equipment is installed to pump 
out the petroleum to the surface.86 
At the top of the well on the surface is a large permanent structure called the wellhead. 
The wellhead consists of the casing head and the tubing head.87  Crude oil, natural gas 
and salt water are often produced simultaneously.88  As a result, once the produced 
fluids exit the surface at the wellhead, they must flow through a separator which 
removes the natural gas. After this, the fluid flows through a heater-treater to separate 
the oil from the water. The gas is put in a pipeline and the oil is stored, piped or trucked 
to the refinery.89 
The above described a typical, vertical well drilling.  Another method of drilling is 
horizontal drilling,90 where a well is drilled vertically and, at a certain depth, the drill is 
turned and drilling continues horizontally through the reservoir.91  The primary reason 
for using this method is that the wellbore is exposed to a far greater surface area than 
with a traditional wellbore.92 
4.3.2 Unconventional Production  
Another method of extraction that is becoming increasingly popular,93 and one that is 
causing great controversy, is hydraulic fracturing or “hydrofracturing”,94 a 
                                                          
86  Lowe (note 21) at 6; Hyne (note 24) at 345. 
87  Hyne (note 24) at 347. 
88  Lowe (note 21) at 6. 
89  Lowe (note 21) at 6. 
90  Deutch J "The Good News about Gas: The Natural Gas Revolution and its Consequences" 2011 
(90) Foreign Affairs 82 at 84. 
91  See US Energy Information Administration “What is Shale Gas and Why is it Important?” 
available at http://geology.com/energy/shale-gas/ [accessed 02.02.2014].   
92  Stemplewicz A "The Known 'Unknowns' of Hydraulic Fracturing: A Case for a Traditional 
Subsurface Trespass Regime in Pennsylvania" 2011 (13) Duquesne Business Law Journal 219 at 
223.   
93  First used in 1948 / 1949 in the United States and replaced the process of explosive fracturing. 
Coastal Oil and Gas Corpo v Garza Energy Trust Case No. 05-0466 of the Supreme Court of 
Texas (argued 28.09.2006) at 5; Hyne (note 24) at 423. 
94  Wiseman H "Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and 
the Need to Revisit Regulation" 2009-2010 (20) Fordham Environmental Law Review 115 at 115; 
Hyne (note 24) at 42; Allaby (note 24) at 284.    
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technological advancement in the economic recovery of shale gas.95 Hydraulic 
fracturing is employed to produce natural oil and natural gas from  “tight” (i.e. 
relatively impermeable) formations with low porosity.96  A more porous and permeable 
formation will allow more natural gas to be exposed to the wellbore.97  Hydraulic 
fracturing has made horizontal drilling a far more cost-effective option.98  It is a method 
of well or formation stimulation that involves liquid (“frack fluid”) being pumped down 
a well under high pressure to fracture the reservoir rock or to expand existing fractures 
and to force out oil or natural gas.99  The pressure from the liquid creates cracks in the 
rock formation and these cracks spread along the natural fault lines of the reservoir rock 
in opposite directions from the well.100   
Fracking occurs in three stages.  First, a pad of fracking fluid is injected into the well to 
initiate fracturing. Then, a slurry of fracking fluid mixed with proppants (small spheres 
like sand, ceramics or aluminium oxide pellets) are pumped down.101  The proppants 
lodge in the fractures to keep them open once the pumping of the fracking fluid is 
stopped. Once fractures have formed, more fluids are pumped down the wellbore to 
continue the development of the fractures and to carry the proppant further into the 
formation.102  The well is then back-flushed to remove the fracking fluid, leaving the 
cracks open for gas or oil to flow to the wellbore.103  The ultimate goal is, through 
fractures, to connect the wellbore to the area in the shale in which production has been 
stimulated, allowing the gas to flow into the well.104    
Hydraulic fracturing allows petroleum to escape (or be produced) from tight or 
unconventional formations in order for it to be produced commecrially.  The moment 
petroleum is produced, exploration methods are substituted by productions methods.  In 
                                                          
95  Ground Water Protection Council and ALL Consulting Modern Shale Gas Development in the 
United States: A Primer (2009) Washington DC Office of Fossil Energy, US Department of 
Energy at 56, available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/epreports/ 
shale_gas_primer_2009.pdf [accessed 08.06.2011].   
96  Coastal Oil and Gas (note 130) at 4; Downey (note 2) at 178.     
97  Stemplewicz (note 92) at 224.   
98  Stemplewicz (note 92) at 224.   
99  Hyne (note 24) at 489; Wiseman (note 94) at 115 and 118; Ground Water Protection Council and 
ALL Consulting (note 95).  
100  Coastal Oil and Gas (note 130) at 5. 
101  Hyne (note 24) at 424; Allaby (note 24) at 284. 
102  Ground Water Protection Council and ALL Consulting (note 95).   
103  Hyne (note 24) at 424; Coastal Oil and Gas (note 130) at 5. 
104  Wiseman (note 94) at 118.   
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Namibia and South Africa, different authorisations are granted in respect of exploration 
and production operations.  It is therefore important to identify the moment when 
exploration operations become production operations in order to know whether the 
company holds the correct authorisation.   
4.3.3 Well Stimulation 
A producing well may continue to produce petroleum for many years until the natural 
or primary pressure in the well becomes so low that petroleum no longer flows into the 
well.105  Secondary and tertiary recovery methods are then available.  A producer then 
has to decide whether to stimulate the well by hydraulic fracturing or by injecting acid 
to dissolve away some of the rock.106  Other recovery methods include injecting natural 
gas above natural oil to force it down or to pump water below the natural oil to force it 
upwards.107  Water flooding is the most commonly used secondary production 
method.108   Oil in the rock can also be heated by fire flooding, which then lowers the 
viscosity of the petroleum and increases the pressure in the reservoir.109  Another 
alternative is to use complex chemical techniques to stimulate further recovery.110  
Neither the Namibian nor the South African legislation requires additional authorisation 
for well stimulation – this falls under production activities covered by the production 
right or licence.111 
4.4 Decommissioning 
Although decommissioning signifies the end of the exploitation process, its importance 
should not be overlooked. When all production operations have ceased, the disused 
petroleum structures are decommissioned.  This poses many legal, regulatory and 
technical challenges for international law, states and the petroleum industry.112   
                                                          
105  Lowe (note 21) at 7; Downey (note 2) at 134.   
106  Lowe (note 21) at 7; Downey (note 2) at 139 – 140. 
107  Allaby (note 24) at 512; Downey (note 2) at 137 – 139.    
108  Downey (note 2) at 137.   
109  Lowe (note 21) at 7. 
110  Lowe (note 21) at 7. 
111  Production activities are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five below. 
112  Altit F and Igiehon M "Decommissioning of Upstream Oil and Gas Facilities" in Picton-
Turbervill G (ed) Oil and Gas: A Practical Handbook (2009) London, Globe Business Publishing 
Ltd at 257. 
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Decommissioning “describes the set of activities to be undertaken to manage and 
dispose of installations and platforms and eliminate environmental footprint once a 
production field is nearing, or reaches, the end of its economic life.”113  Other terms that 
may refer to decommissioning include abandonment, removal and disposal.114 
Decommissioning activities form part of the right awarded to produce petroleum.115 
However, many jurisdictions (such as South Africa and Namibia) impose additional 
obligations on holders in respect of decommissioning.116  Decommissioning may take 
many forms, depending on the type of facilities and the location.117  The basic aim of 
decommissioning is to render all wells safe and to remove most (or where possible all) 
signs of production on the surface or seabed.118   
There is very little practical experience with this phase of petroleum exploitation in 
Namibia and South Africa because of the relative young nature of this industry.119 
Decommissioning raises various issues relating to the environment, technology, 
sustainable development, preparation work, costs and allocation of liability.120 
Moreover, the area of law relating to decommissioning is still evolving.121  
Decommissioning received attention in 1995 when Shell planned on dumping Brent 
Spar (an oil storage and tanker loading buoy operated by Shell) in deep Atlantic waters, 
a decision that was met with fierce opposition and later reversed.122  Concomitant with 
the controversy relating to Brent Spar, many North Sea petroleum developments are 
reaching the decommissioning phase in their lifecycle.123  This is causing the spotlight 
to be cast on decommissioning. 
                                                          
113  Altit and Igiehon (note 112) at 257. 
114  Altit and Igiehon (note 112) at 258; Paterson J "Decommissioning of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Installations" in Gordon G, Paterson J and Üşenmez E (eds) Oil and Gas Law - Current Practice 
and Emerging Trends 2 ed (2011) Dundee Dundee University Press at 285. 
115  Altit and Igiehon (note 112) at 258. 
116  See Chapter Six below at par 2.4.3. 
117  Jahn, Cook and Graham (note 38) at 419.   
118  Jahn, Cook and Graham (note 38) at 422. 
119  See further Chapter Six below.  
120  Altit and Igiehon (note 112) at 258; Paterson (note 114) at 285; Hammerson M Upstream Oil and 
Gas (2011) London Globe Law and Business at 437.   
121  Altit and Igiehon (note 112) at 268. 
122  Hammerson (note 120) at 437.  
123  Hammerson (note 120) at 437. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This thesis only focuses on the upstream petroleum industry, and as such concentrates 
on issues relating to petroleum occurrence, exploration and production.  Because the 
South African and Namibian legislatures employ technical terms without properly 
defining them, it is necessary to have a basic overview of the technical aspects of 
petroleum and petroleum exploitation.  In this chapter, the detail necessary to amplify 
the legislative frameworks of South Africa and Namibia was reviewed.  From the few 
South African examples mentioned, it is clear that a broader understanding of the 
petroleum industry is required when working with the legislative framework.  The same 
may apply to Namibia as well.  The legislature may, in the light of the rise of 
unconventional production methods and the exploitation of unconventional resources, 
consider amending the legislation to provide for this.  References throughout this thesis 
will be made back to this chapter where a technical discussion beyond the legislative 
framework is necessary.   
 
 
Chapter Three:   
GENERAL RULES GOVERNING 
OWNERSHIP OF, CONTROL OVER AND 
ACCESS TO PETROLEUM RESOURCES 
 
1. Introduction 
The regulation of natural resources raises contentious questions on a national and 
international level.1  Questions raised include who may own these resources, in whose 
interest must these resources be exploited and whether limitations should be placed on 
the use of natural resources for the sake of other social values.2 Crucial to answering 
these questions is an understanding of the role that state sovereignty over natural 
resources play. The legal position in respect of the regulation of resources also differs 
in jurisdictions where the ownership of the resources under the surface of the land 
differ from the landownership, as opposed to jurisdictions where the landowner is 
considered the owner of everything below the surface of the land.3  These questions and 
issues must be addressed by the regulatory framework that a state adopts in respect of 
natural resources, which reflects the juncture where international law, national law and 
property law (especially ownership) intercept.4  
To discuss the ownership and control of petroleum, it is necessary first to look at the 
international framework within which petroleum ownership and regulation operates. 
This big-picture view allows for better scrutiny of the inner workings of different 
jurisdictions’ regulatory frameworks in a comparative setting. The different models of 
ownership in respect of petroleum resources, and the basic rules applicable, are 
discussed.  This is then followed by a generalised discussion of how access to 
petroleum resources is granted.  This discussion will lay the foundation for the 
                                                          
1  Barnes R Property Rights and Natural Resources (2009) Portland Hart Publishing at 10.   
2  Barnes (note 1) at 10. 
3  See for example Daintith T Finders Keepers?  How the Law of Capture Shaped the World Oil 
Industry (2010) Washington DC RFF Press at 7.   
4  See for example Barnes (note 1) at 10 – 11. 
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discussion of ownership of, control over and access to petroleum resources in South 
Africa and Namibia, to follow in Chapter Four and Chapter Five.           
2. Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources  
Almost all natural resource regimes are based on the jurisprudential theory of state 
sovereignty.5  Sovereignty signifies independence insofar as it relates to the relationship 
between states: “[i]ndependence in regard to a portion of the globe is a right to exercise 
therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the function of the state”.6  Sovereignty in 
international law is normally employed to express the external rather than internal 
character of a state as regards its ability or capacity to govern itself independently of 
other states.7  A state’s claim to sovereignty extends over its land, territorial waters, 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.8  Sovereignty is primarily concerned 
with the legal relationships between states.  This includes maintenance of and control 
over the natural resources of a particular state.9  In the light of the principle of 
sovereignty, natural resources have traditionally been treated according to the rule that, 
once natural resources fell within the exclusive sovereignty of a state, these resources 
were subject to a few limitations.10  After World War II, this traditional rule became 
embodied in the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources.11   
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has evolved into an 
accepted principle of international law,12 despite contestations about its content and 
                                                          
5  Smith E “World Energy Resources” in Materials on International Petroleum Transactions 2ed 
(2000) Denver Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 28. 
6  Island of Palmas Case 2 RIAA 829 (1928) at 838.   
7  Baker S “Halleck’s International Law 3ed (1893) London Kegal Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co. 
Ltd at 66.   
8  See for example Hammerson M Upstream Oil and Gas (2011) London Globe Law and Business 
at 36.   
9  Barnes (note 1) at 11.   
10  Barnes (note 1) 221. 
11  Barnes (note 1) 221. 
12  Duruigbo E "Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples' Ownership of Natural Resources in 
International Law" 2006 George Washington International Law Review 33 at 39-40; Dale M, 
Bekker L, Bashall F, Chaskalson M, Dixon C, Grobler G, Loxton C, Ash M and Cox A South 
African Mineral and Petroleum Law 1 ed (2005, Service Issue 16 2014) Durban LexisNexis 
Butterworths at MPRDA-108 and the authorities cited there; Elian G The Principle of 
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purpose. It was regarded as a consequence of the legal and political call for self-
determination and decolonization.13  This principle is the basis of ownership of states 
over the natural resources within their boundaries14 and enables a state to exercise 
control over the natural resources within its boundaries.  Its purpose is also to 
encourage international cooperation in the economic development of developing 
countries.15   
The principle of permanent sovereignty was formally endorsed in a 1952 Resolution of 
the United Nations entitled Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources,16 but 
the “most significant expression”17 thereof is embodied in the 1962 Resolution entitled 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.18 The latter states that the right of 
peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over the natural wealth and natural 
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development, as well as in 
the interest of the people of the state.19  This is of particular importance for this thesis, 
as the 1962 Resolution recognises that natural resources, although resorting under the 
sovereignty of the state, must be exploited in the interest of its people whom it 
represents.   
Under the 1962 Resolution, nationalisation and expropriation of these resources is 
possible, but must be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the 
national interest.20  These grounds or reasons are recognised as overriding purely 
individual or private interests.21  Appropriate compensation must be paid.22   
                                                                                                                                                                         
Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1979) Alphen aan den Rijn MD Sijthoff & Noordhoff at 
15.      
13  Dale et al (note 12) at MPRDA-110.   
14  Alramahi M Oil and Gas Law in the UK (2013) West Sussex Bloomsbury Professional Limited at 
§1.35. 
15  Alramahi (note 14) at §1.41. 
16  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 626 (VII) Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth 
and Resources, 21 December 1952.  See also Duruigbo at 38.   
17  Duruigbo (note 12) at 38.   
18  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources, 14 December 1962.     
19  Clause 1 of the GA Resolution 1803.   
20  Clause 4 of the GA Resolution 1803.   
21  Clause 4 of the GA Resolution 1803. 
22  Clause 4 of the GA Resolution 1803. 
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Initially the principle of state sovereignty of natural resources was understood as 
element of self-determination to protect developing states against exploitation by other 
developed states. This was supposed to introduce a new international economic order,23 
an idea which was politically en vogue, but turned out to be unattainable in practice.  
The 1962 Resolution signified a shift in emphasis: developing countries needed and 
sought an international economic order in terms whereof the international community 
evolved “towards at least a semblance of international economic parity and equity”.24 
The new, post-1962 vision of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources insisted on absolute economic sovereignty rather than economic co-operation 
in view of foreign investment.25  This came at the behest of developing states who held 
the view that developed states maintained their economic advantage despite processes 
of decolonisation (economic or political).26  Developing countries wanted, amongst 
others, more control over activities of foreign corporations within their borders, and 
better terms of trade.27 From their vantage point, a new international economic order 
should reflect a change in the balance of world economic forces by promoting the rights 
of developing countries and emphasising the corresponding obligations on the part of 
developed countries.28   
The 1962 Resolution was reaffirmed in a number of other resolutions,29 but in in 1973 a 
resolution was passed dealing with permanent sovereignty over natural resources which 
                                                          
23  Dale et al (note 12) at MPRDA-110.  The developing countries were successful in having three 
resolutions adopted establising a new international economic order, namely General Assembly 
Resolution 3201 (S-VI) Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order, 1 May 1974, General Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI) Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a New International Order, 1 May 1974 and General Assembly Resolution 3281 
(XXIX) Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 12 December 1974.  See also Gordon R 
“The Dawn of a New, New International Economic Order” (2009) Law and Contemporary 
Problems 131 at 131.   
24  Gordon (note 23) 142.   
25  Dale et al (note 12) at MPRDA-110. 
26  Dale et al (note 12) at MPRDA-111. 
27  Gordon (note 23) at 143.   
28  Dale et al (note 12) at MPRDA-111; Gordon (note 23) at 144. 
29  See General Assembly Resolution 2158 (XXI) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resourses, 29 
November 1966, General Assembly Resolution 2386 (XXIII) Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resourses, 19 December 1968 and General Assembly Resolution 2692 (XXV) Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resourses of Developing Countries and Expansion of Domestic Sources 
of Accumulation for Economic Developent, 11 December 1970. 
Chapter Three 






omitted all references to international law with regard to the measure of compensation 
payable on nationalisation of resources.30  This set the stage for dissent and 
confrontation,31 which eventually resulted in the adoption of the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States,32 which reaffirmed states’ permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources within their boundaries and provided states with more control over 
their own economic fate.33  This Charter envisions all states to have full permanent 
sovereignty over their wealth, natural resources and economic activities, which includes 
possession, use and disposal, and to exercise this ability freely.34  The Charter retained 
the general principles of permanent sovereignty over natural resources embodied in the 
1962 Resolution, but also contained various critical differences.35  For example, it also 
omits all references to international law and favours domestic law, which means that 
compensation for nationalisation is to be determined by municipal laws and not 
international law. This may be to the detriment of foreign investors; and eventually also 
to the countries who subscribe to this view, as investors are bound to prefer investment 
into countries who allow the principles of international law to apply.36   
The Charter had the effect that the consensus underlying the 1962 Resolution was 
destroyed.37  The developed countries rejected the idea that there was any responsibility 
on them to ensure even an impression of equality between developed and developing 
countries.38  The Charter was seen as radical, perhaps even socialist.  The disagreement 
between developing and developed countries over the Charter prevented it from even 
attaining the status of “soft law”.39  The Charter and the accompanying resolutions 
establishing a new international economic order appeared to undermine the implied 
assumption that the economic sphere is market-driven and self-regulating and that it 
                                                          
30  General Assembly Resolution 3171 (XXVIII) Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resourses, 17 
December 1973. 
31  Dale et al (note 12) at MPRDA-111. 
32  United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States, 12 December 1974.  
33  Gordon (note 23) at 132.   
34  Clause 2 of the GA Resolution 3281.   
35  Pereira R and Gough O “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in the 21st Century: 
Natural Resource Governance and the Right to Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples under 
International Law” (2013) Melbourne Journal of International Law 451 at 456. 
36  Pereira and Gough (note 35) at 456 – 457; Dale et al (note 12) at MPRDA-111. 
37  Dale et al (note 12) at MPRDA-111. 
38  Gordon (note 23) at 144.  
39  Gordon (note 23) at 144; Dale et al (note 12) at MPRDA-112.   
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should not be subjected to regulation by governments that that were deemed to be part 
of the problem.40 
The various resolutions and the Charter all seek to ensure permanent sovereignty of a 
state over natural resources within its boundaries.  However, the scope of the principle 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources adapted through the decades as a result 
of conflicting interests between developed and developing states.  At the heart of the 
conflict appears to be the tension between the need to exploit resources, to promote 
economic growth, and the dependence on international investors to do the exploiting.  
Developing countries recognised that natural resources must be exploited for the benefit 
of their people.  The reality was, however, that exploitation of resources was led by 
international corporations from developed countries who also had to secure their own 
interests.    
The “Washington Consensus” of 198941  was aimed at ending “nationalistic inclinations 
towards state-led development policies”.42  States sought to open the economy to 
private international entities and to ensure flexible labour markets and World Trade 
Organisation-ruled trade agreements.43  The Washington Consensus was not accepted 
with open arms by all developing countries.  Some still held the view that it was not 
reform adopted in the self-interest of developing countries, but rather reform imposed 
                                                          
40  Gordon (note 23) at 145.   
41  The economist John Williamson coined these policy considerations the “Washington Consensus”. 
The Consensus originated from a meeting of Washington-based institutions that addressed 
struggling countries in Latin America on a number of fundamental policy considerations. 
Williamson J “What Should the World Bank Think of the Washington Consensus?” (2000) The 
World Bank Research Observer 251 at 251.  These ten principles are basically as follows: (1) 
budget deficits should be small enough to be financed without recourse to the inflation tax; (2) 
public expenditure should be redirected from politically sensitive areas that receive more 
resources than their economic return can justify toward neglected fields with high economic 
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary education and health and 
infrastructure; (3) tax reform so as to broaden the tax base and cut marginal tax rates; (4) financial 
liberalisation involving an ultimate objective of market-determined interest rates; (5) a unified 
exchange rate at a level sufficiently competitive to induce a rapid growth in non-traditional 
exports; (6) quantitative trade restrictions to be rapidly replaced by tariffs, which would be 
progressively reduced until a uniform low rate in the range of 10% to 20% is achieved; (7) 
abolition of barriers impeding the entry of foreign direct investment; (8) privatisation of state 
enterprises; (9) abolition of regulations that impede the entry of new firms or restrict competition; 
and (10) the provision of secure property rights, especially to the informal sector.  See Williamson 
J “The Strange History of the Washington Consensus” (2004-2005) Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics 195 at 196. 
42  Gordon (note 23) at 148. 
43  Gordon (note 23) at 149.   
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on them by Washington as representative of the developed countries.44  The 
Washington Consensus was soon viewed as a “neoliberal ideological agenda” imposed 
on all countries at all time, instead of a list of reforms that were widely thought of as 
required by a particular geographical region at a particular date in history.45 
Although adoption of the principle of sovereignty over natural resources was thought to 
be an important component of strategies to promote economic development of 
developing countries, many of the countries in whose interests the principle was 
advanced are still “mired in economic doldrums” and remain excluded from the 
international economic system.46  The one reason advanced for this is that leaders of 
these countries see the principle as a justification for conferring ownership of natural 
resources to themselves; it therefore appears to be used as a justification for possible 
corruption.47  One problem is that the resolutions and the Charter are not explicit about 
the ownership implications of sovereignty over natural resources: it is unclear whether 
the resources are to be vested in the people of a state, or in their government.48 
Scholarship on this is divided. Some authorities see a clear distinction,49 but other 
dissenters indicate that there is no difference in situations.50 The result of such 
uncertainty is that the meaning and effect of the principle is diluted: states essentially 
elect where to vest ownership of natural resources. Sovereignty becomes the basis upon 
                                                          
44  Williamson J “The Washington Consensus and Beyond” (2003) Economic and Political Weekly 
1475 at 1476. 
45  Williamson (note 44) at 1476. 
46  Duruigbo (note 12) at 34 – 35.   
47  Duruigbo (note 12) at 35 – 36 and the examples of Nigeria, Iraq, Angola and Equatorial Guinea 
mentioned there. 
48  Duruigbo (note 12) 43. 
49  E.g. Dale et al (note 12) at MPRDA-110 state that the Declaration was adopted at a time when 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources was a result of the political and legal call for self-
determination and decolonisation.  Consequently, the Declaration per se distinguishes between 
“peoples and nations” and “state”.  Rights with regard to natural resources vest in the peoples and 
nations, but control over natural resources vests in the sovereignty of the state. 
50  Duruigbo (note 12) 37 argues that “peoples” should be understood to mean “the owners of natural 
resources rather than faceless populations” and that this principle vests permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources in the peoples.  This will help to interpret the government’s role as 
temporary custodian or trustee over these resources. Others have opined that, by using the word 
“sovereignty”, the intention was to vest natural resources in states. See Chandler and Sunder “The 
Romance of the Public Domain” 2004 California Law Review 1331 at 1366 where the Convention 
on Biological Diversity 31 International Legal Material 818 was discussed.  Article 15(1) of this 
Convention also recognises the State’s sovereign right over domestic natural resources.  See also 
Duruigbo (n 54) 46, 48 and 50.   
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which states can claim ownership of petroleum resources, elect only to control 
petroleum resources or decide to vest ownership and control over petroleum resources 
in private hands.51  Sovereignty in and of itself is thus not helpful in addressing the 
problems faced by resource-rich countries in the developing world.  
Designed as a mechanism to protect a state’s natural resources from interference by 
other states, its relevance on the economic plain is limited.  Petroleum exploitation in 
particular is led by powerful international corporations protected whose interests are 
protected under bi-lateral investment treaties.  The imbalance in bargaining power 
between developing states and these corporations overshadow states’ sovereign powers 
to decide how petroleum resources should be exploited.  This may be further 
exacerbated by weak regulatory regimes that lack transparency, accountability and a 
proper balance of interests.  Other strategies will have to be devised to ensure that the 
benefits of natural resources accrue to the citizens of resource-rich countries.52 
To give proper effect to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
it is important to ascertain who the rightful owners of resources are, as envisaged by 
this principle.53  It is, after all, the main thrust of the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources to allow states, at the exclusion of other states, to decide where 
to vest ownership of and control over petroleum resources and to ensure that natural 
resources are exploited in the interest of national development.54   
3. Cuius est Solum, Capture and the Main Models of 
Petroleum Ownership 
In line with international law and the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, states may elect where to vest ownership of petroleum resources.55  
                                                          
51  Hammerson (note 8) at 35; Smith (note 5) at 28.   
52  Duruigbo (note 12) at 36. 
53  Duruigbo (note 12) at 36. 
54  Alramahi (note 14) at §1.31, §1.32 and §1.41. 
55  The question of who owns petroleum resources only arises in respect of territorial (onshore) land.  
Petroleum resources located in the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf 
vest in the state in terms of the principle of permanent sovereignty.  See Taverne B Petroleum, 
Industry and Governments: A Study of the Involvement of Industry and Governments in the 
Production and Use of Petroleum 2 ed (2008) Alphen aan den Rijn Kluwer Law International at 
120.  See also Redgwell C and Rajamani L “Energy Underground: International Law” in Zillman 
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Ownership of petroleum in situ (petroleum as occurring under natural conditions on or 
in the land)56 normally resorts under one of two extremes, namely that of private 
ownership and state ownership.  By way of example, in the United States of America – 
a pioneer in the petroleum industries57 – private ownership over petroleum resources is 
generally acknowledged.58 The USA is an exception, however. Generally, ownership of 
petroleum resources is either vested in the state, or the state has exclusive control over 
these resources.59 A study of the exception in this case assists understanding of the rule.  
In the paragraphs below the basic rules applicable to ownership and control of 
petroleum are discussed, both from the setting in which they were first formulated, and 
then from the exceptional vantage point of the US experience. This paves the way for a 
deeper inquiry into the appropriateness of the South African and Namibian regulatory 
frameworks. 
Roman Law regarded minerals as the fruits of the land60 or as having acceded to the 
land.61 They were considered to vest in the owner of the land.62  This is referred to as 
the accession system,63 which applied in Roman law of the Republic and early empire.  
In the later Empire, as a majority of mines and mineral deposits outside Italy were 
acquired through conquest, they became the property of the Republic and later the 
Empire.  It was eventually accepted that the state held primary control over all mineral 
resources.64  This became known as the regalian system, which refers to a system which 
regards ownership of all or some minerals as the property of the ruler or state or under 
                                                                                                                                                                         
DN, McHarg A, Bradbrook A and Barrera-Hernandez L (eds) The Law of Energy Underground:  
Understanding New Developments in Subsurface Production, Transmission, and Storage (2014) 
Oxford Oxford University Press at 118. 
56  Taverne (note 55) at 120.   
57  The first oil well was drilled by Colonel Drake in what became known as Oil Creek, near 
Titusville, Pennsylvania.  See Downey M Oil 101 (2009) La Vergne Wooden Table Press LLC at 
2.  
58  Hammerson (note 8) at 36; Smith E "Ownership of Mineral Rights" in Materials on 
International Petroleum Transactions (2000) Denver, Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 
at 248–249; Daintith (note 3) at 7.  The position in the United States will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
59  Onorato W and Park J, "World Petroleum Legislation: Frameworks that Foster Oil and Gas 
Development" 2001-2002 (39) Alberta Law Review 70 at 73–74.   
60  Kaser M Roman Private Law 3ed (1980) Pretoria University of South Africa at §18.III.   
61  Ely N and Pietrowski Jr RF “Changing Concepts in the World’s Mineral and Petroleum 
Development Laws” (1976) Brigham Young University Law Review 9 at 11. 
62  Wessels JW History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) Grahamstown African Book Company 
Limited at 486. 
63  Daintith (note 3) at 308. 
64  Ely and Pietrowski Jr (note 61) at 11. 
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the ruler or state’s exclusive control.65  The regalian system is characterised by a 
distinction between the ownership of the surface and ownership of the subsoil.66  The 
character of the state’s ownership, however differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
Some vest minerals in the absolute ownership of the state – referred to by some as a 
“dominial” system.67  Other jurisdictions, referred to by some as “true” regalian 
systems, vested control (but not necessarily absolute ownership) over all mines in the 
state.68   
Roman-Dutch Law generally followed early Roman Law.  The principle cuius est 
solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos was accepted and the owner of the land 
was regarded as the owner of everything above and below the surface of the land.69 
Although scope does not allow a detailed exposition of the origins of the cuius est 
solum rule,70 a comparative review of available sources reveal that the rule is almost 
universally endorsed, regardless of the system applicable. In the English common law 
the rule was first referred to in Bury v Pope,71 and in Blackstone’s Commentaries,72 and 
                                                          
65  Ely and Pietrowski Jr (note 61) at 11; Daintith (note 3) at 309. 
66  Campbell N "Principles of Mineral Ownership in the Civil Law and Common Law Systems" 
1956-1957 (31) Tulane Law Review 303 at 306. 
67  Campbell (note 66) at 307. 
68  Campbell (note 66) at 307. 
69  Voet XLI.1.13; Campbell (note 66) at 304; Daintith (note 3) at 308.  
70  The cuius est solum principle probably stems from Roman law or Jewish law but its origins may 
be traced to a 13th century gloss of Accursius on D.viii.2.1. See further Bradbrook A "The 
Relevance of the Cujus Est Solum Doctrine to the Surface Landowner's Claims to Natural 
Resources Located Above and Beneath the Land" 1987-1988 (11) Adelaide Law Review 462 at 
462; Gonzáles JJ “Civil Law Traditions in Latin American Countries” in Zillman DN, McHarg A, 
Bradbrook A and Barrera-Hernandez L (eds) The Law of Energy Underground:  Understanding 
New Developments in Subsurface Production, Transmission, and Storage (2014) Oxford Oxford 
University Press at 62.  Commissioner for Railways and others v Valuer-General [1973] 3 All ER 
268 at 277; Lord Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews & General Ltd [1977] 2 All ER 902 at 905. 
71  Bury v Pope (1588) Cro Eliz at 118.  See Commissioner for Railways and others v Valuer-
General [1973] 3 All ER 268 at 277 
72  Blackstone Commentaries (1766) vol II at 18, where he states as follows: “Land haths, in it's legal 
signification, an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est usque 
ad coelum, is the maxim of the law, upwards; therefore no man may erect any building, or the 
like, to overhang another's land: and, downwards, whatever is in a direct line between the surface 
of any land, and the center of the earth, belongs to the owner of the surface; as is every day's 
experience in the mining countries. So that the word “land” includes not only the face of the earth, 
but every thing under it, or over it. And therefore if a man grants all his lands, he grants thereby 
all his mines of metal and other fossils, his woods, his waters, and his houses, as well as his fields 
and meadows. Not but the particular names of the things are equally sufficient to pass them, 
except in the instance.”   
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later confirmed in Acton v Blundell.73  Still, the use of this rule in English law is 
criticised as “imprecise”.74  The principle was mainly used in analyses involving 
structures erected on adjoining lands and not minerals or petroleum.75 In respect of 
petroleum, the Privy Council was prepared to assume in Borys v Canadian Pacific 
Railway Co (without expressly mentioning the principle of cuius est solum) that the 
owner of the land is the owner of gas in situ below the surface of the land.76  Under 
modern English law the default position of cuius est solum is qualified to a large extent 
by statutory law.77  For example, the Petroleum Act 1998 vests ownership of all 
petroleum in the United Kingdom Continental Shelf in the Crown.78   
The United States of America followed the English approach.79  With the advent of air 
travel, condominium ownership and subsurface resource exploitation, it quickly became 
clear that the cuius est solum rule cannot be applied rigidly and that it has to be 
qualified.80  This was certainly the case when courts had to determine rights in respect 
of underground water. As a liquid, water is migrating in nature and does not respect 
man-made boundaries. The courts were faced with the question of how this affected 
ownership.81 Similarly, when the question of ownership of subsurface petroleum first 
arose in the United States of America,82 the court also had to recognise the uniqueness 
of the nature of oil and held that the owner of the land should be considered owner of 
the oil he obtains when he constructs a suitable well.83   
                                                          
73  Acton v Blundell (1843, Exch) 12 M. & W. 324.  The court confirmed the principle of cuius est 
solum and stated that an owner is entitled to exert his ownership in respect of everything above 
and below the land.  If, while exercising his rights of ownership, he intercepts or drains his 
neighbour’s water or water supply, then that cannot be a cause of action for the neighbour. Acton 
at 353. 
74  Commissioner / Valuer-General (note 70) at 278. 
75  Lord Bernstein (note 70) at 905.   
76  Borys v Canadian Pacific Railway Co and Another [1953] 1 All ER 451 at 458: “For the purpose 
of their decision their Lordships are prepared to assume that the gas whilst in situ is the property 
of the appellant even though it has not been reduced into possession…” 
77  Hammerson (note 8) at 38.   
78  See also Alramahi M Oil and Gas Law in the UK (2013) West Sussex Bloomsbury Professional 
Limited at §1.30.   
79  Smith (note 5) at 39.   
80  Summers W "Property in oil and gas" 1919 (29) The Yale Law Journal 174 at 174; Campbell 
(note 66) at 304; Hobson J "Ownership of Oil and Gas in Place" 1924-1925 (13) Kentucky Law 
Journal 152 at 152. 
81  Summers (note 80) at 174.  
82  Hail v Reed (1854) 54 Ky. 383.  
83  Hail (note 82) at 392. 
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The case of Hail v Reed84 is considered the first case in the United States that deals with 
the nature of a landowner’s interest in petroleum in respect of his land.85 The Supreme 
Court in Pennsylvania recognised that the absoluteness of ownership espoused by the 
cuius est solum doctrine is inadequate for water, oil and gas86 and found it difficult to 
apply the concept of ownership to a migrating substance.87  The court described water, 
oil and gas minerals as ferae naturae.88  They belong to the owner of the land for as 
long as they are within the boundaries of his land and under his control but the owner 
loses ownership as soon as they escape the boundaries of his land.89  So an owner of 
land will lose ownership of petroleum if the petroleum escapes the owner of the land 
because someone else drills on their own property and, by their action, denudes the 
other owner.90 The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in 1934, also likened gas to animals 
ferae naturae and claimed that the gas company lost ownership of their gas when they 
pumped it into a subsurface stratum.91  Other cases followed, comparing oil and gas to 
animals, birds, water, springs, air and other minerals.92  None of these, however, 
claimed the state to be the owner of the petroleum.93   
The abundance of analogies may be ascribed to an earlier misunderstanding of the 
nature of petroleum occurrence.94  It was only later realised that petroleum migrates in 
specific patterns – as described in Chapter Two – and does not flow aimlessly 
underground.95  By likening petroleum to water and wild animals, courts came to the 
conclusion that a landowner does not have ownership of petroleum and only acquired 
title once this resource was reduced to possession.96  By adopting this position, a 
landowner was also deprived of any protectable interest in petroleum that were drained 
                                                          
84  Hail (note 82) at  383. 
85  Anderson OL, Dzienkowski JS, Lowe JS, Peroni RJ, Pierce DE and Smith EE Hemingway Oil 
and Gas Law and Taxation (2004) St Paul Thomson West at 29.   
86  Westmoreland Natural Gas Co v De Witt (1889) 130 Pa. St. 235 at 249; Summers (note 80) at 
177. 
87  Anderson et al (note 85) at 29.   
88  Westmoreland (note 86) at 249; Summers (note 80) at 177. 
89  Westmoreland (note 86) at 249; Summers (note 80) at 177. 
90  Westmoreland (note 86) at 249; Summers (note 80) at 177. 
91  Hammonds v Central Kentucky Natural Gas Company 255 Ky. 685 (1934) at 689. 
92  DCG "The ownership of natural gas and some real property concepts" 1950 (36) Virginia Law 
Review 947 at 949.   
93  DCG (note 92) at 949. 
94  Woodward M "Ownership of Interests in Oil and Gas" 1965 (26) Ohio State Law Journal 353 at 
353–354; Anderson et al (note 85) at 29.     
95  See Chapter Two above.   
96  Anderson et al (note 85) at 30.   
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from his land from elsewhere.97  The comparison to water and wild animals was not, 
however, sufficient, as petroleum travelled within the boundaries of fixed reservoirs 
and courts eventually disregarded the analogy.98   
Today, in the United States, two different approaches may be discerned at state level.  
On the one hand, cuius est solum applies and affords property (ownership) interests in 
petroleum to landowners.99  In states adhering to this approach, the owner of the land is 
the owner of the petroleum beneath the surface of the land.100  Some authorities refer to 
this theory of ownership as “absolute”.101  On the other hand, some states do not 
recognise ownership of petroleum in situ , but merely a right of the landowner to search 
for and extract petroleum.102  In these states landowners lose their exclusive right to the 
resource as soon as the resources moved out of the landowner’s boundaries, either 
through migration or extraction.103  Full ownership of the petroleum is acquired only 
once it is extracted.104  Landowners could grant the right to extract to others.105  This 
view is supported by the Supreme Court of the United States.106  
Regardless of which of the two approaches is followed, the rule of capture applies 
generally in the United States (both in federal and state law).107 This entails that the 
owner of land acquires ownership of the petroleum which he produces from wells 
drilled on his land, regardless of whether the petroleum migrates from neighbouring 
land.108  The origins of this rule may be traced back to the case of Westmoreland & 
Cambria Natural Gas Co v De Witt.109  A number of cases followed, which adopted the 
rule (with some variation in places).110  The rule of capture is prevalent in others 
                                                          
97  Anderson et al (note 85) at 30.   
98  Anderson et al (note 85) at 30.   
99  Anderson et al (note 85) at 30 – 31; DCG (note 92) at 950.   
100  DCG (note 92) at 951; Hobson (note 80) at 155. 
101  Woodward (note 94) at 357. 
102  Anderson et al (note 85) at 31. 
103  DCG (note 92) at 951. 
104  Woodward (note 94) at 359. 
105  Anderson et al (note 85) at 34. 
106  Hobson (note 80) at 153 and the authorities stated there.   
107  Daintith (note 3) at 7; Woodward (note 94) at 356; Coastal Oil and Gas Corpo v Garza Energy 
Trust Case No. 05-0466 of the Supreme Court of Texas (argued 28.09.2006) (Texas) at 13. 
108  Kramer B and Anderson O "The rule of capture - an oil and gas perspective" 2005 (35) 
Environmental Law 899 at 900.   
109  Westmoreland Westmoreland (note 86) 235.  See Daintith (note 3) at 20. 
110  Daintith (note 3) at 20 – 29, 50 
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jurisdictions as well.111  It has been described as “…a cornerstone of the oil and gas 
industry and is fundamental both to property rights and to state regulation.”112  The 
weakness of the rule is that it promotes the practice of drilling as many wells as quickly 
as possible to be the first to capture the petroleum. This leads to waste and disorder, 
unnecessary costs and damage.113  Despite criticisms, the rule of capture retains its grip 
over the petroleum industry in the United States.114 The rule is based on common law 
as framed by case law. The US legislature has never attempted to step in and regulate 
the situation.115  
In Latin American countries, the Roman law notion of absoluteness of ownership – 
which includes ownership of resources in place – was adopted.116  Despite this, most of 
them specifically exclude hydrocarbons from the ownership of land.117  This position is 
a result of the influence of the Spanish approach, which is based on the regalian system 
discussed above.118  Many other jurisdictions across the world also vest ownership of 
natural resources in the state.  This is done either in the country’s constitution, or in a 
statute119  This is the case for Saudi Arabia,120 Iran,121 Mozambique122 and Kuwait.123  
All Australian states have legislated petroleum in situ to be owned by the Crown.124 
Namibia also follows the general international trend of vesting natural resources in the 
state in terms of its Constitution.  The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990 
provides that all natural resources on, in or under land vests in the state.125 This includes 
                                                          
111  Daintith (note 3) at 7. 
112  Coastal Oil and Gas (note 107) at 13. 
113  Daintith (note 3) at 8 – 13. 
114  Daintith (note 3) at 302, with reference to Coastal Oil and Gas (note 107). 
115  Daintith (note 3) at 13 – 16. 
116  Gonzáles (note 70) at 61. 
117  Gonzáles (note 70) at 69. 
118  Gonzáles (note 70) at 69.  In the twentieth century, however, the Latin American civil law systems 
“…built a complex regime of land property rights based on both the regalian and the domanial 
systems of property…” In Mexico, the domanial system has been influential since the 1940s.  The 
Constitution expressly vests all hydrocarbons in the Mexican Nation.  See article 27 of the 
Political Constitution of the Mexican United States and Gonzáles (note 70) at 70. 
119  Taverne (note 55) at 120.   
120  Royal Order No A/91 of the Basic Law of Governance 1992 of Saudi Arabia.   
121  Article 2 of the Petroleum Act of Iran. 
122  Article 6 of the Petroleum Law 2001 of Mozambique.   
123  Article 21 of the Constitution of Kuwait, 1962.   
124  Bradbrook (note 70) at 468.   
125  Article 100 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990.   
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petroleum.  Furthermore, the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act126 states that 
all rights in respect of petroleum resources are vested in the state as well.    
South Africa is an example of where a state has assumed control over petroleum 
resources without explicitly vesting ownership thereof in the state.  South Africa’s 
Constitution is silent as to the ownership of natural resources.  South Africa introduces 
a new concept in respect of ownership and control of petroleum resources, namely 
custodianship.  Under the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 
2002, petroleum resources vest in the nation and the state is custodian thereof for the 
benefit of the nation.127  This choice of a custodianship model blurs the line between 
state ownership and private ownership of petroleum resources.  It is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Five below.  What is clear, however, is that control over petroleum 
resources in South Africa is vested in the state.   
Full privatisation of petroleum resources have been criticised as one of the worst 
abuses, since the state is then getting the worst deal.128  Many countries have therefore 
moved toward some form of state control over petroleum resources. Private ownership 
of petroleum resources is the exception as almost universally states claim some sort of 
ownership or control over petroleum.129  The largest part of the world’s petroleum-
producing states has in fact vested ownership or control or both over petroleum 
resources in the state.  An advantage is that vesting the ownership of petroleum 
resources in the state removes all complexities as regards private ownership of 
petroleum resources.130  Moreover, as this thesis will show, vesting ownership and 
control of petroleum resources in the state is necessary to ensure shared benefit of these 
resources for the greater good.  The state is in the best position to assert its sovereignty 
vis-à-vis other states.131 
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4. Allocation of Rights to Petroleum 
As the first part of the chapter demonstrates, states have a wide discretion, supported by 
international law and the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, to 
determine how their petroleum resources are to be exploited.132  States therefore 
determine how access to their petroleum resources is granted.  It is in the interest of 
states well-endowed with petroleum resources to ensure that these resources are used in 
such a way that the countries benefit on economic and social development levels.133       
As was indicated, the general trend across the globe is to vest ownership, or at least 
control, of petroleum resources in the state.  This is also the case with Namibia and 
South Africa.  Vesting ownership or control of petroleum resources in the state is, 
however, only one aspect of a petroleum regulatory framework.  The second aspect is 
determining the appropriate authorisation through which access to these resources 
owned by or under control of the state is granted.  Together, these two aspects make up 
the regulatory framework for petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia.  
Determining the appropriate authorisation is vital for a petroleum-rich country to reap 
the benefit of its petroleum resources.134       
States can choose to exploit their petroleum resources through various ways.  They may 
exploit these resources through a state petroleum company only or invite private 
petroleum companies to do the exploitation or use of combination of these two 
systems.135  The actual extent of state participation in the petroleum industry varies 
from one jurisdiction to another.136  The extent of state regulation of the of the 
petroleum industry within a host country may also vary, depending on where petroleum 
is located.  Some states are actively involved in the exploitation of their petroleum 
resources through a national petroleum company.137  Other states may exploit its 
resources by inviting private companies to develop these resources.138  Some states may 
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also exploit its resources through joint operations between the state petroleum company 
and a private company.139  This normally happens in Namibia, where the national 
petroleum company is a party to a petroleum licence.   
The extent of state participation in petroleum exploitation and the choice of 
authorisation for granting access to petroleum resources are influenced by the fact that 
petroleum exploitation involves great risk and is capital intensive.140  States often do not 
have the financial means or technological expertise to exploit the petroleum resources 
within their territory,141 and hence choose to delegate the exploitation of petroleum 
resources to other entities.142  The rights of these entities to the petroleum resources 
depend on the type of authorisation used by the state to grant the rights to exploit the 
petroleum within its territory.143  Some states may for instance grant exclusive rights to 
the entity to exploit the petroleum resources through licences or concessions, while 
others may enter into an agreement with the entity to exploit the resources, such as a 
production sharing agreement or a service contract.144  A hybrid legal instrument, 
combining elements of exclusive rights with elements of an agreement, is also 
possible.145   
Aside from the fact that petroleum exploitation involves great risk and is capital 
intensive, a state must also keep public interest in mind when granting access to 
petroleum.146  So, for example, a state must be able to use its regulatory powers to 
prevent abuse of the resource, damage to the environment and human rights abuse.147  A 
state must also use its regulatory power to acquire funds for social and economic 
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development.148  By the same token, a state must be careful not to over-regulate 
petroleum so that potential investors are discouraged.149   
The authorisation used to allocate rights to third parties to exploit petroleum regulates 
the relationship between the state and petroleum companies.150  It further regulates the 
extent to which a state may be involved in the exploitation of its resources and is an 
important consideration when determining the degree of benefit for the nation from the 
exploitation of its resources.151  Before discussing the different authorisations available 
for the allocation of rights to petroleum, it is necessary to look at what factors may be 
taken into account by a state when determining what legal instruments to use. 
4.1 Factors for Determining the Appropriate Authorisation 
The determination of the appropriate system of granting rights to petroleum is a 
political issue.152  The extent to which states are involved in the exploitation of 
petroleum resources depends on the type of authorisation used to authorise exploitation 
of petroleum resources.  This, in turn, depends on various factors, such as risk, the cost 
of exploration and production and the allocation of benefit of exploitation. Each of 
these deserves some further attention.  
In the first place, the allocation of risk is an important issue for a state to take into 
account when deciding what legal instrument to prefer.  While every business 
endeavour will have its risks, the risks involved in petroleum exploitation are 
particularly great.153  Every stage of the exploration and production process faces 
physical, commercial and political risks.154   
(i) One of the biggest physical risks is the uncertainty of petroleum availability.155  
Despite the advanced methods of petroleum exploration, the only certain way to 
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determine whether a trap will contain petroleum, is to drill for petroleum.156  
Furthermore, even if petroleum is found, the quality of the petroleum remains uncertain 
until it has been produced.157  Petroleum exploration and production requires vast 
capital outlays and if the petroleum quality is very low, production will not be feasible.  
It is estimated that nine out of ten exploration efforts result in a loss for the petroleum 
company.158  
(ii) A prevalent commercial risk is the uncertain market price of petroleum.  During the 
exploration phase, neither the state nor the petroleum company has any idea of the price 
at which petroleum will be sold, if found.159  
(iii) Moreover, as experience in Brazil demonstrate well, petroleum exploitation attracts 
political attention.  Governments understandably are not willing to assume great risk 
where it is uncertain whether petroleum actually occurs and can be exploited; but where 
commercially viable petroleum discoveries are made, governments may respond by 
wanting to share in the benefit of the discovery.  In Brazil, after significant offshore 
petroleum discoveries (“Pre-Salt Deposits”)160 were found, the finance minister argued 
for changing the concession system to a production sharing system.161  Launching a 
major overhaul of the legal regime relating to the offshore Pre-Salt deposits and other 
strategic areas, government responded by giving effect to the minister’s proposal.162 
The second factor for determining the appropriate authorisation for granting access to 
petroleum is the cost of exploration and production.163  Petroleum exploitation is capital 
intensive.164  The exploration phase does not generate a profit and is intended solely for 
locating a discovery of petroleum.  If no discovery of petroleum is made, the petroleum 
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company suffers a great loss.165  A discovery of petroleum cannot be guaranteed.  
Furthermore, even if petroleum is found, it may not be a profitable venture to exploit 
the petroleum.166  The authorisation chosen by the state regulating access to petroleum 
resources must address the allocation of risk.  It is also important for the state who 
wishes to participate in the exploitation of petroleum resources to determine to what 
extent it will participate in sharing in the risks of petroleum exploration and production.   
Aside from the risk-issue and the cost of exploration and production, another factor that 
must be taken into account is the allocation of benefit.  When deciding about granting 
of rights to petroleum, states must determine how profits (often called “rents”)167 must 
be shared.168  A host country will want to ensure that it receives some benefit from the 
exploitation of its petroleum, while the entity undertaking the exploitation will seek to 
ensure maximum reward for the risks it bears in carrying out the work.169   
Host countries may lack high-tech equipment and requisite skills to exploit petroleum 
resources.170  As already indicated,171 there are many different, specialised ways of 
exploring for petroleum, but the spread of petroleum resources throughout the world is 
such that most petroleum resources are found in poorer countries.172  The poor host 
countries therefore tend to delegate this task to a petroleum company with the necessary 
equipment and skills.  This requires heavy foreign investment.  If a host country does 
not have the necessary equipment and skill to exploit petroleum resources, it needs to 
attract foreign investors who possess the necessary skill and equipment to do the 
exploitation.  The authorisation that a host country chooses to grant access to petroleum 
needs to be attractive for foreign investors while at the same time ensuring that that not 
all the benefit of these resources are allocated to petroleum company.   
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Finally, it is of utmost importance for oil companies that they acquire good title to the 
petroleum resources.173  Good title enables the holder of a right to encumber it by 
tendering it as security for a loan, thus raising finance.  Good title entails that a 
petroleum company can use the rights that it acquires in respect of petroleum resources 
to raise finance.  For example, in jurisdictions where a petroleum company acquires an 
exclusive right to petroleum resources, the petroleum company can typically encumber 
this right to raise finance.174 
When a country determines what authorisations will be used to grant access to 
petroleum, it must do so with the above factors in mind.  The chosen authorisation must 
be determined with these factors in mind and must attempt to address these factors. 
4.2 Authorisations in respect of petroleum 
With the above factors in mind, the authorisation for allocating rights to petroleum can 
be classified in two groups: exclusive rights and contractual arrangements.  All 
arrangements in these two groups are aimed at accomplishing the same goal, but 
conceptually they differ from one another.175  There are also practical differences 
between exclusive rights and contractual arrangements, pertaining to the level of 
control by the petroleum company and the extent of state involvement.176  The main 
differences between exclusive rights and contractual arrangements pertain to where 
ownership vests and to whom risk and benefit are allocated.  In the case of exclusive 
contracts, ownership of petroleum produced vests in the holder of the exclusive right; 
while the state generally retains ownership of petroleum produced in case of contractual 
arrangements.177  With exclusive rights, the petroleum company will assume most of 
the risk, but if a commercially viable discovery is made, it will enjoy the greatest 
benefit.178  Under contractual arrangements, risks and benefit are usually shared 
between the state and the petroleum company. 
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4.2.1 Exclusive Rights 
Exclusive rights to petroleum are either granted by the state to petroleum companies 
through concessions or through licences.179  Under both a concession and a licensing 
regime, ownership of the petroleum passes to the holder of the concession or licence at 
the well head.180  Once extracted, the government imposes royalty and taxes on the 
produced petroleum.181 
Some authorities consider a licence to be a type of modern concession.182  There are, 
however, subtle differences.  Concessions are typically used in underdeveloped or 
unstable legal systems.  With concessions, host states are more likely to impose 
obligations on petroleum companies to use local employment, provide training and 
transfer technology.183   
4.2.1.1 Concessions 
Concession regimes are used by nearly half of all countries world-wide.184  Notable 
examples include the United Kingdom and the United States.185  Brazil is another 
example,186 as is Norway.187  Here, the concession regime still applies to areas other 
than the Pre-Salt Deposits.188 
There are mainly two types of concessions:  traditional concessions and modern 
concessions.189  The traditional concession is the oldest type of petroleum arrangement 
between a government and petroleum companies.  Traditional concessions were 
typically quite large, sometimes granted over the whole country, and were usually 
granted for a very long period.190  They operated mostly in favour of the petroleum 
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company.191  The host country assumed very little risk as regards petroleum 
exploitation, but enjoyed very little benefit.192  Normally, all that the host country 
gained were concession costs and specified taxes.193  The modern concession also 
grants an exclusive right over a specified area to the holder of the concession, but the 
area is typically smaller and the concession is granted for a shorter period.194  As with 
traditional concessions, the host country only benefits through fees, taxes and royalty.195 
A concession therefore grants the holder thereof the exclusive right to explore for and 
produce petroleum within a specified area for a specified period of time.196  The 
petroleum company carries the risks associated with exploration and production while 
the state is paid compensation through royalty and taxes.197  Ownership of petroleum in 
situ typically remains vested in the state and only passes to the petroleum company at 
the wellhead.198 
Concessions typically take the form of concession agreements, which contains the 
terms and conditions upon which the concession is granted.199  Concession agreements 
are not merely administrative instruments and are therefore not capable of unilateral 
amendment by the host state.200  Despite this, the host state retains considerable liberty 
to modify those terms that are fixed by legislation, although in practice a stable 
investment environment motivates states not to abuse this prerogative.201 
4.2.1.2 Licencing 
The licencing regime is used today in many countries, including the United Kingdom, 
Norway, Russia, the Netherlands, Denmark and Namibia.202  Some jurisdictions refer to 
a lease regime, rather than a licensing regime.203  A licence is an authorisation granted 
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to a petroleum company by the state which entitles the petroleum company to exploit 
petroleum over a certain area for a certain period of time.204  It may either authorise the 
petroleum company to explore for petroleum or to produce petroleum, or both.205  A 
licence fee or royalty, or both a licence fee and a royalty, is normally paid to the state in 
exchange for the licence.206   
Licence conditions are normally reflected in national legislation.  Nevertheless, many 
jurisdictions (such as the United Kingdom) consider a licence to be a contractual 
relationship between the host state and the petroleum company.207 Although the 
regulatory context is normally reflected by considerable degrees of state discretion as to 
the conditions of the licence, the underlying contractual relationship means that the 
licence conditions may not be changed unilaterally by the state.208    
4.2.2 Contractual Arrangements 
Contractual arrangements can be classified as either risk-bearing or non-risk-bearing.209 
This categorisation indicates whether the contractor bears the financial responsibility of 
exploring for and producing petroleum.210  With non-risk-bearing contracts (such as a 
pure service contract), the contractor’s activities are funded, regardless of the 
outcome.211  With a risk-bearing contract (such as a production-sharing contract), the 
contractor has to invest its own funds to exploit the petroleum under the contract.212  A 
risk-services contract on the other hand is a risk-bearing service contract – a 
combination of a risk-bearing and service contract.213   
4.2.2.1 Production Sharing Contracts 
A production-sharing agreement is concluded between a petroleum company or a 
consortium of petroleum companies and the state.214  Ownership of the petroleum 
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resources remains vested in the state,215 who hires a petroleum company as contractor to 
conduct exploration and production operations in exchange for a share from the 
revenues received from the produced petroleum or a share in the produced petroleum, 
or both.216  The state may be a party, either as itself (through government) or through a 
state authority or the national oil company.217       
Under a production-sharing agreement, a petroleum company (or consortium) is 
granted the right to explore for and produce petroleum within a specified area and for a 
limited time.218  The petroleum company carries the bulk of the financial risks of 
exploration and production.219  The production sharing contract provides for the 
percentage of production which the petroleum company may keep as compensation for 
services performed.220  The exploration, development and operating costs incurred by 
the petroleum company are recouped by the company by selling a percentage of post-
royalty production known as “cost oil”.  The remaining oil is known as “profit oil”, the 
production of which is shared between the parties in accordance with the formulae 
defined in the agreement and applicable legislation.221  Ownership of the petroleum, 
however, only passes to the petroleum company at the delivery or export point, as it is 
defined in the agreement.222  
In some instances the national oil company may opt to participate in the consortium as 
an interest holder in the contract, in which case it will contribute part of its profits as 
“share capital” to the consortium.223  Often, the state has the cost of its initial 
contribution “carried” by the petroleum companies.224  This free-carry is later repaid by 
the state to the petroleum company from its future profits under the production-sharing 
contract.225  This is a viable arrangement where the host country does not have the 
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financial or technical capabilities to contribute to the exploitation of the petroleum 
resources.             
The production-sharing contract has appealed to growing nationalist states in post-
colonial areas.226  Retaining formal ownership of the petroleum resources is an 
important factor for countries keen on protecting sovereignty over their petroleum 
resources.227  The benefit it actually receives, however, may not necessarily be more 
than under other systems.228  Even the free-carry that it may receive has to be repaid out 
of its profit share.  In Russia, for example, the initial enthusiasm with which the state 
embraced the production-sharing regime quickly turned into dissatisfaction because of 
the unsatisfactory nature of the actual profit-sharing during times of high energy prices.  
Steps were then taken by the state to reassert control over its petroleum.229      
Proper negotiation is key in a production-sharing agreement.  If the state does not wish 
to participate, the petroleum company will try to bargain a greater share.230  If the state 
wishes to participate, it must try to negotiate the most favourable arrangement with the 
petroleum company.  The state is also put in a potential position of conflict: since it 
shares directly in the profits, it has to be careful not to place its desire for high profits 
above other interests, such as environmental interests.231   
4.2.2.2 Service Contracts 
Where service contracts apply, petroleum at all times vest in the state,232 unless the 
service contract stipulates that the petroleum company is entitled to a share.233  The 
state may approach petroleum companies to conduct exploration and production 
services within a specified area and for a specified period.  A service contract is then 
concluded between the state and the petroleum company for these services.234  Service 
contracts are typically used in countries with substantial capital at their disposal, but 
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where there are strong elements of nationalism, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
Iran.235  They are also used quite often in the United States.236 
There are two types of service contracts.  The first is a pure service contract.  Under 
pure service contracts, a petroleum company is contracted to perform certain services as 
defined in the services agreement.  In return, the state pays a petroleum company a 
fee.237  The role of the petroleum company is that of a mere contractor.238  Pure service 
contracts are rare and the more prominent example is the Iranian buy-back 
arrangements.239  In terms of these arrangements, the petroleum company funds the 
investment costs and implement the exploration and production under a service contract 
entered into with the local or state-owned company.  The oil company in return receives 
remuneration from the sale of petroleum.240  Recently, as part of a politically sensitive 
reconstruction of the oil industry, certain regions of Iraq have used pure service 
contracts.241   
The second type of service contract is a risk services contract and is specifically 
designed for developing petroleum reserves.242  It is most widely used in Latin 
America.243  Under this type of contract, the petroleum company carries the costs and 
risks of all exploration and development of the petroleum resources.244  If no petroleum 
is found, then the petroleum company is not compensated.245  However, if petroleum is 
found and can be produced in commercial quantities, the expenses and operating costs 
incurred by the petroleum company will be treated as a loan by the petroleum company 
to the state.246  This may be recovered in various ways, including payments in cash or a 
share of the marked value of the produced petroleum.247 
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4.3. Allocation Regimes and Access 
The method for allocating rights to petroleum is a significant issue in evaluating a 
petroleum regime.248  It is necessary to distinguish between an allocation regime and 
legal instruments used to grant access to petroleum resources.  Allocation regimes refer 
to the systems within which access to petroleum is granted.  So, while the 
authorisations used to grant access to petroleum resources deal with what rights to 
petroleum is granted, allocation regimes deal with how these rights are granted.249  
Within a particular allocation regime, different instruments are used to grant access to 
petroleum.250  The allocation regime under which a state negotiates the right 
authorisation is important to the state’s efforts to reap the benefits of its petroleum 
resources.251  The allocation regimes generally resort under one of two types, namely 
open-door systems or licencing rounds.252   
With an open-door system, petroleum companies obtain rights to exploit petroleum by 
negotiating with the state.  Interested parties may at any time submit an expression of 
interest in respect of a specific area.253  The petroleum company and the state then enter 
into negotiations as to the terms and conditions upon which the rights to search for and 
extract petroleum are to be granted.254  Normally, there is no predetermined set of 
criteria upon which rights are to be granted.  As a result, states have wide discretion 
whether to grant rights to petroleum and the terms and conditions upon which those 
rights are to be granted.255 
Licensing rounds either take the form of auctions or an administrative procedure based 
on a predetermined set of criteria.  Where licensing rounds take the form of 
administrative procedures, licenses are allocated through an administrative process 
based on a predefined set of criteria.256  With auctions, licences are awarded to the 
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255  Tordo, Johnston and Johnston (note 144) at 14. 
256  Tordo, Johnston and Johnston (note 144) at 12. 
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highest bidder.  Biddable items vary from country to country, for example in some 
countries everything is negotiable, while in other countries licences are awarded based 
on the work programs submitted.257 
5. Concluding Remarks 
States have discretion where to vest ownership and control of their petroleum resources.  
The first step in determining whether a regulatory framework for petroleum resources is 
designed in such a way that petroleum resources is exploited for the benefit of the 
nation as a whole, is to determine who has ownership and control of these resources. It 
is posited in the following chapters that in developing countries such as South Africa 
and Namibia, private ownership of petroleum resources is not a viable option, as this 
would vest the benefit of these resources in a small handful of individuals.  
Once the theoretical model for determining ownership of petroleum resources in any 
given jurisdiction has been identified, the next step is to look at how access to 
petroleum resources is granted. Access to petroleum resources flows from the 
ownership of petroleum resources.  Two basic questions form the backbone of any 
regulatory framework of petroleum, namely, (i) where ownership of petroleum is vested 
and (ii) how access to petroleum resources is granted. These questions are interrelated: 
the choice of ownership-model influences how access is granted. All other aspects of 
petroleum regulation flow from this point.   
In keeping with the purpose of this thesis to evaluate the ability of legal frameworks for 
petroleum exploitation in Namibia and South Africa to ensure that the nation derives 
the benefit from the exploitation of the petroleum resources of these two countries, this 
chapter described the allocation procedures for rights to petroleum.  It is important for a 
regulatory framework for petroleum resources to ensure that a balance is struck 
between the interests of the international oil company doing the exploration and 
production and the interests of the host nation, represented by the host government.   
The state’s choice on how access to its petroleum resources is authorised and awarded 
is important in ensuring that the benefit of the resources accrues to the nation.  There 
                                                          
257  Tordo, Johnston and Johnston (note 144) at 12. 
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are different options available to a state to grant access to petroleum resources.  What 
option the state eventually chooses, depends on various factors.  Most importantly, each 
system allocates risk and benefit differently.  Under exclusive rights, the greatest risk 
falls to the petroleum company, but the petroleum company also enjoys the greatest 
benefit when commercial quantities of petroleum are found.  With contractual 
arrangements, the allocation of risk and benefit is determined under the contractual 
arrangement between the state and the petroleum company.  A sound knowledge of the 
allocation os risks and the available authorisations for allocating access to petroleum is 
necessary on the one hand for the state to make the right decision as to how to grant 
access to petroleum and on the other hand to inform public debate on what types of 
authorisations are best for the host country.258 
This chapter discussed the general approaches to ownership of and control over 
petroleum and how states exercising control over petroleum resources grant access to 
these resources to petroleum companies.  It focused on how states that assume control 
over its petroleum resources grant access to these resources to petroleum companies.  
Various factors important for determining the appropriate framework for granting 
access to petroleum resources were discussed. To evaluate the South African and 
Namibian petroleum regimes, it is important to understand the basic aspects of different 
systems for allocating access to petroleum resources, as well as the factors that play a 
role in choosing a system.  The instruments used in South Africa and Namibia are 
discussed next. 
                                                          
258  Radon (note 133) at 61. 
 
 
PART B:   
LAW AND PRACTICE:  REGULATION OF 
UPSTREAM PETROLEUM IN SOUTH 
AFRICA AND NAMIBIA 
 
Hitherto the attempt has been to explain the possible ownership and control models for 
petroleum resources,1 and how access to petroleum resources are created in various 
jurisdictions,2 in creating a point of departure for the discussion that follows. It is now 
necessary to discuss the ownership and control of unsevered3 petroleum in South Africa 
and Namibia and how access to petroleum resources is granted.   This part of the thesis 
deals with the regulation of petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia and the 
role of the state in the regulation of petroleum in these two countries.  It also discusses, 
in Chapter Nine, how the role of the state as regulator of petroleum resources is limited.  
The limitation of state control over petroleum resources is vital in ensuring 
transparency and accountability in the petroleum industry.   
South Africa and Namibia both may have viable quantities of petroleum resources.  The 
petroleum industries of both countries, however, are in their infancy.  Now is an 
opportune time to consider whether the regulatory frameworks for petroleum resources 
in these two countries can appropriately deal with possible growth in their petroleum 
industries.  
The first step in determining and evaluating the regulatory framework for petroleum 
extraction is to determine the ownership and control models in respect of petroleum 
resources in South Africa and Namibia.  Such models form the basis of the regulatory 
framework for petroleum resources.  Another crucial aspect, discussed in what follows 
below, is the type of authorisation used by the state to grant access to petroleum 
resources. Using the identified ownership and control models as points of departure, the 
                                                          
1  Chapter Three above.   
2  Discussed in Chapter Four.   
3  This thesis is, in general, only concerned with petroleum that has not yet been severed from the 
land.     
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rest of this thesis evaluates the different regulatory measures flowing from the model of 
ownership of and control over petroleum resources.   
This part also focuses on the how the legislative framework for petroleum resources 
ensures that some benefit is derived from the exploitation of these resources by the 
people of South Africa and Namibia.  Because of the framework for granting access to 
petroleum prevailing in South Africa and Namibia – granting of rights and licences – 
the state carries very little risk with regard to petroleum exploitation, but, as agent of its 
people who ultimately own the resource, also receives very little benefit if petroleum is 
found.4  It is therefore important that other measures be put in place to ensure that some 
benefit of the petroleum resources, if found, flows back into the country.  In Namibia 
and South Africa, there are primarily two ways of ensuring that the people of these two 
countries benefit from its petroleum industry; first, the state levies royalty and taxes on 
the petroleum company in respect of its petroleum operations; and second, various 
socio-economic empowerment measures are put in place.   
This part concludes with a discussion of how the state’s authority to exercise control 
over petroleum resources is limited.  Here, the principle of just administrative action 
and the control over corruption is discussed.  The focus is on how this links in with the 
petroleum industry and how it promotes accountability and transparency within the 
regulatory framework for petroleum resources.  .         
 
 
                                                          
4  See Chapter Four and Chapter Seven above.   
 
 
Chapter Four:  
CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR 
REGULATING OWNERSHIP OF AND 
CONTROL OVER PETROLEUM 




This chapter builds upon the groundwork of the previous two chapters by 
contextualising the general principles and rules discussed there for South African and 
Namibia respectively.  Henceforth for the remainder of the thesis, the discussion is 
focused on South African and Namibian petroleum law.1   
The main purpose of a legislative framework in respect of petroleum “…is to provide 
the basic context for and the rules governing petroleum operations in the host country; 
to regulate them, as they are carried out by both domestic, foreign and international 
enterprises; and to define the principal administrative, economic and fiscal guidelines 
for investment activity in the sector.”2  The primary purpose of this chapter is to 
determine the regulatory framework for the ownership of, control over and access to 
petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia.  The other aspects – environmental,   
fiscal and socio-economic empowerment – are covered in Chapters Six, Seven and 
Eight below.   
                                                          
1  Most of the discussion regarding the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 
2002 and the ownership of mineral and petroleum resources have focused on minerals only.  
However, the same discussions may be applied to petroleum resources as well.   
2  Onorato WT Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) Washington 
The World Bank at 3. 
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The secondary purpose of this Chapter is to place the regulatory framework for 
petroleum within the South African and Namibian legal systems.  The paragraphs 
below therefore set out the position as regards ownership of, control over and access to 
petroleum resources in the two countries.  This exposition informs the further 
discussion of the function of the South African and Namibian states in respect of these 
resources.  This is achieved by determining the exact role that the state plays in 
regulating access to petroleum resources by looking at the powers granted to the state 
and the limitations imposed on the state in respect of petroleum resources.   
The discussion of the different models of ownership of petroleum above, and the basic 
rules applicable3 highlighted the two main conceptual extremes, namely that of private 
ownership and state ownership.  The general trend across the globe (with the most 
prominent exceptions being the United States of America and Canada) is that 
ownership of petroleum vests in the state.4  Namibia follows this trend and vests 
ownership and control of petroleum resources in the state.  South Africa follows a 
different approach and vests ownership of petroleum resources in the nation as a whole, 
with the state as custodian controlling these resources on behalf of the people.5  The 
different approaches of the two countries, whose legal systems are otherwise largely 
similar,6 is better understood by an understanding of the history of the regulation of 
minerals in South Africa and Namibia, provided in Chapter One above.  The reason 
why knowledge of the historic regulation of minerals is necessary, is that for the most 
part, petroleum was not treated separately but as resorting under mineral resources.  As 
such, petroleum has historically escaped dedicated legislative attention in South Africa 
and Namibia. 
Despite the apparent difference between South Africa and Namibia with regard to 
where ownership of petroleum resources vests, both countries recognise the need to 
ensure that the exploitation of the countries’ petroleum resources are for the benefit of 
the nation as a whole.  Whether this is actually achieved will depend on the regulatory 
                                                          
3  See Chapter Three above.  
4  Taverne B An Introduction to the Regulation of the Petroleum Industry: Laws, Contracts and 
Conventions International Energy and Resources Law and Policy Series (1994) London Graham 
& Trotman Limited at 11.   
5  Section 3(1) of the MPRD Act.   
6  See Chapter One above.   
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framework for petroleum resource exploitation, determined primarily by the specific 
legislation dealing with petroleum, .   
In view of the above, this chapter discusses the current constitutional and legislative 
framework for the regulation of petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia in 
general.  The remainder of the thesis looks at specific aspects of the framework for 
petroleum resources in these two countries and how the elements of transparency, 
accountability and balance of interests feature in this framework.   
2. Current Policies and Regulatory Frameworks 
Namibia vests ownership of and control over all natural resources (including 
petroleum) in the state.7  In South Africa, the line between private and state ownership 
of petroleum resources is blurred.  The legislature opted for a model of custodianship 
over petroleum resources, rather than vesting ownership of petroleum resources in the 
state.  The state, however, is vested with control over petroleum resources.  
Nevertheless, the right to exploit petroleum has predominantly been reserved for the 
state since the middle of the twentieth century.8  Under the new regulatory framework, 
however, petroleum resources also fall under the custodianship of the state.  The effect 
to which that has influenced or changed the state’s control over these resources is 
discussed in more detail below.   
It is important for any company wishing to invest in a country’s petroleum resources to 
have a clear understanding of the basic framework governing petroleum resources.9  
For this reason, it is important for the regulatory framework for petroleum resources to 
be clear and transparent.  Every basic petroleum law should deal with certain key 
issues.  These include the role of the government and the national petroleum company, 
types of rights to petroleum and how these rights are granted, the different stages of 
                                                          
7  Article 100 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990; section 2 of the Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1991.     
8  See Chapter One above.   
9  Alramahi M Oil and Gas Law in the UK (2013) West Sussex Bloomsbury Professional Limited at 
§1.27. 
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exploitation, environmental requirements, financial aspects, dispute resolution, the role 
of national courts and fines and penalties.10   
By way of outlining the regulatory frameworks for petroleum resources in South Africa 
and Namibia for the discussion below, the following may be noted:  First, regulation of 
the upstream petroleum industry, in particular access to the resource, is discussed in 
Chapter Five below. In South Africa petroleum exploitation is primarily regulated by 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resource Development Act11 (“MPRD Act”).  In Namibia, 
the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act12 (“Petroleum Act”) deals primarily 
with the exploitation of upstream petroleum resources. Second, additional 
environmental obligations are prescribed in a further layer of legislation, discussed in 
Chapter Six below: the South African National Environmental Management Act13 and 
the Namibian Environmental Management Act14 attach further obligations to a private 
company’s access to petroleum resources to ensure that the resource is exploited for the 
benefit of the nation as a whole in the light of the right to a clean environment.  Third, 
imposition of royalty form part of the regulatory framework. In Namibia, the Petroleum 
Act deals with this aspect too, while in South Africa the Minerals and Petroleum 
Royalty Act15 is the applicable statute. This is discussed in Chapter Seven.  Fourth, the 
petroleum industry operates within a wider framework for socio-economic 
empowerment, discussed in Chapter Eight.  Finally, the state’s role as regulator of the 
industry and the resource, its powers and discretions are discussed below in Chapter 
Nine, with reference to the right to fair and reasonable administrative action, the right 
to information and the prohibition of corrupt practices in respect of petroleum 
resources.   
It is necessary first, however, to obtain clarity on exactly how petroleum resources in 
South Africa are controlled and administered.  To answer this, the framework for 
petroleum resources and the implications thereof on ownership of and control over 
petroleum resources need to be discussed.   
                                                          
10  Alramahi (note 9) at §1.46.  See also Chapters Five, Six and Seven below.   
11  Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002. 
12  Petroleum Act. 
13  National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. 
14  Environmental Management Act 7 of 2007. 
15  Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act 28 of 2008. 
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2.1 The Constitutional Framework 
Upon gaining independence in 1990, Namibia immediately adopted a new Constitution, 
namely the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990 (“Namibian Constitution”).  
South Africa shortly followed suit and, after its first democratic election in 1994, 
adopted first an interim Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
200 of 1993, and then a final Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“South African Constitution”).  The South African Constitution and 
Namibian Constitution overlap in material aspects, but also differ in other important 
aspects.   
Both countries’ Constitutions recognise the injustices of the past as a result of 
colonialism, racism and apartheid and the resultant need for an open and democratic 
society under the leadership of a government freely elected by the people.16  The 
Constitutions of these two countries therefore establish the countries as sovereign and 
democratic states based on the supremecy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law.17  
By designating the Constitution as the supreme law of these two countries, all laws of 
these countries and conduct of its people, including that of the Executive, Judiciary and 
Legislative, must be consistent with the Constitution and the obligations imposed by 
the Constitutions must be fulfilled.18 
2.1.1 Treatment of Natural Resources  
One of the most important differences for purposes of this thesis is that the Namibian 
Constitution vests all natural resources in the state, unless they are otherwise lawfully 
owned.19  The South African Constitution does not even have a remotely similar 
vesting clause, but deals with natural resources in a different manner.  It recognises, for 
example, the right of every person to have the environment protected, for the benefit of 
present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that 
inter alia secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
                                                          
16  See the Preamble to the South African Constitution and the Namibian Constitution. 
17  Article 1 of the Namibian Constitution and section 1 of the South African Constitution.   
18  This is expressly stated in the South African Constitution in section 2 and implied in the Namibian 
Constitution by virtue of article 1(6).   
19  Article 100 of the Namibian Constitution.   
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while promoting justifiable economic and social development.20  Furthermore, in its 
clause dealing with property,21 it states that property may be expropriated only in terms 
of a law of general application for a public purpose of in the public interest and subject 
to payment of compensation.22  The South African Constitution, in the property clause, 
expressly states that “public interest includes … reforms to bring about equitable access 
to all South Africa's natural resources.”23   
There thus appears to be a stark difference in the emphasis that the two Constitutions 
place on control over natural resources.  While the Namibian Constitution seems to vest 
natural resources entirely under state control (which makes sense in the light of the 
history of the treatment of natural resources in Namibia, discussed above in Chapter 
One), the South African Constitution has a more nuanced and socially sensitive 
approach to natural resource management.  However, although the vesting clause in the 
Namibian Constitution has often been read to mean that the state owns all natural 
resources, the High Court of Namibia recently dismissed such a reading.24  The Court 
held that this vesting clause should be read subject to the other provisions of the 
Namibian Constitution, most notably the article that states that “[a]ll power shall vest in 
the people of Namibia who shall exercise their sovereignty through the democratic 
institutions of the State.”25  The Court stated that, in its view, the state’s resource 
ownership should not be equated with the rights of a private owner.  Instead, natural 
resources should be seen as belonging to the people either as res publica or res omnium 
communes.26  In concluding this part of its decision, the Court stated that natural 
                                                          
20  Section 24 (b)(iii) of the South African Constitution.   
21  Section 25 of the South African Constitution.  Section 25(1) states that “[n]o one may be deprived 
of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property.” 
22  Section 25(2) of the South African Constitution.   
23  Section 25(4)(a) of the South African Constitution.   
24  Rostock CC and Another v Van Biljon 2011 (2) 751 (HC) at [8]. 
25  Article 1(2) of the Namibian Constitution.  See Rostock CC and Another v Van Biljon 2011 (2) 
751 (HC) at [9]. 
26  The Court argued here that “belonging” does not mean the same as “owning”, referring to Gaius 
Digesta 1.8.1.pr: “nullius in bonis esse creduntur. These things belonged to no one in ownership 
(nullius in bonis esse creduntur), but were those of the whole world (ipsius enim universitatis esse 
creduntur). In the discussion of the things belonging to the whole world no reference was made to 
the concept ownership. This could have created the indication that these goods were res omnium 
communes. It was therefore not the property of a person or common property of all persons. It 
was, at the most, available for common use (universitates).”  See Rostock (note 24) at [10] – [11].  
Van den Berg HM Mineral Rights under Development: A Comparative Study of the Evolving 
 
Chapter Four 
Current Constitutional and Legislative Frameworks for Regulating Ownership of and Control over  






resources are simply administered by the state (through its incumbent elected 
government)27 on behalf of the Namibian people.28  Therefore, even under the 
Namibian Constitution, it may be argued that natural resources should be managed in a 
socially responsive manner.29 
The first important aspect of the constitutional frameworks of Namibia and South 
Africa in respect of petroleum is that these resources should be managed so as to give 
effect to the interests of the people of these two countries.  All legislation should adhere 
to this obligation.  By imposing this obligation on states, acting through elected 
governments, the South African and Namibian Constitutions recognises the interests of 
the people in respect of petroleum and holds governments accountable on a 
constitutional level to its people in managing these resources.   
2.1.2 Entrenchment of Fundamental Rights 
Both Constitutions contain a Bill of Rights, setting out the fundamental human rights 
and freedoms.30  So, for example, the Constitutions recognise the right to life,31 human 
dignity,32 equality and freedom from discrimination33 and property.34  The 
Constitutions also recognise certain freedoms, including the freedom to practice any 
trade or profession.35  One important aspect in which the South African Constitution 
differs from the Namibian Constitution is its treatment of the environment, discussed 
below.  Both Constitutions, however, recognise the fundamental right to just 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Nature of Mineral Rights in South Africa and Namibia (unpublished LLM-thesis, University of 
Cape Town, 2009) at 93 argues that unsevered mineral resources in Namibia must be seen as res 
publica.  See also Mostert H and Van den Berg HM “Roman-Dutch Law, Custodianship, and the 
African Subsurface: The South African and Namibian Experiences” in Zillman DN, McHarg A, 
Bradbrook A and Barrera-Hernandez L (eds) The Law of Energy Underground: Understanding 
New Developments in Subsurface Production, Transmission, and Storage (2014) Oxford Oxford 
University Press at 84. 
27  This part was not added by the Court, but probably should have been.  The State may be defined 
as a legal person consisting of a community of people that live on a particular area of land under a 
specified authority according to common legal rules.  The Government consists of the people and 
bodies exercising authority on behalf of the State.  See Wiechers M Verloren van Themaat 
Staatsreg 2ed (1967) Durban Butterworths at 5 – 6.   
28  Rostock (note 24) at [10]. 
29  See further paragraphs 2.2. and 2.3. below.   
30  Chapter 3 of the Namibian Constitution and Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution. 
31  Article 6 of the Namibian Constitution and section 11 of the South African Constitution. 
32  Article 8 of the Namibian Constitution and section 10 of the South African Constitution. 
33  Article 10 of the Namibian Constitution and section 9 of the South African Constitution. 
34  Article 16 of the Namibian Constitution and section 25 of the South African Constitution. 
35  Article 21(1)(j) of the Namibian Constitution and section 22 of the South African Constitution. 
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administrative action, which is an important right in respect of the regulation of 
petroleum and discussed in more detail later in Chapter Nine. 
The rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights must be respected and upheld 
by all branches of government and, where applicable, all natural and legal persons, and 
are enforceable in a court of law.36  The rights and freedoms in the Bill of Rights of 
both Constitutions may only be limited under certain circumstances.  Under the South 
African Constitution, the rights in the Bill of Rights may only be limited in terms of a 
law of general application and only to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.37  The limitation clause in the Namibian Constitution is more stringent and 
states that the rights or freedoms in the Namibian Bill of Rights may only be limited by 
a law of general application and that the limitation may not negate the essential content 
thereof and may not be aimed at a particular individual.38 
The second important aspect of the constitutional frameworks of Namibia and South 
Africa in respect of petroleum is that any legislation passed in relation to petroleum 
resources must respect and uphold the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people as 
set out in the Bill of Rights.  If a piece of legislation infringes any of these rights of 
freedoms, it must meet the constitutional requirements of limitations of rights and 
freedoms.  By subjecting legislation in respect of petroleum resources to the 
fundamental rights and freedoms set out in the respective Bills of Rights, the interests 
of people (both those applying for and holding rights to petroleum and those affected 
by petroleum exploitation) are further defined.  Furthermore, by making these rights 
and freedoms justiciable, emphasis is placed on the accountability of governments 
towards its people.   
                                                          
36  Article 5 and article 25 of the Namibian Constitution and section 8 of the South African 
Constitution. 
37  Section 36(1) of the South African Constitution.  When limiting a right, all relevant factors must 
be taken into account, including the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the 
limitation, the nature and extent of the limitation, the relationship between the limitation and its 
purpose and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
38  Article 22(a) of the Namibian Constitution.   
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2.1.3 Sustainable Development, Environmental Protection and the 
Constitution 
The right to a clean environment is contained in local legislation and regional, African 
and international documents.39  Domestic and international environmental law is 
underpinned by the notion of sustainable development, which may be understood as 
development that meets the need of the present without jeopardising the ability of 
future generations to meet their needs.40  This definition integrates three features into 
decision-making, namely environmental protection, economic development and social 
upliftment.41   
Sustainable development is expressly referred to in the South African Constitution and 
the Namibian Constitution.42  The concept of “sustainable development” is “a 
fundamental building block around which environmental legal norms have been 
fashioned, both internationally and in South Africa…”43  Both Constitutions deal with 
environmental protection and recognise the need to ensure sustainable development.  
Different emphases are, however, placed on the environment.  In South Africa, for 
example, the environmental right is included in its Bill or Rights and have 
characteristics of all three generations of rights.44  The Namibian Constitution, on the 
other hand, deals with the environment in its chapter on the principles of state policy.45  
The principles cannot be regarded as constitutional rights strictu sensu, but rather 
societal goals.46 
                                                          
39  See Chapter Six below.   
40  See Glazewski J Environmental law in South Africa 2 ed (2005) Durban LexisNexis Butterworths 
at 12–13.   
41  See also Glazewski (note 19) at 13. 
42  Section 24 of the South African Constitution and article 95(1)(l) of the Namibian Constitution.   
43  BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land 
Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) at 144. 
44  Kidd M Environmental Law 2 ed (2011) Claremont Juta & Co Ltd at 21 22; Glazewski J "The 
Environmental Right" in Cheadle D, Davis DM and Haysom N (eds) South African Constitutional 
Law: The Bill of Rights (Service Issue 11 2011) Durban LexisNexis at 19-11. 
45  Article 95 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990. 
46  Naldi G Constitutional Rights in Namibia (1995) Kenwyn Juta at 99.   
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The importance of sustainable development was highlighted in the last few years in 
South Africa when acid mine drainage came under the spotlight.47  In short, acid mine 
drainage is when decant from defunct mines drains into surrounding water resources.48  
The relationship between the extraction of natural resources and the long-lasting effect 
thereof on the environment in the long run came under discussion.49  It also featured 
prominently recently when Shell proposed to employ hydraulic fracturing in the 
environmentally-sensitive Karoo-Basin.50 
The South African Constitution places much greater emphasis on the environment than 
its Namibian counterpart by guaranteeing, in its Bill of Rights, every person’s right to 
an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being.51  Furthermore, every 
person has the right to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and 
future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that prevent 
pollution and ecological degradation,52 promote conservancy53 and secure ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development.54   
Because environmental rights are included in the Bill of Rights, these rights feature 
prominently in South Africa and are entrenched, justiciable rights.55  By implication, 
environmental considerations are afforded appropriate respect and recognition in the 
administrative processes of South Africa.56 This is especially important in the light of 
the fact that petroleum exploitation is regulated by administrative processes.57   
                                                          
47  See for example Sader G “Acid Mine Drainage: The Neighbour Law Implications” (unpublished 
LLB-thesis, University of Cape Town, 2011), available at http://landlawwatch.co.za/projects-
mpl.html [accessed 12.04.2015].    
48  Van Vuuren L "SA Urged to Say "NO" to Instant Wealth and "YES" to Environment" Nov/Dec 
2009 The Water Wheel 21 at 21.   
49  Van Vuuren (note 24) at 21; McCarthy T "The Impact of Acid Mine Drainage in South Africa" 
2011 (107) South African Journal of Science 1. 
50  See Chapter Six below.   
51  Section 24(a) of the South African Constitution. 
52  Section 24(b)(i) of the South African Constitution. 
53  Section 24(b)(ii) of the South African Constitution. 
54  Section 24(b)(iii) of the South African Constitution. 
55  Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region, and Another v Save the Vaal Environment and 
Others 1999 (2) SA 709 (SCA) at 719; BP / MEC (note 43) at 142.   
56  Director: Mineral Development / Save the Vaal (note 40) at 719. 
57  See Chapter Seven above.   
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The constitutional environmental right echoes the concept of “sustainable 
development” and has been quoted with approval by South African courts.58  Petroleum 
exploitation can no longer only be guided by pure economic principles.59  Any 
development, including development in the petroleum industry, must meet present 
needs without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.60  
The potential profitability of a petroleum exploitation project cannot overshadow the 
impact that it may have on the environment.61 
While the Namibian Constitution does not place the same amount of emphasis on the 
environment than its South African counterpart, it was the southern African forerunner 
in including a provision dealing with the environment in its Constitution.62  The 
Namibian Constitution does not entrench the right to the environment in its Bill of 
Rights, but lists it under the principles of state policy.63  The Constitution states that the 
state must actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter 
alia, policies aimed at the maintenance of ecosystems, essential ecological processes 
and biological diversity of Namibia and utilisation of living natural resources on a 
sustainable basis for the benefit of all Namibians.64   
The principles of state policy are not by themselves legally enforceable by any court, 
but serve as a guide to government in making and applying laws to give effect to the 
fundamental objectives contained in the principles.  The courts are, however, entitled to 
consider the principles in interpreting any laws based on them.65  As a result, Namibia 
does explicitly recognise environmental rights as human rights.66  Under international 
law, however, the citizens of Namibia have a right to a clean environment.  This is 
                                                          
58  See BP / MEC (note 43)  at 144; HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism and Others 2006 (5) SA 512 (T) at 518. 
59  See also BP / MEC (note 43) at 144. 
60  HTF Developers (note 43) at 518.   
61  BP / MEC (note 43) at 144. 
62  Glazewski (note 20) at 71.   
63  Article 95 of the Namibian Constitution.   
64  Article 95(1)(l) of the Namibian Constitution. 
65  Article 101 of the Namibian Constitution. 
66  See also for example Ruppel O "Human Rights and the Environment" in Ruppel OC and Ruppel-
Schlichting K (eds) Environmental Law and Policy in Namibia (2011) Windhoek 
OrumbondePress.na & Welwitschia Verlag Dr. A. Eckl, Essen at 219-220.   
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supported by the fact that the Namibian legislature has put various provisions in place 
through which the right to a clean environment may be enforced.67         
2.2 Aims and Objectives of the Legislative Framework for the 
Regulation of Petroleum Resources 
The balance of interests between the nation and petroleum companies is clearly 
described in the preamble68 and objects69 of the MPRD Act, which mirror and amplify 
each other.  The objectives of the MPRD Act are couched in broad terms and give the 
MPRD Act a socio-economic dimension, as well as an international dimension.  The 
objectives of the MPRD Act70 can be grouped into three main categories, namely those 
relating to the state’s interests, those relating to the interest of the people of South 
Africa, and those relating to the interests of (foreign and local) investors in the industry.   
Objectives expounding the state’s interest include the first stated point in the MPRD 
                                                          
67  See Chapter Six below.   
68  The Preamble reads as follows: 
“RECOGNISING that minerals and petroleum are non-renewable natural resources; 
ACKNOWLEDGING that South Africa's mineral and petroleum resources belong to the 
nation and that the State is the custodian thereof; 
AFFIRMING the State's obligation to protect the environment for the benefit of present 
and future generations, to ensure ecologically sustainable development of mineral 
and petroleum resources and to promote economic and social development; 
RECOGNISING the need to promote local and rural development and the social upliftment 
of communities affected by mining; 
REAFFIRMING the State's commitment to reform to bring about equitable access to South 
Africa's mineral and petroleum resources; 
BEING COMMITTED to eradicating all forms of discriminatory practices in the mineral 
and petroleum industries; 
CONSIDERING the State's obligation under the Constitution to take legislative and other 
measures to redress the results of past racial discrimination; 
REAFFIRMING the State's commitment to guaranteeing security of tenure in respect of 
prospecting and mining operations; and 
EMPHASISING the need to create an internationally competitive and efficient 
administrative and regulatory regime…”  
The fourth statement and the eighth statement in the Preamble only refer to the minerals industry.  
The fourth statement recognises the need to promote local and rural development and the social 
upliftment of communities affected by mining, while the eighth statement reaffirms the State’s 
commitment to guaranteeing security of tenure in respect of prospecting and mining operations.  
The effect of this on the petroleum industry is discussed elsewhere.  Suffice it to say that in the 
light of the general tenor of the MPRDA and the objects explicitly stated, the fourth statement and 
the eighth statement in the Preamble should be read as applying to both minerals and petroleum. 
69  Dealt with in detail in section 2 of the MPRD Act.   
70  The objects are the same for mineral resources.  Since this thesis only focuses on petroleum 
resources, the discussion will be limited to the application of the MPRD Act in respect of 
petroleum resources.    
Chapter Four 
Current Constitutional and Legislative Frameworks for Regulating Ownership of and Control over  






Act’s preamble, i.e. to recognise the internationally accepted right of the State to 
exercise sovereignty over all the petroleum resources within the Republic of South 
Africa.71  This is in line with international law as discussed in Chapter Three above.  
The second objective which also resorts in this category, is to give effect to the 
principle of the State's custodianship of the nation's petroleum resources.72  This is 
achieved in section 3(1), which vests mineral and petroleum resources in the 
custodianship of the state.  The eighth objective of the MPRD Act recognises the effect 
of mineral and petroleum exploitation on the environment.  This objective is aimed at 
giving effect to section 24 of the South African Constitution by ensuring that the 
nation's petroleum resources are developed in an orderly and ecologically sustainable 
manner while promoting justifiable social and economic development.73  This objective 
is discussed in more detail in chapter 9 below. 
In the category of giving effect to the rights of the people of South Africa belongs the 
MPRDA’s third objective: to promote equitable access to the nation's petroleum 
resources to all the people of South Africa.74  The fourth objective supplements further: 
to expand, in a substantial and meaningful manner, opportunities for historically 
disadvantaged persons – which includes women – to enter the petroleum industries and 
to benefit from the exploitation of the nation's petroleum resources.75  Also in line with 
the other objectives of socio-economic empowerment is the sixth objective, namely to 
promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all South 
Africans,76 and the ninth objective, namely to ensure that holders of production rights 
contribute towards the socio-economic development of the areas in which they are 
operating.77 These objectives are discussed in more detail in Chapter Eight below.  
Finally, the fifth objective also belongs here: to promote economic growth and the 
development of petroleum resources in South Africa.78  The second (custodianship) and 
eighth (environmental protection) objectives, mentioned under “state interests” above 
                                                          
71  Section 2(a) of the MPRD Act. 
72  Section 2(b) of the MPRD Act. 
73  Section 2(h) of the MPRD Act. 
74  Section 2(c) of the MPRD Act. 
75  Section 2(d) of the MPRD Act. 
76  Section 2(f) of the MPRD Act. 
77  Section 2(i) of the MPRD Act. 
78  Section 2(e) of the MPRD Act. 
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also resort here, as the interest of the people in the endorsement of these objectives are 
also undeniable.  
In the category dealing with the interests of investors belong the MPRDA’s seventh 
objective, of providing for security of tenure in respect of exploration and production 
operations.79  Security of tenure deals with the nature and content of rights to 
petroleum.  It is important for an investor to know what type of right it obtains, what it 
can do with this right, how the state can cancel or suspend the right and how the right 
may be renewed or transferred or how an interest in the right may be granted.  This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Five below.   
The Petroleum Act of Namibia does not contain any social obligations on the state 
similar to those of the MPRD Act.  In fact, the Petroleum Act does not explicitly state 
any objectives.  On a first reading, it does not appear as if the state has a duty to ensure 
the optimal exploitation of petroleum resources for the benefit of the people of 
Namibia. The purposes of the Petroleum Act can be deduced from the substantive 
provisions of the Act and judicial opinion, though. The High Court of Namibia for 
instance has recognised that the state, through its elected government, must administer 
natural resources on behalf of the people of Namibia.80  Furthermore, there are various 
other indicators throughout the Act and in other documents related thereto that the state 
is under an obligation to ensure that petroleum resources are exploited for the benefit of 
all the people.  For example, the Petroleum Act sets out standard terms and conditions 
relating to preferential employment, skills development and procurement.81  The 
Petroleum Act, unlike its South African counterpart, does not expressly refer to the 
promotion of security of tenure.  This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five below.   
                                                          
79  Section 2(g) of the MPRD Act. 
80  See earlier with reference to Rostock (note 24). 
81  It is a standard term and condition of any petroleum licence that the holder thereof must, in the 
employment of employees, give preference to Namibian citizens who possess appropriate 
qualifications for the purpose of the operations to be carried out in terms of the licence.  Section 
14(a) of the Petroleum Act.  Furthermore, holders must carry out training programmes to 
encourage and promote the development of such citizens in such person’s employ.  Section 14(b) 
of the Petroleum Act.  A holder of a licence must also, after due regard being had to the need to 
ensure technical and economic efficiency, make use of products, equipment and services which 
are available in Namibia.  Section 14(c) of the Petroleum Act.  Holders must co-operate with other 
persons involved in the petroleum industry to enable such citizens to develop skills and 
technology to render services in the interest of such industry in Namibia.  Section 14(d) of the 
Petroleum Act.   
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Before a petroleum licence is issued in Namibia, the Minister must enter into a 
petroleum agreement with the persons concerned.  The agreement may not be in 
conflict with the provisions of the Petroleum Act.82  This agreement must set out the 
terms and conditions, apart from the standard terms and conditions contained in the 
Act, subject to which the licence will be issued.83  Importantly, however, is that the 
agreement must not be interpreted in such a way that a party to the agreement is 
absolved from any requirement laid down by law, nor does it absolve a holder from 
applying for, and obtaining, any permit, licence, approval, permission or other 
document required by law, such as an ECC.84   
Aside from the above, the Namibian Ministry of Mines and Energy also published a 
White Paper on Energy in 1998.85  This White Paper addresses both the upstream and 
the downstream energy sectors in Namibia.  With regard to the upstream sector, it states 
that the primary challenge for upstream petroleum policy is identifying and developing 
petroleum resources for the benefit of Namibia as a whole.86  To achieve this, the 
Namibian upstream policy should aim to attract adequate investment in exploration and 
production, especially in the light of the limited capacity of the local petroleum 
exploration and production sector.87  
Despite the fact that the Petroleum Act does not contain any explicit indication of its 
objectives, a proper reading of the Act shows that there are various provisions that 
oblige the state to ensure that the nation benefits from petroleum resources.  This if 
further amplified by the provisions of the White Paper on Energy and the interpretation 
of the High Court.  It is clear, however, that on the one hand, petroleum must be 
developed and exploited for the benefit of the Namibian people, but on the other hand, 
investors must be attracted and sufficiently protected. 
                                                          
82  Any provisions inconsistent with the Act are deemed to be of no force and effect.  Section 13(1) 
and section 13(4) of the Petroleum Act. 
83  Section 13(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
84  Section 13(5) of the Petroleum Act.   
85  Available at http://www.mme.gov.na/pdf/energy_policy_whitepaper.pdf [accessed 10 July 2013].   
86  Paragraph 3.2.1. of the White Paper on Energy.   
87  Paragraph 3.2.1. of the White Paper on Energy. 
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2.3 Ownership of Petroleum Resources 
According to Onorato, the first essential element of any petroleum law is an assertion of 
state ownership over petroleum resources within its boundaries.  This is consistent with 
international standards and established practice.88 
The South African state, as custodian,89 exercises control over petroleum resources for  
the benefit of the nation as a whole.90  This is enabled by the MPRD Act, which deals 
with the exploration and production of petroleum in South Africa.  This Act is 
applicable to all resources which fall under the definition of mineral and petroleum.91  It 
is regulated by the Department of Mineral Resources through the Minister of Mineral 
Resources.92  Its principle aim is to provide for equitable access to and sustainable 
development of South Africa’s mineral and petroleum resources and for matters 
incidental thereto.93 
The choice of a custodianship model obscures the line between state ownership and 
private ownership of petroleum resources, discussed in Chapter Three above.  The 
MPRD Act introduces a new form of control over petroleum resources, namely 
custodianship, and vests petroleum resources in the nation as a whole.  In doing so, the 
legislature introduced “uniquely South African tools to regulate public resources”.94  
                                                          
88  Onorato WT Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) Washington 
The World Bank at 5. 
89  Under the MPRD Act, petroleum resources vest in the nation and the state is custodian thereof for 
the benefit of the nation. Section 3(1) of the MPRD Act. 
90  Section 3(1) of the MPRD Act.   
91  See Chapter Five, paragraph 2 below for a discussion of the definition of petroleum.   
92  In May 2009, the national cabinet was reorganised.  As a result, the Department of Minerals and 
Energy was divided into two separate departments, the Department of Minerals Resources and the 
Department of Energy.  Each department has its own cabinet minister.  The two new ministers are 
the Minister of Mineral Resources and the Minister of Energy.  A proclamation was made on 22 
June 2009 which transfers the administration, powers and functions of specific legislation to the 
new ministers.  This Proclamation was published as Proclamation 44, 1 July 2009 Government 
Gazette  32367 .  With effect from 1 July 2009, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 of 2002 is administered by the Minister of Minerals Resources.  See item 1.9 
of the Schedule to Proclamation 44, 1 July 2009 Government Gazette  32367 .  Therefore, while 
the MPRD Act still defines Minister as the Minister of Minerals and Energy in section 1, it is now 
administered by the Minister of Mineral Resources.    
93  Long title of the MPRD Act. 
94  Watson D “Ownership of and custodian over unsevered minerals: the impact of the MPRDA” 
(Unpublished LLB thesis, University of Cape Town, 2009) at 24, available at  
www.landlawwatch.co.za [accessed 02.02.2014].  
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The choice elicited various academic responses as to what exactly custodianship 
entails.   
Different theories of the state’s custodianship have been proposed.  Most discussions, 
however, are limited to mineral resources.95  Because mineral and petroleum resources 
are both dealt with in the MPRD Act, the same arguments can be applied to petroleum 
resources.  Some scholars argue that the MPRD Act abolished the cuius est solum 
principle and that ownership of unsevered minerals and petroleum falls to the state.96  
This view is contested by other scholars, who propose a second theory and state that 
what is actually intended by the MPRD Act is that the collective wealth of the mineral 
and petroleum resources in South Africa vest in the nation, but that unsevered minerals 
and petroleum remain vested in the owner of the land.97  In terms hereof, the cuius est 
solum rule has not been abrogated and the landowner remains owner of the minerals 
and petroleum found in or on the land.   
A third theory states that the MPRD Act introduced the concept of public trust and that 
the mineral and petroleum resources are now held in public trust by the state for the 
benefit of the nation.98  The applicability of the public trust concept, which is prevalent 
in the United States, and its possible application in South Africa is questionable.99  The 
role that the public trust doctrine fulfils is already fulfilled in South Africa by the 
                                                          
95  See for example Badenhorst PJ and Mostert H Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1 ed 
(2004, Revision Service 10 2014) Wetton Juta at 13-4 – 13-11; Dale M, Bekker L, Bashall F, 
Chaskalson M, Dixon C, Grobler G and Loxton C South African Mineral and Petroleum Law 
(2005, Service Issue 16 2014) Durban LexisNexis Butterworths at 121; Van den Berg HM 
“Ownership of Minerals under the New Legislative Framework for Mineral Resources” 2009 (20) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 137; Watson (note 94); Van der Schyff E "Who 'Owns' the Country's 
Mineral Resources?  The Possible Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine through the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act" 2008 (4) TSAR 757; Badenhorst PJ "Ownership of 
Minerals in situ in South Africa: Australian Darning to the Rescue" 2010 SALJ 646.  
96  Badenhorst PJ "Exodus of 'Mineral Rights' from South African Mineral Law" 2004 (22) Journal 
of Energy and Natural Resources Law 218 at 223; Badenhorst and Mostert (note 95) at 13-5; 
Badenhorst PJ and Mostert H "Artikel 3(1) en (2) van die Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act 28 van 2002: ŉ Herbeskouing" 2007 TSAR 469 at 476.  See also Badenhorst 
(note 95) at 655–656.   
97  Dale et (note 95) at 121.  See also Watson (note 94) at 13 - 16; Badenhorst (note 95) at 656 - 658.     
98  Glazewski J Environmental law in South Africa 2 ed (2005) Durban LexisNexis Butterworths at 
468; Van der Schyff (note 95) at 765; Watson (note 94) at 23 - 27; Van der Schyff E, "Die 
Nasionalisering van Minerale Hulpbronne" Lente / Spring 2010 Woord en Daad / Word and 
Action 20 at 20; Badenhorst (note 95) at 658–660.       
99  Van den Berg (note 95) at 148.  
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concept of res publica.100  A final theory is that the collective mineral and petroleum 
resources should be considered a res publica and that the state controls these resources 
for the benefit of the nation.101   
Despite the abundance of academic discussion regarding custodianship and its meaning, 
the courts in South Africa have not pronounced themselves clearly on what 
custodianship means.  In an unreported decision of the High Court of Orange Free 
State, the court merely stated that the “fundamental change” to custodianship means 
that “the State has done away with the legal notion of private ownership of mining and 
mineral rights and the State in granting prospecting benefits or permits is not dealing 
with the mineral resources of the public as a holder of common-law rights nor does it 
deal with these minerals as a subject of mineral rights of private persons.”102  In another 
unreported judgment, the same division of the High Court blunty stated that 
custodianship does not mean that minerals are res publica.103  The reasons given by the 
Court are somewhat weak.  The Court states that it is not res publica as nowhere in the 
MPRD Act does it state that mineral resources belong to the state.  The Court compares 
it to fishing resources, which also fall under the custodianship of the state, but states 
that this does not mean that the state owns fishing resources – “[t]he fishing resources 
comprise, simply, the wealth of fish which South Africa can call upon if need be. The 
MPRDA controls the use of the “resource”.104   
In the important case of Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy,105 the 
Constitutional Court refrained from analysing the concept of state custodianship of 
                                                          
100  Van den Berg (note 95) at 155. 
101  Badenhorst and Mostert (note 95) at 13-5; Badenhorst and Mostert (note 9) at 476–478; Van den 
Berg (note 95) at 154 –156.  See also Watson (note 94) at 19 - 22; Badenhorst (note 95) at 660–
661.     
102  De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Regional Manager, Mineral Regulation Free State Region, 
Department of Minerals and Energy and Others [2009] JOL 23667 (O) at 30. 
103  De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd (Orange Free State Provincial 
Division, unreported judgment deliverd on 13 December 2007, case number 3215/06) at [38]. 
104  De Beers / Ataqua (note 103) at [38].  In Van den Berg (note 95) at 151 – 152, it is stated that 
“[t]he argument is not, however, that minerals are res publicae, but rather that the collective 
mineral and petroleum resources of the country is a res publica… When one applies the res 
publica argument to fishing resources, one might argue that the wealth of fishing resources is in 
fact a res publica and that the state controls it as custodian for the benefit of the nation. This does 
not mean that the fish belong to the state in private ownership or that it is the fish that are res 
publicae.” 
105  Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC).   
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mineral (and by extension petroleum) resources.  The court did, however, state that 
assumption of custodianship and the concomitant power to grant what could previously 
have been granted only by holders does not mean that the state acquired ownership of 
rights to mineral and petroleum resources.106  This is repeated later in the judgment 
where the court states that it is not necessary to define custodianship and that, whatever 
custodianship means, “it does not mean that the state has acquired and thus has become 
owner of the mineral rights concerned.”107  By assuming custodianship the state is “a 
facilitator or a conduit through which broader and equitable access to mineral and 
petroleum resources can be realised.”108   
Whatever the correct interpretation is, landowners clearly and importantly no longer 
have a right to exploit the minerals in or under their land; nor can they cause it to be 
exploited.  In fact, the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa has held that “there is 
nothing to be gained by attempts to dissect these concepts and categorise them in terms 
of private law concepts such as ownership.”109  On the contrary, Mostert argues that 
more content needs to be given to the concept of custodianship.110  Without expressing 
a preference for any of the theories, Mostert notes that both the res publica concept and 
the public trust doctrine pursue a shared idea: “if the state were to be the owner of the 
country’s mineral resources, the MPRDA would have authorised it to act as owner.”111  
Instead, the state does not enjoy discretionary use and enjoyment of the resources; the 
MPRDA “is at pains to limit discretionary exercise of state power”.112   
Clearly the introduction of the MPRD Act and the adoption of the notion of 
custodianship allows the state now to control all activities in respect of minerals and 
petroleum, but it has a duty to do so for the benefit of the nation as a whole.113  By 
acting as custodian, the state is expected to demonsrate a “higher duty of care and 
                                                          
106  Agri SA (CC) (note 105) at [68]. 
107  Agri SA (CC) (note 105) at [71]. 
108  Agri SA (CC) (note 105) at [68]. 
109  Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 (5) SA 1 (SCA) at [86]. 
110  Mostert H Mineral Law: Principles and Policies in Perspective (2012) Claremont Juta & Co Ltd 
at 135. 
111  Mostert (note 110) at 135. 
112  Mostert (note 110) at 135. 
113  Badenhorst and Mostert (note 95) at 13-8.   
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degree of responsibility than what can be expected of an owner”.114  As custodian, the 
state can grant rights to exploit petroleum resources to suitable applicants.  These rights 
take the form of reconnaissance rights, exploration rights and production rights.115  
Exploration rights and production rights are limited real rights in respect of land over 
which they are granted.116  The state is under an obligation to ensure that, in granting 
these rights, its duty towards the nation is fulfilled.  In other words, the state must, 
when granting the rights, ensure that the petroleum resources will be exploited to the 
benefit of the nation as a whole. 
Unlike South Africa, Namibia follows the general international trend and vests 
ownership and control of petroleum resources in the state.  As stated above, under the 
Namibian Constitution, all natural resources vest in the state, unless they are otherwise 
lawfully owned.  The High Court of Namibia has interpreted this to mean that these 
resources are either res publica or res omnium communes and that the state (through its 
elected government) must exercise control over natural resources on behalf of its 
people.  Furthermore, the Petroleum Act states that all rights in respect of petroleum 
resources are vested in the state as well.117  In Namibia, therefore, the position is 
clearer: the state controls all petroleum resources and the government must exercise this 
control on behalf of its people.   
2.4 Regulation of Access to Petroleum and the Administration 
of Petroleum Resources 
The second essential element of a petroleum law is an identification of a single 
government agency or competent authority vested with the mandate to implement 
government policy in respect of petroleum resources.  This should preferable be a 
government ministry, acting on behalf of the government, but in some instances this 
may also be a national petroleum company.118 
As custodian, the South African State must ensure that petroleum resources are 
                                                          
114  Mostert (note 110) at 135. 
115  See section 5(1) of the MPRD Act.  See also Chapter Five below.   
116  Section 5(1) of the MPRD Act. 
117  Section 2 of the Petroleum Act. 
118  Onorato (note 2) at 6 – 7. 
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controlled so that the aim and the objectives of the MPRD Act are met.  To do this, the 
state is authorised to grant, issue, refuse, control, administer and manage any technical 
co-operation permit, reconnaissance permit, exploration right and production right in 
respect of petroleum.119  This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five below.  
Furthermore, the State may, in consultation with the Minister of Finance, determine and 
levy any fee or consideration payable under any relevant Act of Parliament in respect of 
petroleum.120  This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven below.   
The Minister must ensure the sustainable development of South Africa's petroleum 
resources within a framework of national environmental policy, norms and standards 
while promoting economic and social development.121  This is discussed in more detail 
in Chapters Six and Eight below.  By promoting sustainable development, which 
encompasses the three pillars of economic development, social development and 
environmental protection,122 the MPRD Act aims at ensuring that the benefit from the 
country’s mineral and petroleum resources is spread over the long-term. 
The MPRD Act provides for a three-tier administration, namely the Minister of Mineral 
Resources, the Director-General of the Department of Mineral Resources and the 
Regional Managers appointed for each region.123  Most decision-making functions are, 
however, assigned to the Minister, with the Regional Managers basically functioning as 
a vehicle for receiving, preliminarily assessing and forwarding applications for permits 
and rights relating to reconnaissance, retention, prospecting and mining to the 
Minister.124 
The MPRD Act places an obligation on the Minister of Minerals and Energy (now the 
Minister of Mineral Resources) to divide the Republic, the sea and the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf into regions.  This must be done by notice in the 
                                                          
119  Section 3(2)(a) of the MPRD Act.  See chapter 8 for a discussion of the nature and content of 
these rights to petroleum.    
120  Section 3(2)(b) of the MPRD Act.  
121  Section 3(3) of the MPRD Act. 
122  Hunter T “Sustainable Socio-economic Extraction of Australian Offshore Petroleum Resources 
through Legal Regulation: Is it Possible?” 2011 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 
209 at 212. 
123  Badenhorst and Mostert (note 95) at 2-2.   
124  Dale et al (note 95) at MPRDA-154. 
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Government Gazette.125  Acting on this mandate, the Minister divided the Republic of 
South Africa and the adjacent sea into the following regions:126 Western Cape, 
Northern Cape, Free State, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, 
Gauteng and North West.  This division was done in accordance with the provincial 
boundaries described in Schedule 1 of the Interim Constitution127 read with section 103 
of the Final Constitution.128  The sea129 and continental shelf130 adjacent to and opposite 
regions with a coastline are included in the regions in the manner set out in the 
notice.131 
The Director-General of the Department of Mineral Resources must perform certain 
functions as set out by the MPRD Act.  This includes receiving monthly reports, annual 
financial statements and annual reports from a holder of a right to minerals.132  
Furthermore, the Director-General must designate officers of the Department to 
perform the administrative functions of the Minerals and Petroleum Board.133  The 
Director-General must also confirm or set aside orders, suspensions and instructions 
issued by persons authorised by the MPRD Act to do so.134   
A Regional Manager must be appointed by the Director-General for each region, 
subject to the laws governing the public service. The Regional Manager must perform 
the functions delegated or assigned to him under the MPRDA or any other law.135  The 
Director-General must also hear administrative appeals from the Regional Managers.136   
The Minister may delegate most powers, or assign any of the duties conferred under the 
MPRD Act to the Director-General, the Regional Manager or any officer.137  A 
                                                          
125  Section 7 of the MPRD Act. 
126  Government Notice 564 in Government Gazette 26319 (RG 7960) of 30 April 2004. 
127  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993. 
128  The South African Constitution. See Dale et al (note 95) at MPRDA-153. 
129  As defined in section 1 of the Sea-Shore Act 21 of 1935. 
130  Referred to in section 8 of the Maritime Zones Act 15 of 1994. 
131  Dale et al (note 95) at MPRDA-153. 
132  Section 28(2) of the MPRD Act.   
133  Section 68 of the MPRD Act.   
134  Section 93(2) of the MPRD Act.   
135  Section 8 of the MPRD Act. 
136  Section 96(1)(a) of the MPRD Act.   
137  Section 103(1) of the MPRD Act. See Badenhorst and Mostert (note 9) 2-5 – 2-12 for a detailed 
discussion of the delegation of authority in terms of the MPRDA and PAJA and the possible 
constitutional challenges that it might hold. 
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delegation or assignment must be in writing. Further delegation of these powers or 
duties is possible, so long as it is authorised by the Minister and such further delegation 
is in writing.138  The power to make regulations or deal with any appeal cannot be 
delegated. 
The Minister may designate an organ of State or an agency wholly owned and 
controlled by the State or a company belonging to State to perform the functions 
contained in the MPRD Act139 in respect of petroleum.140  A designated state-owned 
petroleum company is a common feature around the world.141  In line with this, the 
Minister designated the South African Agency for the Promotion of Petroleum 
Exploration and Exploitation (Pty) Ltd (“Petroleum Agency SA”).142  Petroleum 
Agency SA is funded by money appropriated by Parliament.143  It may, with the 
approval of the Minister, provide technical and consulting services and assistance to 
equivalent agencies of other countries.144     
The functions of the Petroleum Agency SA are prescribed by the MPRD Act.145  Its 
functions are very wide146 and includes, for example, promoting onshore and offshore 
exploration for and production of petroleum.147  Petroleum Agency SA must also 
receive applications for reconnaissance permits, technical co-operation permits, 
exploration rights and production rights in the prescribed manner148 and evaluate such 
applications and make recommendations to the Minister.149  It must monitor and report 
regularly to the Minister in respect of compliance with such permits or rights.150  The 
Petroleum Agency SA must also bring to the attention of the Minister any information 
in relation to the exploration and production of petroleum which is likely to be of use or 
                                                          
138  Section 103(2) and (3) of the MPRD Act. 
139  The functions referred to in Chapter 6 of the MPRD Act. 
140  Section 70 of the MPRD Act. 
141  Alramahi (note 9)  at §1.17. 
142  Government Notice 733, 18 June 2004. Government Gazette 26468.  See also Badenhorst and 
Mostert (note 95) at 19-3; Dale et al (note 95) at MPRDA-489.   
143  Section 72(1) of the MPRD Act. 
144  Section 72(2) of the MPRD Act.  
145  Section 71 of the MPRD Act. 
146  Only the most important functions for purposes of thesis are discussed here.   
147  Section 71(a) of the MPRD Act. 
148  Section 71(b) of the MPRD Act. 
149  Section 71(c) of the MPRD Act. 
150  Section 71(d) of the MPRD Act. 
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benefit to the State.151         
In South Africa, therefore, the state as custodian is placed in complete control over 
unsevered petroleum resources.  This control is exercised with the assistance of the 
Petroleum Agency SA.  The Minister, however, remains responsible for regulating 
access to petroleum.  Both the Minister and the Petroleum Agency SA are 
administrative bodies and must act reasonably and fairly in the exercise of their 
functions.  This is discussed in Chapter Nine below. 
The Namibian Constitution and the Petroleum Act is clear on the role of the state with 
regard to petroleum resources: these resources, and all rights to these resources, vest in 
the state.  The state may grant private petroleum companies rights to search for and to 
extract petroleum.152  The Minister of Mines and Energy is the relevant line minister 
who is charged with controlling access to petroleum resources.    
Under the Petroleum Act, the Minister of Mines and Energy must appoint a 
Commissioner of Petroleum Affairs153 (“Commissioner”) and a Chief Inspector of 
Petroleum Affairs154 (“Chief Inspector”).  These two officers must exercise or 
perform, subject to the direction and control of the Minister, the powers, duties and 
functions conferred or imposed upon any of them by or under the provisions of the 
Petroleum Act and such other functions as may be imposed upon them by the 
Minister.155  The Commissioner and Chief Inspector are assisted by such other officers 
as may be designated by the Permanent Secretary: Mines and Energy for such 
purpose.156 
Furthermore, in Namibia there is also a state petroleum company, the National 
Petroleum Corporation of Namibia (Pty) Ltd (“Namcor”).  Namcor is a private 
company with the Government of the Republic of Namibia as its sole shareholder.157  
                                                          
151  Section 71(f) of the MPRD Act. 
152  Section 2 of the Petroleum Act.    
153  Section 3(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act. 
154  Section 3(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act 
155  Section 3(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
156  Section 3(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
157  Namcor “About Us” available at http://www.namcor.com.na/about-us [accessed 02.02.2014]. 
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Namcor was given statutory recognition in the Petroleum Act.158  The functions of 
Namcor are described in section 8 of the Petroleum Act.159  It includes, for example, 
carrying out, whether on its own or together with any other person, reconnaissance 
operations or, in terms of a licence, exploration operations or production operations160 
or carrying out on behalf of the State any reconnaissance operations, exploration 
operations or production operations together with any other person.161  Namcor must 
also assist the Commissioner on his request in the exercise by him of his powers, duties 
and functions under the Petroleum Act.162   
The Minister of Mines and Energy can require Namcor to carry out reconnaissance 
operations, exploration operations and production operations, whether on its own or 
together with any other person.163  The White Paper on Energy recognises that, 
although Namcor is empowered to carry out upstream activities, the Namibian 
Government prefers that these activities are carried out by the private sector.164  It does 
state, however, that where the state does compete with other players in petroleum 
exploration and production, “this will be by means of commercialised state companies, 
treated on the same terms as other players.”165  It is uncertain whether the White Paper 
envisages Namcor to be the “commercialised state company”, but in practice this will 
probably be the case, as Namibia does not have any other state company involved in the 
petroleum industry.   
Aside from requiring Namcor to conduct upstream activities, the Minister may also 
require Namcor to carry out any process of refining, or disposing of, or dealing in, 
petroleum or any by-products of such petroleum, or to take part in any such process 
carried out by any other person.166  Finally, the Minister may require Namcor to advise 
or otherwise assist the Minister in relation to, or in any negotiations in relation to any 
                                                          
158  Section 8 of the Petroleum Act. 
159  Section 8(1)(b)–(d) of the Petroleum Act. 
160  Section 8(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act. 
161  Section 8(1)(c) of the Petroleum Act. 
162  Section 8(1)(d) of the Petroleum Act. 
163  Section 8(1)(a)(i) of the Petroleum Act. 
164  Paragraph 3.2.4. of the White Paper on Energy. 
165  The White Paper on Energy at par 3.2.4.1.   
166  Section 8(1)(a)(ii) of the Petroleum Act. 
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petroleum agreement, or in relation to the discovery of, petroleum or the development 
of petroleum resources.167  
Although the Petroleum Act empowers Namcor to operate widely in the petroleum 
sector, including exploration and production, refining, and liquid fuels marketing, 
Namcor has thus far limited its activities to promotion of Namibian acreage.  This 
includes data gathering and marketing, technical management of exploration activities 
and the rendering of advice to the Ministry of Mines and Energy.168  Despite this, 
however, it has become practice for the Ministry to require Namcor to be a party 
(normally a minority party) to a petroleum licence.169 
3. Concluding Remarks 
The South African choice of a custodianship model – with its obvious view of 
enhancing the welfare of its people – may be laudable as opposed to the more sterile 
approach in Namibia.  However, Namibia’s approach to the regulation of its petroleum 
resources has been consistent for about a century, whereas its South African counterpart 
has gone through various changes in focus.  The consistency and predictability of the 
Namibian approach may in the long run be more sustainable and welfare enhancing 
than the South African approach, which seems to focus on more immediate goals.170  In 
order to attract investment, “a clear, simple, and nondiscretionary legal and regulatory 
framework is a crucial factor.”171 
The preceding two chapters sketch the backdrop against which the analysis in the 
following section is to take place. Chapter Two provides a general overview of the 
basic aspects of the petroleum industry. Chapter Three discusses the general rules 
governing ownership of, control over and access to the resource. It deals with the rule 
of international law that states have permanent sovereignty over the natural resources 
                                                          
167  Section 8(1)(a)(iii) of the Petroleum Act. 
168  See The White Paper on Energy at par 3.2.   
169  Koep & Partners “Namibia” Africa Oil and Gas published by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer at 
2, available at 
http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/SiteWide/News_Room/Insight/Africa_ENR/ 
Namibia/Namibia%20oil%20and%20gas.pdf [accessed 26.032015]. 
170  Barma NH, Kaiser K, Le TM and Viñuela L Rents to Riches?  The Political Economy of Natural 
Resource-led Development (2012) Washington The World Bank at 104. 
171  Barma et al (note 170) at 104. 
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within their boundaries territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and continental 
shelf.172  The entitlements and obligations of states are set out there very generally.173  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the general regulatory 
framework within which petroleum exploitation takes place.  It emphasises the two 
main legislative spheres for petroleum resources, namely the Constitution as the 
supreme law and the MPRD Act and Petroleum Act as the general legislative measures 
dealing with petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia respectively.  This 
chapter provides a general overview of the ownership of petroleum resources within a 
constitutional sphere.  It also discusses the aims and objectives of the specific 
legislation dealing with petroleum resources and the regulation of access to petroleum 
resources.  It therefore provides the skeleton of the petroleum regulatory framework in 
South Africa and Namibia.  The following four chapters will give further content to this 
regulatory framework by discussing the specific aspects of access to and control over 
petroleum resources in these two jurisdictions.  Chapter Nine then discusses how the 
state’s role in regulating petroleum resources is limited.   
                                                          
172  See paragraph 2 of Chapter Three above.   










Chapter Five:   
PROMOTING SECURITY OF TENURE: THE 
MEANING OF PETROLEUM AND THE 




Uncertainty in the regulatory framework for oil and gas is identified as one of the major 
challenges facing emerging players in this industry.  Such uncertainty may be the result 
of a lack of transparency regarding the procedure through which rights to petroleum are 
granted.1  This chapter examines the measures employed by the state to grant petroleum 
companies access to the petroleum resources of Namibia and South Africa, in an 
attempt to give content to the nature and substance of access to petroleum. If the nature 
and substance of access to petroleum is transparent, security of tenure of holders of 
rights to petroleum is promoted.  This in turn promotes accountability within a 
petroleum regulatory framework in that the rights and obligations of the holder and the 
state are clearly defined.  Transparency and accountability work together toward 
protecting the interests of both the petroleum company and the citizens of the host 
nation.   
In South Africa and Namibia, ownership of and control over petroleum resources are 
vested in the state.2  The state is the conduit through which access to petroleum 
resources is granted.3  The state grants access to these resources to petroleum 
companies by granting rights to search for (by means of reconnaissance and exploration 
operations) and extract (by means of production operations) petroleum resources.  The 
                                                          
1  PricewaterhouseCoopers From Promise to Performance: Africa Oil and Gas Review (2012), 
available at https://www.pwc.com/en_NG/ng/pdf/pwc-africa-oil-and-gas-review.pdf [accessed 
13.04.2015]. 
2  See Chapter Four above.   
3  See Chapter Four above at par 2.3. 
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exploitation of petroleum resources creates a “symbiotic relationship” between the host 
state and the petroleum company; both are dependant on each other for exploitation of 
petroleum to occur.4  The petroleum company needs the state in order to gain access to 
the resource, while the state needs to petroleum company to exploit this resource.5  This 
relationship between the state and a petroleum company is primarily determined by the 
nature and content of the rights granted to a petroleum company by the state.6  In turn, 
the nature and content of these rights are for the most part determined by the legislation 
dealing with the upstream petroleum industry in these two countries, namely the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 33 of 2002 (“MPRD Act”) in 
South Africa and the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1991 
(“Petroleum Act”) in Namibia.   
The MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act only apply to resources that qualify as 
petroleum under the definitions provided in these two Acts.  The basic characteristics of 
petroleum were discussed in Chapter Two above, but the legislature in South Africa 
and Namibia has ascribed a specific definition for petroleum.  It is therefore necessary, 
before the nature and content of rights to petroleum are discussed, to determine what 
exactly is meant by petroleum.  The rights to petroleum that this chapter discusses can 
only be awarded in respect of resources that fall under the definition of petroleum in the 
two Acts. 
2. The Meaning of Petroleum in terms of South African 
and Namibian Legislation 
Chapter Two above discusses the geological understanding of petroleum.  The South 
African MPRD Act and the Namibian Petroleum Act, however, only apply to resources 
which fall under the statutory definition of petroleum.  In line with other statutory 
                                                          
4  Hunter T Legal Regulatory Framework for the Sustainable Extraction of Australian Offshore 
Petroleum Resources: A Critical Functional Analysis (unpublished PhD-thesis, University of 
Bergen, 2010) at 74 – 75. 
5  Hunter (note 2) at 75. 
6  See Chapter Five above. 
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definitions for petroleum,7 the MPRD Act follows a wide meaning of petroleum.  
Petroleum is defined as: 
“any liquid, solid hydrocarbon or combustible gas existing in a natural 
condition in the earth's crust and includes any such liquid or solid 
hydrocarbon or combustible gas, which gas has in any manner been returned 
to such natural condition, but does not include coal, bituminous shale or 
other stratified deposits from which oil can be obtained by destructive 
distillation or gas arising from a marsh or other surface deposit”8 
The phrase “any liquid, solid hydrocarbon” contains a grammatical oversight, and 
should rather read “any liquid or solid hydrocarbon”, since petroleum includes any 
liquid hydrocarbon and not any liquid in general.9  This is supported by the fact that the 
second line of the definition correctly refers to “any such liquid or solid hydrocarbon”.10  
This is further supported by the geological definitions of petroleum discussed in 
Chapter Two above, statutory definitions for petroleum in other jurisdictions, and the 
definition of “natural oil” under the repealed Natural Oil Act.11   
The Namibian Petroleum Act also has a wide definition of petroleum, similar to the 
definition of petroleum in the MPRD Act.  It defines petroleum as: 
                                                          
7  So, for example, section 1 of the United Kingdom Petroleum Act 17 of 1998 defines petroleum as 
“...includ[ing] any mineral oil or relative hydrocarbon and natural gas existing in its natural 
condition in strata; but does not include coal or bitumenous shales or other stratified deposits from 
which oil can be extracted by destructive distillation.”  The Australian Petroleum and Geothermal 
Energy Act of 2000, Part 1 Division 3, defines petroleum as “…a naturally occurring substance 
consisting of a hydrocarbon or mixture of hydrocarbons in gaseous, liquid or solid state but does 
not include coal or shale unless occurring in circumstances in which the use of techniques for coal 
seam methane production or in situ gasification would be appropriate or unless constituting a 
product of coal gasification (whether produced below or above the ground) for the purposes of the 
production of synthetic petroleum.”   
8  Section 1 of the MPRDA, sv “petroleum”. 
9  Dale M, Bekker L, Bashall F, Chaskalson M, Dixon C, Grobler G, Loxton C, Ash M and Cox A 
South African Mineral and Petroleum Law 1 ed (2005 Service Issue 16 2014) Durban LexisNexis 
Butterworths at MPRDA-71, where the authors refer to the unqualified reference to “any liquid” 
as a “patent error”.  See also Badenhorst PJ and Shone R "'Minerals', 'Petroleum' and 'Operations' 
in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002: A Geologist as Devil's 
Advocate for a Change?" 2008 Obiter 33 at 45.   
10  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-71.   
11  The Natural Oil Act 46 of 1942 defines “natural oil” as “...any liquid or solid hydrocarbon or 
combustible gas existing in a natural condition in the earth’s crust, but shall not include coal or 
bituminous shales or other stratified deposits from which oil can be obtained by destructive 
distillation, or gas arising from marsh or other surface deposits.”  See section 1 of the Natural Oil 
Act 46 of 1942, sv “natural oil”.   
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“any liquid or solid hydrocarbon or combustible gas existing in a natural condition 
in the earth's crust and includes any such liquid or solid hydrocarbon or 
combustible gas which has in any manner been returned to such natural condition, 
but shall not include coal, bituminous shales or other stratified deposits from which 
oil can be obtained by destructive distillation, or gas arising from marsh or other 
surface deposits”12 
The definitions of petroleum in the MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act exclude certain 
substances.  Although these substances are explicitly excluded, they will be excluded in 
any event, since they do not meet the requirements for petroleum.  So, for example, 
coal, bituminous shale and other stratified deposits from which oil can be manufactured 
when employing a process of destructive distillation13 do not qualify as petroleum.  The 
product formed by the process of destructive distillation is also excluded from the 
definition of petroleum because it does not occur in a natural condition.  Coal falls 
under the definition of “mineral”, since it is a solid substance, primarily of 
carbonaceous material, which occurs naturally in the earth and is formed by a 
geological process.14   
Scholarly interpretations of the definition of petroleum further exclude certain products: 
Petroleum derived by Sasol Limited through destructive distillation of coal is 
excluded.15  Furthermore, petroleum stored in disused mine shafts do not occur in its 
natural condition and is therefore excluded from the definition of petroleum.16  Oil 
produced from oil shale is also excluded.17  Although Dale et al do not explain these 
exclusions, it is most likely because these substances do not occur naturally, but has to 
be manufactured through a process of destructive distillation of coal or oil shale.  For 
example, oil shale is shale that contains organic substances that produces liquid 
                                                          
12  Section 1 of the Namibian Petroleum Act, sv “petroleum”.   
13  “Destructive distillation” may be defined as “decomposition of a substance (as wood, coal, or oil) 
by heat in a closed container and collection of the volatile products produced”.  See Merriam 
Webster “Destructive Distillation” available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
destructive%20distillation [accessed 02.02.2014].   
14  Hyne N Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production 2 ed 
(2001) Tulsa PennWell Corporation at 464.  See also Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-71.   
15  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-72. 
16  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-72.   
17  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-72. 
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hydrocarbons on distillation.18  It does not contain free petroleum.19  Oil shale is 
therefore a stratified deposit from which oil can be manufactured when employing a 
process of destructive distillation and is excluded from the definition of petroleum.      
The inclusion of gaseous hydrocarbons in the definition of petroleum is limited to 
combustible natural gas.  Marsh gas, as well as all other non-combustible gas, falls 
under the definition of “mineral” as long as the gas occurs naturally and is formed by or 
subjected to a geological process.20  It is therefore presumed that all non-combustible 
gas will rather fall under the definition of mineral if the requirements for a mineral are 
met.21  
Whether a hydrocarbon exists in a solid, liquid or gaseous state depends on the 
molecular composition, pressure and prevailing reservoir temperature.22  Liquid 
hydrocarbons are generally referred to as natural oil, while gaseous hydrocarbons are 
referred to as natural gas.23  Natural gas can be classified as either associated natural 
gas, which refers to natural gas generated in association with some type of oil, or non-
associated natural gas, which refers to natural gas generated in association with coal.24  
The adjective “natural” indicates that the hydrocarbons exist in natural conditions, as 
opposed to manufactured hydrocarbons.25  Only hydrocarbons that exist in a natural 
condition qualify as petroleum. 
The recent application by Royal Dutch Shell for exploration rights in respect of shale 
gas in the Karoo highlights the importance of a proper understanding of petroleum.26  
One commentator opined that shale gas does not fall under the definition of petroleum, 
as it is  an unconventional gas “…that has to be subjected to an artificial hydrological 
                                                          
18  Allaby M (ed) Oxford Dictionary of Earth Sciences, (2008) Oxford, Oxford University Press at 
402; Jones C (ed) Illustrated Dictionary of Geology, (2010) New Delhi, Lotus Press at 135.     
19  Allaby (note 14) at 402. 
20  See section 1 of the MPRD Act, sv “mineral” for the definition of mineral.  See also Dale et al 
(note 9) at MPRDA-72 and Badenhorst and Shone (note 9) at 42 – 45.   
21  See section 1 of the MPRD Act, sv “mineral” for the definition of mineral.  See also Dale et al 
(note 9) at MPRDA-72 and Badenhorst and Shone (note 9) at 42 – 45. 
22  Taverne B Petroleum, Industry and Governments: A Study of the Involvement of Industry and 
Governments in the Production and Use of Petroleum 2 ed (2008) at 1; Lowe JS Oil and Gas Law 
in a Nutshell 5 ed (2009) at 1.   
23  Lowe JS Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell 5 ed (2009) at 1. 
24  Taverne (note 18) at 1.   
25  Taverne (note 18) at 1. 
26  See Chapter One above. 
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fracturing process before becoming a liquid, solid, hydrocarbon or combustible gas” 
and therefore falls outside the definition of petroleum in the MPRD Act.27  This 
statement, however, is not further qualified or discussed in any detail.  If this statement 
is correct, Shell’s entire application would be invalid. The crux of this statement seems 
to be that shale gas does not occur naturally but is “created” by hydraulic fracturing.   
Shale gas is an unconventional natural gas that is produced from shale formations, 
which function as both source and reservoir rock for the shale gas.28  Shale is a common 
sedimentary rock composed of clay-sized and silt-sized particles.29  It has thin layers 
and is able to split into small chips.30  Shale gas is unconventional because it is not 
produced like traditional gas.  The shale reservoir requires stimulation or other 
expensive recovery techniques to remove the gas from the shale.31  Hydraulic fracturing 
therefore does not create the shale gas, but merely releases it from its natural conditions 
by stimulating the reservoir.  Shale gas is composed primarily of methane gas, normally 
90% or more methane.32  As a result, it is combustible.33   
Shale gas thus complies with the two requirements for petroleum, in that it is a 
combustible gas and exists in a natural condition (inside the shale rock).  Importantly, 
shale gas is not manufactured or created by the process of hydraulic fracturing, but 
merely released from the reservoir rock through hydraulic fracturing.  Shale gas 
therefore falls under the definition of petroleum in the MPRD Act.  As a result, to 
                                                          
27  Bekker F Review of the Draft EMP in Support of an Application for Gas Exploration in the 
Western Karoo (Central Precinct) by Shell Exploration Company (2011) Report Prepared in 
Response to the Publication for Public Comment of Shell's EMP, Stilbaai Clean Stream 
Environmental Services at 37. 
28  Arthur JD et al Evaluating the Environmental Implications of Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale Gas 
Reservoirs (2008) Research Paper Prepared by ALL Consulting at 3; Downey M Oil 101 (2009) 
at 178; US Energy Information Administration “What is Shale Gas and Why is it Important?” 
available at http://geology.com/energy/shale-gas/ [accessed 02.02.2014]; American Petroleum 
Institute “Facts About Shale Gas” available at http://www.api.org/policy/exploration/ 
hydraulicfracturing/shale_gas.cfm [accessed 02.02.2014]; Ground Water Protection Council and 
ALL Consulting Modern Shale Gas Development in the United States: A Primer (2009) 
Washington DC Office of Fossil Energy, US Department of Energy at ES-1 and 7, available at 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/epreports/shale_gas_primer_2009.pdf 
[accessed 08.06.2011].    
29  Hyne NJ Nontechnical Guide to Petroleum Geology, Exploration, Drilling, and Production 2 ed 
(2001) at 525;  
30  Jones C (ed) Illustrated Dictionary of Geology (2010) New Delhi Lotus Press at 170.   
31  Downey M Oil 101 (2009) at 178. 
32  Arthur (note 24) at 3; Downey (note 27) at 178. 
33  See also Badenhorst PJ, Mostert H and Dendy M "Minerals and Petroleum" in Joubert WA (ed) 
LAWSA Vol 18 2 ed (2007) at par 14. 
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exploit shale gas, the company interested in doing so must apply for one of the rights to 
petroleum, discussed below.34 
Comparing the definition of petroleum in both the MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act, it 
becomes apparent that both contain the same two requirements for a substance to 
qualify as petroleum.35  First, it must be a liquid hydrocarbon or solid hydrocarbon or 
combustible gas; and second, it must exist in a natural condition in the earth’s crust or 
must have returned to a natural condition in the earth’s crust.36  Substances meeting 
these requirements will be regulated by the MPRD Act in South Africa and the 
Petroleum Act in Namibia.   
3. The Nature and Substance of Rights to Petroleum 
A petroleum legislative framework designed to foster development should be clear 
about how petroleum operations are regulated.  This entails including relevant 
provisions within the legislation clearly setting out how access to petroleum resources 
is granted.37  The MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act regulate access to petroleum 
resources in South Africa and Namibia respectively.  Access to these resources is 
obtained by applying for the relevant rights, which are issued by the state.  These rights 
are either for the searching for petroleum (through reconnaissance or exploration 
operations) or for the extraction of petroleum (through production operations).     
3.1 Instruments for Granting Access to Petroleum 
In Namibia the state grants licences in respect of petroleum, while in South Africa the 
state grants rights.  The question is, however, whether there is any difference in the 
two.  Both are more administrative in nature than contractual (such as production 
sharing contracts and service contracts).38  Both grant exclusivity to the holder thereof 
                                                          
34  See paragraph 3.1.1. below.   
35  Badenhorst and Shone (note 5) at 45. 
36  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-71 argue that the reference to “gas” in the phrase “…which gas 
has…” is a patent typographical error which must be read as pro non scripto.  The second 
requirement is that the liquid hydrocarbon, solid hydrocarbon or natural gas must exist in a natural 
condition in the earth’s crust, or must have returned to a natural condition in the earth’s crust.  
This second part of the second requirement is not limited to gas only, as the definition in section 1 
of the MPRD Act suggests.     
37  Onorato WT Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) Washington 
The World Bank at 9. 
38  See Chapter Two above. 
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(although the extent of exclusivity differs), who also becomes owner of the resources 
once they are extracted.  The holder, however, also carries most of the risk involved in 
working the right or licence.  The state carries very little risk but also enjoys very little 
benefit.  Both are granted over a specific area for a specific period and retains a strong 
regulatory flavour.39   
The effect is therefore that there is very little difference in the types of rights granted in 
respect of petroleum in South Africa and Namibia.  There are, however, slight 
differences in the content of these auhtorisations, which are discussed below. 
3.2 The Nature of Rights to Petroleum 
Authorisations to explore for and to produce petroleum raise vexing issues, such as as 
whether these authorisations confer contractional rights and obligations or whether they 
amount to proprietary interests.40  The answers lie in the statutes creating the 
authorisations and the context within which authorisations are granted.41  Sometimes 
the statute is clear on the nature of the right, as in South Africa where exploration and 
production rights are characterised as limited real rights.42  Mostly, though, the nature 
of the rights must be inferred, as is the case in Namibia.43 
By nature, rights can be personal or real.44  In Ex Parte Geldenhuys,45 the court held that 
to determine whether rights are personal or real, one must look at the correlative 
obligation imposed by the right.  If that correlative obligation imposes a burden on the 
land (or amounts to a subtraction from the dominium), the corresponding right is real 
and registrable.  If the correlative obligation is merely an obligation binding a person, 
the corresponding right is personal.46  This test, which became known as the 
“subtraction from the dominium”-test, has been applied in various forms by different 
courts in South Africa.  In Lorentz v Melle,47 for example, the court held that for a right 
to be real, it had to impose a physical curtailment on the owner’s use and enjoyment of 
                                                          
39  See also Chapter Three above. 
40  Crommelin M “The Legal Character of Resource Title” (1998) AMPLJ 57 at 57. 
41  Crommelin (note 33) at 57. 
42  See section 5(1) of the MPRD Act.  See also Crommelin (note 33) at 57. 
43  The Petroleum Act is silent as to nature of exploration and production licences.   
44  Badenhorst, Mostert and Dendy (note 29) at par 116. 
45  Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155  
46  Geldenhuys (note 38) at 162.   
47  Lorentz v Melle 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T). 
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the land.48  In Cape Explosive Works Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd,49 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in South Africa held that two requirements must be met before a right is real: 
(1) the person who created the right must intend to bind not only the present owner of 
the land, but also successors in title; and (2) the nature of the right or condition must be 
such that the registration of it results in a subtraction from the dominium of the land 
against which it is registered.50 
The question of whether authorisations to search for and to extract petroleum are real or 
personal in nature by extension deals with the question whether these rights are capable 
transferred or encumbered by mortgage bonds.51  This is important for investors, who 
may want to use these rights to rise capital.  Furthermore, if rights are real in nature, 
then it also raises issues of possible expropriation if these rights are cancelled or 
suspended.  If the rights are real, investors who are granted these rights enjoy the 
additional protection that the relevant Constitutions offer in respect of property.52  
Under the MPRD Act, exploration and production rights in South Africa are limited 
real rights in respect of the petroleum and the land to which the petroleum relates.53  
Holders of exploration and production rights are obliged to register these rights in the 
Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office.54  A limited real right is only created 
upon registration in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office.55  Once it is 
registered, exploration and production rights are binding on third parties.56  Any 
transfer, cession, letting, subletting, alienation, encumbrance by mortgage or variation 
of an exploration right must be lodged for registration at the Mineral and Petroleum 
Titles Registration Office.57      
The MPRD Act is silent as regards the nature of reconnaissance permits and technical 
co-operation permits.  Technical co-operation permits are mere permits and 
                                                          
48  Lorentz (note 40) at 1052F. 
49  Cape Explosive Works Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd 2001 (3) SA 569 (SCA) 
50  Cape Explosive Works (note 42) at 578D – E.   
51  Badenhorst, Mostert and Dendy (note 29) at par 116. 
52  Section 25 of the South African Constitution, 1996 and article 16 of the Namibian Constitution.  
See, however, the discussion in paragraph 3.3.1.1 below.   
53  Section 5(1) of the MPRD Act.  See also Badenhorst, Mostert and Dendy (note 29) at par 116.   
54  Section 82(2)(a) and section 86(2)(a) of the MPRD Act.   
55  Section 2(4) of the Mining Titles Registration Act 16 of 1967. 
56  Section 2(4) of the Mining Titles Registration Act. 
57  Section 11(4) of the MPRD Act.   
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administrative in nature.  They are unique to South Africa and to the MPRD Act, but 
are similar to agreements entered into prior to the MPRD Act.58  They do not constitute 
a subtraction from the dominium and are therefore not limited real rights but personal 
rights.59   
As with technical co-operation permits, reconnaissance permits are personal to the 
holder thereof.60  The fact that reconnaissance permits and technical-co-operation 
permits are personal in nature is further supported by the fact that they are not 
transferable and may not be encumbered.    
In South Africa, therefore, exploration and production rights are limited real rights.  
Holders of these rights may encumber the rights to raise capital61 and also enjoy the 
protection of the constitutional property clause.  Reconnaissance permits and technical 
co-operation permits, on the other hand, are personal in nature.  They cannot be 
encumbered to raise capital.  In principle, these permits are not considered 
constitutional property for purposes of the constitutional property clause.  However, the 
tendency is to regard permits as constitutional property if they have a commercial value 
and once they have been vested in and acquired by the holder according to the relevant 
statutory requirements.62    
Unlike its South African counterpart, the Namibian Petroleum Act is silent as to the 
nature of rights to petroleum.  When one applies the subtraction from the dominium test 
to reconnaissance licences, exploration licences and production licences, it may be 
argued that these licences are, in fact, limited real rights.  Reconnaissance, exploration 
and production operations take away the rights of the landowner by granting the holder 
of licences in respect of these operations authority to enter and use the land without 
                                                          
58  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-501. 
59  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-501.  See, however, the contradictory view in the same work at 
MPRDA-134. 
60  See for example Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-220 where reconnaissance permissions are 
discussed.   
61  See par 3.3.5 below.   
62  Van der Walt AJ Constitutional Property Law (2005) Wetton Juta & Co Ltd at 100.   
Chapter Five 






unreasonable interference by the landowner.  Furthermore, the rights that holders have 
are enforceable against successors in title to the owner.63   
In principle, therefore, it appears that reconnaissance licences (unlike reconnaissance 
permits in South Africa), exploration licences and productions licences in Namibia may 
be limited real rights.  These licences may also be transferred and encumbered.  
Nevertheless, Namibia does not have a title office similar to the Mineral and Petroleum 
Titles Registration Office in South Africa.  Also, in practice these licences are not 
registered in the central Deeds Registry.  However, because the rights may be 
considered to be limited real rights, they are constitutional property for purposes of the 
Namibian constitutional property clause.64     
3.3 Rights to Petroleum 
The types of authorisations granted in Namibia and South Africa generally exclude 
state participation and production sharing, while vesting the exclusive ownership of 
petroleum produced in the right holder.65  In both South Africa and Namibia the state 
may grant authorisations to search for petroleum (either reconnaissance permits or 
licences or exploration rights or licences) or to produce petroleum (production rights or 
licences).  This is in line with a number of jurisdictions across the globe, where the 
authorisations to search for petroleum is separate from the authorisation to extract 
petroleum.66  In South Africa, there is a fourth possible authorisation that the state may 
grant in respect of petroleum, namely a technical co-operation permit.  This permit does 
                                                          
63  Neither the legislation nor practice deals with the change of ownership of land upon which a 
petroleum licence has been granted. 
64  Article 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990.   
65  See Chapter Three above. 
66  For example, under the EC Directive 94/22/EC (the primary European Union document dealing 
with petroleum exploration and production), member states may grant authorisations to prospect 
and explore for an produce petroleum.  See article 2 and article 3 of the EC Directive 94/22/EC, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994L0022: 
EN:HTML [accessed 13.01.2015].  In the United Kingdom, one of the EU member states, 
licences may be granted to explore for and bore (produce) petroleum.  See Section 3(1) of the 
Petroleum Act 1998.  The same applies in Australia in terms of part 2.2 and part 2.4 of the 
Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) and in the Netherlands in terms 
of article 2 of the Mining Act 2003 (Mijnbouwwet 2003).  In Angola in terms of article 4 of Lei 
10_04 de 12 de Novembro das Activitades Petrolifers (Petroleum Activities Law), all rights in 
respect of upstream petroleum resources are granted to the Sociedade Nacional de Combustíveis 
de Angola, Empresa Pública - (Sonangol, E.P.), the national concessionaire.  In terms of article 8, 
the supervising Minister may grant prospecting rights, while the Government shall be responsible 
for granting concessions for the exercise of mining (production) rights.   
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not relate to the searching or extracting of petroleum, but rather allows the holder to 
conduct desktop studies.67 
3.3.1 Types of Rights in Respect of Petroleum 
To be transparent and promote security of tenure, a legislative regime for petroleum 
should be clear on a number of points in respect of the types of rights to petroleum.68  
First, it should make a clear distinction between the different types of authorisations 
available.  Secondly, it should circumscribe the operations allowed under each type of 
authorisation in sufficient detail to enable any person to be able to link the activities 
they intend to conduct with the relevant authorisation.  Thirdly, it should, in addition to 
setting out the relevant allowable operations, be clear as to all additional powers and 
privileges that the holder of a licence has.  Finally, the petroleum legislative regime 
should be clear on the period for which the authorisation is granted.    
The type of right or licence that may be awarded to an applicant will determine the 
applicant’s relationship with the state and grants a company access to petroleum 
resources situated in South Africa and Namibia.  In South Africa, the state can grant 
four different types of rights in respect of petroleum: reconnaissance permits, technical 
co-operation permits, exploration rights and production rights.  The Namibian 
Petroleum Act determines the content of petroleum licences: the state can grant three 
types of licences in respect of petroleum, namely reconnaissance licences, exploration 
licences and production licences.  
3.3.1.1 Rights relating to reconnaissance or exploration activity 
South Africa and Namibia are two of only a handful of countries that distinguish 
between reconnaissance and exploration operations in their laws.  Other jurisdictions 
that do the same include Mauritania,69 Morroco70 and Mozambique.71  Although the 
distinction between reconnaissance rights and licences and exploration rights and 
                                                          
67  See par 3.3.1.3 below.   
68  Onorato (note 37) at 13. 
69  The new Crude Hydrocarbons Code of Mauritania provides for reconnaissance authorisations, 
while its predecessor, Ordinance No 88.151 of 1988, does not provide for this. See Ernst & Young 
Global Oil and Gas Tax Guide 2014 Ernst & Young at 331 (available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Global-oil-and-gas-tax-guide-2014/$FILE/EY-
Global-oil-and-gas-tax-guide-2014.pdf [accessed 13.01.2015].   
70  Law No 21-90 of the Kingdom of Morocco, chapter II. 
71  Article 29 of the new Petroleum Law No 21/2014 of Mozambique. 
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licences at first glance seem somewhat opaque, a proper understanding of the nature of 
operations permitted under these rights and licences and the intention of the legislature 
makes the distinction clearer.  The legislation is also quite clear as to what rights the 
holder of each right, permit or licence have.  A closer look at the MPRD Act and the 
Petroleum Act distinguishes between the types of rights, permits and licences for which 
a company may apply to search for and extract petroleum. 
In South Africa, a reconnaissance permit is awarded to a person who intends to search 
for petroleum by means of reconnaissance operations, while in Namibia a 
reconnaissance licence is granted.  Similarly, in South Africa an exploration right is 
awarded to a person who intends to search for petroleum by means of exploration 
operations, while in Namibia a reconnaissance licence is granted.  The discussion 
below follows the more elaborate definitions in South African legislation, which 
overlap to a large extend with its Namibian counterpart. Where Namibian law deviates, 
this is stated and explained 
A reconnaissance permit in South Africa allows its holder to carry on reconnaissance 
operations.72  “Reconnaissance operations”, in respect of petroleum, means any 
operations carried out for or in connection with the search for petroleum by geological, 
geophysical and photogeological surveys.73  It includes any remote sensing techniques, 
but excludes exploration operations.74  A reconnaissance licence holder in Namibia may 
carry on reconnaissance operations in the block or blocks specified in the licence.75 
There, “reconnaissance operations” has the same meaning as in the South African 
legislation76 and it includes the same techniques.77  
The South African definition of reconnaissance operations excludes exploration 
operations.  This is problematic, because the techniques described in Chapter Two 
above (geological, geophysical and photogeological surveys) are accepted methods of 
exploration.78  The definition of reconnaissance operations in respect of reconnaissance 
                                                          
72  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-97. 
73  Section 1 of the MPRD Act, sv “reconnaissance operation”.   
74  Section 1 of the MPRD Act, sv “reconnaissance operation”. 
75  Section 22(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
76  Section 1 of the Petroleum Act, sv “reconnaissance operations”. 
77  Section 1 of the Petroleum Act, sv “reconnaissance operations”. 
78  See Chapter Two. 
Chapter Five 






permissions for minerals excludes prospecting operations as well.79  In this case, 
however, the distinction is easier to draw.  Prospecting operations involve a physical 
disturbance of the surface or subsurface of the land, while reconnaissance operations 
take place from a distance.80  Exploration operations, however, are not limited to 
activities which involve a physical disturbance of the surface or the subsurface. 
On a practical level reconnaissance operations are “less invasive” exploration 
operations.81  Stated in another way, reconnaissance operations are limited to 
exploration operations involving remote sensing techniques (or surveying).82  As such, 
they are also not subject to the same strict regulation as exploration or production 
operations.83 A holder of a reconnaissance permit also does not have the ancillary rights 
granted to a holder of an exploration or production right.84 
Another way to distinguish between reconnaissance and exploration operations is to 
look at the intention of the person who conducts the operations: exploration operations 
are aimed at defining a trap to be tested with the intention of locating a discovery.85  
When this intention is absent, activities conducted through remote sensing techniques 
are reconnaissance operations as opposed to exploration operations.86  This is, however, 
not a satisfactory explanation, as reconnaissance operations are obviously also 
ultimately aimed at locating petroleum, although this is not specifically stated.  The 
Petroleum Law No 21/2014 of Mozambique contains a more satisfactory explanation of 
what reconnaissance activities entails.  This law states that a reconnaissance concession 
contract grants a non-exclusive right “to carry out preliminary exploration work and 
assessment operations in the concession contract area, through airborne, terrestrial and 
other surveys, including geophysical, geo-chemical, paleontological, geological and 
                                                          
79  Section 1 of the MPRD Act, sv “reconnaissance operation” 
80  See Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-96.  “Prospecting operations” is defined in section 1of the 
MPRD Act, sv “prospecting operations” as “intentionally searching for any mineral by means of 
any method (a) which disturbs the surface or subsurface of the earth, including any portion of the 
earth that is under the sea or under other water; or (b)in or on any residue stockpile or residue 
deposit, to establish the existence of any mineral and to determine the extent and economic value 
thereof; or (c)in the sea or other water on land”. 
81  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-97.   
82  See Chapter Two.   
83  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-96.   
84  Section 5(3) of the MPRD Act.   
85  See section 1 of the MPRD Act, sv “exploration operations”.   
86  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-44. 
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topographical studies.”87  From this explanation, it is clear that reconnaissance 
operations are preliminary exploration operations (not limited to remote sensing 
techniques).  This may be brought in line with the “less invasive” explanation above, 
which explains reconnaissance operations are merely involving surveying.   
The definition of reconnaissance operations in the Nambian Petroleum Act is less 
problematic than the definition in the MPRD Act, in that it does not exclude exploration 
operations.  However, the effect is the same.  All remote sensing techniques carried out 
in connection with the search for petroleum constitute reconnaissance operations.  As 
discussed below in respect of exploration licences, the Petroleum Act also does not 
emphasise the intention of the person doing the searching.  As with South Africa, 
reconnaissance operations is limited to surveying, which is less invasive than other 
means of searching for petroleum provided for under an exploration licence.   
In Namibia, an exploration licence holder may exclusively carry on exploration 
operations in the block or blocks to which it relates subject to such terms and conditions 
and in such block or blocks as may be specified in such licence.88  Exploration 
operations under the Petroleum Act are defined in much broader terms than the MPRD 
Act.  It means any operations carried out for or in connection with the exploration for 
petroleum, and includes geological, geophysical, geochemical, paleontological, aerial, 
magnetic, gravity or seismic surveys and the appraisal of such surveys.  It also includes 
drilling for appraisal purposes and the study of the feasibility of any production 
operations or development operations to be carried out in such licence area or of the 
environmental impact of such operations.89 In South Africa, exploration rights authorise 
the holder thereof to search for petroleum.  An exploration right holder is entitled to the 
rights conferred on him under the MPRD Act or any other law.90  In broad terms, an 
exploration right holder may conduct exploration operations,91 which includes more 
than just surveying authorised in terms of the reconnaissance permit and may involve 
physical disturbances of the land.  The MPRD Act defines “exploration operation”, 
which is in line with the geological meaning of exploration operations discussed in 
                                                          
87  Article 29(1) of the Petroleum Law No 21/2014 of Mozambique. 
88  Section 29(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
89  Section 1 of the Petroleum Act, sv “exploration operations”.   
90  Section 5(2) of the MPRD Act.   
91  Badenhorst, Mostert and Dendy (note 29) at par 137.   
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Chapter Two.92  Under the MPRD Act, the definition of exploration operations contain 
four elements: First, it requires activities, which include re-processing of existing 
seismic data, acquisition and processing of new seismic data or other related activities.  
Second, these activities must be conducted with the very specific purpose of defining a 
trap.  Third, the trap must be tested by drilling, logging and testing (including extended 
well testing) of a well.  Finally such testing must occur with the intention of locating a 
discovery. 
The MPRD Act does not limit exploration operations to the collection and processing 
of seismic data, but includes “other related activities”, provided that these activities are 
used to define a trap with the intention of locating a discovery.93  The MPRD Act does 
not state what is meant by “other related activities”, but in general in the exploration 
phase, the holder of a right to explore for petroleum may use geological methods such 
as mapping, geological surveys and remote imaging analysis, geochemical methods 
such as water and soil testing, and geophysical methods such as gravity exploration, 
magnetic exploration and seismic studies in an attempt to locate a trap.94 
The holder of an exploration right furthermore has the exclusive right to remove and 
dispose of any petroleum samples found during the course of exploration.95  However, 
the holder may only remove and dispose for his own account any petroleum found by 
him in the course of the exploration operations conducted pursuant to his exploration 
right in such quantities as may be required to conduct tests on it or to identify or 
analyse it.96  The written permission of the Minister must be obtained to remove and 
dispose for the holder’s own account bulk samples of petroleum found by the holder in 
the course of exploration activities.97 
The holder of an exploration right furthermore has the exclusive right to apply for and 
be granted a production right in respect of the petroleum and the exploration right in 
                                                          
92  Under the MPRD Act, exploration operation means“…the re-processing of existing seismic data, 
acquisition and processing of new seismic data or any other related activity to define a trap to be 
tested by drilling, logging and testing, including extended well testing, of a well with the intention 
of locating a discovery”. 
93  Section 1 of the MPRD Act, sv “exploration operation”.   
94  See Chapter Two above.   
95  Section 82(1)(c) of the MPRD Act.   
96  Section 82(1)(c) read with section 20(1) of the MPRD Act.   
97  Section 82(1)(c) read with section 20(2) of the MPRD Act. 
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question.98  This right may only be exercised if the holder has complied with certain 
provisions of the MPRD Act.99   
The holder of an exploration right is, moreover, not limited to conducting exploration 
operations. An exploration right holder may also carry on any other activity incidental 
to exploration operations, insofar as that activity does not contravene the MPRD Act.100  
So, for example, a holder may enter the exploration area together with his employees.101  
The holder may also bring any plant, machinery, or equipment onto that land and may 
build, construct or lay down any surface, underground or under sea infrastructure which 
may be required for the purposes of exploration.102  Furthermore, the holder may also 
explore for his own account on or under that land petroleum for which the exploration 
right has been granted103 and may remove and dispose of any such petroleum found in 
the course of exploration.104 
The holder of an exploration right may, subject to the National Water Act105 and as 
required by the holder to conduct exploration operations, use water from any natural 
spring, lake, river or stream, situated on, or flowing through, the land in respect of 
which the exploration right is granted.106  The holder may also, on the same terms, use 
water from any excavation previously made and used for prospecting, mining, 
exploration or production purposes, or sink a well or borehole.107  The provisions of the 
National Water Act apply to the water management and pollution control at all 
proposed or existing exploration operations.108  An assessment of impacts relating to 
                                                          
98  Section 82(1)(a) of the MPRD Act.   
99  Section 82(1)(a) of the MPRD Act. 
100  Section 5(3)(e) of the MPRD Act.   
101  Section 5(3)(a) of the MPRD Act. 
102  Section 5(3)(a) of the MPRD Act.   
103  Section 5(3)(b) of the MPRD Act.   
104  Section 5(3)(c) of the MPRD Act.  The MPRD Act does not specifically refer here to petroleum.  
Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-143 correctly state, however, that the ommission is an absurdity.   
105  National Water Act 36 of 1998. 
106  Section 5(3)(d) of the MPRD Act.   
107  Section 5(3)(d) of the MPRD Act.   
108  Regulation 47(2) read with regualtion 68(1) of the MPRD Regulations.  The purpose of the 
National Water Act 36 of 1998 Act is stated in section 2 of the Act and is “…to ensure that the 
nation's water resources are protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in 
ways which take into account amongst other factors (a) meeting the basic human needs of present 
and future generations; (b) promoting equitable access to water; (c) redressing the results of past 
racial and gender discrimination; (d) promoting the efficient, sustainable and beneficial use of 
water in the public interest; (e) facilitating social and economic development; (f) providing for 
growing demand for water use; (g) protecting aquatic and associated ecosystems and their 
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water management and pollution control at proposed exploration operations, where 
appropriate, must form part of the environmental management plan.109 
From the above, it is clear that the Petroleum Act in Namibia has a much broader 
understanding of what reconnaissance and exploration operations may entail, while the 
MPRD Act in South Africa is much more specific.  The disadvantage of the Namibian 
approach is that it leaves scope for differences in interpretation between the regulator 
and petroleum companies, especially as regards the rights of the holder.  Under the 
South African MPRD Act, the holder’s rigths are stipulated in much clearer terms, 
which is much more transparent and grants the holder better security of tenure.   
3.3.1.2 Rights relating to production of petroleum 
A production right is the only authorisation which allows the holder thereof to extract 
petroleum by means of production operations in South Africa. Its Namibian counterpart 
is a production licence.  
The South African definition of production operations is similar to the Namibian 
understanding: it means any operation, activity or matter that relates to the exploration, 
appraisal, development and production of petroleum.110  The MPRD Act and the 
Petroleum Act are unclear as to what exactly constitutes production of petroleum.  
Under the MPRD Act, to “mine”, when used in respect of minerals, is the equivalent of 
the production activity.111  To “mine” is defined in the MPRD Act as operations or 
activities conducted for the purposes of the winning of minerals.112  Subsequently, the 
production of petroleum for purposes of the MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act can be 
understood as any operation or activity for the purposes of winning any petroleum. 
A production licence holder in Nambia may exclusively carry on production operations 
on the block or blocks to which that licence relates, to sell or otherwise dispose of 
petroleum recovered within such block or blocks and to carry on such other operations 
                                                                                                                                                                         
biological diversity; (h) reducing and preventing pollution and degradation of water resources; (i) 
meeting international obligations; (j) promoting dam safety; (k) managing floods and droughts.”    
109  Regulation 47(2) read with regulation 68(2) of the MPRD Regulations. 
110  Section 1 of the Petroleum Act, sv “production operations”; section 1 of the MPRD Act, sv 
“production operation”.  
111  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-77 with reference to section 69(2)(b)(ii).   
112  Section 1 of the MPRD Act, sv “mine”.  See also section 1 of the Namibian Minerals (Prospecting 
and Mining) Act 33 of 1992, sv “mine”, which contains a similar definition.  
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and works in or in connection with such block or blocks as may be necessary for or in 
connection with the operations and selling or disposal.113     
The holder of a South African production right has the exclusive right to remove and 
dispose of any petroleum found during the course of production.114  Unlike an 
exploration right, no limit is placed on the amount of petroleum and the further consent 
of the Minister is not required. As with exploration rights, the holder of a production 
right is not limited to conducting production operations. A production right holder may 
also carry on any other activity incidental to production operations, insofar as that 
activity does not contravene the MPRD Act.115   
Activities intended to produce or win petroleum are not exploration operations but 
rather production operations.  At first sight this seems unproblematic, but the recent 
application by Royal Dutch Shell for exploration rights in the Karoo proves 
otherwise.116  As part of their exploration activities, Shell stated in its application that it 
may intend to employ hydraulic fracturing techniques during their operations.  
However, a proper understanding of the nature of hydraulic fracturing shows that these 
activities are production activities as they are aimed at winning petroleum and not 
locating a trap.117  An exploration right is therefore not sufficient to authorise the holder 
thereof to conduct hydraulic fracturing.  Hydraulic fracturing is a process that is clearly 
                                                          
113  Section 44(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
114  Section 86(1)(b) of the MPRD Act.   
115  Section 5(3)(e) of the MPRD Act.  So, for example, a holder may enter the exploration or 
production area together with his employees.  The holder may also bring any plant, machinery, or 
equipment onto that land and may build, construct or lay down any surface, underground or under 
sea infrastructure which may be required for the purposes of production.  Furthermore, the holder 
may also produce for his own account on or under that land petroleum for which the production 
right has been granted and may remove and dispose of any such petroleum found in the course of 
production.  The holder of a production right may, subject to the National Water Act 36 of 1998 
and as required by the holder to conduct production operations, use water from any natural spring, 
lake, river or stream, situated on, or flowing through, the land in respect of which the production 
right is granted.  The holder may also, on the same terms, use water from any excavation 
previously made and used for prospecting, mining, exploration or production purposes, or sink a 
well or borehole.  The provisions of the National Water Act apply to the water management and 
pollution control at all proposed or existing exploration or production operations.  An assessment 
of impacts relating to water management and pollution control at proposed exploration or 
production operations, where appropriate, must form part of the environmental management plan.  
See sections 5(3)(a) – (d) and section 47(2) of the MPRD Act, read with regualtion 68(1) of the 
MPRD Regulations.  The MPRD Act does not specifically refer here to petroleum.  Dale et al 
(note 9) at MPRDA-143 correctly state, however, that the ommission is an absurdity.    
116  See Chapter One above. 
117  See Chapter Two above.   
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aimed at winning petroleum, and not exploring for petroleum.  Any person who wishes 
to employ hydraulic fracturing will therefore only be able to do so under a production 
right and not under an exploration rights.118 
3.3.1.3 Rights relating to co-operation 
The Namibian Petroleum Act does not provide for any authorisation in respect of 
technical co-operation.  In South Africa, a technical co-operation permit, unlike the 
other authorisations, is not aimed at searching for and extracting petroleum, but to 
enable the holder thereof to co-operate with the designated agency, Petroleum Agency 
of SA, to conduct a technical study of the available data and information relating to 
petroleum in respect of a relevant area.119   The MPRD Act does not define what is 
meant by “technical co-operation”.  Dale et al presumes that the purpose behind 
technical co-operation is that the holder of such a permit will co-operate with the 
designated agency, Petroleum Agency of SA, to conduct a technical study of the 
available data and information relating to petroleum in respect of a relevant area.120  
The holder of a technical co-operation permit has the exclusive right to apply for and be 
granted an exploration right in respect of the area to which the permit relates.121  
Notwithstanding its expiry date, a technical co-operation permit in respect of which an 
application for an exploration right has been lodged, shall remain in force until the 
exploration right has been granted or refused.122   
3.3.2 Life span / Duration of rights 
The MPRD Act envisages that reconnaissance permits and technical co-operation 
permits are valid for a maximum period of one year, are exclusive, renewable or 
transferable and are subject to the prescribed terms and conditions.123  The terms and 
conditions agreed upon in respect of a reconnaissance permit must be approved by the 
                                                          
118  See also Badenhorst PJ and Mostert H Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1 ed (2004, 
Revision Service 10 2014) Wetton Juta at 19-20.   
119  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-503. 
120  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-503.  On the website of Petroleum Agency of SA, a technical co-
operation permit is defined as “[a] permit issued to applicant in terms of section 77(1) of MPRDA 
which allows the applicant to do desktop study, acquire seismic data from other sources including 
the Agency, etc; but does not include any prospecting or exploration activities.” 
121  Section 78(1) of the MPRD Act.  
122  Section 79(5) of the MPRD Act.   
123  Section 75(4)(a) – (e) and section 77(4)(a) – (d) of the MPRD Act. 
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Minister.124  The short period for which the permit is granted may be justified by the 
nature of the activities authorised by the permit, which include only surveying. 
An exploration right is valid for the period specified in the right, subject to a maximum 
of three years.125  A production right is valid for the period specified in the right, subject 
to a maximum of 30 years.126  Both are subject to the prescribed terms and conditions.127  
Terms and conditions further agreed upon must be approved by the Minister.128   
Both the Petroleum Act and the MPRD Act clearly state the duration of rigths to 
petroleum.  This promotes transparency and provides better security of tenure for 
investors.  A Namibian reconnaissance licence is valid for a maximum period of two 
years, although the Minister may determine a shorter period.129 Unlike its South African 
counterpart, a Namibian reconnaissance licence may be renewed. A production licence 
is valid for such period  as may be determined by the Minister at the time of the 
granting of such licence, but may not exceed 25 years130 An exploration licence is valid 
for an initial maximum period of four years, although the Minister may grant it for a 
shorter period.131  The Minister may, upon application and upon good cause shown, 
extend this period to an initial maximum period of five years.132   
3.3.3 Application Procedures 
Certainty in the application procedures for rights to petroleum is an important feature of 
transparent petroleum legislation.  Prospective investors need to have a clear 
understanding of how to acquire rights in respect of petroleum to gain access to these 
resources.  A transparent petroleum legislative framework must set out in certainty the 
application procedures that must be followed.   
The application procedures for rights to petroleum are regulated by the specific 
principles set out in the MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act, and are subject to the more 
                                                          
124  Regulation 19 of the MPRD Regulations.   
125  Section 80(5) of the MPRD Act.   
126  Section 84(4) of the MPRD Act.   
127  Section 80(5) and section 84(4) of the MPRD Act.   
128  Regulation 29 and regulation 35 of the MPRD Regulations.   
129  Section 23(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
130  Section 45(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
131  Section 30(1) and section 30(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
132  Section 30(2A) of the Petroleum Act.   
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general principles of just administrative action.  As regulator, the state must comply 
with both the specific legislation and the general principles when dealing with 
applications for rights to petroleum.  The following discussion deals with how certainty 
and stability is achieved through the legislative processes governing the application for 
and award of rights, the requirements of the rights awarded, and the procedure for 
renewals.  The application procedures set out below do not, however, operate in 
isolation but against the backdrop of procedural fairness as a key element of just 
administrative action.  This aspect is covered in Chapter Nine below.   
3.3.3.1 Submission of Applications 
In South Africa, application for a reconnaissance permit, technical co-operation permit, 
exploration right and production right must be submitted to Petroleum Agency of SA 
As the designated agency.133  The MPRD Regulations prescribe the content of the 
application.134  In Namibia application for a reconnaissance, exploration or production 
licence is made to the Petroleum Commissioner135 in accordance with the provisions of 
the Petroleum Act.136  Both jurisdictions require the application to be accompanied by a 
prescribed fee.137  Under the Petroleum Act, the Commissioner must determine the 
form of the application.138  Under the MPRD Act, the application must contain a work 
programme, which must contain the prescribed information and which will form part of 
the permit or right if it is granted.139 
                                                          
133  Section 74(1)(a) and (b), section 76(1)(a) and (b), section 79(1)(a) and (b) and section 83(1)(a) of 
the MPRD Act.   
134  Application for a reconnaissance permit must be made on Form K contained in Annexure I to the 
MPRD Regulations.  Regulation 18 of the MPRD Regulations lists the detail that must be 
included in the application.  Application for a technical co-operation permit must be made on 
Form L contained in Annexure I of the MPRD Regulations.  Regulation 23(2) prescribes the 
information that must be contained in the application.  Application for an exploration right must 
be made on Form M contained in Annexure I of the MPRD Regulations.  Regulation 28 of the 
MPRD Regulations set out in detail what the application must contain.  Application for a 
production right must be made on Form N contained in Annexure I of the MPRD Regulations.  
Regulation 34 of the MPRD Regulations prescribes the content of the application. 
135  Section 11(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
136  Section 11 of the Petroleum Act.  Section 24 prescribes the content of an application for a 
reconnaissance licence, while section 32 and section 46 prescribes the content of applications for 
exploration and production licences respectively.   
137  Section 11(1) of the Petroleum Act and section 74(1)(c), section 76(1)(c), section 79(1)(c) and 
section 83(1)(b) of the MPRD Act.   
138  Section 11(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
139  Regulation 18(2)(g), regulation 20, regulation 23(2)(g), regulation 25, regulation 28(2)(i), 
regulation 30, regulation 34(2)(h) and regulation 36 of the MPRD Regulations.   
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Under the Namibian Petroleum Act, a natural person or company may apply for a 
reconnaissance licence, while only a company may apply for an exploration or 
production licence.140  The MPRD Act in South Africa does not state who may apply 
for a right or permit to petroleum.  Typically, however, only companies apply for rigths 
to petroleum.   
The MPRD Act states that the Petroleum Agency SA must accept the application within 
14 days of receipt if the prescribed requirements are met, no other person holds a right 
to petroleum over the same area and no prior application for any an exploration right, 
production right or technical co-operation permit has been accepted in respect of the 
same resource, land and area.141  If the application does not comply with the 
requirements, Petroleum Agency SA must notify the applicant in writing within 14 days 
of the receipt of the application.  In line with the principles of just administrative action 
discussed in Chapter Nine below, the MPRD Act requires that the notification must be 
accompanied by written reasons.142  The MPRD Act is clear when Petroleum Agency 
SA must accept or refuse an application.  Where the application is defective, the 
designated agency does not have discretion to accept the application, but must inform 
the applicant that it is defective.143   
The Namibian legislation does not provide for an agency such as the South African 
Petroleum Agency SA to deal with applications before a decision is made by the 
relevant Minister.  The National Petroleum Corporation of Namibia (Pty) Ltd 
(“Namcor”) – the state-owned petroleum company – does not have delegated authority 
to receive and advise on applications for rights to petroleum.  Despite this, the 
Petroleum Act include under the functions of Namcor assisting the Petroleum 
Commission on his request in the exercise by him of his functions, powers and duties 
under the Petroleum Act.144   
In Namibia, the Minister may, at any time after an application for a petroleum licence 
has been received, require the applicant to furnish the Minister with further information 
                                                          
140  Section 10 of the Petroleum Act.   
141  Section 74(2), section 76(2), section 79(2) and section 83(2) of the MPRD Act.   
142  Section 74(3), section 76(3), section 79(3) and section 83(3) of the MPRD Act.   
143  See Chapter Nine below for a discussion of whether the applicant has an opportunity to remedy 
the application. 
144  Section 8(1)(d) of the Petroleum Act.   
Chapter Five 






that the Minister may in his discretion deem necessary for purposes of considering the 
application.145  This may include information relating to the controlling interest in the 
affairs of the company.146  The Minister may also require the applicant to publish 
certain particulars of the application,147 a function that has to date not been exercised.  
The Minister may also require theh applicant to furnish certain information about the 
application to any other persons specified by the Minister.148  The furnishing of further 
information is left up to the discretion of the Minister.  The Minister may cause such 
investigations or negotiations to be made or undertaken as the Minister in his discretion 
deem necessary to enable him to consider any application for a petroleum licence or the 
renewal of a petroleum licence.149  The Minister may, in order for him to be able to 
consider the application for a petroleum licence or renewal of a petroleum licence, 
require the applicant in writing to carry out or cause to be carried out such 
environmental impact studies as may be specified in the notice150 or to furnish the 
Minister with such proposals, by way of alteration to or in additional to proposals set 
out in the application as may be specified by the Minister.151  Further investigations and 
negotiations are also left to the discretion of the Minister.  Similar provisions are not 
provided for in South Africa.   
The MPRD Act sets out a standard set of requirements for all applications for 
authorisations in respect of petroleum.  First, the applicant must have access to financial 
resources and the technical ability to conduct the proposed operations.152  This is an 
important requirement, as it curbs the possibility of front or shell companies that do not 
have the necessary financial capability of exploring for and producing petroleum from 
applying for a petroleum right.153  Secondly, the estimated expenditure must be 
compatible with the intended operations and the intended duration of the 
                                                          
145  Section 12(1)(a)(ii) of the Petroleum Act.   
146  Section 12(1)(a)(i) of the Petroleum Act.   
147  Section 12(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act. 
148  Section 12(1)(c) of the Petroleum Act.   
149  Section 12(2)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
150  Section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Petroleum Act. 
151  Section 12(2)(b)(ii) of the Petroleum Act. 
152  Section 75(1)(a), section 77(1)(a), section 80(1)(a) and section 84(1)(a) of the MPRD Act. 
153  See for example Hopwood G Namibia’s New Frontiers: Transparency and Accountability in 
Extractive Industry Exploration (2013) Windhoek Institute for Public Policy Research at 14.  See 
also Onorato (note 37) at 12.   
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reconnaissance, technical co-operation, exploration or production program.154  Third, 
the applicant must not be in contravention of any provision of the MPRD Act.155   
Aside from the standard requirements set out above, further specific requirements are 
set out for reconnaissance permits, exploration rights and production rights.  Some 
apply to all three authorisations, while others apply only to one or two of the 
authorisations.  The reason for this is that these rights are more invasive and may have 
environmental consequences as well and therefore require additional regulation.  The 
first of these additional requirements is that, in respect of reconnaissance permits and 
production rights, the reconnaissance operations and production operations must not 
result in unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the 
environment.156  In respect of applications for exploration rights, the Minister must have 
issued an environmental authorisation.157  The second of these additional requirements 
is that the applicant must have the ability to comply with the relevant provisions of the 
Mine Health and Safety Act.158   
In respect of applications for exploration rights, the third additional requirement is that 
the applicant must have complied with the terms and conditions of the technical co-
operation permit (if applicable).159  In respect of applications for production rights, the 
third additional requirement is that the applicant must have complied with the terms and 
conditions of the exploration right, if applicable.160  Fourth, the granting of the 
exploration or production right must promote employment and advance the social and 
economic welfare of all South Africans.161  Fifth, the granting of the exploration or 
production right must substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities for 
historically disadvantaged persons, including women and communities, to enter into 
                                                          
154  Section 75(1)(b), section 77(1)(b), section 80(1)(b) and section 84(1)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
155  Section 75(1)(e), 77(1)(c), section 80(1)(e) and section 84(1)(e) of the MPRD Act. 
156  Section 75(1)(c) of the MPRD Act.  This section is substituted by section 54 of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Amendment Act 49 of 2008, which reads as follows: “the reconnaissance 
will not result in unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the environment and 
that the environmental authorisation is issued.”  This amendment will come into operation on 07 
December 2014.  See also section 84(1)(c) in respect of applications for production rights.   
157  Section 80(1)(c) of the MPRD Act. 
158  Act 29 of 1996.  Section 75(1)(d),  section 80(1)(d) and section 84(1)(d) of the MPRD Act.   
159  Section 80(1)(f) of the MPRD Act. 
160  Section 84(1)(f) of the MPRD Act. 
161  Section 80(1)(g) read with section 2(f) and section 84(1)(i) read with section 2(f) of the MPRD 
Act. 
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and participate actively in the petroleum industry and to benefit from the exploitation of 
the nation’s petroleum resources.162  With regard to this last requirement and in respect 
of applications for exploration rights only, the Minister may, having regard to the type 
of petroleum resource concerned and the extent of the exploration project, specifically 
request that the applicant gives effect to this requirement.163   
Two further additional requirements must be met in respect of applications for 
production rights.  The sixth requirement is that the applicant must have provided 
financially and otherwise for a prescribed social and labour plan.164  Finally, the 
petroleum must be capable of being produced optimally in accordance with the 
production work programme.165 
In Namibia, an applicant for a production licence must also submit details of its 
technical and financial ability, including its experience in the petroleum industry, as is 
the case in South Africa.166 This is an important requirement, but one that appears not 
to have been applied strictly in practice.  In a recent statement to the public, the 
Petroleum Commissioner has indicated that “government patience was running short” 
as petroleum companies seem to be struggling to raise finances for exploration and 
drilling and threatened not to renew licences for this reason.167  This situation could 
have been prevented if the requirements set out in the Petroleum Act in respect of 
petroleum licences were applied strictly.    
The Petroleum Act of Namibia furthermore states that if application is made for a 
production licence by the holder of an exploration licence, any part of the exploration 
area in respect of which the production licence is issued ceases to be part of the 
exploration area when the production licence is issued.168  Although it is not expressly 
stated, the implication is that the remainder of the exploration area shall remain in force 
and the holder of the exploration licence may continue to exercise its rights in terms of 
                                                          
162  Section 80(1)(g) read with section 2(d) and section 84(1)(i) read with section 2(d)of the MPRD 
Act. 
163  Section 80(2) of the MPRD Act.   
164  Section 84(1)(g) of the MPRD Act. 
165  Section 84(1)(h) of the MPRD Act. 
166  Section 46(2)(b) of the Petroleum Act.   
167  Staff Reporter “Oil and Gas” Insight: Mining in Namibia (2014) at 12.   
168  Section 48 of the Petroleum Act.   
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the exploration licence over the remaining area.  No similar provision exists under the 
MPRD Act. 
From the above, it is clear that in Namibia under the Petroleum Act the Minister has 
much more discretion when it comes to requiring further information and granting or 
refusing and granting or refusing applications for petroleum licences than in South 
Africa.  The MPRD Act goes to great lengths to limit the discretion of the Minister in 
respect of appications for rights to petroleum.  The South African situation is therefore 
much more transparent than its Namibian counterpart.  Not only does this provide 
greater security of tenure for the applicant, but it also promotes accountability.169 
3.3.3.2 Consultations with Interested and Affected Parties 
In South Africa, Petrolem Agency SA must, within 14 days after accepting an 
application for an exploration or production right, call on interested and affected 
persons to submit comments on the application.170  These comments must be submitted 
within 30 days from the date of the notice.171  If any person objects to the granting of 
the right, the Regional Manager must refer the objections to the Regional Mining 
Development and Environment Committee172 to consider the objections and to advise 
the Minister.173  This is a very important step in the application procedure, as it gives 
persons affected by the application an opportunity to be heard, therefore giving 
additional protection to the interests of the people.174   
There is no provision made for consultations with interested and affected parties in the 
Namibian legislation.  This is contrary to a regulatory regime that seeks to protect the 
                                                          
169  For example, under South African law if an applicant whose application was refused takes the 
Minister on review, he can rely on various review grounds in the light of the strict requirements 
imposed in terms of the MPRD Act.  Under the Namibian law, since so much is left to the 
discretion of the Minister, the applicant may have a harder time convincing a court to grant the 
application.    
170  Section 10(1)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
171  Section 10(1)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
172  This Committee also has functions in respect of petroleum.  See Dale et al at MPRDA-531. 
173  Section 10(2) of the MPRD Act. 
174  See the discussion in Chapter Five at 4.1.3.5. above.   
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interests of citizens as well.  It is vital for accountability that the broader public have a 
role to play in the exploitation of natural resources.175   
3.3.3.3 Evaluating Applications 
The MPRD Act does not state within what time period Petroleum Agency SA must 
accept the application.  In the light of the obligation placed upon administrators to make 
a decision within a reasonable time,176 Petroleum Agency SA may not take an 
unreasonable time to accept the application.   
Petroleum Agency SA must evaluate the application and make recommendations to the 
Minister.177  The application is then considered by the Minister of Mineral Resources.  
The Minister must issue the permit or licence if certain requirements are met.178  The 
least amount of requirements are set for technical co-operation permits, while 
applications for production rights have the most requirements.  The requirements 
therefore depend on the type of authorisation applied for.  Once again, the discretion of 
the decision-maker is limited – if the application applies with the prescribed 
requirements, the Minister must issue the permit or licence.  On the other hand, the 
Minister must refuse the application if the application does not meet all these 
requirements as applicable to the relevant right in respect of petroleum.179  Where 
application was made for a production right and all the requirements have not been met, 
the Minister must, within sixty days after receipt of the application, refuse to grant the 
application.180  Similar time-periods are not set in respect of applications for any other 
permit or right.  In terms of the principles of just administrative action, a decision must, 
however, be taken in a reasonable time, failing which the applicant will have a basis for 
an action of based on just administrative action.181  If the Minister refuses the 
application for any of the rights, he must within 30 days of the decision, in writing 
                                                          
175  Barma NH, Kaiser K, Le TM and Viñuela L Rents to Riches?  The Political Economy of Natural 
Resource-led Development (2012) Washington The World Bank at 41 – 42. 
176  Section 6(1) of the MPRD Act.  See also Chapter Five above, at 4.1.3.1. 
177  Section 71(c) of the MPRD Act.   
178  Section 75(1), section 77(1), section 80(1) and section 84(1) of the MPRD Act.   
179  Section 75(2), section 77(2), section 80(3) and section 84(2) of the MPRD Act.   
180  Section 84(2) of the MPRD Act.   
181  See section 6(1) of the MPRD Act.  See Chapter Nine below for a discussion of whether the 
applicant has a right to remedy the application.   
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notify the application of the decision.  The notification must be accompanied by 
reasons for the decision.182 
In Namibia, a petroleum licence may only be granted over a block or blocks in respect 
of which, at the time that the application for the licence is made, no other petroleum 
licence has been issued to any other person.183  Interestingly, the Minister in Namibia 
has a discretion whether to grant the licence, unlike South Africa where he is obliged to 
grant the application if all the requirements are met.  The Minister may also refuse to 
grant the application for the petroleum licence.184  When considering an application for 
a petroleum licence or the renewal of a petroleum licence, the Minister must take into 
account the need to conserve and protect natural resources in or on the block or block to 
which the application related and in or on adjoining or neighbouring land.185  If the 
Minister is prepared to grant the application for a petroleum licence, he must direct that 
notice be given to the applicant in which the terms and conditions (in addition to the 
standard terms and conditions discussed below) are set out in which he is prepared to 
grant the application.186  The applicant then has sixty days to agree to the terms and 
condition or such other terms and conditions as may be agreed upon,187 failing which 
the application will lapse.188  The Minister may, subject to the provisions of the 
Petroleum Act, grant a petroleum licence on such terms and conditions as may be 
determined by him.189  Here, the Minister has discretion as to what conditions may be 
attached to a licence.  The decision to attach conditions, and the conditions themselves, 
must comply with the principles of just administrative action.190  The Petroleum Act is, 
however, not transparent in respect of what conditions may be attached.   
Once again, the above discussion shows that in South Africa the powers of the Minister 
in respect of evaluating applications are restricted, while in Namibia the Minister has 
                                                          
182  Section 75(3), section 77(3), section 80(4) and section 84(3) of the MPRD Act.   
183  Section 22(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
184  Section 11(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
185  Section 12(3) of the Petroleum Act.   
186  Section 12(4)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
187  Section 12(4)(b) of the Petroleum Act.  The sixty days may, on good cause shown, be extended by 
the Minister.   
188  Section 12(5) of the Petroleum Act.   
189  Section 11(2) of the Petroleum Act. 
190  See Chapter Five above at 4.1.3.   
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much more discretion.  This is not conducive to a transparent regulatory framework for 
petroleum resources.  
3.3.3.4 Petroleum Agreements 
Onorato identifies model petroleum contracts as one of the essential elements of a 
petroleum law.  The main tenets of this agreement should be provided for within the 
relevant petroleum act in order to give it a legislative basis.  There should, however, be 
sufficient scope for negotiations to ensure that the contract is flexible.191   
One of the major differences between South Africa and Namibia is the requirement 
under Namibian law to enter into a petroleum agreement.  Before an exploration licence 
is issued, the Minister must enter into a petroleum agreement with the holders 
concerned.  If a production licence is issued to a holder who does not hold an 
exploration licence, the Minister must enter into a petroleum agreement with the 
holders concerned.  If the applicant for a production licence already holds an 
exploration licence, it is not necessary under the Petroleum Act to enter into a second 
agreement.192  However, the Petroleum Act provides for additional discretionary terms 
and conditions in respect of production operations which may not have been included 
when the agreement was negotiated and entered into in respect of the exploration 
licence.  To accommodate for this, the Ministry of Mines and Energy in 1998 published 
a model petroleum agreement (“MPA”) which is normally used in practice, subject to 
negotiations between the parties.193  An updated MPA was published in 2007.194  This 
agreement deals extensively with exploration and production operations.  The MPA 
contains terms relating to exploration operations and terms and conditions that will 
apply when the holder applies for and is issued a production licence.  The MPA is 
therefore a combination agreement that applies to both holders of exploration and 
production licences.   
                                                          
191  Onorato (note 37) at 10. 
192  Section 13(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
193  This agreement is available at Ministry of Mines and Energy “Model Petroleum Agreement” 
available at http://www.mme.gov.na/pdf/model_petroleum_agreement_1998.pdf [accessed 
02.02.2014]. 
194  This agreement is available at Ministry of Mines and Energy “Model Petroleum Agreement 2007” 
available at http://www.mme.gov.na/energy/pdf/MODEL%20PETROLEUM%20AGREEMENT 
2007.doc [accessed on 02.02.2014].   
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The Petroleum Act specifically refers to a petroleum agreement, giving it legislative 
recognition, but the MPA is not incorporated as part of the Petroleum Act, thus 
ensuring room for negotiation.  The petroleum agreement that a holder must enter into 
may not be in conflict with the provisions of the Petroleum Act.  Any provisions 
inconsistent with the Petroleum Act are deemed to be of no force and effect.195  The 
petroleum agreement must contain the terms and condition on which the Minister is 
prepared to grant the licence.196  It must furthermore contain the terms and conditions 
relating to the basis on which the market value of petroleum may from time to time be 
determine.197   
The petroleum agreement may also contain certain discretionary conditions, subject to 
agreement between the parties.  These conditions relate to the name of the holder, 
particulars of its incorporation and registration as company, the registered address, the 
names and nationality of the directors, the capital and the name of any person who is 
the beneficial holder of more than 5% of the shares issued by the company.198  It may 
also contain terms and conditions relating to the mining exploration operations to be 
carried out and the time-table for these operations, as well as the minimum expenditure 
in respect of the operations.199  The formation of joint ventures or other joint 
arrangements, including profit-sharing by the state may also be included,200 as well as 
the participation, including the acquisition of equity share capital, by the state, Namcor 
or any other person in any ventures or arrangements entered into with the holder.201        
In the case of profit sharing by the state, the agreement may also contain terms and 
conditions relating to the basis upon which the holder of a production licence may be 
exempted, wholly or partly, from any provision of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act202 or 
any other law governing income tax.203  Other discretionary terms relate to the manner 
in which exploration operations must be carried out, guarantees to ensure the due and 
                                                          
195  Section 13(1) and section 13(4) of the Act.    
196  Section 13(1) read with section 12(4) of the Petroleum Act.   
197  Section 13(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
198  Section 13(2)(a) of the Petroleum Act. 
199  Section 13(2)(b) and (c) of the Petroleum Act.   
200  Section 13(2)(d) of the Petroleum Act.   
201  Section 13(2)(e) of the Petroleum Act.   
202  Act 3 of 1991.  
203  Section 13(2)(e) of the Petroleum Act.   
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proper performance by the holder of its obligations and arbitration in the event of a 
dispute.204  Finally, the agreement may contain terms and conditions relating to the co-
ordination of operations for the recovery of petroleum carried out or to be carried out in 
any neighbouring production area in which part of the petroleum reservoir to which the 
production licence relates is situated.205  Nothing contained in the agreement may be 
construed as absolving any party thereto from any requirement laid down by law or 
from applying for, and obtaining, any permit, licence, approval, permission or other 
document required by law.206   
3.3.3.5 Renewals 
In South Africa, the holder of an exploration right or production right has the exclusive 
right to apply for and be granted a renewal of the right in respect of petroleum and the 
area in question.207  Application for renewal must be lodged with Petroleum Agency SA 
in the prescribed manner and must be accompanied by the prescribed, non-refundable 
application fee.208  Application for renewal must state the reasons for renewal and the 
period for which the renewal is required.209  It must also be accompanied by a detailed 
report reflecting the exploration or production results, the interpretation thereof and the 
exploration and production expenditure incurred.210  The application for renewal must 
be accompanied by a report reflecting the extent of compliance with the requirements 
of the approved environmental management programme, the rehabilitation to be 
                                                          
204  Section 13(2)(f), (g) and (h) of the Petroleum Act.   
205  Section 13(2)(j) of the Petroleum Act.   
206  Section 13(5) of the Act.   
207  Section 82(1)(b) and section 86(1)(a) of the MPRD Act.   
208  Section 81(1)(a) to (c) and section 85(1)(a) to (c) of the MPRD Act.  Application for renewal of 
an exploration right is lodged on Form M contained in Annexure I of the MPRD Regulations.  
Regulation 33 of the MPRD Regulations contains the prescribed information that the application 
must contain.  Application for renewal of a production right is lodged on Form N contained in 
Annexure I of the MPRD Regulations.  Regulation 38 of the MPRD Regulations contains the 
prescribed information that the application must contain.      
209  Section 81(2)(a) and section 85(2)(a) of the MPRD Act. 
210  Section 81(2)(b) and section 85(2)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
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completed and the estimated cost thereof.211  Finally, the application for renewal must 
include a detailed work programme for the renewal period.212   
The Minister must grant the application for renewal if the application complies with the 
requirements for renewal applications set out above and the holder thereof has 
complied with the work programme, the requirements of the approved environmental 
management programme, the social and labour plans (where application is for renewal 
of a production right), the terms and conditions of the exploration or production right 
and is not in contravention of any relevant provision of the MPRD Act or any other 
law.213  Once again, the discretion of the Minister is limited here.  If the application for 
renewal complies with all the requirements, the Minister must grant the application.   
An exploration right may only be renewed for a maximum of three periods not 
exceeding two years per period.214  The maximum period that an exploration right may 
be granted for is therefore nine years.  A production right is valid for a maximum 
period of 30 years and may be renewed for further periods of 30 years.215  An 
exploration or production right in respect of which an application for renewal has been 
filed shall, notwithstanding its expiry date, remain in force until such time as the 
application for renewal has been granted or refused.216 
In Namibia, application for the renewal of any petroleum licence must be made in the 
prescribed manner.217  A petroleum licence in respect of which an application for 
renewal is filed will not, despite its expiry date, expire until the application for renewal 
is refused or withdrawn or has lapsed, whichever occurs first.218 
                                                          
211  Section 81(2)(c) of the MPRD Act.  Section 81(2)(c) is substituted by section 59(a) of the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Act, which reads as follows: “be 
accompanied by a report reflecting the extent of compliance with conditions of the environmental 
authorisation”.  This amendment shall come into operation on 07 December 2014.  With regard to 
renewal of production licences, see section 85(2)(c) of the MPRD Act.       
212  Section 81(2)(d) and section 85(2)(d) of the MPRD Act. 
213  Section 81(3) and section 85(3) of the MPRD Act. 
214  Section 82(4) of the MPRD Act.   
215  Section 85(4) of the MPRD Act.   
216  Section 82(5) and section 85(5) of the MPRD Act.   
217  Sections 25, 33 and 49 of the Petroleum Act.   
218  Sections 23(3), 30(3)(a) and 45(3) of the Petroleum Act.   
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Application for renewal of a reconnaissance or exploration licence has to be made 90 
days prior to the expiry of the licence.219  Application for the renewal of a production 
licence has to be made no later than one year before the expiry of the licence.220  In each 
case, the Minister may on good cause shown allow a shorter period within which 
application for renewal must be made, provided that no application for renewal may be 
filed after the licence has expired.221  
The Minister may not grant an application for the renewal of an exploration or 
production licence if, the holder of such licence is, at the time of the application, failing 
to comply with any term or condition subject to which the licence in question has been 
issued or with any provision of the Petroleum Act.222  The same requirement is not 
stated in respect reconnaissance licences.  The effect therefore is that the requirement 
for renewals for reconnaissance licences are much more relaxed – the renewal may be 
granted even if the holder is not complying with the terms and conditions of the licence 
or the Act.  Although the discretion of the Minister appears to be limited here, the fact 
that he may not grant an application if all requirements are not met does not mean that 
he must grant the application if the requirements are met, as is provided for in South 
Africa under the MPRD Act.   
The Minister may not refuse the application to renew an exploration or production 
licence unless written notice has been given to the holder of his intention to refuse the 
application.  The notice must set out particulars of the alleged failure and must require 
the holder to make representations to the Minister in relation to the alleged failure or to 
remedy such failure on or before a date specified in such notice, and such holder has 
failed to so remedy such failure or make such representation.223  The same provision is 
not made in respect of reconnaissance licences.  However, in the light of just 
administrative action (especially the right to be heard and the right to be given written 
reasons), the same should apply to applications for renewals of reconnaissance 
licences.224  The Minister still appears to have discretion to grant an application for 
                                                          
219  Sections 25(a) and 33(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.  
220  Section 49(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
221  Sections 25(a), 33(1)(a) and 49(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
222  Section 33(3)(a) and section 49(3)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
223  Sections 33(3)(b) and 49(3)(b) of the Act.   
224  See Chapter Six above.   
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renewal, although he is obliged, if he decides to exercise this discretion and refuse the 
application, to give notice to the applicant.   
A reconnaissance licence may be renewed for further periods, not exceeding two years 
at a time.225  It may, however, only be renewed twice.226  The maximum period that a 
reconnaissance licence may therefore be issued (including renewals) is six years.  An 
exploration licence may be renewed for two further periods of two years each, provided 
that it may not be renewed on more than two occasions.227  The Minister may, upon 
application and upon good cause shown, extend each two-year renewal period to a 
maximum of three years.228  A third renewal is, possible if the Minister of Mines and 
Energy deems it to be in the interest of the development of the petroleum of Namibia.  
A third renewal may not be for a period longer than two years,229 which two-year 
period may also on application and good cause shown, be extended by the Minister to a 
maximum of three years.230  The normal period that a licence is therefore valid is for a 
maximum of eight years.  A third renewal is possible, which will extend the licence to a 
maximum of ten years.  Upon application and good cause shown, this period can be 
extended further to a maximum of between eleven and fourteen years.  No further 
extensions are possible in terms of the Petroleum Act.  The holder of an exploration 
licence must, on renewal, be obliged to relinquish a certain portion of the exploration 
area.231   
A production licence may be renewed for such further period, not exceeding 10 years, 
as may be determined by the Minister at the time of the renewal of the licence.232  The 
renewal period runs from the date on which such licence would have expired if an 
application for renewal had not been made or on the date on which the application for 
such renewal is granted, whichever date is the later date.233  A production licence may 
not be renewed on more than one occasion.234  The maximum duration of a production 
                                                          
225  Section 23(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
226  Section 23(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
227  Section 30(1) and section 30(2)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
228  Section 30(2A) of the Petroleum Act.   
229  Section 30(2)(b) of the Petroleum Act.   
230  Section 30(2A) of the Petroleum Act.   
231  Section 37 of the Petroleum Act.   
232  Section 45(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act.   
233  Section 45(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act.   
234  Section 45(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
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licence is therefore 35 years.  A production licence does not expire during a period 
during which an application for the renewal of such licence is being considered until 
such application is refused or the application is withdrawn or has lapsed, whichever 
occurs first.235   
3.3.3.6 Assessment of Application Procedures 
The application procedures for rights to petroleum is regulated on the one hand by the 
specific principles set out in the MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act, and on the other 
hand by the more general principles of just administrative action, discussed in Chapter 
Nine.  As regulator, the state must comply with both the specific legislation and the 
general principles when dealing with applications for rights to petroleum.   
The MPRD Act clearly limits the discretion the Minister in respect of the granting of 
rights and permit and state that the Minister must grant an application if all 
requirements are met.  In Namibia, the Minister appears to have discretion whether to 
grant an application for a petroleum licence, even if the requirements are met.  In fact, 
the entire application procedure under the Petroleum Act appears to be dependent on 
the discretion of the Minister.  This is not in line with a transparent petroleum 
regulatory regime.  This unfortunate situation is remedied to a certain extent by the fact 
that the Minister, while he still has discretion, must exercise this discretion in line with 
the principles of just administrative action.236 
3.3.4 Obligations of Holders 
A transparent petroleum legislative framework must set out the obligations of holders 
prescribed by law.237  Holders also need to know whether there are obligations that may 
be imposed at the discretion of the regulator.  It is furthermore to the benefit of the 
nation as a whole to know what obligations holders of rights in respect of petroleum 
may have and how they are imposed.   
In South Africa, the obligations placed on holders of reconnaissance and technical co-
operation permits are much less onerous than the obligations on holders of exploration 
                                                          
235  Section 45(3) of the Petroleum Act.   
236  See Chapter Nine below.     
237  Onorato (note 37) at 12. 
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and production rights.  The same applies in Namibia, where stricter obligations are 
placed on holders of exploration and production licences than on holders of 
reconnaissance licences.  The reason for this probably   
The Namibian Petroleum Act contains certain standard terms and conditions that apply 
to all petroleum licences, as well as terms and conditions that apply to exploration and 
production licences specifically.  So, for example is a standard terms and condition of 
all petroleum licences that the holder must, in the employment of employees, give 
preference to Namibian citizens who possess appropriate qualifications for purposes of 
the operations to be carried out in terms of the licence.238  The holder must also carry 
out training programmes to encourage and promote the development of Namibian 
citizens in the holder’s employment.239  For this purpose, the Minister may enter into 
agreements with licence holders providing for the implementation of training programs 
and the contribution of moneys to the Petroleum Training and Education Fund.240  
Furthermore, the holder of a petroleum licence must co-operate with other persons 
involved in the petroleum industry to enable these citizens to develop skills and 
technology to render services in the interest of the Namibian petroleum industry.241  The 
holder must, after due regard being had to the need to ensure technical and economic 
efficiency, make use of products, equipment and services which are available in 
Namibia.242  If any mineral is found during operations, this must be reported to the 
Minister as soon as possible.243   
Aside from the standard conditions of a licence discussed above, the Petroleum Act 
also prescribes other terms and conditions of an exploration or production licence.244  
Many of these terms and conditions relate to the environment245 and are discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter.  Aside from these conditions relating to the 
                                                          
238  Section 14(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
239  Section 14(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act. 
240  Section 14(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
241  Section 14(1)(c) of the Petroleum Act.   
242  Section 14(1)(d) of the Petroleum Act. 
243  Section 14(1)(e) of the Petroleum Act.   
244  Sections 38 and 53(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.  See Koep PF and Van den Berg HM “Mining and 
Energy Law in Namibia” in Ruppel OC and Ruppel-Schlichting K (eds) Environmental Law and 
Policy in Namibia: Towards Making Africa the Tree of Life, (2013) Windhoek 
OrumbondePress.na & Welwitschia Verlag Dr. A. Eckl, Essen at 188–190. 
245  Section 38(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
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environment, it is also a term and condition of an exploration or production licence that 
the holder thereof must carry out exploration or production operations in the 
exploration or production area in accordance with good oilfield practices.246  The holder 
must also take all reasonable steps necessary to secure the safety, welfare and health of 
persons employed for purposes of such operations in the exploration area.247 
The holder of an exploration or production licence must maintain in good condition and 
repair all structures, equipment and other goods in the exploration area and used in 
connection with the exploration operations.248  All installations, equipment, pipelines 
and other facilities (whether onshore or offshore) not used or intended to be used in 
connection with the exploration operations must be removed by the holder or otherwise 
dealt with as directed by the Minister in consultation with the Minister of Environment, 
the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources and the Minister of Finance.249  Finally, 
the holder must take reasonable steps to warn persons who may from time to time be in 
the vicinity of any such structures, equipment or other goods of the possible hazards 
resulting therefrom.250  Any holder of a licence who contravenes or fails to comply with 
these obligations is guilty of an offence.  On conviction, the holder may be liable to a 
maximum fine of N$20,000.251 
Finally, specific conditions are imposed only on holders of production licences.  The 
holder of a production licence must measure and weigh in accordance with a method 
approved, due regard being had to good oilfield practices, by the Commissioner, 
petroleum produced and saved from the area to which such holder's licence relates.252   
The holder must also cause all appliances used for purposes of weighing and measuring 
                                                          
246  Sections 38(1)(a) and 53(1) of the Petroleum Act.  “Good Oilfield Practices” means “any practices 
which are generally applied by persons involved in the exploration or production of petroleum in 
other countries of the world as good, safe, efficient and necessary in the carrying out of 
exploration operations or production operations”. See Section 1 of the MPA and Section 1 of the 
Petroleum Act.  See also Chapter Six, par 3.3.2.2. below for the criticism on “good oilfield 
practices”. 
247  Sections 38(1)(b) and 53(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
248  Sections 38(1)(c) and 53(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
249  Sections 38(1)(d) and 53(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
250  Sections 38(1)(e) and 53(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
251  Sections 38(3) and 53(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
252  Section 53(2)(a)(i) of the Petroleum Act.   
Chapter Five 






to be tested and examined in accordance with any directions in writing issued by the 
Commissioner.253 
The South African legislation does not contain a standard set of obligations, but instead 
lists specific obligations of each right holder.  Under the MPRD Act, the holder of a 
reconnaissance permit is obliged to conduct reconnaissance operations actively in 
respect of petroleum on the relevant area and in accordance with the reconnaissance 
programme,254 while the holder of a technical co-operation permit must actively carry 
out the technical co-operation study in accordance with the technical co-operation work 
programme.255   Holders in respect of both permits must comply with the terms and 
conditions of the permit, the relevant provisions of the MPRD Act and any other law 
that may be applicable.256  Holders of reconnaissance permits must pay the prescribed 
reconnaissance fee to the designated agency.257  Holders of technical co-operation 
permits must submit the permit for recording in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles 
Registration Office.258  In Namibia, the standard conditions apply to reconnaissance 
licences, as well as exploration and production licences.   
n South Africa, the MPRD Act lists various obligations of holders of exploration and 
production rights.  First, the holder must lodge the right within 60 days for registration 
at the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office.259  Second, the holder must 
continuously and actively conduct exploration and production operations in accordance 
with the approved work programme.260  Third, the holder must comply with the terms 
and conditions of the right, the relevant provisions of the MPRD Act and any other 
law.261  Fourth, the holder must comply with the requirements of the approved 
environmental management programme and, in the case of holders of production rights, 
the prescribed social and labour plan.262  Two further obligations are prescribed for 
                                                          
253  Section 53(2)(a)(ii) of the Petroleum Act.   
254  Section 74(5)(a) of the MPRD Act. 
255  Section 78(2)(a) of the MPRD Act.   
256  Section 75(5)(b)(c) and section 78(2)(b) of the MPRD Act.   
257  Section 75(5)(b)(c) of the MPRD Act. 
258  Section 78(2)(c) of the MPRD Act.   
259  Section 82(2)(a) and section 86(2)(a) of the MPRD Act.   
260  Section 82(2)(b) and section 86(2)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
261  Section 82(2)(c) and section 86(2)(c) of the MPRD Act. 
262  Section 82(2)(d) of the MPRD Act.  With regard to production rights, see section 86(2)(d) of the 
MPRD Act.  This subsection is substituted by section 64(b) of the Mineral and Petroleum 
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holders of exploration rights.  Holders must pay the prescribed exploration fees to the 
designated agency263 and must commence with exploration activities within 90 days 
from the effective date of the exploration right or such extended period as the Minister 
may authorise.264 
The holder of an exploration or production right in South Africa may only commence 
with the exploration or production operations when the holder has provided for a 
financial provision acceptable to the designated agency.265  This financial provision 
must guarantee the availability of sufficient funds for the due fulfilment of all 
exploration or production work programmes by the holder.266  A similar requirement is 
not imposed in Namibia under the Petroleum Act.  The MPA does, however, contain 
various obligations on holder to submit proof of funding on the date of signing of the 
agreement.267 
In Namibia, specific obligations are imposed on holders of exploration licences with 
regard to discoveries of petroleum.  This is in line with general practice in respect of 
petroleum legislation.268  When a discovery of petroleum is made in an exploration 
area, the holder of the exploration licence concerned must immediately inform the 
Commissioner by notice in writing of the fact that such discovery has been made.269  
The holder must then, within a period of sixty days after the notice, furnish the 
Commissioner in writing with particulars relating to the block or blocks where such 
discovery has been made, the nature of such discovery and such other particulars as the 
Commissioner may require.270   
Immediately after a discovery of petroleum is made, the holder must cause tests to be 
made in connection with such discovery to determine the commercial interest of such 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Resources Development Amendment Act 49 of 2008, which reads as follows:  “comply with the 
conditions of the environmental authorisation and the prescribed social and labour plan”.  This 
amendment shall come into operation on 07 December 2014. 
263  Section 82(2)(e) of the MPRD Act. 
264  Section 82(1)(c) of the MPRD Act. 
265  Section 89 of the MPRD Act. 
266  Section 89 of the MPRD Act. 
267  See clause 4.7 of the MPA.   
268  Onorato (note 37) at 49. 
269  Section 39(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
270  Section 39(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act. 
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discovery.271  Within a period of sixty days after having completed such tests, the 
holder must furnish the Commissioner with a report containing an evaluated result of 
such tests and an evaluation of the potential commercial interest of such discovery.272   
If it appears from the report that a discovery may be of a commercial interest, the 
holder of the licence must forthwith take all such steps as may be reasonable in the 
circumstances to appraise the discovery and determine the quantity of petroleum to 
which the discovery relates in so far as it occurs within the exploration area.273  After 
the appraisal has been completed, the holder must furnish the Commissioner with a 
report containing particulars of such appraisal and determination.274  The Minister may, 
on application by the holder, exempt the holder from appraising the discovery.275   
At any time during the period referred to above, the Commissioner may require the 
holder of the exploration licence concerned by notice in writing addressed and 
delivered to such holder to furnish the Commissioner, within such period as may be 
specified in such notice in writing, with such particulars on any matter so specified 
concerning the discovery or any appraisal of such discovery.276  A holder who fails to 
comply with this notice is guilty of an offence and is on conviction liable to a 
maximum fine of N$20,000.00.277 
If it appears from the report submitted to the Commissioner by the holder that a 
discovery is not of potential commercial interest, the Minister may by notice in writing 
addressed and delivered to the holder, direct that with effect from a date specified in 
such notice the licence in question shall cease to be of any force and effect in relation to 
the discovery block in question and any adjoining land required for purposes of 
obtaining access to that block.  The Minister must give this notice within 180 days as 
from the date on which such report was furnished.278  The Minister may not exercise 
this power unless: (1) he has by notice in writing informed the holder of his intention to 
exercise such powers.  The notice must require the holder to make representations to 
                                                          
271  Section 39(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act. 
272  Section 39(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act. 
273  Section 39(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
274  Section 39(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
275  Section 39(3) of the Petroleum Act.   
276  Section 40(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
277  Section 40(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
278  Section 41(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
Chapter Five 






the Minister in relation to the matter on or before a date specified in such notice; and 
(2) he is, having regard to information available to him and after having considered any 
representations made to him by the holder, satisfied that the discovery is of not 
potential commercial interest.279 
If it appears that a discovery is of a commercial interest, the Minister must, upon an 
application made to the Minister by the holder of the licence concerned, within a period 
of 90 days as from the date of such application declare by notice in the Government 
Gazette the discovery block and not more than eight other blocks specified in the 
application to be a petroleum field.280  The Minister may, upon an application made to 
him by the holder of the licence concerned declare by notice in the Government Gazette 
that the block specified in such application shall form part of or cease to form part of a 
petroleum field.281  The holder of an exploration licence may not make any application 
to the Minister in respect of any block, unless such block adjoins282 the discovery block 
and is situated within the exploration area of such holder.283  The Minister on the other 
hand may not declare any block to be a petroleum field or to form part of a petroleum 
field, unless such block contains a petroleum reservoir or part of a petroleum reservoir 
or adjoins any such block.284 
When a petroleum field has been declared, the holder of the exploration licence issued 
in respect of the discovery block in question may, subject to the provisions of the 
Petroleum Act relating to production licences, apply within a period of two years as 
from the date on which the petroleum field has been so declared or such further period 
as the Minister may on good cause shown allow in writing during the currency of its 
licence, for a production licence in respect of such petroleum field.285   If the holder 
                                                          
279  Section 40(2) of the Petroleum Act.  With regard to the second requirement, the Petroleum Act 
states that the Minister must be satisfied that the discovery of of potential commercial interest.  
This, however, appears to be a typing error, as the section deals with discoveries not of potential 
commercial interest.   
280  Section 41(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
281  Section 41(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
282  For purposes of this section, a block shall be regarded to adjoin a discovery block or a block 
containing a petroleum reservoir or part of such reservoir, if any part of such first-mentioned 
block has a side in common or touches such discovery block or such other block.  See section 
41(5) of the Petroleum Act.   
283  Section 41(3) of the Petroleum Act.   
284  Section 41(4) of the Petroleum Act.   
285  Section 43(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
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fails to apply for a production licence within the period so referred to informs the 
Minister by notice in writing within such period that he does not intend to apply for a 
production licence, the Minister may by notice in the Government Gazette withdraw the 
notice in terms of which such petroleum field is declared to be a petroleum field.286 
If petroleum is not recovered in a production area and the Minister is satisfied that 
petroleum is recoverable in such,  he may by written notice to the holder of the 
production licence concerned, direct the holder to take, due regard being had to good 
oilfield practices, such steps as may be necessary and practicable to recover petroleum 
in such area, as the Minister may specify in such notice.287  The same applies if 
petroleum is recovered at a rate which is, having regard to the capacity of the petroleum 
reservoir in such area, in the opinion of the Minister not in the public interest.  In that 
case, the notice must require the holder to increase or reduce the rate at which the 
petroleum is recovered in such area to such rate, not exceeding, in the case of an 
increase, the capacity of the production facilities of the holder of the licence.288  Any 
holder of a production licence who contravenes or fails to comply with such a notice is 
guilty of an offence and on conviction liable to a fine not exceeding N$100,000.289  This 
section ensures that the state is placed in a position to ensure the optimal exploitation of 
petroleum resources in Namibia. 
The obligations imposed by the MPRD Act on the holder of a right or permit relate for 
the most part to administrative issues, such as lodgement for registration and payment 
of fees.  Some obligations, however, may have a much wider effect on the operations of 
the holder, such as the obligation to comply with all relevant laws and the relevant 
work programmes.  The Petroleum Act describes in much more detail the obligations of 
holders than the MPRD Act.  Additional obligations may be imposed in terms of the 
petroleum agreement as well.  These obligation relate to more than just administrative 
issues, but have an effect on the relevant activities as well, for example training, 
procurement, skills development, environmental issues, etc.  The more detailed the 
obligations are, the more certainty the relevant legislative framework provides.  
                                                          
286  Section 43(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
287  Section 52(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
288  Section 52(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
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Under both Acts it appear as if the Minister may at his discretion impose conditions on 
holders that are not prescribed in the relevant statutes.  This general authority of the 
Minister is, however, curbed by the principles of just administrative, discussed later.    
The Petroleum Act sets out in detail what the obligations of a holder are when a 
discovery of petroleum is made, which the MPRD Act fails to do.  Given the national 
importance of such a discovery, legislatures should consider providing in its legislation 
in detail for the role of the state in the event of a discovery.  This is in line with the 
approach by other jurisdictions as well, such as Australia,290 Ghana291 and Angola.292 
3.3.5 Transfer and Encumbrance of Rights 
Holders of rights to petroleum often require additional capital.  When structuring a 
finance arrangements, security will likely be sought over the right, permit or licence.  It 
is therefore important for an investor and holder to know whether or not the rights held 
by the holder can be transferred and encumbered.  Restrictions on the transferability 
and encumbrance of rights to petroleum will affect the type of funding arrangement for 
a particular project.293 
Petroleum legislation typically provide for the transfer and encumbrance of rights to 
petroleum.294  For example, in Ghana a contractor or subcontractor may not assign 
(directly or indirectly) his rights and obligations under a petroleum contract, in whole 
or in part, to a third party without the prior written consent of the Secretary.295  
Furthermore, a contractor or subcontractor may not transfer any shares in its 
incorporated company in Ghana to a third party either directly or indirectly without the 
written approval of the Secretary if the transfer will amount to a change in control in 
the company or control over the interest of shareholder who owns more than 5% of the 
shares in the company.296  In Australia, petroleum titles may not be transferred unless it 
has been approved by the Titles Administrator and an instrument of transfer is 
                                                          
290  Section 284 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth). 
291  Section 9 of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984.   
292  Article 62 of Lei 10_04 de 12 de Novembro das Activitades Petrolifers (Petroleum Activities 
Law). 
293  McCormick RS “Legal Issues in Project Finance” (1983) Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law 21 at 29. 
294  Onorato (note 37) at 40. 
295  Section 23(1) of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984.   
296  Section 23(16) of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Law, 1984.   
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registered under the relevant legislation.297  Furthermore, a dealing (which includes 
creation or assignment of an interest or right in an existing title) is of no force until the 
Titles Administrator has approved the dealing and made the necessary entry into the 
relevant register.298  In the Netherlands, a licence holder may only transfer a licence or 
part of the licence with the written permission of the Minister.299   
What is important about all the mentioned jurisdictions is that all of them recognise that 
authorisations to petroleum may be transferred or encumbered – there is no outright 
prohibition on the transfer or encumbrance of petroleum authorisations or an interest in 
petroleum authorisations.  This way, the regulatory frameworks recognise the practical 
need of ensuring petroleum authorisations, or an interest therein, can be encumbered to 
raise necessary capital.   
In South Africa, reconnaissance permits and technical co-operation permits cannot be 
transferred, unlike an exploration right or production right which can be transferred and 
encumbered provided ministerial consent has been obtained.300  More specifically in 
respect of encumbrance, an exploration right or an interest in an exploration right, or a 
controlling interest in a company or close corporation may not be ceded, transferred, 
let, sublet, assigned, alienated or otherwise disposed of without the written consent of 
the Minister, except in the case of change of controlling interest in listed companies.301  
The Minister must grant consent if the cessionary, transferee, lessee, sublessee, 
assignee or the person to whom the right will be alienated or disposed of is capable of 
carrying out and complying with the obligations and the terms and conditions of the 
exploration or production right and the holder complies with the requirements set for 
applicants for exploration and production rights.302  The discretion of the Minister to 
                                                          
297  Section 472 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth). 
298  Section 487 of the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth). 
299  Article 20 of the Mining Act 2003 (Mijnbouwwet 2003).  
300  Section 82(1)(d) and section 86(1)(c) of the MPRD Act.   
301  Section 82(1)(c) and section 86(1)(c) read with section 11(1) of the MPRD Act.  Subsection 11(1) 
is substituted by section 8(a) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment 
Act 49 of 2008, which will be put into operation by proclamation.  The new section will read as 
follows: “A prospecting right or mining right or an interest in any such right, or any interest in a 
close corporation or unlisted company or any controlling interest in a listed company (which 
corporations or companies hold a prospecting right or mining right or an interest in any such 
right), may not be ceded, transferred, let, sublet, assigned alienated or otherwise disposed of 
without prior written of the Minister.”  
302  Section 11(2) of the MPRD Act.   
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grant the consent is therefore limited – he must grant the consent if the requirements of 
the MPRD Act are met.   
In Namibia, as with South Africa, exploration and production licences can only be 
transferred with Ministerial consent.  Unlike South Africa, however, reconnaissance 
licences are transferable.303  Furthermore, under the Petroleum Act no person may 
grant, cede or assign any interest in a petroleum licence to any other person or be joined 
as a joint holder of a petroleum licence other than in writing and with the approval of 
the Minister.304  Application must be made to the Petroleum Commission in such form 
as may be determined by the Minister.305   
The prohibition on transferring and encumbering exploration and production rights 
without ministerial consent as worded in the MPRD Act gives rise to some 
interpretative difficulties.306  For example, it is unclear what is meant by “interest” in an 
exploration or “alienated or otherwise disposed of” or “controlling interest”.307  
Furthermore, does cession refer to an out-and-out cession only or does it include a 
security cession (cession in securitatem debiti) as well?308   
The interpretation of the section may be approached in one of two ways.309  First, 
because it amounts to a restraint on alienation, it must be interpreted strictly.310  
Secondly, and possibly contradictory, the section must be interpreted with the purpose 
of the section and the objects of the MPRD Act in mind.311  The MPRD Act itself seems 
to support the second approach by stating that, when a provision of the MPRD Act is 
                                                          
303  Section 9(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act.   
304  Section 9(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act.   
305  Section 11(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act.   
306  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-162. 
307  See for example Van der Merwe M and Ferreire E "Will Amendments to the MPRDA make 
Foreign Investment any Easier?" September 2013 Without Prejudice 26 at 26.  On controlling 
interest, see Dale et al (note 9) at MPRDA-169–MPRD-172 and Moore G and Veldsman J "Big 
Brother and the Holding Company: Ministerial Consent to Dispose of Indirect Controlling 
Interests in Mining Companies" 2013 (130) SALJ 85. 
308  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-173.   
309  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-162. 
310  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-162.  This approach is based on the presumptions that statute law is 
not unjust, inequitable or unreasonable and a restrictive approach must be taken in respect of 
interpretations of restraints on alienation in contract.  See Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-162 and the 
authorities cited there.     
311  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-162.  This purposive approach is supported by section 4 of the 
MPRD Act. 
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interpreted, any reasonable interpretation which is consistent with the objects of the Act 
must be preferred.312   
So, for example, when a restrictive interpretation is applied to “cession”, it may refer 
only to an out-and-out cession and not a cession in securitatem debiti as well.313  
However, in normal legal parlance a cession refers to both out-and-out cessions as well 
as cessions in securitatem debiti and any literal interpretation of this section should 
accordingly refer to both cessions.314 
For holders of exploration and production rights to be in a position to exploit the right 
optimally, they must be in a position to use the right to obtain financing.  This can be 
done by various means, including mortgaging the right.  However, the section dealing 
with the transfer and encumbrance of exploration rights does not refer to encumbrance 
by mortgage.315  Even so, it is stated later in the section that consent of the Minister is 
not required for the encumbrance by mortgage of an exploration or production right or 
interest in such a right as security to obtain a loan or guarantee for the purpose of 
funding or financing of an exploration or production project by certain banks or 
financial institutions,316 provided that the bank or financial institution in question 
undertakes in writing that any sale in execution or any other disposal pursuant to the 
foreclosure of the mortgage will be subject to the consent of the Minister.317   
This creates confusion whether the prohibition on transfer and encumbrance of rights 
envisage mortgage of a licence as well.318  A restrictive interpretation will exclude 
encumbrance by means of mortgage from requiring the Minister’s consent, as including 
it will broaden the scope of the prohibition.319  It may, however, also be argued that the 
subsequent reference to mortgage shows an intention to include mortgage under the 
                                                          
312  Section 4 of the MPRD Act.   
313  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-173. 
314  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-173. 
315  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-172. 
316  This section only applies to banks as defined in the Banks Act 94 of 1990 and financial 
institutions approved for this purpose by the Registrar of Banks on request by the Minister.  See 
section 11(3) of the MPRD Act.   
317  Section 11(3) of the MPRD Act.   
318  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-172. 
319  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-172. 
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prohibited actions.320  Dale et al are, however, of the opinion that applying a restrictive 
approach here is not inconsistent with the objects of the MPRD Act, as any foreclosure 
on the mortgage will in any event require ministerial consent.321  
The Petroleum Act Namibia is also unclear as to what amounts to an interest in a 
licence and no guidance is given in the Act or in case law in Namibia on how to 
interpret it, other than using the normal rules of statutory interpretation.  For example, it 
is unclear whether shareholding in the company holding the licence will fall under the 
definition of interest in a licence and whether Ministerial consent is required when 
transferring shares in the holder.  Unlike the MPRD Act, the Petroleum Act does not 
refer to a change in the controlling interest requiring Ministerial consent.   
In South Africa, any transfer, cession, letting, subletting, alienation, encumbrance by 
mortgage or variation of an exploration or production right must be lodged for 
registration at the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office.322  Lodgement 
must take place within sixty days of the relevant transaction.323  In Namibia, the 
provisions relating to application for a petroleum licence or renewal of a petroleum 
licence insofar as they relate to the powers of the Minister after receiving the 
application apply to applications for transfer of petroleum licences or the grant, cession 
or assignment of interests in petroleum licence or the joining of joint holders in a 
petroleum licence as well.324  The transfer of a licence does not affect any legal 
proceedings instituted against the holder.325  The granting, ceding or assigning of an 
interest in the licence does not affect any obligations or liability of the holder imposed 
in terms of the licence or the Petroleum Act.326 
The MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act make it possible to transfer and encumber rights 
to petroleum.  The Acts, however, are not clear as to what type of transactions are 
allowed under the Acts and the exact scope of the relevant provisions is uncertain.  The 
legislature should amend these provisions to provide more clarity.  Furthermore, 
                                                          
320  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-172. 
321  Dale et al (note 9) at MPRD-172. 
322  Section 11(4) of the MPRD Act.   
323  Section 11(4) of the MPRD Act. 
324  Section 12 of the Petroleum Act.   
325  Section 11(3) of the Petroleum Act. 
326  Section 11(4) of the Petroleum Act. 
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another issue that may be a problem for petroleum companies is the timing in respect of 
security.  To illustrate, when a petroleum company enters into a security agreement in 
terms whereof security is granted over the petroleum right or licence, it is uncertain 
when exactly the consent of the Minister should be obtained.  It may either be at the 
conclusion of the agreement, or only upon enforcement of the agreement.  In Namibia 
in practice, the Minister does not entertain applications for consent for entering into a 
security agreement in respect of a petroleum licence – the Ministry’s view is that 
consent is only required when enforcing the security.  This creates a problem, as the 
holder of the security can never be guaranteed that the Minister will give his consent 
when the security is to be enforced.  There needs to be more certainty from the outset 
whether the security will be enforceable or not.   
3.3.6 Recordkeeping / Reporting 
Proper recordkeeping and reporting ensures continued transparency within a petroleum 
legislative framework.  Not only does recordkeeping and reporting obligations give 
greater certainty to holders as to their duties, but it also ensures that the public is kept 
informed of the activities of holders of rights to petroleum.  It furthermore enables a 
state to exercise proper control over the functions of the holder, thereby promoting 
transparency.   
In terms of the South African MPRD Act, a holder of a technical co-operation or 
reconnaissance permit must submit progress reports to Petroleum Agency SA.  These 
reports must detail the progress achieved as described in the work programme.327  The 
reports must be submitted twelve months from the date of issue of the permit or at the 
end of the period for which the permit is granted if the period is granted for less than 
twelve months.328   
The level of reporting is much stricter with exploration rights than with reconnaissance 
permits and technical co-operation permits with regard to the frequency of submissions.  
The holder of an exploration right must submit timeous, accurate reports to the 
                                                          
327  Regulation 21(1) and regulation 26(1) of the MPRD Regulations.   
328  Regulation 21(2) and regulation 26(2) of the MPRD Regulations. 
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designated agency on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis.329  The MPRD Regulations 
prescribe the content of the reports.330   
A holder of any authorisation in respect of petroleum must supply the designated 
agency digital and, where appropriate, hard copies of all data, reports and 
interpretations generated.331  It must be provided in a format and medium as agreed 
upon with the designated agency and must be done as soon possible after completion of 
the operations or the projects.332  The designated agency must in turn submit the 
progress reports and data to the Council for Geoscience.  This must be done within 
thirty days after the designated agency has received the reports.333   
All information, data, reports and interpretations must, subject to the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act,334 be kept confidential by the designated agency.  
Confidentiality is only for a maximum period of four years or until the date on which 
the permit lapses or is cancelled or terminated or the area to which the permit relates 
has been abandoned or relinquished.335 
Unlike its South African counterpart, the Namibian Petroleum Act does not have 
different levels of reporting for different licences; holders are subjected to the same 
reporting requirement, regardless of the type ot petroleum licence.  Holders must keep 
proper record regarding its operations.336  The record must be kept in such form as may 
be determined by the Commissioner.337  Twice a year, the holder must submit a 
summary of the geological and geophysical word carried out and drilling activities 
performed.338  The holder must also submit a list of maps and geological and 
geophysical reports prepared by or on behalf of the holder in connection with the 
                                                          
329  Regulation 31(1) of the MPRD Regulations.  Monthly reports must be submitted within seven 
days after each month-end, quarterly reports within twenty-one days of the end of a particular 
quarter and annual reports within sixty days of each calendar year end.  See regulation 31 of the 
MPRD Regulations.   
330  See Regulation 31 of the MPRD Regulations.   
331  Regulation 22, regulation 27, regulation 32 and regulation 37 of the MPRD Regulations. 
332  Regulation 22, regulation 27, regulation 32 and regulation 37of the MPRD Regulations. 
333  Section 88(1) of the MPRD Act.   
334  Act 20 of 2002. 
335  Section 88(2) of the MPRD Act. 
336  Section 18(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
337  Section 18(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
338  Section 18(1)(c)(i) of the Petroleum Act.   
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exploration operations, which must also be submitted twice year.339  Failure to comply 
with the reporting provisions is a criminal offence.340 
Within sixty days after the end of each year of the currency of the licence, the holder 
must submit to the Commissioner a return in respect of the results of the operations 
carried out during the previous year and the estimates of petroleum recoverable in the 
area to which the licence relates for the period ending on the last day of the succeeding 
year.341  On each day on which drilling operations are carried out, the holder must 
submit a report on such drilling operations carried out on the previous day.342 
In the event that the licence is cancelled or expires, the holder thereof must, within 
three months of the date of cancellation or expiry date, deliver to the Commission all 
reports, maps and plans as well as all tapes, diagrams, profiles and charts prepared by 
or on behalf of the holder in respect of the licence and such other books, document, 
records and reports as the Commissioner may require.343  Failure to do so is a criminal 
offence.344 
Both the MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act obliges the holder to keep proper records 
and report to the state on its activities.  This ensures proper continues control over 
petroleum companies by the state.  It also ensures that the activities of petroleum 
companies do not take place in a clandestine manner.  Public access to these records 
are, however, restricted or otherwise not provided for.  Restricting access for the public 
to information gathered and held by petroleum companies may be in commercial 
interest, as petroleum companies may want to keep this information confidential to 
protect them from their competitors, who may use the information to compete directly 
with the holder.  The lack of transparency in this case may therefore be justified 
                                                          
339  Section 18(1)(c)(ii) of the Petroleum Act.   
340  Section 18(3) of the Petroleum Act.   
341  Section 18(1)(d) of the Petroleum Act.   
342  Section 18(1)(e) of the Petroleum Act. 
343  Section 18(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
344  Section 18(3) of the Petroleum Act.   
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4. Assessment and Concluding Remarks 
The legislation in South Africa and Namibia regulating access to petroleum resources 
only applies to resources that fall under the statutory definition of petroleum.  The 
definition of petroleum in the MPRD Act in South Africa and the Petroleum Act in 
Namibia may be considered the “threshold” that must be passed before invoking the 
provisions of these two Acts.  The definition of petroleum in both the Namibian and 
South African acts accords with international definitions and the geological 
understanding of petroleum.  If the definition is broken up into its different 
requirements, it is easier to determine whether a substance qualifies as petroleum.  
Nevertheless, there is a rise in the popularity of unconventional petroleum resources.  
The legislature may have to amend the definition of petroleum to ensure that there is no 
confusion whether certain resources, such as shale gas, are regulated by the relevant 
legislation.    
Different rights may be granted in respect of petroleum.  The type of right will depend 
on what the holder intends to do.  So, for example, if a petroleum company intends to 
search for petroleum, it can apply for a reconnaissance permit or exploration right (in 
South Africa) or a reconnaissance licence or exploration licence (in Namibia).  If the 
company merely intends to collect information by means of aerial surveys, it should 
apply for a reconnaissance permit or reconnaissance licence.  However, if the company 
intends to employ more extensive operations, it should apply for an exploration licence 
or exploration right.  If the company intends to extract (produce) petroleum, it needs a 
production right (in South Africa) or production licence (in Namibia).   
The different types of rights a company can apply for in respect of petroleum is 
discussed in some detail in the MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act.  These Acts sets out 
the application procedure, the rights of holders and the terms and conditions upon 
which rights and licences are issued.   
With regard to the content of authorisation granted in Namibia and South Africa in 
respect of petroleum, the legislation of both countries cover the essential elements.  The 
legislative framework prescribes the nature of the activities authorised by the right, 
permit or licence and the duration and renewal possibilities. 
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The transfer and encumbrance of rights and licences are dealt with in the MPRD Act 
and the Petroleum Act.  Under the MPRD Act, technical co-operation permits and 
reconnaissance permits may not be transferred or encumbered.  As a result, these rights 
cannot be used to raise finance.  Exploration rights, production rights, exploration 
licences and production licences are, however, transferable and may also be 
encumbered.  The South African MPRD Act deals in much more detail with the transfer 
and encumbrance of rights than the Namibian Petroleum Act.  Neverthelessevertheless, 
both Acts are unclear as to what transactions are caught and will require ministerial 
consent.  This uncertainty creates a problem for holders and their legal representatives.  
The legislature needs to amend the legislation to clarify what transactions require 
ministerial consent. 
The application procedure for exploration and production rights in South Africa 
requires that notification be given to interested and affected parties and that they be 
given an opportunity to give their views and to object to the granting of these rights.  
This is a very important step in ensuring that the interests of the people of South Africa 
are protected as well and that they are heard on decisions that affect them.  The same 
requirement is not present in the Namibian legislation.  However, as discussed in the 
next chapter, interested and affected parties will have an opportunity to be heard during 
the process of applying for environmental authorisations.345 
To enable the state to exercise proper control over licence holders, both Acts also 
require strict reporting and recordkeeping.  This promotes transparency of a the 
petroleum regulatory regime and accountability of the state, who is kept informed of 
the operations.  However, as stated above, public access to these reports and records are 
not provided for.  Although this may be seen as contrary to transparency, it may be 
justified based on commercial grounds.   
This chapter deals with the primary legislation regulating the petroleum exploitation 
process in the upstream industry.  Petroleum exploitation, however, operates within a 
wider regulatory framework.  While the legislation for upstream petroleum resources 
discussed in this chapter primarily determines how access to these resources is obtained 
                                                          
345  See paragraph 2.4.2.2.1 of Chapter Six below.   
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and what the content of this access is, they are not the only legislative measures 
determining access to petroleum.  An important aspect of the regulatory framework for 
the petroleum exploitation process is the effect of petroleum exploitation on the 
environment.  The legislation dealing with this gives further content to access to 
petroleum.  The following chapter therefore expands on the regulatory framework for 
petroleum by focusing on the framework for environmental protection during the 




PETROLEUM EXPLOITATION AND THE 
RIGHT TO A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT 
 
1. Introduction 
As the world’s biggest commodity,1 petroleum adds value to the daily lives of people.  
It has played a positive role in industrial development and the modern way of life by 
contributing to economic growth and a higher standard of living.2  This benefit, 
however, comes at a price.3  The effect that petroleum exploitation has on the 
environment is receiving increasing international attention.  Petroleum has the capacity 
of polluting the land, sea and atmosphere and is a major contributor in the depletion of 
the ozone layer4 and has left a profound adverse impact on the global environment.5  
Petroleum extraction takes place deep beneath the surface of the land, sometimes in 
environmentally sensitive areas, and the petroleum itself is made up of extremely toxic 
chemicals.6   
The Exxon Valdez oil spill in 19897 and the more recent 2010 well blow-out of BP’s 
leased Deepwater Horizon rig8 highlighted the effect that the exploitation, production 
                                                          
1  See paragraph 1 of Chapter One above. 
2  Gao Z “Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: An 
Introduction and Overview” in Gao Z (ed) Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas (1998) 
London Kluwer Law International at 3; Waskow D and Welch C "The Envioronmental, Social, 
and Human Rights Impacts of Oil Development" in S Tsalik and A Schiffrin (eds), Covering Oil: 
A Reporter's Guide to Energy and Development (2005) New York, Open Institute Society at 101. 
3  Waskow and Welch (note 2) at 101. 
4  Omorogbe Y Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria (2003) Lagos Malthouse Press Limited at 17.   
5  Gao (note 2) at 3. 
6  Waskow and Welch (note 2) at 101. 
7  In 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez tore its hull and ruptured eight of its eleven cargo tanks, 
which resulted in the spill of approximately 10.8 million gallons of crude oil.  Clean-up efforts 
cost Exxon around US$2.1 billion.  Exxon was further fined US$125 million and settled the civil 
action instituted against it by the Unites States and State of Alaska for environmental damage by 
agreeing to pay at least US$900 million for restoring natural resources and another US$300 
million in voluntary settlements with private individuals.  See Moreland I "From the Exxon 
Valdez to the Deepwater Horizon: Will BP's Dollar Reach Where the Oil Didn't" 2011 (14) 
Sustainable Development Law Journal 117 at 118 – 119. 
8  The 2010 well blow-out of BP’s leased Deepwater Horizon rig was the largest oil spill in the 
United States and resulted in the death of eleven men, caused as a result of a malfunctioning 
blow-out preventer.  An estimated four million barrels of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico.  See 
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and transport of this precious commodity has on the environment.9 The Deepwater 
Horizon is an example of a catastrophe that occurred during the production stage, 
where an estimated four million barrels of produced oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. 
By contrast, the Exxon Valdez demonstrates the catastrophic consequences that may 
accompany transport of petroleum, where the supertanker Exxon Valdez tore its hull 
and ruptured eight of its eleven cargo tanks, which resulted in the spill of approximately 
10.8 million gallons of crude oil.   
Disastrous incidents such as the ones mentioned above are not only a major concern for 
the petroleum company doing the exploitation and the host government within whose 
borders the incident occurs; it affects the lives of many other, including the citizens of 
the host country.10  Petroleum exploitation also raises socio-economic, cultural and 
human rights issues.11  A well-known example of the human rights / environment 
aspect of petroleum exploitation is the failure by the Nigerian government to protect the 
interest of the Ogoni people, who regard the environment as sacred.12  The objection by 
the Ogoni people against the effects of petroleum exploitation on the environment was 
met with fierce, even violent, protest.13   
Moreover, new methods of recovering petroleum, such as horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing,14 raise new environmental concerns.15  These concerns relate 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Grant J "What Can We Learn from the 2010 BP Oil Spill?  Five Important Corporate Law and 
Life Lessons" 2010-2011 (42) McGeorge Law Review 809 at 809-810; Moreland (note 7) at 120. 
9  See Waskow and Welch (note 2) at 101; Havemann L “Environmental Law and Regulation” in 
Gordon G, Paterson J and Üşenmez E (eds) Oil and Gas Law: Current Practices and Emerging 
Trends 2ed (2011) Dundee Dundee University Press at 231. 
10  Koons JE “Earth Jurisprudence and the Story of Oil: Intergenerational Justice for the Post-
Petroleum Period” 2011-2012 University of San Francisco Law Review 93 at 93 – 94. 
11  Gao (note 2) at 7. 
12  Blanco EM and Razzaque J Globalisation and Natural Resources: Challenges Key Issues and 
Perspectives Cheltenham Edward Elgar at 147. 
13  See for example Blanco and Razzaque (note 12) at 147. 
14  See Chapter Two and Chapter Five. 
15  The hydraulic fracturing that royal Dutch Shell intends to use in the Karoo to produce shale gas 
elicited widely-published controversy.  One of the major concerns raised is the effect that this will 
have on the environment.  See for example Cropley E “Karoo Fracking: Water, Wealth and 
White” 28 October 2013 Mail and Guardian available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-10-28-
karoo-fracking-water-wealth-and-whites [accessed 02.02.2014]; SAPA “Fracking Threatens 
Karoo Water Reserves: Conservationists” 06 September 2013 Times Live available at 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/scitech/2013/09/06/fracking-threatens-karoo-water-reserves-
conservationists [accessed 02.02.2014]; Karoo Space “Threat of Fracking Unites Karoo 
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amongst others to the unknown effects that certain substances used during the fracking 
process may have on water resources.16  Other concerns relate to soil contamination, 
earthquakes and climate change.17   
Since this thesis focuses on the upstream petroleum industry, this chapter will only 
focus on those environmental regulations directly applicable in the upstream petroleum 
industry.  The potential effect of upstream petroleum exploitation on the environment 
differs depending on the stage of the exploitation process.18  Reconnaissance operations 
have very little, if any, negative impact on the environment.19  The impact of petroleum 
activities on the environment increases as the exploitation activities progress.20  Finally, 
the methods employed in the production of petroleum are invasive and often take place 
in remote and environmentally sensitive locations.21   
Environmental obligations in respect of petroleum principally involve the relationship 
between the holder and the state as agent of its people. This chapter therefore expands 
on what the previous chapter has discussed.22  Environmental regulation also operates 
in the interest of the nation by ensuring that people’s right to a clean environmental is 
respected and upheld.  The potential benefit that oil exploitation can provide to a 
country must be weighed up against the potential environmental consequences of oil 
exploitation for that country.23  The state, as regulator of access to petroleum resources 
and agent of the nation,24 has to ensure that a balance is struck between the potential 
benefit of petroleum exploitation and the right to a clean environment.  This is achieved 
through a transparent and accountable legislative framework in respect of petroleum 
exploitation and environmental protection. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Communities” available at http://karoospace.co.za/threat-of-fracking-unites-karoo-communities/ 
[accessed 02.02.2014].   
16  See Staff Reporter “Fracking” Insight May 2013 at 31. 
17  Parliamentary Commission for the Environment Evaluating the Environmental Impacts of 
Fracking in New Zealand November 2012 at 28 – 29. 
18  See Chapter Two above.  See also Table 1.1 in Gao (note 2) at 5, where the author lists the major 
environmental concerns during each phase of the petroleum exploitation process.   
19  Gao (note 2) at 7. 
20  See paragraph 3.2. below.  See also Gao (note 2) at 7. 
21  Waskow and Welch (note 2) at 101. 
22  Chapter Seven.   
23  See Waskow and Welch (note 2) at 102. 
24  See Chapter Five above. 
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The petroleum environment regulatory framework on an international level is faced 
with many issues.  For example, the bulk of international, regional and “soft law” 
provisions do not deal specifically with environmental control of petroleum operations 
and where they do, this is typically limited to offshore operations.25  Furthermore, few 
countries follow an integrated legislative approach, where legislation is passed dealing 
specifically with petroleum exploitation and environmental protection.26  Instead, 
countries generally follow statutory or contractual approaches, where environmental 
provisions may be found in various statutes or based on petroleum agreements.27  
Namibia and South Africa follow the same approach where environmental provisions 
are found in a number of statutes and, in the case of Namibia, in a petroleum 
agreement.  These provisions are discussed in more detail below.   
2. Enforcement of the Right to a Clean Environment 
Proper control by the government over the environment is important, as government 
oversight plays a role in the degree of environmental damage.28  The constitutional 
measures that establish the right to a clean environment were discussed above in 
Chapter Four.  Environmental considerations must be accorded the appropriate respect 
and recognition in the administrative processes of the country to ensure accountability 
of the state.  In the context of petroleum, the functionaries awarding rights to 
petroleum29 play a pivotal role in the “administrative processes” relating to petroleum 
regulation.  The state, through these functionaries, therefore has a constitutional duty to 
consider the environment when fulfilling their duties.30   
Furthermore, in terms of the South African Constitution, everyone is entitled to have 
the environment protected through reasonable legislative and other measures.31  In 
response to this, the South African Parliament promulgated the National Environmental 
                                                          
25  Gao (note 2) at 29.   
26  Gao (note 2) at 37.   
27  Gao (note 2) at 32 – 37.   
28  Waskow (note 2) at 102. 
29  See Chapter Seven above.   
30  BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land 
Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) at 142. 
31  Section 24(b) of the South African Constitution.   
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Management Act32  (“NEMA”).  The Namibian Parliament also promulgated similar 
legislation, namely the Environmental Management Act33 (“EMA”), despite there not 
being a constitutional obligation to enact such legislative measures.   
Across the globe, a number of environmental management tools have developed.  Some 
of these have been adopted in the NEMA and EMA.  Before discussing the statutory 
enforcement of the right to a clean environment, these principles will briefly be 
discussed.   
2.1. Environmental Management Tools 
The rise of environmental awareness in the 1970s and the concomitant new measures 
for environmental control and regulation led to the introduction of new environmental 
policy and regulatory tools in respect of petroleum exploitation.34  These tools include 
environmental assessments (EAs), environmental management plans or programmes 
(EMPs), environmental reporting, environmental insurance programmes, 
decommissioning and abandonment funds and plans and environmental monitoring and 
auditing.35   
EAs may be defined as “the analysis of the likely environmental consequences of a 
proposed human activity”.36  An EA is a “planning tool” or “precautionary measure” 
that assists decision-makers in taking environmental concerns into account when 
deciding whether or not to approve a permit, right or licence.37  An EA furthermore 
allows industry participants the opportunity to consider potential environmental impacts 
                                                          
32  National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (“NEMA”). 
33  Environmental Management Act 7 of 2007 (“EMA”). 
34  For the first half of the twentieth century, there was limited provision in legislation dealing with 
pollution resulting from petroleum exploitation.  For example, an EU environmental impact 
regime (Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985) was only introduced in 1985.  The first 
comprehensive UK petroleum pollution law was passed only in 1971.  The first comprehensive 
petroleum legislation dealing with the environmental effects of petroleum exploitation in the USA 
was only passed in 1990.  Gao (note 2) at 10, 11, 32 and 40; Havemann (note 9) at 231; Gordon G 
“Petroleum Licencing” in Gordon G, Paterson J and Üşenmez E (eds) Oil and Gas Law: Current 
Practices and Emerging Trends 2ed (2011) Dundee Dundee University Press at 81. 
35  Gao (note 2) at 40 – 42; Glazewski J and Du Toit L (eds) Environmental Law of South Africa 
(2013) Durban LexisNexis; Kidd M Environmental Law 2 ed (2011) Claremont Juta & Co Ltd at 
235. 
36  Glazewski and Du Toit (note 35) at 10-3. 
37  Glazewski and Du Toit (note 35) at 10-3; Gao (note 2) at 40.   
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of petroleum exploitation and put measures in place to mitigate these impacts.38  EAs 
targeting specific projects are generally referred to as environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs), as opposed to strategic environmental assessments (SEAs), which 
covers the assessment of plans, policies and programs.39  Under established regimes, 
EAs are mandatory in respect of petroleum operations.40  EIAs are incorporated into 
legislation more frequently, as well as in industry guidelines.41   
An environmental management plan or programme (EMP) is a “dynamic set of 
objectives, targets, actions and responsibilities prepared for the management of a 
particular project or area”42 and typically sets out the company’s environmental policy 
and objectives.43  EMPs supplement EIAs44 and may include information in respect the 
company’s environmental personnel, emergency incident action plans, training and 
awareness and review procedures in respect of environmental procedures.45   
Some countries additionally require petroleum companies to submit environmental 
reports.  These have to be submitted at certain intervals and / or following certain 
incidents and have to contain information relating to the impact of petroleum 
exploitation on the environmental situation.46   
Environmental monitoring and audit is another environmental management tool and on 
similar to environmental reporting.  This tool is often used by industry for internal 
management purposes and is considered one of the most effective tools in managing 
environmental protection, as it facilitates environmental management and control of 
environmental protection, evaluates environmental performance and ensure compliance 
with environmental obligations.47  Regulators, the public and environmental 
                                                          
38  Gao (note 2) at 40. 
39  Glazewski and Du Toit (note 35) at 10-3. 
40  EU Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 and Havemann (note 9) at 244. 
41  Armstrong K “Managing Environmental Legal Risks in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Activities” in Gao Z (ed) Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas (1998) London Kluwer Law 
International at 372. 
42  Glazewski and Du Toit (note 35) at 10-10. 
43  Gao (note 2) at 41. 
44  Armstrong (note 41) at 372. 
45  Gao (note 2) at 41. 
46  Gao (note 2) at 41. 
47  Gao (note 2) at 42. 
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organisations are also increasingly demanding environmental auditing and the sharing 
of such auditing results.48 
A number of petroleum-producing countries have introduced environmental insurance 
programmes as another environmental management tool.  Environmental insurance 
policies would typically cover pollution liability and clean-up expenses.49  Finally, a 
number of countries have successfully introduced measures providing for the financing 
of decommissioning and abandonment – issues that have been ignored for most of the 
twentieth century.50 
Environmental assessments and environmental managements plans or programmes per 
se do not curb or minimise environmental damage, but form part of a larger framework 
of environmental management tools that must apply throughout a project.51  The 
purpose of these tools is to provide a decision-maker with the relevant information to 
enable it to exercise its decision-making function.52  Environmental management 
principles must therefore be imposed through the whole petroleum exploitation process 
and not just in the planning or application stage. 
2.2 The Intersection between the Regulation of Petroleum and 
Environmental Protection 
Environmental legislation is typically administered by the Department or Ministry 
responsible for the environment.  In South Africa, this is the Department of 
Environmental Affairs, while in Namibia it is the Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism.  Petroleum legislation, on the other hand, is regulated by the Department or 
Ministry responsible for petroleum resources.  In South Africa, it is the Department of 
Mineral Resources, while in Namibia it is the Ministry of Mines and Energy.  This is in 
                                                          
48  Armstrong (note 41) at 373. 
49  Gao (note 2) at 42. 
50  Gao (note 2) at 42. 
51  Glazewski and Du Toit (note 35) at 10-2 – 10.3. 
52  See for example EU Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 and Gordon (note 34) at 81. 
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line with more mature jurisdictions, which separates the administration of petroleum 
laws from the administration of environmental laws.53   
The environmental aspects of petroleum regulation lead to an interesting intersection 
between the governmental agencies responsible for environment and the governmental 
agencies responsible for petroleum and the enforcement of environmental rights.  The 
NEMA contains various provisions in respect of co-operative governance in respect of 
environmental issues.  The Department of Mineral Resources is recognised in the 
NEMA as a national department exercising functions involving the management of the 
environment.54  As such, the Department must prepare an environmental management 
plan every five years.55  Broadly, the contents of this plan must reflect how the 
functions of the Department of Mineral Resources involve the management of the 
environment.56  The NEMA lists various purposes of this plan.  First, its purpose is to 
coordinate and harmonise the environmental policies, plans, programmes and decisions 
of the various national departments that exercise functions that may affect the 
environment or are entrusted with powers and duties aimed at the achievement, 
promotion, and protection of a sustainable environment, and of provincial and local 
spheres of government, to minimise duplication of procedures and functions and 
promote consistency in the exercise of functions that may affect the environment.57  
Secondly, its purpose is to give effect to the constitutional principles of co-operative 
                                                          
53  Alramahi M Oil and Gas Law in the UK (2013) West Sussex Bloomsbury Professional Limited at 
§1.23, with reference to the regulation of petroleum and the environment in the UK and Norway.   
54  Section 11(2) read with Schedule 2 of the NEMA.   
55  Section 11(2) of the NEMA.   
56  Glazewski and Du Toit (note 35) at 7-17 and section 14 of the NEMA which states that “[e]very 
environmental management plan must contain (a) a description of the functions exercised by the 
relevant department in respect of the environment; (b) a description of environmental norms and 
standards, including norms and standards contemplated in section 146(2)(b)(i) of the Constitution, 
set or applied by the relevant department; (c) a description of the policies, plans and programmes 
of the relevant department that are designed to ensure compliance with its policies by other organs 
of state and persons; (d) a description of priorities regarding compliance with the relevant 
department's policies by other organs of state and persons; (e) a description of the extent of 
compliance with the relevant department's policies by other organs of state and persons; (f) a 
description of arrangements for cooperation with other national departments and spheres of 
government, including any existing or proposed memoranda of understanding entered into, or 
delegation or assignment of powers to other organs of state, with a bearing on environmental 
management; and (g) proposals for the promotion of the objectives and plans for the 
implementation of the procedures and regulations referred to in Chapter 5.”   
57  Section 12(a) of the NEMA.   
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governance.58  Thirdly, its purpose is to secure the protection of the environment across 
the country as a whole.59  Fourthly, its purpose is to prevent unreasonable actions by 
provinces in respect of the environment that are prejudicial to the economic or health 
interests of other provinces or the country as a whole.60  Finally, its purpose is to enable 
the Minister of Environment to monitor the achievement, promotion, and protection of 
a sustainable environment.61   
The EMA in Namibia has similar obligations in respect of co-operative governance that 
the NEMA has.62  These provisions are, however, not yet applicable as the Minister of 
Environment and Tourism has not yet identified the organs of state responsible for 
drafting these plans.63 
Aside from the principles relating to co-operative governance, both the NEMA and the 
EMA recognise the Minister of Mineral Resources in South Africa and the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy in Namibia as “competent authorities” in terms of the NEMA and 
the EMA.  By doing so, these line Ministers have a duty to take the environment into 
consideration when regulating petroleum resources.   
The intersection between governmental agencies responsible for the environment and 
petroleum may have as a result that the responsibilities of the agency responsible for 
petroleum towards the environment play second fiddle to furthering the primary 
objectives of that agency towards developing and promoting the petroleum industry.64  
The state, through its various agencies, therefore has the responsibility of ensuring that 
various interests are balances.  First, the interests towards promoting the petroleum 
industry must be balanced with environmental interests.  Secondly, the interests of 
people towards a clean environment must be balanced with the financial interests of 
holders and investors.  Because of the conflicting nature of these interests, the spread of 
                                                          
58  Section 12(b) of the NEMA.  See also section 41 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996.   
59  Section 12(c) of the NEMA.   
60  Section 12(d) of the NEMA.   
61  Section 12(e) of the NEMA.   
62  Part VI of the EMA.   
63  See section 24(1) of the EMA.   
64  Burns Y and Kidd M “Administrative Law & Implementation of Environmental Law” in Strydom 
HA and King ND (eds) Fuggle & Rabie's Environmental Management in South Africa (2009) 
Wetton Juta Law at 240. 
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environmental responsibilities between governmental agencies with different policy 
objectives is justified.   
2.3 Enforcement in terms of the Constitution 
Both the South African and Namibian Constitutions provide for the protection of the 
environment.  In South Africa, the right to a clean environment is enforced as 
fundamental right of the Bill of Rights.  Namibia does not entrench the right to 
environmental protection, but provides for it under the principles of state policy, which 
are not enforceable.65  The drafters of the South African Constitution opted to include 
environmental protection in its Bill of Rights and thereby explicitly stated that human 
rights have an environmental dimension,66 rather than recognising it as civil and 
political rights, as is the case with the Namibian Constitution.67  The environmental 
right in South Africa is not limited to citizens of South Africa, but to all persons.68  This 
environmental right consists of two rights: the right to an environment that is not 
harmful to health or well-being, and the right to have the environment protected 
through reasonable legislative and other measures.69  The effect of this is that the 
entrenchment of the right to the environment in South Africa is rendered justiciable, 
whereas in Namibia it is not.70  
Any person acting in his own interest has the right to approach a competent court in 
South Africa if the environmental right has been infringed or threatened.71  The same 
applies to any person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in his own 
interest, as a member of or in the interest of a group or class of persons or in the public 
interest.72  Finally, an association acting in the interest of its members may also 
approach a competent court in case of an infringement or threatened infringement of the 
                                                          
65  See Chapter Four above. 
66  Du Bois F and Glazewski J "The Environment and the Bill of Rights" in Bill of Rights 
Compendium Service Issue 27 ed (2010) Durban, LexisNexis at 2B-4. 
67  Du Bois and Glazewski (note 66) at 2B-7.  See paragraph 2.2 below for a discussion of the 
Namibian Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990. 
68  This is supported by the fact that the wording of section 24 does not limit the operation of this 
section to citizens only.  Compare the wording of section 24 (“...[e]veryone has the right...”) with 
that of other sections, for example section 22 (“...[e]very citizen has the right...).       
69  Glazewski (note 29) at 19-6. 
70  See also Chapter Four abovewith reference to principles of state policy in Namibia.   
71  Section 38 of the South African Constitution. 
72  Section 38 of the South African Constitution. 
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environmental right.73  The court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration 
of rights.74 
Notwithstanding the fact that the environment and sustainable development are treated 
as principles of state policy in Namibia, courts may have regard to these principles.  
Furthermore, the Constitution provides for the appointment of an Ombudsman, who is 
independent and subject only to the Constitution.75  The functions of the Ombudsman 
include the duty to investigate complaints concerning the irrational exploitation of non-
renewable resources, the degradation and destruction of ecosystems and the failure to 
protect the beauty and character of Namibia.76 
2.4 Statutory Enforcement 
Aside from enforcement of environmental rights in terms of the Constitution, there are 
also various statutes in place than ensure that environmental rights are observed and 
enforced.  These statutory provisions are the most immediate, and probably the most 
effective, methods of ensuring that the environmental rights are recognised and given 
effect. 
2.4.1 The Statutory Framework for Petroleum Exploitation and 
Environmental Protection 
There is a plethora of laws dealing with various aspects of the environment and the 
protection of the environment in South Africa and Namibia.77  A discussion of all 
legislation dealing with the environment is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Only those 
statutory measures that are directly involved when applying for and exercising rights to 
petroleum (NEMA and EMA) are discussed here.    
                                                          
73  Section 38 of the South African Constitution. 
74  Section 38 of the South African Constitution. 
75  Article 89(1) and article 89(2) of the Namibian Constitution. 
76  Article 91(c) of the Namibian Constitution. 
77  See in general Glazewski and Du Toit (note 35); Kidd (note 35); Strydom HA and King ND (eds) 
Fuggle & Rabie's Environmental Management in South Africa (2009) Wetton, Juta Law; Ruppel 
OC and Ruppel-Schlichting K (eds), Environmental Law and Policy in Namibia: Towards Making 
Africa the Tree of Life (2013) Windhoek OrumbondePress.na & Welwitschia Verlag Dr. A. Eckl, 
Essen. 
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The NEMA and the EMA are the two principle legislative measures dealing with the 
environment in South Africa and Namibia respectively.  These two acts must be read in 
conjunction with the legislation primarily dealing with petroleum exploitation.   
In South Africa, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (“MPRD 
Act”) integrates the principles of NEMA into petroleum exploitation.78  The MPRD Act 
is amendment by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Amendment Act 49 of 2008 
(“MPRD Amendment Act 2008”).  Parts of this amendment act are in force.  Further 
amendments are proposed in by the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Amendment Bill 
of 2012 (“MPRD Amendment Bill 2012”).  These also deal extensively with 
environmental issues.   
The MPRD Act seeks to ensure that the petroleum resources of South Africa are 
exploited in an orderly and ecologically sustainable manner.79  The Act makes various 
provisions of NEMA applicable to reconnaissance, exploration and production 
operations.80  The principles in section 2 of NEMA apply to exploration and production 
operations81 and serve as guidelines for the interpretation, administration and 
implementation of the environmental requirements of the MPRD Act.82  It serves as the 
general framework within which environmental management and implementation plans 
must be formulated.83  Any organ of state which takes a decision in terms of NEMA or 
any other statutory provision relating to the environment, which includes the statutory 
provisions in the MPRD Act, must use these principles as guidelines.84  The principles 
also aid in the interpretation, administration and implementation of the NEMA, and any 
other law concerned with the protection or management of the environment,85 which 
includes the MPRD Act. 
                                                          
78  Section 38 of the MPRD Act.   
79  Badenhorst PJ and Mostert H Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1 ed (2004, Revision 
Service 10 2014) Wetton Juta at 20-2.   
80  Section 37 and section 38 of the MPRD Act.   
81  Section 37(1)(a) read with section 69(2) of the MPRD Act. 
82  Section 37(1)(b) read with section 69(2) of the MPRD Act.   
83  Section 2(1)(b) of the NEMA.   
84  Section 2(1)(c) of the MPRD Act.   
85  Section 2(1)(e) of the MPRD Act.   
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The NEMA specifically provides for standing to enforce environmental laws.86  It deals 
with standing not only in respect of the enforcement of NEMA, but also any other 
environmental laws.87  In terms of the NEMA, any person or group of persons may seek 
appropriate relief in his or their own interests or in the interest of or on behalf of a 
person who is for practical reasons unable to institute any proceedings in terms of 
NEMA.  It is also possible for a person to institute proceedings in terms of NEMA in 
the interest of or on behalf of a group or class of persons whose interests are affected, in 
the public interest and in the interest of protecting the environment.88 
In Namibia, the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act89 (“Petroleum Act”) does 
not refer explicitly to the EMA, but the EMA itself expressly applies its provisions to 
petroleum exploitation.  Moreover, before the Minister of Mines and Energy issues an 
exploration or production licence, he must enter into a petroleum agreement with the 
applicant.90  A Model Petroleum Agreement (“MPA”) was published in 1998 and an 
updated one was published in 2007.  In practice, the MPA is used as a starting point for 
negotiations between the Minister and the applicant.  This agreement has various 
provisions dealing with the environment.   
The Namibian EMA does not contain a standing provision similar to the one contained 
in the NEMA in South Africa.  As a result, and especially in the light of the fact that a 
clean environment in terms of the Constitution is a non-justiciable right, the 
enforcement of a right to a clean environment is difficult in Namibia.   
The provisions relating to standing in the NEMA go to greater lengths than the 
Namibian regulatory regime to ensure that the public’s right to a clean environment is 
protected.  The NEMA recognises public interest litigation, while in Namibia the strict 
rules of standing still apply.  Any person who wishes to enforce his right to a clean 
environment therefore has to show that he was personally aggrieved in some way.    
                                                          
86  Section 32 of the NEMA.   
87  Section 32(1) of the NEMA.   
88  Section 32(1) of the NEMA. 
89  Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1991 (“Petroleum Act”). 
90  Section 13(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
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A thorough discussion of the laws and regulations dealing with the environment is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, to illustrate how these provisions relating to 
the environment inform the regulatory regime for petroleum exploitation, the most 
important measures are discussed.  Instead of discussing the acts themselves, the 
discussion is structured to follow the petroleum exploitation process.   
2.4.2 Application for a Right to Petroleum  
Application for a right to petroleum in South Africa and Namibia is brought under the 
MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act respectively.  Both these acts require certain 
information regarding the environment when applying for a right to petroleum.  
Furthermore, the NEMA and the EMA are also applicable and require certain 
authorisations to be in place when a right to petroleum is granted.  In doing so, the 
legislature in South Africa and Namibia requires all applicants to comply with certain 
clearly-defined requirements, thus statutorily enforcing the right of the people of the 
host nation to a clean environment.     
2.4.2.1 South Africa 
The South African Minister of Mineral Resources has a duty not grant a reconnaissance 
permit or production right if the reconnaissance or production operations will result in 
unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the environment.91  In this 
respect, the rights of the host nation to a clean environment is elevated above the 
interests of the petroleum company.  It also curbs the discretion of the Minister in 
favour of environmental interests.  The MPRD Act recognises that petroleum should 
not be exploited at the cost of the environment.  The same, however, is not stated in 
respect of an application for an exploration right.  This is possibly an oversight.  It may 
also be a deliberate omission, as exploration operations have less impact on the 
environment.  This, however, does not explain why it is required in respect of 
reconnaissance operations, which have even less impact on the environment than 
exploration activities.92  The better view is that it is an oversight by the legislature, as 
                                                          
91  Section 75(1)(b) and section 84(1)(c) of the MPRD Act. 
92  See for example Chapter Two and Chapter Seven above.   
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even exploration activities impact the environment.93  Neither the MPRD Amendment 
Act 2008 nor the MPRD Amendment Bill 2012 addresses this issue. 
Aside from the general provision above, applicants must also apply for environmental 
authorisations, issued in terms of NEMA, and compile work programmes in respect of 
their intended operations.94  The regulatory framework in respect of the environmental 
aspects of petroleum exploitation therefore recognises the potential effects of petroleum 
exploitation on the environment.  Through applicable legislation, applicants for rights 
to petroleum are required from the outset to consider the environmental impacts of their 
proposed operations.     
The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism has identified various activities 
which may not be undertaken without EA from the competent authority.95  These 
activities include any activities that require a reconnaissance permit, except where such 
reconnaissance is done by means of a fly-over.96  Activities requiring an exploration 
and production right are also included.97  The NEMA therefore requires an applicant for 
a right to petroleum to have the necessary EA.  The listed activities are linked to the 
type of activities that may be conducted and recognise that some, such as fly-over 
reconnaissance operations, do not affect the environment and therefore do not require 
an environmental authorisation.   
Before the MPRD Amendment Act 2008 came into operation, no person could 
commence with any reconnaissance, exploration or production operations without an 
approved EMP.98  The MPRD Amendment Act 2008, however, attempts to align the 
MPRD Act with NEMA by deleting all references in the MPRD Act to EMPs and 
instead using EA.  An EA in terms of the MPRD Amendment Act 2008 has the 
meaning ascribed to it in NEMA.  A new section is inserted in the MPRD Act99 which 
                                                          
93  Table 1.1 in Gao (note 2) at 5; Waskow and Welch (note 2) at 103. 
94  Regulation 18(2)(d), regulation 20(1)(d), regulation 28(2)(i), regulation 30(1)(h)(ii) and regulation 
34(2)(h).   
95  Section 24(2) and section 24D of the NEMA and GNR 544, GN 545 and GN 546 of 18 June 
2010, published in Government Gazette 33306. 
96  Item 23 of Listing Notice 2, GN 545 of 18 June 2010, published in Government Gazette 33306. 
97  Item 21 and item 22 of Listing Notice 2, GN 545 of 18 June 2010, published in Government 
Gazette 33306. 
98  Section 5(4)(a) of the MPRD Act. 
99  Section 5A of the MPRD Act. 
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states that no person may conduct reconnaissance operations or explore for or produce 
petroleum without an EA.100  Any EMP approved under the MPRD Act before and at 
the time of coming into force of NEMA is deemed to have been approved and an EA 
issued in terms of NEMA.101 
Two further new sections are inserted which deal with EAs.102  The first one states that 
the Minister of Mineral Resources is the responsible authority for implementing the 
environmental provisions in terms of NEMA insofar as it relates exploration and 
production activities or activities incidental thereto.103  It does not state that the Minister 
is the responsible authority for implementing the environmental provisions of NEMA 
insofar as it relates to reconnaissance operations.  This is likely an oversight by the 
legislature.  See also the discussion of the intersection between the regulation of 
petroleum and environmental laws discussed above.104  By making the Minister of 
Mineral Resources the competent authority in respect of environmental issues in 
relation to petroleum, there is a chance that the environmental obligations may be 
subjected to the Minister’s primary obligation, being to develop the petroleum industry.  
This is further supported by the fact that the competent authority, in this case the 
Minister of Mineral Resources, has the power to grant or refuse the environmental 
authorisation.105  However, the legislation is designed in such a way that the discretion 
of the Minister in respect of environmental issues is curbed by the fact that the Minister 
is obliged to give preference to the environment106 and has to issue the environmental 
authorisation in line with the principles of NEMA.    
EAs must be issued prior to the issuing of a right to petroleum.107  Once again, this 
elevates the environmental concerns of petroleum operations above actual exploitation.  
If an EA is refused, no right to petroleum may be issued.  The rights of the host nation 
to a clean environmental is therefore placed above the interests of the petroleum 
                                                          
100  Section 5 of the MPRD Amendment Act 2008.   
101  Section 39B(1) of the MPRD Act.   
102  Section 38A and 38B of the MPRD Act.   
103  Section 38A(1) of the MPRD Act. 
104  See 2.2 above.   
105  See the definition of “competent authority” in section 1 of the NEMA.   
106  Section for example 75(1)(b) and section 84(1)(c) of the MPRD Act and the discussion at the 
beginning of this paragraph.   
107  Section 38A(2) of the MPRD Act.   
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companies, whose interests may be profit-seeking rather than protecting the 
environment.  When considering an application for an EA, the Minister of Mineral 
Resources may require an additional EMP.108              
The NEMA prescribes certain standard conditions attached to all EAs,109 thus 
promoting transparency in respect of EAs and limiting the discretion of the decision 
maker.  Every EA must ensure that adequate provision is made for the ongoing 
management and monitoring of the impacts of the activity on the environment 
throughout the life cycle of the activity.110  It must also ensure that the property or site 
where the activity is taking place is specified111 and that provision is made for the 
transfer of rights and obligations when there is a change of ownership in the property.112 
Notwithstanding the fact that the MPRD Act has done away with EMPs, the NEMA 
states that where application is made for an EA in respect of exploration or production 
and related activities on the exploration or production area, the Minister of 
Environment and Tourism and the Minister of Mineral Resources must require the 
submission of an EMP before considering an application for an EA.113  The NEMA 
describes in detail the information that must be contained in the EMP.114 
Petroleum exploitation, even if all the necessary requirements in respect of the 
environment have been met or complied with, still has great impact on the environment.  
These operations also may take place on private land, thus causing damage to a private 
entity who needs assurance that the company will be in a position to rehabilitate the 
land once it has wrapped up its operations.  The NEMA recognises this and requires 
that an applicant for an EA relating exploration, production or related activities on an 
exploration or production area must make financial provision for the rehabilitation, 
                                                          
108  Section 24N(1) of the NEMA.   
109  Section 24E of the NEMA.   
110  Section 24E(1) of the NEMA.  
111  Section 24E(2) of the NEMA. 
112  Section 24E(3) of the NEMA. 
113  Section 24N(1A) of the NEMA.   
114  Section 24N(1A) of the NEMA. 
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management and closure of environmental impacts.  This must be done before the 
Minister of Mineral Resources issues the EA.115   
Aside from EA and EMP, when applying for a reconnaissance permit, exploration right 
or production right, the applicant must submit a work programme, which must deal 
inter alia with the costs pertaining to the rehabilitation and management of 
environmental impacts.116  If the permit or right is awarded, the holder thereof must 
actively conduct operations in accordance with these programmes.117  This is not 
required for technical co-operation permits, which authorise desktop studies that have 
no impact on the environment.   
Finally, under the MPRD Act, any person who applies for a production right must 
conduct an EIA.118  This is in line with international trends.119  An EIA, in terms of the 
MPRD Regulations, comprises a compilation of a scoping report followed by an EIA 
report.120  The MPRD Regulations lists the scope and content of the scoping report and 
the EIA report.121 
The same requirement is not listed for applicants for exploration rights or 
reconnaissance permits.  The reason why an EIA is required from the applicant for a 
production licence is because production activities are much more intrusive on the 
environment that reconnaissance and exploration activities.  However, this does not 
mean that these operations do not have any impact on the environment.     
In South Africa, therefore, the legislation dealing with environmental aspects in respect 
of petroleum exploitation clearly sets out the environmental requirements that must be 
met by a person applying for a right to petroleum.  By imposing through legislation, 
transparency is promoted.  The importance of the interests of the host nation in a clean 
                                                          
115  Section 24P(1) of the NEMA.   
116  Regulation 18(2)(d), regulation 20(1)(d), regulation 28(2)(i), regulation 30(1)(h)(ii), regulation 
34(2)(h) and regulation 36(1)(h).   
117  Section 75(5)(a), section 82(2)(b) and section 86(2)(b) of the MPRD Act.   
118  Section 39(1) read with section 69(2) and 83(4) of the MPRD Act.   
119  See 2.1. above.   
120  Regulation 48 of the MPRD Regulations.   
121  Regulation 49 and regulation 50 of the MPRD Regulations.   
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environment is also emphasised from the application phase and is elevated above the 
interests of the petroleum company applying for the relevant right.     
2.4.2.2 Namibia 
The Petroleum Act of Namibia predates the EMA by sixteen years.  Unlike the MPRD 
Act, the Petroleum Act does not incorporate the principles of EMA.  Nevertheless, 
EMA contains provisions that ensure that this Act is applicable to the petroleum 
industry.   
An application for a reconnaissance or exploration licence or the renewal of such a 
licence must set out an estimate of the effect which the proposed operations may have 
on the environment.122  An application for a production licence not only requires an 
estimation of the significant effect of the production operations on the environment, but 
must also set out how the company intends to control or limit the effect of the 
production operations on the environment.123  Here, the South African framework 
differs from its Namibian counterpart.  In South Africa, it is clearly stated that a right to 
petroleum may not be granted if it will result in unacceptable pollution, ecological 
degradation or damage to the environment.  In Namibia, this is not the case.  An 
applicant is only required to estimate what the significant effect of the operations will 
be on the environment – even if they are substantial, the legislation makes provision 
that a licence may still be granted.  The same emphasis is therefore not placed on the 
interests of the host nation as in South Africa.     
Aside from the information required in an application for a petroleum licence, there are 
other authorisations that must be obtained or steps that must be followed which pertain 
to the environment.  As with South Africa, an EA (in Namibia an environmental 
clearance certificate, or ECC) and EIAs are prescribed.  Namibia does not require work 
programmes setting out the environmental impact of petroleum operations, but unlike 
South Africa a petroleum agreement must be signed with the state, which deals 
extensively with environmental aspects of petroleum operations.   
                                                          
122  Section 24(1)(c)(iii), section 25(1)(c)(iii), section 32(1)(c)(iii) and section 33(1)(c)(iii) of the 
Petroleum Act.   
123  Section 46(2)(i)(vii) of the Petroleum Act.   
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2.4.2.2.1 Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) and EIAs 
The EMA states that the Minister may, after following the prescribed consultative 
process, list activities124 which may not be undertaken without an ECC.125  Failure to 
obtain an ECC amounts to an offence and may lead to a fine or imprisonment or both.126  
A competent authority may not issue an authorisation unless the person proposing to 
undertake the listed activity (“proponent”) has obtained an ECC in terms of the 
EMA.127  Any authorisation issued where the proponent does not hold an ECC in 
invalid.128   
The first question that has to be asked, therefore, is whether a person intends 
undertaking a listed activity.  If the activity that the person intends to undertake is not 
listed, no ECC is required.  If, however, the activity is listed, it is necessary to obtain an 
ECC before commencing with the activity.129  The listed activities are far reaching and 
will not be discussed in detail here.  For purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to note 
that mining or the extraction of any natural resources, whether regulated by law or not, 
requires a clearance certificate.130  Furthermore, any resource extraction, manipulation, 
conservation and related activities also require a clearance certificate.131  Finally, the 
extraction or processing of gas from natural and non-natural sources, including gas 
from landfill sites, requires a clearance certificate.132 
In terms of the EMA, therefore, if the petroleum licence a company intend applying for 
will trigger one of the listed activities, you will first need to obtain ECC before the 
Minister of Mines and Energy can grant you the licence.133  The result is therefore the 
same as in South Africa – the principles of EMA are for all practical purposes 
                                                          
124  “Activity” means a physical work that a proponent proposes to construct, operate, modify, 
decommission or abandon or an activity that a proponent proposes to undertake.  Section 1 of the 
EMA. 
125  Section 27(1) and section 27(3) of the EMA.   
126  Section 27(4) of the EMA. 
127  Section 31(1) of the EMA.   
128  Section 31(2) of the EMA.  
129  Section 27(3) of the EMA.   
130  Item 3.2 of GN 29 of Government Gazette 4878 of 06 February 2012.   
131  Item 3.3 of GN 29 of Government Gazette 4878 of 06 February 2012.   
132  Item 3.4 of GN 29 of Government Gazette 4878 of 06 February 2012.   
133  In practice, this does not happen.  The Minister of Mines and Energy grants and issues a licence to 
an applicant before the applicant has acquired an ECC.  Only after the applicant has been awarded 
a licence, will the applicant apply for environmental clearance.   
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incorporated in the Petroleum Act.  An important difference between South Africa and 
Namibia is, however, that in terms of NEMA the competent authority issues the 
environmental authorisation.  In Namibia, however, although the Minister of Mines and 
Energy is the competent authority, the ECC is still issued by the Minister of 
Environment and Tourism.  This removes the possibility that the competent authority 
may subject environmental obligations to his primary objective, namely promotion of 
the petroleum industry.   
It is unclear under Namibian law whether applicants for exploration or reconnaissance 
licences must obtain an ECC.  The nature of reconnaissance operations134 is such that it 
will not trigger a listed activity as these operations do not require resource extraction, 
manipulation or related activities.  It is not that clear in respect of exploration activities.  
Exploration operations are operations aimed at searching for petroleum and do not 
entail resource extraction or manipulation.  However, in terms of an exploration 
licence, the holder thereof is entitled to remove petroleum samples.  The question is 
whether this will amount to resource extraction or manipulation and whether this will 
trigger one of the listed activities.  One may argue that the listed activities are couched 
in such broad terms that they envisage exploration operations as well.  Furthermore, in 
practice it is typically a condition of an exploration licence that an ECC must be 
obtained.  This seems to indicate that the Minister of Mines and Energy in Namibia 
considers exploration operations to have a substantial impact on the environment and 
therefore requires environmental clearance     
Application for an ECC must be lodged with the Minister of Mines.135  The proponent 
must designate an environmental assessment practitioner (“EAP”) to manage the 
assessment process.136  After submitting an application for an ECC, the proponent must 
conduct a public consultation process,137 which process must be completed within 21 
days.138  This process must be conducted regardless of whether an assessment may be 
                                                          
134  See Chapter Five above.   
135  This does not happen in practice, where it is lodged with the Environmental Commissioner 
directly.   
136  Regulation 3(a) of the EIA Regulations, GN 30 of Government Gazette 4878 of 06 February 
2012.   
137  Regulation 7(1)(a) of the EIA Regulations.   
138  Regulation 21(7) of the EIA Regulations.   
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required.  The proponent must open and maintain a register of all interested and 
affected parties in respect of the application.139  After submission of an application for 
an ECC, the proponent must prepare a scoping report140 and give all interested and 
affected parties an opportunity to comment on the scoping report.141  The public is 
therefore given an opportunity to make representations, which is important to ensure 
that their rights are protected.  It is also important considering that Namibia does not 
place a duty on an applicant or the government to consult with the public when 
application for a right to petroleum is made.142   
After completing the public consultative process and preparing the scoping report, the 
proponent must submit to the relevant competent authority the scoping report and the 
management plan.143  The proponent must also submit copies of any representations, 
objections and comments received in connection with the application or the scoping 
report, copies of the minutes of any meetings held by the proponent with interested and 
affected parties and other role players which record the views of the participants and 
any responses by the EAP to those representations, objections, comments and views.144  
The competent authority must then in the prescribed manner forward the application to 
the Environmental Commissioner, if the proponent complies with any requirements 
prescribed by law in respect of that activity.145   
The Commissioner must, within the prescribed time (14 days of receipt of 
application),146 decide whether the proposed activity requires an EIA.147  If the 
Commissioner decides that an EIA is needed, an extensive and interactive process must 
be followed.148  If the Commissioner decides that the proposed activity does not require 
an EIA, the Commissioner may grant the application and, on payment of the prescribed 
                                                          
139  Regulation 7(1)(b) of the EIA Regulations.   
140  Regulation 7(1)(d) of the EIA Regulations.   
141  Regulation 7(1)(e) of the EIA Regulations.   
142  See Chapter Five above.   
143  Regulation 7(2) of the EIA Regulations.   
144  Regulation 7(2) of the EIA Regulations.   
145  Section 32(2) of the EMA.   
146  Regulation 12(1)(d) of the EIA Regulations.   
147  Section 33(1) of the EMA.   
148  Section 35 to section 37 of the EMA; regulation 14 to regulation 18 of the EIA Regulation.  
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fee, issue an ECC to the proponent149 or refuse the application, in which case the 
Commissioner must give reasons for the refusal.150   
The Commissioner must determine the scope of the EIA and the procedures and 
methods for conducting the EIA.151  The Commissioner must then in writing notify the 
applicant that an EIA of the proposed activity is required to be carried out and prepared 
by the applicant, at the applicant’s own expense and in accordance with the scope, 
procedures and methods determined by the Commissioner.152  The proponent must 
instruct the EAP to prepare an EIA report within 21 days of receipt of a notification to 
prepare an EIA.153  On the completion of the EIA report the proponent must submit the 
report to the Environmental Commissioner.154  If it appears to the Commissioner that 
the prescribed requirements in respect of the contents of the EIA report have been 
complied with, the Commissioner must at the cost of the proponent, notify the 
application and EIA report in the prescribed manner or direct the proponent to notify 
the application in the prescribed manner.155  
The Commissioner must review the application within a reasonable time after the 
closing date for submissions.156  Within seven days of reviewing the application, the 
Commissioner must notify the proponent and the competent authority of his decision.157  
The Commissioner may grant the application and, on payment of the prescribed fee, 
issue an ECC to a proponent.158  The Minister may also refuse the application and 
provide the proponent with reasons for the refusal.159  The Minister must, within the 
prescribed time and in the prescribed form and manner, notify the proponent of the 
decision made and, if the application is granted, provide the proponent with the ECC.160 
                                                          
149  Section 34(1)(a) of the EMA. 
150  Section 34(1)(b) of the EMA.   
151  Section 35(1)(a) of the EMA.   
152  Section 35(1)(b) of the EMA; Regulation 14(a) of the EIA Regulations.   
153  Regulation 15(1) of the EIA Regulations.   
154  Regulation 15(3) of the EIA Regulations.   
155  Section 35(6) of the EMA; Regulation 16(1)(b) of the EIA Regulations.   
156  Section 36(1) of the EMA.   
157  Regulation 18(a) of the EIA Regulations.  
158  Section 37(1)(a) of the EMA; Regulation 18(b) of the EIA Regulations.   
159  Section 37(1)(b) of the EMA.   
160  Section 37(2) of the EMA.   
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Notwithstanding the discretion granted to the Commissioner to require an applicant to 
conduct an EIA, once the Minister of Mines and Energy has received an application for 
a petroleum licence, he may, to consider the application, require the applicant to carry 
out an EIA.161  Once again, this is a discretion conferred upon the Minister of Mines 
and Energy to require an applicant to conduct an EIA.    
A petroleum licence may not be issued unless a clearance certificate has been 
granted.162  In this regard, the Namibian and South African systems are the same.  By 
prioritising the EA or ECC, the interests of the host nation in respect of a clean 
environment are recognised and elevated above that of the petroleum company.  This 
ensures that the rights of the people in respect of a clean environment are respected and 
also provides grounds for accountability if the requirements have not been met.   
2.4.2.2.2 The Petroleum Agreement 
The relationship between the state and the holder of an exploration or production 
licence is not only dealt with under the Petroleum Act and the licence, but also in terms 
of the petroleum agreement.163  Before the Minister issues an exploration or production 
licence, the company applying for the licence must negotiate and sign a petroleum 
agreement with the state.164  The MPA deals with environmental protection165 and states 
that the holder must conduct its petroleum operations in a manner likely to conserve the 
natural resources of Namibia and protect the environment.166  This clause of the MPA 
may be criticised, as it is unclear as to what exactly is expected from the holder.  More 
context or guidance should be given to a holder to enable it to conduct  its petroleum 
operations in a manner likely to conserve the natural resources of Namibia and protect 
the environment. 
                                                          
161  Section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Petroleum Act.  See also Koep PF and Van den Berg HM “Mining and 
Energy Law in Namibia” in Ruppel OC and Ruppel-Schlichting K (eds) Environmental Law and 
Policy in Namibia: Towards Making Africa the Tree of Life, (2013) Windhoek 
OrumbondePress.na & Welwitschia Verlag Dr. A. Eckl, Essen at 187. 
162  Section 31(1) of the EMA.     
163  See Chapter Five above.   
164  Section 13(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
165  Clause 11 of the MPA. 
166 Clause 11.2(a) of the MPA. 
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The holder must furthermore in terms of the MPA employ the best available techniques 
in accordance with good oilfield practices167 for the prevention of environmental 
damage168 to which its petroleum operations might contribute and for the minimisation 
of the effect of such operations on adjoining or neighbouring lands.169 The holder must 
also implement the proposals contained in its development plan regarding the 
prevention of pollution, the treatment of wastes, the safeguarding of natural resources 
and the progressive reclamation and rehabilitation of lands disturbed by petroleum 
operations.170 
The holder undertakes, for purposes of the MPA, to take all reasonable, necessary and 
adequate steps in accordance with good oilfield practices to minimise environmental 
damage to the licence area and adjoining or neighbouring lands.171 If the holder fails to 
comply with this provision, or contravenes any law on the prevention of environmental 
damage, and such failure or contravention results in environmental damage, the holder 
must take all necessary and reasonable measures to remedy such failure or 
contravention and the effects thereof.172  These measures and methods must be 
determined in timely consultation with the Minister upon the commencement of 
petroleum operations or whenever there is a significant change in the scope or method 
of carrying out petroleum operations. The holder must take into account the 
international standards applicable in similar circumstances and the relevant 
environmental impact assessment studies carried out in accordance with the MPA.  The 
holder must notify the Minister in writing of the nature of the measures and methods 
finally determined by the holder and must cause such measures and methods to be 
reviewed from time to time in view of prevailing circumstances.173  These obligations 
on the holder are all very broad without much content and it is uncertain exactly how 
                                                          
167 “Good Oilfield Practices” means “any practices which are generally applied by persons involved 
in the exploration or production of petroleum in other countries of the world as good, safe, 
efficient and necessary in the carrying out of exploration operations or production operations”. 
See Section 1 of the MPA and Section 1 of the Petroleum Act.  See also paragraph 3.3.2.2. below 
for the criticism on “good oilfield practices”.   
168 “Environmental Damage” includes “any damage or injury to, or destruction of, soil or water or 
any plant or animal life, whether in the sea or in any other water or on, in or under land.” 
169 Clause 11.2(b) of the MPA. 
170 Clause 11.2(c) of the MPA. 
171 Clause 11.3 of the MPA. 
172 Clause 11.4 of the MPA. 
173 Clause 11.6 of the MPA. 
Chapter Six 







they should be enforced.  Because of the infant nature of the petroleum industry in 
Namibia, it is also uncertain how these clauses are applied in practice.174 
The holder must cause a person or persons, approved by the Minister on account of 
their special knowledge of environmental matters, to carry out two EIA studies.  These 
studies must be carried out to determine the prevailing situation relating to the 
environment, human beings, wildlife or marine life in the licence area and in the 
adjoining or neighbouring areas at the time of the studies.175  The EIAs are also carried 
out to establish what the effect will be on the environment, human beings, wildlife or 
marine life in the licence area in consequence of the petroleum operations to be made 
under the MPA, and to submit for consideration by the parties to the MPA, measures 
and methods for minimising environmental damage and carrying out site restoration in 
the licence area.176  By requiring two EIAs, the MPA seems to be more strict than the 
regulatory framework in South Africa.  However, since the petroleum agreement is 
subject to negotiation between the Minister and the holder, these conditions may be 
excluded.   
The procedure applicable to the EIAs, including the phases in which it must be carried 
out and information relating to the guidelines it must contain is dealt with in detail in 
the MPA.177  Furthermore, the holder’s obligations in respect of the environment in 
every phase of its operations are determined in the MPA, including the holder’s duty to 
report to the Minister of Mines and Energy at various stages of its operations and the 
holder’s duty to establish a trust fund for purpose of decommissioning.178 
The holder must ensure that petroleum operations are carried out in an environmentally 
acceptable and safe manner consistent with good oilfield practices and that such 
operations are properly monitored.179 The pertinent completed EIA studies must be 
made available to its employees and to its contractors to develop adequate and proper 
                                                          
174  See for example Gao (note 2) at 13; Havemann (note 9) at 235. 
175 Clause 11.7(a) of the MPA. 
176 Clause 11.7(b) of the MPA. 
177 Clause 11.8 to clause 11.10 of the MPA. 
178 Clause 11.12 to clause 11.17 of the MPA. 
179  Clause 11.11 of the MPA. 
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awareness of the measures and methods of environmental protection to be used in 
carrying out its petroleum operations.180   
Finally, any agreement entered into between the holder and its contractors relating to its 
petroleum operations shall include the terms set out in the MPA and any established 
measures and methods for the implementation of the Company's obligations in relation 
to the environment under the MPA.181  This ensures a wider application of the 
provisions of the MPA to the benefit of the environment.   
2.4.2.3 Assessment 
A major difference between Namibia and South Africa is that, in South Africa, the 
Minister of Mineral Resources may not grant a right to petroleum if the operations will 
result in unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the environment, 
while in Namibia this is not stated.  By curtailing the state’s powers in granting rights to 
petroleum in this way, the interests of the host nation in a clean environment is 
emphasised in South Africa and elevated above the interests of the petroleum company.  
This is not the case in Namibia. 
In South Africa and Namibia, the Ministers responsible for the environment have 
identified petroleum operations as “listed activities” which require an EA (in Namibia 
an ECC).182  Before the holder of a right to petroleum is entitled to exercise those 
rights, he must obtain the necessary EA.  These EAs must be issued before the right to 
petroleum is issued.  By making this EA a prerequisite of petroleum exploitation, both 
countries emphasise the importance of environmental protection in petroleum 
exploitation.     
EAs in South Africa are granted or refused by the Minister of Mineral Resources, while 
in Namibia the granting of ECCs remains the competency of the Minister of 
Environment and Tourism.  By vesting the power to grant EA in the Minister of 
                                                          
180  Clause 11.11 of the MPA. 
181  Clause 11.11 of the MPA. 
182  The identification (or listing) of petroleum operations as having a potential impact on the 
environmental and requiring clearance is in line with international practice.  For example, the EU 
Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 follows the same trend.  See Gordon (note 34) at 
81. 
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Mineral Resources – whose primary objective is the promotion of the petroleum 
industry and not the environment – the legislature has created a risk that environmental 
obligations may be subjected to the promotion of the petroleum industry.  This risk is 
somewhat curtailed by the obligation on the Minister not to grant a right to petroleum if 
the operations will result in unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage 
to the environment.  This risk is eliminated in Namibia, where the power to grant ECCs 
remains vested in the Minister of Environment and Tourism.   
Both regimes follow international trend by requiring EIAs in respect of petroleum 
exploitation,183 although in South Africa, EIA are only required to be conducted by 
persons applying for production rights.  The reason for this is probably that production 
activities have a much greater impact on the environment than reconnaissance or 
exploration activities; this does not mean that reconnaissance and exploration 
operations do not have any impact on the environment.     
In Namibia, the legislation does not specifically require an EIA in respect of any of the 
licences.  However, if the holder is obliged to apply for an ECC, the Environmental 
Commissioner may require the holder to conduct an EIA.  When the Minister of Mines 
and Energy receives an application for a licence, he may also require the applicant to 
conduct an EIA.  Here, however, both the Environmental Commissioner and the 
Minister have discretion to compel an applicant to conduct an EIA.  It is submitted that 
to ensure that the environmental right is given effect to, EIAs should be compulsory in 
all applications where the proposed activities may have an environmental impact.     
Namibia has gone one step further than South Africa with regard to the environmental 
responsibilities of applicants.  The petroleum agreement that the applicant has to enter 
into with the state has various provisions relating to the applicant’s duties in respect of 
the environment.  The provisions of the petroleum agreement apply over and above the 
provisions of the Petroleum Act and the EMA.  For example, it obliges the holder to 
comply with good oilfield practices as applicable in other countries, as well as other 
international standards.  This international dimension given to applicants in Namibia 
provides more context to the content of access to petroleum in Namibia than in South 
                                                          
183  See for example Glazewski and Du Toit (note 35) at 10-2. 
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Africa.  On the other hand, South Africa requires an applicant for all rights to petroleum 
to compile a work programme, which inter alia deals with the costs of rehabilitation 
and the management of environmental impacts.  A similar requirement is not present in 
the Namibian system.   
By legislating the obligations of applicants in respect of the environment, the relevant 
legislation provides transparency as to what is expected of holders in respect of the 
environment.  Persons who wish to enforce any rights in respect of the environment 
may rely on the legislation for certainty.  This also promotes accountability – if the 
state or the holder applicant does not comply with the prescribed requirements and an 
EA is awarded in any event (or a permit, right or licence to petroleum), the decision to 
award such an authorisation may be taken on review on the ground of legality.184 
A problem arises, however, in Namibia in respect of the obligations contained in the 
petroleum agreement.  The MPA is typically used in practice, but they remain contracts 
open to negotiation between the parties.  Once an agreement has been signed, this 
agreement is not made available to the public and other interested persons therefore do 
not have insight into the final provisions agreed upon.  Furthermore, the obligations in 
terms of the MPA are couched in wide terms and cause uncertainty as to what exactly is 
expected from holders.  Although reference is made to international practices, this by 
itself is problematic as international practices differ and are also subject to criticism.185   
2.4.2 Exercising the right to petroleum 
Once a right to petroleum has been granted, the holder of the right has to adhere to the 
terms and conditions attached to this right.  These include terms and conditions relating 
to the environment.    This ensures continuance compliance with environmental 
obligations, which operates in favour of the interests of the people.   
In both jurisdictions, the holder of a right to petroleum is responsible for any damage 
caused to the environment.  In South Africa, however, most obligations on holders are 
imposed in terms of NEMA, while in Namibia these obligations are imposed by the 
Petroleum Act. 
                                                          
184  See Chapter Nine below.  
185  Gao (note 2) at 13; Havemann (note 9) at 235. 
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The NEMA ensures continuous compliance with environmental obligations by placing 
various obligations on holders of right to petroleum in respect of the environment.  This 
promotes the interests of the people of South African in respect of the environment.   
A holder of a reconnaissance, exploration or production right must actively conduct 
operations in accordance with the work program that the applicant submitted when 
applying for the right.186  Furthermore, a holder must also adhere to the terms and 
conditions of attached to the right, the provisions of the MPRD Act and any other 
law.187    
Holders of an EA (which includes all holders of rights to petroleum) must at all times 
give effect to the general objectives of integrated environmental management, laid 
down in NEMA.188  Holders must consider, investigate, assess and communicate the 
impact of its exploration and production activities on the environment.189  Holders must 
manage all environmental impacts in accordance with its approved EMP (if one was 
required) and as an integral part of its exploration or production operations, unless the 
Minister of Mineral Resources directs otherwise.190  Holders must also monitor and 
audit compliance with the requirements of the environmental management 
programme.191  Finally, holders are responsible for any environmental damage, 
pollution, pumping and treatment of extraneous water or ecological degradation as a 
result of its exploration or production operations or related activities which may occur 
inside and outside the boundaries of the area to which its right relates.192  
Every holder must annually assess its environmental liability and must adjust the 
financial provision made for remediation of environmental damage, if required and to 
the satisfaction of the Minister of Mineral Resources.193  This is in line with the 
internationally accepted environmental management tools, discussed above.  If any 
                                                          
186  Section 75(5)(a), section 82(2)(b) and section 86(2)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
187  Section 75(5)(b), section 82(2)(c) and section 86(2)(c) of the MPRD Act. 
188  Section 24N(7)(a) of the NEMA.  The principles of integrated environmental management are set 
out in section 23 of the NEMA. 
189  Section 24N(7)(b) of the NEMA. 
190  Section 24N(7)(c) of the NEMA. 
191  Section 24N(7)(d) of the NEMA. 
192  Section 24N(7)(f) of the NEMA. 
193  Section 24P(3) of the NEMA.   
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holder fails to manage any impact on the environment or is unable to manage such 
impact, the Minister of Mineral Resources may, on written notice to the holder, use all 
or part of the financial provision to manage the environmental impact of the holder’s 
exploration or production operations.194   
Aside from the above, it is also part of the general terms and conditions of EAs that 
every holder must conduct such monitoring and such performance assessment of the 
approved environmental management programme as may be prescribed.195  The purpose 
of this is to ensure compliance with the conditions of the EA and to assess the 
continued appropriateness and adequacy of the EMP.196 
The continuous annual assessment of environmental liability is an important obligation 
placed on holders.  Because of the potential length of petroleum exploitation projects, it 
is necessary for holders to comply with this in order not to lose sight of his 
environmental obligations.  It also ensures that the state, who is ultimately in charge of 
controlling the impact of petroleum exploitation on the environment, can adequately 
manage the activities of holders.   
The Petroleum Act regulates the obligations of holders of petroleum licences in respect 
of the environment in much more detail than in South Africa.  The Namibian Minister 
of Mines and Energy may, having due regard to good oilfield practices, give directions 
to the holder of a licence in respect of the prevention of the spillage of substances 
(including water and drilling fluid) extracted from a well drilled for purposes or in 
connection with reconnaissance operations, exploration operations or production 
operations, or substances used in relation to the drilling of such a well.197  The 
invocation of “good oilfield practices” has been criticized as being “simplistic and 
vague” as it has no binding definition and does not indicate where such practices may 
be found.198  The same criticism apply in respect of Namibia as, despite defining what 
is meant by “good oilfield practices”, no indication is given as to where these practices 
are applied.   
                                                          
194  Section 24P(2) of the NEMA. 
195  Section 24Q of the NEMA.   
196  Section 24Q of the NEMA. 
197  Section 21(1)(d) of the Petroleum Act.   
198  Gao (note 2) at 13; Havemann (note 9) at 235. 
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The Petroleum Act is silent as to the terms and conditions relating to the environment 
applicable to the holder of a reconnaissance licence.  As stated above, however, an 
application for a reconnaissance licence must set out the possible effect that 
reconnaissance operations will have on the environment.  The Minister may attach 
whatever condition to the licence as he deems necessary.  These may relate to the 
environment as well.   
The Petroleum Act imposes various obligations relating to the environment on the 
holder of exploration and production licences.  The holder of an exploration or 
production licence has an obligation carry out exploration and production operations in 
the exploration or production area in accordance with good oilfield practices.199  The 
holder must also control the flow and prevent the waste, escape or spilling in the 
exploration area of petroleum, water or any gas.200  Further, the holder must prevent the 
waste or spilling in the exploration or production area of substance (including water and 
drilling fluid) extracted from a well drilled for purposes of or in connection with 
exploration or production operations or used in relation to the drilling of such a well.201   
The holder must prevent damage to petroleum-bearing strata in any area outside the 
exploration area202 and prevent petroleum reservoirs in the exploration and production 
area or water sources from being connected with each other.203   
The holder of an exploration or production licence must prevent water or any other 
substance entering any petroleum reservoir through the wells in the exploration area, 
except if required by, and in accordance with, good oilfield practices.204  The holder 
must also prevent the pollution of any aquifer, estuary, harbour, lake, reservoir, river, 
spring, stream, borehole and all other areas of water by the spilling of petroleum, 
drilling fluid, chemical additive, any gas or any waste product or effluent.205 
Prior to the drilling of any well, the holder must furnish the Petroleum Commissioner 
with a report containing particulars of the technique to be employed, an estimate of the 
                                                          
199  Section 38(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.  See also Koep and Van den Berg (note 161) at 187–190. 
200  Section 38(2)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
201  Section 38(2)(b) of the Petroleum Act.   
202  Section 38(2)(c) of the Petroleum Act. 
203  Section 38(2)(d) of the Petroleum Act.   
204  Section 38(2)(e) of the Petroleum Act.   
205  Section 38(2)(f) of the Petroleum Act.   
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time to be taken, the material to be used and the safety measures to be employed in the 
drilling of such well.206  The holder may not flare any combustible gas, except for 
purposes of testing such gas, or for operational reasons, or with the approval of the 
Minister and in accordance with such terms and conditions as may be determined by the 
Minister.207  Finally, a holder may not abandon, close or plug a well without the 
approval of the Minister.208 
In Namibia, the Minister may, in consultation with the Minister of Fisheries and Marine 
Resources and the Minister of Environment and Tourism, exempt holders of 
exploration or production licences from the above provisions.209  The Minister may 
determine the period for which and the conditions subject to which the exemption is 
granted.210  This discretion of the Minister is not conducive towards a petroleum 
regulatory regime that respects peoples’ right to a clean environment.  This in turn 
reduces accountability on the part of the state as well; by granting the Minister a 
discretion instead of imposing certain obligations on the Minister, the EMA reduces the 
scope for holding the Minister accountable. 
When in the course of production operations carried out under a production licence any 
petroleum or other substances are spilled or any pollution is caused, the holder of such 
production licence report it to the Minister of Mines and Energy.  This must be done as 
soon as possible and the holder must take, at its own costs, all such steps as may be 
necessary in accordance with good oilfield practices or otherwise as may be necessary 
to remedy it.211  If the holder fails to do so, the Minister may order the holder to take 
such necessary steps to remedy the spilling, pollution or damage or loss.  This must be 
done by means of written notice addressed to the holder.  If the holder fails to comply 
with the directions of the Minister, the Minister may cause the necessary steps to be 
                                                          
206  Section 38(2)(g) of the Petroleum Act.   
207  Section 38(2)(h) of the Petroleum Act.   
208  Section 38(2)(i) of the Petroleum Act.   
209 Section 38(2A)(a) of the Petroleum Act. 
210  Section 38(2A)(a) of the Petroleum Act. 
211 Section 71(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
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taken to remedy such spilling, pollution or damage or loss.  All costs incurred by the 
Minister must be recoved from the holder by the Minister through a competent court.212 
In 1999, regulations relating to the health, safety and welfare of persons employed, and 
protection of other persons, property, the environment and natural resources in, at or in 
the vicinity of exploration and production areas (“Petroleum Regulations”) were 
published.213 These regulations were made by the Minister of Mines and Energy, acting 
in consultation with the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources and the Minister of 
Environment and Tourism. The Petroleum Regulations regulate, inter alia, electricity, 
fires and explosions, transport (including transport of hazardous substances), subsea 
operations, emergency preparedness (including pollution by spilling of petroleum) and 
safety zones. 
If the Minister has reason to believe that any works or installations erected by the 
company or any operations carried out by the company are endangering or may 
endanger persons or any property of any other person, the Minister may require the 
company to take reasonable remedial measures within such reasonable period as may 
be determined by the Minister.  The Minister may furthermore require the holder to to 
take reasonable and appropriate steps to repair any damage to the environment.  This 
also applies in respect of any works, installations or operations which the Minister has 
reason to believe is causing pollution or is harming wildlife or the environment.  If the 
Minister deems it necessary, he may require the company to discontinue petroleum 
operations in whole or in part until the company has taken such remedial measures or 
has repaired any damage. 
It is obvious from the above discussion that in South Africa, the holder is obliged to 
comply with the work programme, which deals inter alia with the environmental 
impacts of petroleum operations.  In Namibia, the holder must comply with good 
oilfield practices applicable in other countries.  Once again, this gives an international 
flavour to the Namibian legislation which is absent in South Africa.  However, this 
“international dimension” may be subject to criticism as it is vague.   
                                                          
212 Section 71(2) of the Petroleum Act. 
213 GN 190 of Government Gazette 2188 of 23 September 1999.  See also Koep and Van den Berg 
(note 161) at 190. 
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As with applicants for rights to petroleum, the obligations imposed on holders of rights 
to petroleum are legislated and therefore provide transparency into what is expected of 
holders.  It also promotes accountability, as holders and citizens know what obligations 
are imposed on rights to petroleum and what the role of the state is enforcing these 
rights.  In Namibia, however, some of these provisions are negotiable in the petroleum 
agreement to which the public does not have insight.  There is therefore a lack of 
transparency and accountability in Namibia.    
2.4.3 Rehabilitation, Production Closure and Decommissioning 
As stated in Chapter Two above, decommissioning refers to the “wrapping-up” of 
upstream petroleum exploitation.214  Rehabilitation of the production area is one of the 
steps of decommissioning.  Across the globe, the law relating to decommissioning is 
still evolving.215    South Africa and Namibia have scant regulation of the final stages of 
production.   
The South African legislation distinguishes between rehabilitation on the one hand and 
decommissioning and production closure on the other hand.  The main difference is that 
rehabilitation takes place throughout the exploration and production operations, while 
decommissioning and production close takes place at the end of exploration and 
production operations.   
A reconnaissance work program, exploration work program and production work 
program must contain and estimate of the expenditure to be incurred, which must 
include inter alia costs pertaining to the rehabilitation of environmental impacts.216  
Furthermore, application for renewal of an exploration or production right must be 
accompanied by a report reflecting the extent of compliance with the requirements of 
                                                          
214  See Chapter Two above. 
215  Altit F and Igiehon M "Decommissioning of Upstream Oil and Gas Facilities" in G Picton-
Turbervill (ed) Oil and Gas: A Practical Handbook (2009) London, Globe Business Publishing 
Ltd at 268. 
216  Regulation 20(1)(d) of the MPRD Regulations. 
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the environmental management program or plan, the rehabilitation to be completed and 
the estimated costs thereof.217 
Quarterly and annual reports submitted in respect of exploration operations must 
include a statement reflecting rehabilitation work completed and the rehabilitation work 
uncompleted.218  The same reporting requirements do not exist for holders of production 
licences.219 
The production closure programme (discussed below) must include a summary of the 
results of progressive rehabilitation undertaken.220  It is a principle of production 
closure that, after production operation ceases, the holder the land is rehabilitated, as far 
as is practicable, to its natural state, or to a predetermined and agreed standard or land 
use which conforms with the concept of sustainable development.221 
In terms of the NEMA, a holder of an environmental authorisation must, as far as is 
reasonably practicable, rehabilitate the environment affected by the exploration or 
production operations to its natural or predetermined state or to a land use which 
conforms to the generally accepted principle of sustainable development.222  If any 
holder fails to rehabilitate any impact on the environment or is unable to rehabilitate 
such impact, the Minister of Mineral Resources may, on written notice to the holder, 
use all or part of the financial provision to manage the environmental impact of the 
holder’s exploration or production operations.223 
The MPRD Act and NEMA do not specifically mention decommissioning.  The MPRD 
Regulations on the other hand discusses decommissioning in the context of production 
closure and state that a production closure plan must contain a description of the 
                                                          
217  Section 81(2)(c) and section 85(2)(c) of the MPRD Act.  The reference to environmental 
management programme in respect of application for renewal of exploration licences is deleted by 
the MPRD Amendment Act to refer to the environmental authorisation and reference to the 
rehabilitation to be completed and the estimated costs thereof is deleted.  See section 59(a) of the 
MPRD Amendment Act.  This section will come into operation on 07 December 2014.  The same 
amendment does not apply in respect of applications for renewal of production rights.    
218  Regulation 31(3)(v) and regulation 31(4)(v) of the MPRD Regulations. 
219  See also Chapter Five above.   
220  Regulation 62(e) of the MPRD Regulations. 
221  Regulation 56(e) of the MPRD Regulations.   
222  Section 24N(7)(e) of the NEMA.   
223  Section 24P(2) of the NEMA. 
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methods to decommission each exploration or production component and the mitigation 
or management strategy proposed to avoid, minimise and manage residual or latent 
impacts.224  In this way, decommissioning is linked back to the MPRD Act and the 
NEMA, as both also deal with production closure.  The holder of an exploration or 
production right must ensure that the closure of exploration or production operations 
incorporate a process which must start at the commencement of the operation and 
continue throughout the life of the operation.225  The holder must also ensure that risks 
pertaining to environmental impacts must be quantified and managed pro-actively.226  
This includes gathering relevant information throughout the life of an exploration or 
production operation.227  The holder must also ensure that the safety and health 
requirements in terms of the Mine Health and Safety Act228 are complied with,229 that 
residual and possible latent environmental impacts are identified and quantified230 and 
that exploration or production operations are closed efficiently and cost effectively.231  
Finally, the holder must ensure that the land is rehabilitated, as far as practical, to its 
natural state or to a predetermined and agreed standard or land use which conforms 
with the concept of sustainable development.232 
Under the MPRD Act and NEMA, the holder of an exploration or production right 
remains responsible for any environmental liability, pollution, ecological degradation, 
the pumping and treatment of extraneous water, compliance to the conditions of the 
environmental authorisation and the management and sustainable closure of production.  
This responsibility remains with the holder until the Minister has issued a closure 
certificate under the MPRD Act to the holder concerned.233  The holder may, however, 
apply in writing to the Minister for the transfer of the environmental liabilities and 
                                                          
224  Regulation 47 read with regulation 62(f) of the MPRD Regulations.   
225  Regulation 47 read with regulation 56(a) of the MPRD Regulations. 
226  Regulation 47 read with regulation 56(b) of the MPRD Regulations. 
227  Regulation 47 read with regulation 56(b) of the MPRD Regulations. 
228  Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996. 
229  Regulation 47 read with regulation 56(c) of the MPRD Regulations. 
230  Regulation 47 read with regulation 56(d) of the MPRD Regulations. 
231  Regulation 47 read with regulation 56(f) of the MPRD Regulations. 
232  Regulation 47 read with regulation 56(e) of the MPRD Regulations. 
233  Section 69(2) read with section 43(1) of the MPRD Act; section 24R(1) of NEMA.   
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responsibilities of the holder as may be identified in the environmental management 
report to a person with the necessary qualifications.234   
The MPRD Regulations contain closure objectives.235  These objectives form part of the 
draft environmental management program or environmental management plan.236  They 
must identify the key objectives from production closure to guide the project design, 
development and management of environmental impacts.237  They must also provide 
broad future land use objectives for the production site and provide proposed closure 
costs.238 
Upon the lapsing, abandonment or cancellation of an exploration or production right, 
the holder thereof must apply for a closure certificate.239  The same applies when 
exploration or production operations are ceased,240 any portion of the exploration area is 
relinquished241 or the prescribed closing plan to which the exploration or production 
right relates is completed.242   
Application for a closure certificate must be made to the designated agency.243  
Application must be lodged within 180 days the obligation to apply for a clearance 
certificate arises and must be accompanied by an environmental risk report.244  The 
MPRD Regulations prescribe the form and content of an application for a closure 
certificate.245  The application must be accompanied by an environmental risk report,246 
                                                          
234  Section 69(2) read with section 43(2) of the MPRD Act.  Application for transfer of 
environmental liabilities must be on Form O contained in Annexure II to the MPRD Regulations.  
See regulation 58(1) of the MPRD Regulations.  The necessary qualifications are prescribed by in 
regulation 59 of the MPRD Regulations. 
235  Regulation 47 read with regulation 61 of the MPRD Regulations.   
236  Regulation 47 read with regulation 61 of the MPRD Regulations.   
237  Regulation 47 read with regulation 61(a) of the MPRD Regulations.   
238  Regulation 47 read with regulation 61(b) and (c) of the MPRD Regulations.   
239  Section 69(2) read with section 43(3)(a) of the MPRD Act.   
240  Section 69(2) read with section 43(3)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
241  Section 69(2) read with section 43(3)(c) of the MPRD Act. 
242  Section 69(2) read with section 43(3)(d) of the MPRD Act. 
243  Section 69(2) read with section 43(4) of the MPRD Act. 
244  Section 69(2) read with section 43(4) of the MPRD Act.  This section is amended by section 34(d) 
of the MPRD Amendment Act 49 of 2008 to delete the reference to an environmental risk report 
and to replace it with “required information, programmes, plans and reports prescribed in terms of 
this Act and the National Environmental Management Act, 1998.”  The amendment will take 
effect on 07 December 2014.   
245  Regulation 47 read with regulation 57 of the MPRD Regulations.   
246  The content of this report is prescribed by regulation 60 of the MPRD Regulations.   
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a final performance assessment report and a completed application form for the transfer 
of environmental liabilities and responsibilities, if this is applied for.247    
A closure certificate may only be issued if a number of conditions are met.  First, the 
Chief Inspector of Mines and each government department responsible for 
administering any law relating to the environment have confirmed in writing that the 
provisions relating to health and safety and management of pollution of water 
resources, the pumping and treatment of extraneous water and compliance with the 
conditions of the environmental authorisation have been addressed.248  This 
confirmation must be received within sixty days from the date on which the Minister 
informs the Chief Inspector or government departments to do so.249  Second, the 
Council of Geoscience must confirm in writing that complete and correct exploration 
reports have been submitted to the Council.250  Third, complete and correct records, 
borehole core data or core-log data that the Council of Geoscience may deem relevant 
have been lodged with the Council.251  Finally, complete and correct surface and 
relevant underground geological plans have been lodged with the Council for 
Geoscience.252 
When the Minister issues a closure certificate, she must return such portion of the 
financial provision contemplated in the NEMA,253 as she may deem appropriate, to the 
holder of the exploration or production right, but may retain any portion of such 
financial provision for latent and residual safety, health or environmental impact which 
may become known in the future.254  The Minister may also, in consultation with the 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, publish by notice in the Government 
Gazette strategies to facilitate production closure where production is interconnected, 
have an integrated impact or pose a cumulative impact255 or where the safety, health, 
                                                          
247  Regulation 47 read with regulation 57(2) of the MPRD Regulations.   
248  Section 69(2) read with section 43(5) of the MPRD Act. 
249  Section 69(2) read with section 43(5A) of the MPRD Act. 
250  Section 69(2) read with section 43(13)(a) of the MPRD Act. 
251  Section 69(2) read with section 43(13)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
252  Section 69(2) read with section 43(13)(c) of the MPRD Act. 
253  Section 24R(2) of the NEMA. 
254  Section 69(2) read with section 43(6) of the MPRD Act. 
255  Section 69(2) read with section 43(10) of the MPRD Act.   
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social or environmental impacts are integrated which results in a cumulative impact.256  
NEMA, on the other hand, states that the Minister of Environment and Tourism may, 
by notice in the Gazette, publish strategies to facilitate mine closure where mines are 
interconnected, have an integrated impact or pose a cumulative impact.257  The Minister 
may also, in consultation with the Minister of Mineral Resources, and by notice in the 
Gazette, identify areas where mines are interconnected or their impacts are integrated to 
such an extent that the interconnection results in a cumulative impact.258  If a notice is 
published under the MPRD Act, the holder must amend his programmes, plans or 
environmental authorisations accordingly or submit a closure plan, subject to the 
approval of the Minister, which is aligned with the closure strategies in the notice.259  
This is another example of where the MPRD Regulations and the NEMA overlap.   
A holder of an exploration or production right must plan for, manage and implement 
such procedures and such requirements on production closure as may be prescribed in 
NEMA.260  NEMA in turn requires every holder to plan, manage and implement such 
procedures and requirements in respect of the closure of a mine as may be prescribed.261   
Finally, the MPRD Regulations deal extensively with the management of residue 
stockpiles and deposits.262  The assessment of impacts relating to the management of 
residue stockpiles and deposits, where appropriate, must form part of the environmental 
impact assessment report and environmental management programme.263  A system of 
routine maintenance and repair in respect of the residue deposit must be implemented to 
ensure the ongoing control of pollution, the integrity of rehabilitation, health and safety 
matters at the site.264  The decommissioning, closure and post closure management of 
residue deposits must be addressed in the closure plan, which must contain inter alia the 
closure objectives, final land use or capability, conceptual description and details for 
closure and post-closure management, cost estimates and financial provision for closure 
                                                          
256  Section 69(2) read with section 43(9) of the MPRD Act. 
257  Section 24R(5) of NEMA. 
258  Section 24R(4) of NEMA. 
259  Section 69(2) read with section 43(11) of the MPRD Act. 
260  Section 69(2) read with section 43(7) and (8) of the MPRD Act. 
261  Section 24R(3) of the NEMA.   
262  Regulation 73 of the MPRD Regulations.   
263  Regulation 73(1) of the MPRD Regulations.   
264  Regulation 73(6)(b) of the MPRD Regulations. 
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and post-closure management and residual impacts, monitoring and requirements to 
obtain mine closure under the MPRD Act.265 
Unlike the South African legislation, the Namibian legislation deals with rehabilitation 
as part of decommissioning and closure.  As a result, it is discussed under the same 
heading and no distinction is made between rehabilitation on the one hand and 
decommissioning and closure on the other hand.     
Decommissioning, rehabilitation and closure are dealt with primarily under the 
Petroleum Act and the petroleum agreement.  Some provisions of the EMA are also 
applicable.       
An application for a production licence must, apart from what has been stated above 
and in Chapter Five, contain a proposed programme of production operations and of the 
processing of petroleum in question.  This program must include separate 
decommissioning plans266 in respect of the production area and any area outside such 
production area where activities in connection with the production operations in such 
production area are being carried out.  More specifically, it must set out to the 
satisfaction of the Minister (acting in consultation with the Minister of Environment 
and Tourism, the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources and the Minister of 
Finance), the measures proposed to be taken after cessation of such production 
operations to remove or otherwise deal with all installations, equipment, pipelines and 
other facilities, whether on-shore or off-shore, erected or used for purposes of such 
operations and to rehabilitate land disturbed by way of such operations.267 
The holder of a production licence must review, and if necessary, revise the 
decommissioning plan.  This must be done one year before the estimated date on which 
50% of the estimated recoverable reserves of petroleum in the production area would 
                                                          
265  Regulation 73(8) of the MPRD Regulations. 
266  The MPA defines “decommissioning plan” as “the package of measures proposed by the 
Company pursuant to s.46(2)(viA) of the Petroleum Act to be taken after cessation of production 
operations to remove or otherwise deal with all installations, equipment, pipelines and other 
facilities, whether on shore or off shore, erected or used for purposes of such operations and to 
rehabilitate land disturbed by way of such operations, reviewed pursuant to s.68A(1) and either 
approved or revised by the Minister pursuant to s.68A(2) or 68A(3) of the Petroleum Act”.  See 
clause 1.1(n) of the Model Petroleum Agreement.   
267 Section 42(2)(i)(vi) of the Petroleum Act. 
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have been produced.  The Minister may, acting in consultation with the Minister of 
Environment and Tourism, the Minister of Fisheries and Marine Resources and the 
Minister of Finance, approve the reviewed or revised decommissioning plan or refer it 
back to the holder of the production licence concerned to make such amendments as the 
Minister may deem necessary.268 
Other than the general provisions in the Petroleum Act, it is also a term and condition 
of an exploration licence that the holder thereof remove from the exploration area, or 
otherwise deal with, as directed by the Minister in consultation with the Minister or 
Ministers responsible for environment, fisheries and finance, all installations, 
equipment, pipelines and other facilities, whether on-shore or off-shore, not used or 
intended to be used in connection with such exploration operations.269  The same 
condition is not listed for the holder of a production licence. 
The MPA states that, on expiration or termination of the MPA or on relinquishment of 
part of the licence area, the holder must remove or otherwise deal with, as directed by 
the Minister in consultation with the Minister or Ministers responsible for environment, 
fisheries and finance, all equipment and installations from the licence area or 
relinquished area to the extent and in the manner agreed with the Minister in terms of 
the decommissioning plan approved by the Minister.270   The same applies to all 
installations, equipment, pipelines and other facilities erected or used outside the 
licence area for the petroleum operations.271  The holder must also perform all 
necessary site restoration activities in accordance with good oilfield practices and take 
all other action necessary to prevent hazards to human life or to the property of others 
or the environment.272   
The MPA obliges the holder to establish a trust fund for the purpose of 
decommissioning facilities on cessation of production operations.273  This is dealt with 
in more detail in the Petroleum Act and is in line with the general international 
                                                          
268 Section 68A(2) of the Petroleum Act. 
269 Section 38(1)(d) of the Petroleum Act. 
270  Clause 11.16(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
271  Clause 11.16(b) of the Petroleum Act.   
272  Clause 11.16(c) of the Petroleum Act. 
273  Clause 11.17 of the Petroleum Act.   
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environmental management tools discussed above.  The trust deed must be approved by 
the Minister of Mines and Energy after consultation with the Minister of Finance.274  
The holder must annually contribute to the trust fund and the value must represent the 
estimated future costs of decommissioning the facilities in the production area on 
cessation of production operations in such area and the costs of the administration of 
the trust fund.275  If facilities outside the licence area are being used in connection with 
production, then a separate trust fund must be established for these facilities.276  The 
trust fund must be managed by a board of trustees consisting of such equal number of 
persons, not fewer than four members, as may be determined by mutual agreement 
between the Minister of Mines and Energy and the holder of the licence concerned.  
One-half of the trustees must be nominated by the Minister and the other half must be 
nominated by the holder of the licence concerned.277  The Minister must designate the 
chairperson and vice-chairperson.278  The Petroleum Act prescribes some of the 
functions of the trustees.279 
When applying for an ECC, a proponent has to prepare a scoping report, which is 
discussed above.280  The scoping report include a draft EMP, which in turn must include 
information on any proposed management, mitigation, protection or remedial measures 
to be undertaken to address the effects on the environment that have been identified, 
including objectives in respect of the rehabilitation of the environment and closure.281  
This draft management plan must also include, as far as is reasonably practicable, 
measures to rehabilitate the environment affected by the exploration or prospecting to 
its natural or predetermined state or to a land use which conforms to the generally 
accepted principle of sustainable development.282  Finally, it must include a description 
of the manner in which the applicant intends to modify, remedy, control or stop any 
                                                          
274  Section 68B(3) of the Petroleum Act.   
275  Section 68B(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
276  Section 68B(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
277  Section 68B(4)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
278  Section 68B(4)(b) of the Petroleum Act. 
279  Section 68B(5) of the Petroleum Act. 
280  See 2.4.2.2.1 above.   
281  Regulation 8(j)(aa) of the EMA Regulations.   
282  Regulation 8(j)(bb) of the EMA Regulations. 
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action, activity or process which causes pollution or environmental degradation remedy 
the cause of pollution or degradation and migration of pollutants.283 
Decommissioning and abandonment are recent issues in the international sphere and the 
regulation thereof is a major concern worldwide.284  Laws and regulations dealing with 
decommissioning remain largely untested, despite the immensity of these provisions.285  
Even in an established system like the UK, abandonment is provided for briefly and in 
a discretionary manner.286  In Namibia and South Africa, very little has been written on 
decommissioning, probably because in practice the industry has not yet reached that 
stage.  From a practical point of view, therefore, it is uncertain how the legislation will 
be applied.     
Both South Africa and Namibia deal with the obligations of holders of rights to 
petroleum in respect of rehabilitation and decommissioning and production closure.  
Both countries also provide for financial provision to be made in respect of 
rehabilitation and decommissioning and closure.  This is important to ensure that the 
interests of persons affected by petroleum operations are protected.  People need to 
have certainty that the petroleum company will be in a position to rehabilitate and close 
production.  By including obligations for financial provision, this comfort is given.   
South Africa distinguishes between rehabilitation, which takes place during petroleum 
operations, and decommissioning and closure, which takes place when petroleum 
operations are wrapped up.  In Namibia, this distinction is not made.  The effect, 
however, is the same and holders in both jurisdictions are obliged to rehabilitate the 
environment and have additional duties in respect of decommissioning and closure.   
                                                          
283  Regulation 8(j)(cc) of the EMA Regulations. 
284  Dias A “The Oil and Gas Industry in the Tangled Web of Environmental Regulation: Spider or 
Fly?” in Gao Z (ed) Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas (1998) London Kluwer Law 
International at 83; Gao Z “International Law on Offshore Abandonment: Recent Developments, 
Current Issues and Future Directions” in Gao Z (ed) Environmental Regulation of Oil and Gas 
(1998) London Kluwer Law International at 143. 
285  Cameron P “Tackling the Decommissioning Problem” (1999) Natural Resources & Environment 
121 at 121.   
286  Section 29(1) of the Petroleum Act 1998 states that the Secretary of State may by written notice 
require the recipient of the notice to submit to the Secretary a programme setting out the measures 
proposed to be taken in connection with the abandonment of an offshore installation or submarine 
pipeline.  See also Alramahi (note 53) at §3.276. 
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Holders of petroleum licences in Namibia must comply with good oilfield practices in 
respect of rehabilitation, decommissioning and production closure.  While this gives an 
international dimension to the content of access to petroleum in Namibia, these 
provisions are negotiable in the petroleum agreement and the public does not have 
insight into the final, signed agreement.  In this respect, the Namibian legislative 
framework lacks transparency.  These provisions are also vague and it is uncertain what 
exactly is expected from holders.287     
2.5 Consequences of Non-compliance with Statutory Measures 
The efficiency of the statutory regulation of the environment in the context of 
petroleum exploitation (and in general) depends on the effectiveness of the 
consequences of non-compliance.  Enforcement has, however, been traditionally 
viewed as weak and ineffective in many developing countries, partly because of a lack 
of resources and political will.288  Lack of resources, however, are encouraging many 
countries to “step up environmental enforcement as a way of generating revenues to 
pay for government activities and services”.289   
Both the South African and Namibian legislation make it a criminal offence if a person 
conducts a listed activity without the proper EAs (in South Africa) or ECCs (in 
Namibia).290  Any person found guilty may be subject to imprisonment or a fine or both.  
The maximum period of imprisonment in South Africa is ten years and in Namibia 
twenty-five years and the maximum fine in South Africa is R5 million and in Namibia 
N$500,000.00.291       
Aside from the above, both the NEMA and the EMA contains numerous other incidents 
where non-compliance with these acts is a criminal offence.  The consequences are far-
reaching as non-compliance may lead to imprisonment or a fine or both.  Imprisonment 
terms range between one and ten years in South Africa and two to twenty-five years in 
Namibia, while the fines in South Africa range from one to five million South African 
                                                          
287  See above at 3.3.2.2. 
288  Armstrong (note 41) at 374. 
289  Armstrong (note 41) at 374 – 375.   
290  Section 24F of the NEMA and section 27(4) of the EMA.   
291  Section 24F(4) of the NEMA and section 27(4) of the EMA.   
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Rand and in Namibia from N$10,000.00 to N$100,000.00.292  Both Acts also pierce the 
corporate veil by providing for potential liability of directors of companies found guilty 
in terms of these Acts293 and provide for forfeiture in favour of the state of items and 
assets used in connection with the offence.294  
In terms of the EMA, the Environmental Commissioner in Namibia may appoint 
environmental officers for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of the EMA.295  
These environmental officers have wide powers in terms of the EMA in respect of entry 
into premises, inspection of books, records and other documents and seizure of any 
relevant material.296  Environmental officers may also issue compliance orders in the 
event of a contravention of the EMA or the conditions of a clearance certificate.297  
Failure to comply with a compliance order is a criminal offence.298 
The NEMA in South Africa does not provide for environmental officers.  Instead, it 
provides for the designation of environmental management inspectors.299  The functions 
of environmental management inspectors include monitoring and enforcing compliance 
with an environmental law for which he has been designated and investigating possible 
offences or contraventions of that law or a permit or authorisation issued in terms of 
that law.300  As with the environmental officers in Namibia, environmental management 
inspectors have wide powers in respect of entry, search and seizure.301  However, the 
NEMA also provides for powers of environmental management officers to stop, enter 
and search vehicles and vessels and to carry out routine inspections.302  Environmental 
management officers may also issue compliance notices and failure to comply with a 
compliance notice is a criminal offence.303 
                                                          
292  See for example section 24F(4) of the NEMA and section 20(8), section 22(2) and section 27(3) 
of the EMA. 
293  Section 34(7) of the NEMA and section 53(1) of the EMA.   
294  Section 34D of the NEMA and section 54 of the EMA.   
295  Section 18(1) of the EMA. 
296  Section 19 of the EMA.   
297  Section 20(2) of the EMA.   
298  Section 20(8) of the EMA.   
299  Section 31B of the NEMA. 
300  Section 31G(1) of the NEMA.   
301  Section 31H and 31I of the NEMA.   
302  Section 31J and 31K of the NEMA.   
303  Section 31L and 31N of the NEMA.   
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By criminalising non-compliance with environmental obligations, both the Namibian 
and South African legislative frameworks for petroleum ensures accountability of 
petroleum companies as regards their duties in respect of the environment.  
Furthermore, by expressly stating the consequences of non-compliance, transparency is 
promoted.  The rights of the host nations in respect of the environment are also 
enforced.  However, criminalisation and criminal prosecution of environmental 
offences has a downside as well, as it requires significant costs for the state.304  There 
may also be significant time delays between the commissioning of the offence and the 
prosecution thereof.305  Furthermore, criminal prosecution of environmental offences is 
reactive in nature and is designed to react to offences already committed.  It is not 
aimed at remedying environmental damage already caused.306  This is contrary to the 
primary objective of environmental law, namely conserving the environment.  
Incorporating criminal prosecution into environmental law, however, does act as a 
deterrent for persons from committing environmental offences.307 
A better alternative to criminal sanctions may be administrative measures, such as 
compliance notices.308  This is less costly and time consuming and more in line with the 
objective of environmental law.  Both NEMA and EMA provide for the possibility of 
issuing compliance notices.   
2.6 Enforcement in terms of Common Law 
The enforcement of a right to a clean environment in terms of the Constitution and 
environmental legislation is discussed above and in Chapter Four.  However, persons 
whose rights in respect of the environment have been affected also have certain 
remedies available to them in terms of common law.  Because Namibia and South 
Africa share a common law, the enforcement of environmental rights in terms of the 
common law is similar in both jurisdictions.  The fact that the common-law remedies in 
respect of damage to the environment is still in force provides additional transparency 
and accountability in the legislative framework for petroleum.  The reason for this is 
                                                          
304  Burns and Kidd (note 64) at 244. 
305  Burns and Kidd (note 64) at 244. 
306  Burns and Kidd (note 64) at 245. 
307  Burns and Kidd (note 64) at 245. 
308  Burns and Kidd (note 64) at 257. 
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that common-law remedies, the elements of which are well-established and therefore 
transparent,309 are additional methods for a person whose right to a clean environment is 
affected.  While these remedies are typically used against the polluter, it may also be 
employed against the state if all the elements are met.   
Under the common law, where a person commits an unlawful act, he may be held 
delictually liable.310  Five elements must be proved before a person can be held 
delictually liable.  These are conduct, wrongfulness, fault (either negligence or intent), 
harm and causation.311  Delicts can also be committed in respect of the environment.312  
The harm suffered in an environmental context may take one of two forms.  First, it 
may be harm to the person or privately-owned property.  Secondly, it may be harm to 
the environment where no private law interests or rights are affected.313  The second 
form will only give rise to delictual liability where contemporaneous harm is caused to 
individual interests.314  In the event of actual harm, the affected person may claim for 
damages.  Where harm is threatened, the person whose rights may be affected may 
apply for an interdict.315   
Environmental harm in the context of neighbouring owners of land fall under a very 
specific area of common law, namely nuisance.316  Nuisance refers to conduct causing 
actual or potential damage, discomfort or injury to neighbours.317  An action based on 
nuisance normally involves neighbouring land owners, but does not necessarily have to 
                                                          
309  See Visser D “Delict” in Du Bois F (ed) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9ed (2007) 
Wetton Juta & Co at 1096 for the elements of delictual liability. 
310  See Visser (note 286) at 1091. 
311  Visser (note 286) at 1096.   
312  Summers R "Common-law Remedies for Environmental Protection" in A Paterson and L Kotze 
(eds) Environmental Compliance and Enforcement in South Africa (2010) Claremont, Juta Law at 
341-342.   
313  Summers (note 289) at 342. 
314  Summers (note 289) at 342. 
315  Summers (note 289) at 342. 
316  Summers (note 289) at 342. 
317  Van der Merwe D "Neighbour Law" in Zimmerman R and Visser D (eds) Southern Cross - Civil 
Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996) Kenwyn Juta & Co Ltd at 759; Mostert H 
“Nuisance” in Reid E and Visser D (eds) Private Law and Human Rights: Bringing Rights Home 
in Scotland and South Africa (2013) Edinburgh Edinburgh University Press at 256. 
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be limited to neighbours – the essence of nuisance lies the interference of proprietary 
interests rather than the geographical relationship of land units.318   
The principles of nuisance have been invoked in South Africa in numerous instances in 
the context of environmental harm.319  An action in nuisance is, however, not primarily 
aimed at protecting the environment.  Rather, its purpose “is to control that conduct 
[causing the nuisance] to protect proprietary rights rather than to protect the 
environment per se.”320  An interdict may also be applied for to prevent the occurrence 
or continuance of a nuisance.321 
3. Emergency Incidents 
As mentioned in the introduction, the potential effects that petroleum exploitation may 
have on the environment are substantial.  Catastrophic incidents such as well-blowouts 
or large oil spills need to be addressed effectively and timeously to minimise the harm 
on the environment.  It is important for a regulatory framework for petroleum to 
address emergency incidents as well. 
In Namibia, neither the petroleum nor the environmental legislation deals with the 
control over emergency incidents by the state.  This is a major flaw in the regulatory 
framework for petroleum resources as it leaves the organisation of, planning for and 
control over emergency incidents to the petroleum companies without proper state 
involvement.  So, for example, the Petroleum Act states that in the event that petroleum 
or any other substance is spilled in the sea or on land or any water source, the holder 
must report the spillage as soon as possible and take at its own costs all such steps as 
may be necessary in accordance with good oilfield practices or otherwise as may be 
necessary to remedy such spilling, pollution, loss or damage.322  If the holder fails to do 
so after being notice by the Minister, the Minister may cause such steps to be taken as 
may be necessary to remedy such spilling, pollution or damage or loss and recover in a 
                                                          
318  Church J and Church J "Nuisance" in WA Joubert (ed) The Law of South Africa Vol 19(1), (2003) 
Durban, LexisNexis Butterworths at par 169; Summers (note 289) at 343. 
319  See Summers (note 289) at 344 and the case law cited there. 
320  Summers (note 289) at 345. 
321  Summers (note 289) at 345. 
322  Section 71(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
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competent court the costs incurred thereby from such holder.323  Similar provisions are 
contained in the MPA.324 
In South Africa, the legislature provided for control of emergency incidents in the 
NEMA.325  In terms of the NEMA, if an incident326 occurs, the responsible person or his 
employer must immediately report the nature of the incident, the risks posed to public 
health, safety and property and the toxicity of substances or by-products released by the 
incident.327  The responsible person must also report any steps that should be taken to 
avoid or minimise the effects of the incident on public health and the environment.328  
Reporting is done to the Director-General, the South African Police Services and the 
relevant fire service, the relevant provincial head of department or municipality and all 
persons whose health may be affected by the incident.329  The responsible person or his 
employer must then take all reasonable measures to contain and minimise the effects of 
the incident, including its effects on the environment and any risks posed by the 
incident to the health, safety and property of persons.330  He must also undertake clean-
up procedures, remedy the effects of the incident and assess the immediate and long-
term effects of the incident on the environment and public health.331    
Within 14 days of the incident, the responsible person must report to the Director-
General, provincial head of department and municipality such information as is 
available to enable an initial evaluation of the incident.332  The information may include 
the nature of the incident, the substances involved and an estimation of the quantity 
released and their possible acute effect on persons and the environment and data needed 
to assess these effects, initial measures taken to minimise impacts, causes of the 
incident, whether direct or indirect, including equipment, technology, system, or 
                                                          
323  Section 71(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
324  See clause 11.12 and 11.13 of the MPA.   
325  Section 30 of the NEMA.   
326  An “incident” is defined as “an unexpected sudden occurrence, including a major emission, fire or 
explosion leading to serious danger to the public or potentially serious pollution of or detriment to 
the environment, whether immediate or delayed”.  See section 30(1)(a) of the NEMA. 
327  Section 30(3)(a) to (c) of the NEMA.   
328  Section 30(3)(d) of the NEMA. 
329  Section 30(3) of the NEMA.   
330  Section 30(4)(a) of the NEMA.   
331  Section 30(4)(b) to (d) of the NEMA.   
332  Section 30(5) of the NEMA.   
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management failure and measures taken and to be taken to avoid a recurrence of such 
incident.333 
A relevant authority may direct the responsible person to undertake specific measures 
within a specific time to fulfil his obligations in terms of NEMA in respect of 
emergency incidents.334  If he fails to do so, or there is uncertainty who the responsible 
person is, or there be an immediate risk of serious danger to the public or potentially 
serious detriment to the environment a relevant authority may take the measures it 
considers necessary to contain and minimise the effects of the incident, undertake 
clean-up procedures and remedy the effects of the incident.335  The relevant authority 
may claim reimbursement from the relevant person for any costs incurred by the 
relevant authority.336 
Whenever a relevant authority directs the relevant person to take certain steps, or where 
the relevant authority itself takes certain steps in respect of controlling an emergency 
incident, it must as soon as reasonably practicable, prepare comprehensive reports on 
the incident.337  These reports must be made available to the Director-General, the 
public, the South African Police Services and the relevant fire prevention service, the 
relevant provincial head of department or municipality and all persons who may be 
affected by the incident.338 
Any relevant person who contravenes or fails to comply with the provisions of NEMA 
relating to emergency incidents is guilty of an offence.  On conviction, he may be liable 
to a fine of R1 million or to imprisonment for a maximum period of one year or both 
such fine and imprisonment.339  
                                                          
333  Section 30(5) of the NEMA. 
334  Section 30(6) of the NEMA.   
335  Section 30(8) of the NEMA.   
336  Section 30(9) of the NEMA.   
337  Section 30(10) of the NEMA.   
338  Section 30(10) of the NEMA. 
339  Section 30(11) of the NEMA.   
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The South African and Namibian legislation generally adopt a broad approach in its 
legislation with regard to environmental assessment.  This broader approach would 
normally require the assessment of projects and policies,340  but the regulations dealing 
with environmental assessment in respect of petroleum only focus on specific 
projects.341  The primary legislation dealing with petroleum exploitation and 
environmental protection is furthermore silent on various other important issues, such 
as liability for historic damage to the environment.342  Furthermore, there is not 
requirement for environmental insurance policies, which is an acceptable international 
environmental management tool.343 
South Africa and Namibia follow general international trends by making provision for 
petroleum exploitation and environmental protection in a number of statutes and, in 
Namibia, in petroleum agreements.  Few countries have introduced a consolidated, 
integrated legislative framework for petroleum exploitation and environmental 
protection – Peru and Ecuador being two examples.344  Such legislation is desirable as 
“a comprehensive petroleum environmental regulation is politically desirable, legally 
feasible, and practically implementable.”345  It should be encouraged, especially in 
developing petroleum producing countries.346  A comprehensive, integrated petroleum 
environmental framework would not only promote transparency and accountability, but 
would also ensure that proper effect is given to the right to a clean environment.  
Furthermore, it would also operate to the benefit of the investor or petroleum company.  
A lack of a comprehensive petroleum environmental framework may cause 
unnecessary delays or even suspension or cancellation of petroleum operations.347  
In Namibia, the environment is dealt with as a principle of state policy, as opposed to 
its South African counterpart, where a right to a clean environment is a guaranteed 
                                                          
340  Glazewski and Du Toit (note 35) at 10-3. 
341  See for example Glazewski and Du Toit (note 35) at 10-3. 
342  Badenhorst PJ, Mostert H and Dendy M “Minerals and Petroleum” in Joubert WA (ed) The Law 
of South Africa Vol 18 2ed (2007) Durban LexisNexis at par 204.   
343  See 2.2 above. 
344  Gao (note 2) at 39.   
345  Gao (note 2) at 39. 
346  Gao (note 2) at 39.   
347  See for example Gao (note 2) at 45. 
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right.  In Namibia, the EMA also does not provide for standing for persons who wish to 
enforce their rights in respect of the environment.  This, together with the fact that 
Namibia does not have an enforceable constitutional right to a clean environment, 
makes it very difficult for the public to take action against holders of petroleum 
licences to comply with their obligations in terms of the EMA.  This is important for 
accountability and transparency purposes as it gives the public access to relief where 
their environmental right is infringed.  Although it is possible in Namibia and South 
Africa to enforce certain environmental rights in terms of common law, the scope is 
much narrower.  A person can only rely on common law to enforce environmental 
rights if that person is directly affected by it.       
The NEMA places obligations on holders of exploration and production rights to 
uphold the principles of NEMA and other environmental legislation.  The NEMA 
requires environmental authorisation before commencing with exploration or 
production activities.  Contravention of the NEMA and conditions of an environmental 
authorisation is a criminal offence and may lead to a fine, imprisonment or both.  
Environmental management inspectors are appointed to ensure compliance with the 
NEMA and other environmental legislation.  So, from the perspective of the holder of 
an exploration or production right,  regulatory measures in respect of the environment 
are in place.   
The EMA, as with NEMA in South Africa, places various obligations on the holders of 
exploration and production licences.  The Minister may not issue an exploration or 
production licence before the applicant has been awarded an ECC by the 
Environmental Commissioner.  Contravention of the EMA and conditions of an ECC is 
a criminal offence and may lead to a fine, imprisonment or both.  Environmental 
officers are appointed to ensure compliance with the EMA.  Unlike South African 
environmental management inspectors, the powers of the environmental officers are 
limited to ensuring that the provisions of the EMA are complied with and does not 
extend to other environmental legislation. 
The duties of holders of rights to petroleum in respect of the environment provide 
further content to access to petroleum resources.  Not only does is ensure that the rights 
of host nations to a clean environment is promoted, but by statutorily entrenching the 
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duties transparency and accountability in the legislative frameworks for petroleum are 
promoted.  In Namibia, the content of access to petroleum is amplified by the 
petroleum agreement, but the final, signed contract is not available to the public and 
hence lacks transparency.  
Environmental law, however, is not only contained in the Constitutions, legislation and 
judicial decisions relating to the environment.  It also incorporates the general 
principles and specific principles of administrative law, which applies to all 
environmental issues, unless specifically excluded by statute..348  Furthermore, 
environmental law falls within public law, which means the legal relationships within 
environmental law are characterised by inequality, as one party is always the state or 
public official.349  As result, the principles of environmental law discussed in this 
chapter does not exist in isolation.  It must be read against the backdrop of the 
principles of administrative law, discussed in Chapter Nine. 
 
                                                          
348  Burns and Kidd (note 64) at 222.  The authors explain that environmental law primarily belong to 
the field of specific administrative law, which is that area of administrative law that applies 
specifically to an area, such as the environment.  However, general prinviples of administrative 
law (such as the general rigth to administrative justice) aslo applies to environmental law.   
349  Burns and Kidd (note 64) at 222 – 223. 
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As stated in Chapter One, Namibia and South Africa are not major players in the 
international petroleum industry.  As such, they need to attract investors to develop 
their petroleum industries.  This is done partially through the legislative regime relating 
to royalties and taxation in these two countries.1  The legal framework embodying the 
fiscal regime applicable to petroleum companies will make a country more or less 
attractive for investment.2  It will also allow a state to capture resource rent, thus 
creating a benefit for the state.3 
Namibia and South Africa both grant exclusive rights to petroleum companies to 
exploit petroleum.4  Because these two countries therefore have no claim in respect of 
the produced petroleum (as in the case of countries using production sharing contracts 
or service contracts),5 measures must be put in place to ensure that a benefit is 
generated for the state.  In countries following a system where an exclusive right is 
granted to the petroleum country, this benefit is usually generated by imposing royalty 
and taxation on petroleum exploitation.  States may use these costs imposed on 
                                                          
1  See for example Moolman AM Evaluating Incentives in the Tax Legislation Applicable to the 
South African Oil, Petroleum and Gas Industries (unpublished MComm-thesis, North-West 
University, 2012) at 41. 
2  African Development Bank and the African Union Oil and Gas in Africa (2009) New York 
Oxford University Press Inc at 80: “The competitiveness of the regime is an essential determinant 
of the amount of upstream investment in exploration, discovery, and production by multinational 
oil companies.”  See also Mintz J and Chen D “Capturing Economic Rents from Resources 
Through Royalties and Taxes” (October 2012) The School of Public Policy: SPP Research Papers 
1 at i.    
3  Hunter T Legal Regulatory Framework for the Sustainable Extraction of Australian Offshore 
Petroleum Resources: A Critical Functional Analysis (unpublished PhD-thesis, University of 
Bergen, 2010) at 73. 
4  See Chapter Six above. 
5  See Chapter Three above.   
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petroleum companies for economic growth and indirectly benefiting the host 
communities.6 
The central objective in designing a petroleum fiscal regime is succinctly stated by 
Nakhle:7 “to acquire for the state in whose legal territory the resources in question lie, a 
fair share of the wealth accruing from the extraction of that resource, whilst 
encouraging investors to ensure optimal economic recovery of the hydrocarbon 
resources.”  The purpose of this chapter is to discuss petroleum royalty and taxation in 
respect of petroleum in South Africa and Namibia.  It seeks to determine what measures 
are put in place in these two countries to ensure that the host countries benefit from the 
exploitation of petroleum resources, while at the same time encouraging investment.   
Since this thesis is focused on the legal framework for petroleum resources, the 
discussion of petroleum royalty and taxation is limited to the legislative framework for 
petroleum royalty and taxation and not the economic or accounting aspects thereof.  
Furthermore, the focus is specifically on royalty and taxation directly applicable to 
petroleum companies and not the general fiscal regime of South Africa and Namibia.  
In doing so, it focuses on two aspects of the petroleum fiscal regimes of South Africa: 
(i) the creation of a benefit for the host country in sharing in the petroleum wealth by 
imposing an obligation on the petroleum company to pay royalty and taxes; and 
(ii) measures put in place to benefit investors.   
Petroleum royalty and taxation does not only operate to benefit the host country and to 
attract investors.  It also contributes to government accountability.8  It may be argued 
that a “lack of a viable tax regime can impede broad economic growth and the 
development of democracy”.9  The state after all acts as agent of the nation and must 
ensure that the country properly benefits from the petroleum resources within its 
borders.  However, another pattern may arise: government may draw so much from 
petroleum revenues that it is no longer necessary for its citizens to be taxed.  This may 
                                                          
6  Moolman (note 1) at 15. 
7  Nakhle C "Petroleum Fiscal Regimes: Evolution and Challenges" in Daniel P, Keen M and 
McPherson C (eds) The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice 
(2010) London Routledge at 89. 
8  Nakhle C Petroleum Taxation (2008) New York Routledge at 10; Ross ML The Oil Curse (2012) 
New Jersey Princeton University Press at 5 – 6.   
9  Nakhle (note 8) at 10. 
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in turn lead to no representation and this is unsustainable in the long run.10  This 
illustrates the importance of a proper fiscal regime.   
2. Why Should Petroleum Resources be Treated 
Differently?  
The exploitation of petroleum resources is different from other income-generating 
activities that companies may undertake and often different taxation rules apply to 
companies exploiting non-renewable resources.11  For one, it may take many years 
between exploration and production and ultimately rehabilitation.12  Fiscal stability is 
therefore very important for investors, who must be confident that the fiscal regime 
under which it will operate will not be subject to radical changes at the whim of the 
host government.13  Furthermore, the initial stages of petroleum exploitation (notably 
the exploration phase) is cost-intensive and not aimed at generating an income.14  
Uncertainty also plays a major role: when a company undertakes exploration 
operations, it is uncertain whether an economically viable discovery will be made.15  By 
the same token, petroleum operations hold prospects of substantial economic rents.16   
Aside from the above, the exploitation of petroleum resources requires financial and 
technical capabilities that are not necessarily available in South Africa or Namibia.  To 
exploit these resources, it is necessary to rely on foreign petroleum companies to do the 
exploitation.  This, however, creates a problem for host countries.  On the one hand, the 
host country’s framework with regard to the exploitation of natural resources needs to 
be attractive enough for investors to want to invest in the country.  On the other hand, 
the host country must ensure that the nation somehow benefits from the exploitation of 
                                                          
10  Nakhle (note 8) at 10. 
11  Otto J, Andrews C, Cawood F, Doggett M, Guj P, Stermole F and Tilton J Mining Royalty: A 
Global Study of Their Impact on Investors, Government, and Civil Society (2006) Washington 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank at 11. 
12  Hamilton K and Ley E “Sustainable Fiscal Policy for Mineral-based Economies” in Arezki R, 
Gylfason T and Sy A (eds) Beyond the Curse: Policies to Harness the Power of Natural 
Resources (2011) Washington DC International Monetary Fund at 131.   
13  See for example Boadway R and Keen M "Theoretical Perspectives on Resource Tax Design" in 
Daniel P, Keen M and McPherson C (eds) The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, 
Problems and Practice (2010) New York Routledge at 15; Otto et al (note 11) at 12.. 
14  See Chapter Two and Chapter Three above and Hamilton and Ley (note 12) at 131..     
15  See Chapter Two and Chapter Three above. 
16  Boadway and Keen (note 13) at 15. See Chapter One above for a discussion of economic rent.   
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the resources.17  The host country needs to ensure that, when designing its regulatory 
framework for mineral and petroleum resources, it strikes a balance between the 
interests of the mineral and petroleum company doing the exploitation and the nation as 
“owners” of the resource.18   
The petroleum company, on the other hand, is placed in a “complex business 
arrangement” with the host country.19  This business arrangement involves the 
petroleum company, who has the necessary capital, technology and equipment to 
exploit the resources, and the host country, who controls access to the resources, in a 
sector characterized by high stakes, risks and potential vast profits.20  Because of the 
potential long duration of a petroleum-related project, coupled with the volatile 
petroleum prices, petroleum companies are also exposed to long-term risk.21  Petroleum 
companies therefore need some sort of protection that will ensure a stable investment 
climate.   
Resource taxation is an effective way of ensuring that the host country receives some 
benefit from the resources exploited within its border.  In fact, it is one of the main 
ways to ensure that a benefit is generated for the people of the country.  The other 
important way of ensuring local benefit is by imposing reform measures within the 
industry, such as socio-economic empowerment measures, discussed in the next 
chapter.  Importantly, however, host countries must design the resource taxation system 
in such a way that maximum benefit is ensured for the people, without estranging 
investors.  The more a government taxes petroleum companies, the more the 
government will get from its petroleum operations but the less the petroleum company 
will receive.  This undermines the company’s incentive to invest in the country, killing 
                                                          
17  See for example Dale MO “Comparative International and African Mineral Law as Applied in the 
Formation of the New South African Mineral Development Legislation” in Bastida E, Wälde T 
and Warden-Fernández J (eds) International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy: Trends 
and Prospects (2005) The Hague Kluwer Law International at 841; Stiglitz J "Making Natural 
Resources into a Blessing rather than a Curse" in Tsalik S and Schiffrin A (eds) Covering Oil: A 
Reporter's Guide to Energy and Development (2005) New York Open Institute Society at 18. 
18  See Chapter One and Chapter Three above.   
19  Coale MTB “Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Transactions” (2001-2002) Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy 217 at 218.   
20  Coale (note 19) at 218 – 219. 
21  Coale (note 19) at 219. 
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“the goose that lays the golden egg”.22  On the other hand, the less tax is levied, the less 
benefit will flow to the host country.23  Governments must therefore achieve the 
optimal level of taxation – a level of taxation that will benefit both the host country and 
the petroleum company.24  At the same time, the substantial risks that petroleum 
companies face over long periods must in some way be mitigated by the host 
government’s revenue framework for petroleum resources.   
The remainder of this chapter discusses how wealth from petroleum resources is 
generated.  It first discusses the imposition of petroleum royalties, followed by a 
discussion of the direct taxes imposed on petroleum companies and how these taxes 
may differ from normal corporate taxes.  The chapter then concludes with a discussion 
of possible ways of using petroleum revenue potential to enrich a nation.  
3. Petroleum Royalty 
Royalty on petroleum is collected as compensation to the owner of the petroleum 
resources in return for the removal of these non-renewable resources from the land.25  
More specifically, it is payment in lieu of permission for the mining (or petroleum) 
company to gain access to the resources and the right to develop these resources for the 
company’s own benefit.26  In line with this, the intention of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Royalty Act27 (“MPRRA”) is to compensate the state as custodian of the 
South Africa’s mineral and petroleum resources for the exploitation of its non-
renewable resources.28   
Whether royalty may be considered a tax or not is uncertain.  Some hold the view that, 
since royalty is paid to the owner of a resource as compensation for the depletion of 
that resource, it is not a tax but rather consideration payable to the state for the 
                                                          
22  Otto et al (note 11) at 8. 
23  Otto et al (note 11) at 8. 
24  Otto et al (note 11) at 8. 
25  See et al (note 11) at 41; Henrico JH “Royalty on Non-Renewable Resources in South Africa: An 
International Comparison” (unpublished LLM-thesis, University of Pretoria, 2012) at 1.     
26  Otto et al (note 11) at 42. 
27  Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act 28 of 2008. 
28  Cawood F “Getting to Grips with Royalty Tax” 04 May 2010 Inside Mining 24 at 24.   
Chapter Seven 






extraction of petroleum.29  Others hold the view that royalty is a mining or production 
tax.30  In Namibia, whether royalty may be considered a tax on petroleum production or 
a consideration payable to the state for the extraction of its resources is not a major 
concern – petroleum resources vest in the ownership of the state.31   
In South Africa, however, the issue of whether mineral and petroleum royalties are 
taxes or considerations payable to the resource owner is more contentious: if royalty is 
not a tax but rather a consideration payable to the state as owner of the resources, then 
the issue of custodianship and where ownership of unsevered minerals vest is 
applicable.  If one states that royalty are consideration payable to the state as owner of 
the resources, then one can argue that the MPRD Act vested ownership of unsevered 
minerals in the state and by implication expropriated private ownership of petroleum 
resources.  However, one can also argue that, if royalty are consideration payable to the 
owner of resources for the extraction of the resource, then the state as regulator must 
collect these resources on behalf of the nation, in whom the resources ultimately vest.32  
This is supported by the fact that the MPRD Act specifically directs the state as 
custodian to collect royalty.33  Collecting royalty is therefore one of the regulatory 
functions of the state as custodian, acting on behalf of the nation.   
A royalty regime should be aimed at achieving an optimal trade-off between 
encouraging investment to extract resources on the one hand, and earning a large 
revenue for the owner of the resource on the other hand.34  The optimal trade-off will be 
achieved when the fiscal risk associated with the royalty is shared equally between the 
state and the petroleum company: where the petroleum is depleted for no consideration, 
the state bears the fiscal risk; where the petroleum company is required to pay royalty 
irrespective of profit, it bears the fiscal risk.35  An increased risk in developing 
                                                          
29  Dale M, Bekker L, Bashall F, Chaskalson M, Dixon C, Grobler G, Loxton C, Ash M and Cox A 
South African Mineral and Petroleum Law (2005, Service Issue 16 2014) Durban LexisNexis 
Butterworths at MPRRA-1.   
30  See for example Henrico (note 25) at 16. 
31  See Chapter Four above.  
32  See also Cawood (note 28) at 24. 
33  Section 3(4) of the MPRD Act. 
34  Van der Zaan P and Nel P “The Impact of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act on 
the South African Mining Industry: A Critical Analysis” 2010 Meditari Accountancy Research 89 
at 96. 
35  Van der Zaan and Nel (note 34) at 96; Otto et al (note 25) at 42. 
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petroleum resources and low commodity prices may cause investors to be highly 
selective when deciding on whether to invest in the petroleum industry of a specific 
country.36 
In South Africa, royalty is levied in terms of the MPRRA and the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Royalty (Administration) Act37 (“MPRRAA”).  In Namibia, 
royalty is dealt with in terms of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act38 
(“Petroleum Act”) and the compulsory Petroleum Agreement between the holder and 
the state.39 
3.1 The Obligation to Pay Royalty 
In South Africa, petroleum resources belong to the nation and the state is custodian of 
petroleum resources for the benefit of the nation.40  The authority of the state to impose 
royalty on petroleum resources extracted within South Africa is vested in the 
custodianship principle.41  The MPRRA states that a person must pay a royalty for the 
benefit of the National Revenue Fund in respect of the transfer of mineral resources 
extracted from within the Republic of South Africa.42  “Mineral resources” means a 
mineral or petroleum as defined in the MPRD Act.43   
In Namibia, the state is the owner of all petroleum resources in situ.44  As owner, the 
state is entitled to charge royalty on the production of petroleum resources.  As was 
discussed in Chapter Four above, however, the state acts as agent of the nation and has 
to ensure that the benefit ultimately accrues to its people.   
The regulation of royalty in Namibia is not as detailed as the regulation of royalty in 
South Africa.  For example, there is no separate legislation dealing with royalty.  
                                                          
36  Cawood FT and MacFarlane AS “The Mineral and Petroleum Royalty Bill – Report to National 
Treasury” 2003 The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 213 at 231; 
Moolman (note 1) at 59. 
37  Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty (Administration) Act 29 of 2008. 
38  Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 2 of 1991. 
39  Section 13 of the Petroleum Act. 
40  See section 3(1) of the MPRD Act and Chapter Five above for a discussion of the meaning and 
extent of this section.   
41  Dale et al (note 29) at MPRRA-1. 
42  Section 2 of the MPRRA. 
43  See section 1 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act 28 of 2008. 
44  See article 100 of the Namibian Constitution, section 2 of the Petroleum Act and Chapter Four 
above.   
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Royalty is cursorily dealt with under the Petroleum Act and expanded on to some 
extent in the petroleum agreement.       
Before the introduction of the MPRRA, South Africa was one of the few countries in 
the world that did not impose a royalty on petroleum.  By introducing the MPRRA, the 
South African regime was reformed to international norms and contributing to an 
attracting regulatory environment compared to the rest of the world.45 
Royalty in Namibia is not paid on the extraction of the resources, but only on the first 
transfer of the resource after extraction.46  “Transfer” in the MPRRA means the disposal 
of the resource or the consumption, theft, destruction or loss of a petroleum resource 
(other than by way of flaring or other liberation into the atmosphere during exploration 
or production), if the petroleum resource has not previously been disposed of, 
consumed, stolen, destroyed or lost.47   
The obligation to pay royalty on the transfer of petroleum resources is not only placed 
on the holder of a production right.48  It may also include the lessee or sub-lessee of the 
right, a person that wins petroleum unlawfully or any person who contractually 
accepted responsibility for the payment of the royalty.49  However, only persons who 
extract petroleum for their own benefit is responsible for the payment of royalty on 
petroleum, which excludes contractors.50  It also excludes holders of reconnaissance 
permits and exploration rights.  The MPRRA refers to these persons collectively as 
‘extractors’.51   
Royalty is determined by multiplying the gross sales of the extractor (minus certain 
deductible expenses) in respect of the petroleum during the year of assessment by a 
specific percentage.52  The MPRRA prescribes different percentages in respect of 
                                                          
45  Moolman (note 1) at 58. 
46  See Dale et al (note 29) at MPRRA-7. 
47  See section 1 of the MPRRA. 
48  Section 2 of the MPRRA refers to “a person” and not “a holder”.  See Dale et al (note 29) at 
MPRRA-6. 
49  Dale et al (note 29) at MPRRA-6. 
50  Dale et al (note 29) at MPRRA-6. 
51  Section 1 of the MPRRA.  See also Cawood (note 16) at 28. 
52  Section 3(1) and (2) of the Section 4(3) of the MPRRA. 
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refined and unrefined petroleum.53  The percentages in respect of unrefined and refined 
petroleum are calculated as follows:54 
 Unrefined Petroleum Refined Petroleum  
 0.5 + [A / (B x 9] x 100 0.5 + [A / (B x 12.5] x 100  
 A = earnings before interest and taxes55 
B = gross sales in respect of the unrefined petroleum56 
A = earnings before interest and taxes57 
B = gross sales in respect of the refined petroleum58 
 
 
Although there is no fixed royalty rate, the MPRRA sets certain maximum rates.59  To 
this effect, the maximum royalty percentage that may be levied on unrefined petroleum 
is 7% on the gross sales of unrefined petroleum, while the maximum royalty percentage 
that may be levied on refined petroleum is 5% on the gross sales of refined petroleum.60  
Furthermore, the MPRRA states that if earnings before interests and taxes (A in the 
formulae above) is a negative, that amount is deemed to be zero.61  If this is the case, 
the minimum royalty rates set out above will amount to 0.5%.62 
The formula set out above takes into account the petroleum company’s profitability, 
while at the same time ensuring that a minimum royalty is payable to the state.  In 
doing so, neither party is exponentially exposed to fiscal risk.63  A reasonable trade-off 
is therefore achieved, which should encourage investment.   
                                                          
53  Section 3(1) and (2) of the MPRRA.  A “refined mineral resource” means a mineral resource 
listed solely in Schedule 1 of the MPRRA or listed in Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 that has been 
refined to or beyond the condition specified in Schedule 1 for that resource.  An “unrefined 
mineral resource” means a mineral resource listed solely in Schedule 2 of the MPRRA or listed in 
Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 that has not been refined to or beyond the condition specified in 
Schedule 1 for that resource.  See section 1 of the MPRRA.  Petroleum, in terms of the MPRRA, 
is considered refined at the inlet of the refinery.  Before that, it is considered unrefined.  See 
section 1 of the MPRRA and Schedule 1 to the MPRRA. 
54  Section 4(1) and (2) of the MPRRA. 
55  Section 5 of the MPRRA defines in detail what is meant by “earnings before interest and taxes”.   
56  Section 6 of the MPRRA discusses in detail the meaning of gross sales.  
57  Section 5 of the MPRRA defines in detail what is meant by “earnings before interest and taxes”.  
See also Badenhorst PJ and Mostert H Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1 ed (2004, 
Revision Service 10 2014) Wetton Juta at 36-7 – 36-12. 
58  Section 6 of the MPRRA discusses in detail the meaning of gross sales.   
59  Section 4(3) of the MPRRA. 
60  Section 4(3) of the MPRRA. 
61  Section 5(5) of the MPRRA. 
62  Moolman (note 1) at 60. 
63  Van der Zaan and Nel (note 34) at 97. 
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The MPRRA contains certain rules countering the avoidance of paying royalty.  For 
example, if the Commissioner of Inland Revenue is satisfied that a disposal, transfer, 
operation, scheme or understanding, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing 
liability for the royalty or of reducing the amount thereof, has been entered into or 
carried out, the Commissioner must determine the liability for the royalty as well as the 
amount thereof, as if the extractor had not entered into or carried out the relevant 
transaction.64  Alternatively, the Commissioner may determine the liability for the 
royalty and the amount thereof as the Commissioner in the circumstances deems 
appropriate for the prevention or diminution of avoidance, postponement or reduction.65   
The same anti-avoidance rule applies to transactions entered into or carried out solely 
or mainly for the purposes of obtaining a royalty benefit.66  Similarly, it also applies to 
transactions that would not normally be employed for bona fide business purposes, or 
which would not normally be employed in similar transactions.67  Finally, it applies to 
transactions which have created rights or obligations which would not normally be 
created between persons dealing at arm’s length.68 
Finally, the MPRRA deals specifically with foreign currency, but applies different rules 
to oil and gas companies than to other extractors.  Any amount received by or accrued 
to an oil and gas company69 in any foreign currency must be translated to South African 
Rand by applying the average exchange rate for the year in which that amount was so 
received or accrued.70  On the other hand, amounts received by or accrued to an 
extractor in any foreign currency must be translated into South African Rand by 
applying the spot rate71 on the date on which that amount was so received or accrued to 
                                                          
64  Section 12(1)(a) of the MPRRA. 
65  Section 12(1) of the MPRRA. 
66  Section 12(1)(c) of the MPRRA.  “Royalty benefit” includes any avoidance, postponement or 
reduction of the liability for payment of the royalty.  See section 12(3) of the section 12(1)(b)(i) of 
the MPRRA. 
67  Section 12(1)(b)(i) of the MPRRA. 
68  Section 12(1)(b)(i) of the MPRRA. 
69  As defined in paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
70  Section 15(a) of the MPRRA. 
71  See section 1 of the Income Tax Act.   
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the extractor.72  The same rule applies to expenditure or loss incurred by oil and gas 
companies and extractors.73   
In Namibia, royalty on petroleum resources is payable quarterly and not annually as is 
the case in South Africa.74  Royalty is only payable by the holders of production 
licences.75  It is unclear in the Namibian legislation whether this will include lessees, 
sublessees, persons who unlawfully produce petroleum or any person who contractually 
accepts liability for the payment of the petroleum.76  However, nothing in the legislation 
or the petroleum agreement precludes these persons from paying royalty.  The purpose 
of imposing royalty is to ensure that whoever extracts the petroleum shares the benefit 
thereof with the “owners” of the resource.77  However, the obligation to pay royalty 
should vest with the entity who extracts the resource for its own benefit.  Therefore, any 
person who is contracted by the holder of the licence to extract the petroleum on behalf 
of the holder would not be responsible for the payment of royalty on the petroleum 
extracted.  The licence holder, however, should remain responsible for the payment of 
royalty.78  Where the holder of a licence has transferred the right to extract petroleum to 
another person who is entitled to extract the petroleum for its own interest, the 
Petroleum Act is unclear as to whether the licence holder remains responsible for the 
royalty.  It appears, however, that the holder of the licence remains responsible for the 
payment of royalty.79  The transfer of the obligation to pay royalty should be dealt with 
in the contract in which the interests in the petroleum licence is transferred.  This, as is 
stated above, is not prohibited by the Petroleum Act.   
Royalty in Namibia is calculated on the market value, determined as provided for in the 
terms and conditions of the licence, of the petroleum produced and saved in the 
production area during each quarter.80  This distinguishes the Namibian royalty regime 
from the South African royalty regime in two ways.  First, in South Africa royalty is 
                                                          
72  Section 15(b) of the MPRRA. 
73  Section 15(a) and (b) of the MPRRA. 
74  Section 62(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
75  See section 62(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
76  See paragraph 2.1.1. above in respect of South Africa.   
77  See paragraph 3 above. 
78  This is supported by the fact that section 62(1) refers to the obligation of the holder of the licence 
to pay royalty.   
79  Section 62(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
80  Section 62(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
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determined based on the gross sales of the petroleum, while in Namibia it is based on 
the market value.  Second, in Namibia royalty is payable on petroleum produced and 
saved during each quarter as opposed to South Africa, where royalty is payable on the 
first transfer of the petroleum.   
Royalty in Namibia is charged at a fixed rate, unlike South Africa where the rate is 
calculated based on a prescribed formula.  In Namibia, the rate at which royalty is 
charged depends on during which licensing round the licence was issued.81  Royalty on 
licences issued during the first and second licensing rounds (ie the licencing rounds 
before 1998) is charged at a rate of 12½%  on the market value of the petroleum 
produced.  Royalty on licences issued during the third and fourth licensing rounds (ie 
after 1998) as well as licences granted during the current, open-licensing system82 is 
charged at a rate of 5% of the market value of the petroleum produced. The market 
value is determined on the petroleum produced and saved, which is defined in the 
Model Petroleum Agreement as crude oil produced by the company under a production 
licence.  It does not include any crude oil which has been unavoidably lost or lawfully 
used in connection with operations for the recovery of petroleum.83   
The Petroleum Act does not distinguish between royalty payable on refined and 
unrefined petroleum.  The same rules therefore apply equally to refined and unrefined 
petroleum.  However, since royalty is levied on petroleum produced and saved, it will 
be levied only on unrefined petroleum.   
Because royalty in Namibia is charged at a fixed rate, this provides certainty to 
investors and the state enjoys the benefit of a fixed rate based on market value.  When 
determining a royalty, however, the profitability of the company is not taken into 
account.  As a result, in Namibia the petroleum company is exposed to a greater fiscal 
risk.84 
                                                          
81  Section 62(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
82  See Chapter Seven above.   
83  Clause 1.1(m) of the MPA.   
84  See paragraph 3.1.1 above. 
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3.2 Investor Relief and Incentives  
The South African MPRRA contains various provisions relating to investor relief and 
incentives, which take the form of exemptions, rollover relief and fiscal stability 
agreements.85  These provisions are included to strike a balance between the principle 
of levying a royalty and applying the royalty in a way that it will not trigger detrimental 
socio-economic consequences.86  These provisions are important for attracting and 
keeping investors in the South African petroleum industry.  
The MPRRA provides for the exemption of small businesses from paying royalty.87  A 
“small business” is not defined, but the MPRRA provides for certain requirements that 
must be met before an extractor is exempt.88  First, the gross sales of that extractor in 
respect of all transferred petroleum resources must not exceed R10 million during the 
year.89  Second, the royalty that would be imposed for that year must not exceed 
R100,000.00.90  Third, the extractor must, throughout the year, be a tax resident for 
purposes of income tax.91  Finally, the extractor must be registered for that year in terms 
of MPRRAA.92  Exemptions apply on an annual basis and are not once-off.93 
Under certain circumstances, small businesses who meet the requirements set out above 
are not exempted.94  So, for example, an extractor is not royalty exempt if, during the 
applicable year, the extractor holds the right to participate either directly or indirectly in 
more than 50% of the share capital, share premium, current or accumulated profits or 
reserves of, or is entitled to exercise more than 50% voting rights in any other 
extractor.95  The same applies when any other extractor at any time during the year 
holds the right to participate, either directly or indirectly, in more than 50% of the 
current or accumulated profits of the extractor96 or in more than fifty percent of the 
                                                          
85  For a full discussion, see Moolman (note 1).   
86  Van der Zaan and Nel (note 34) at 98. 
87  Section 7 of the MPRRA. 
88  Section 7(1) of the MPRRA. 
89  Section 7(1)(a) of the MPRRA. 
90  Section 7(1)(b) of the MPRRA. 
91  Section 7(1)(c) of the MPRRA.  See also section 1 of the Income Tax Act.   
92  Section 7(1)(d) of the MPRRA. 
93  See section 7(1) of the MPRRA. 
94  Section 7(2) of the MPRRA. 
95  Section 7(2)(a) of the MPRRA. 
96  Section 7(2)(b) of the MPRRA. 
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profits of the extractor and more than 50% of the current or accumulated profits of any 
other extractor.97  Finally, an extractor is not exempted from royalty if the extractor is a 
registered, unincorporated body of persons.98 
An extractor is exempt from paying royalty in respect of petroleum resources won or 
recovered by the extractor for purposes of testing, identification, analysis and 
sampling.99  This exemption does not apply if the gross sales in respect of those 
petroleum resources exceed R100,000.00 during a year of assessment.100 
The MPRRA further provides for rollover relief from transfers between extractors101 
and rollover relief for disposals involving going concerns (companies which continue to 
operate on the same basis after transfer).102  Rollover treatment basically enables any 
gain for the seller (whether capital or income) to be ignored.  Any gain is effectively 
rolled over to the next owner.103  An extractor that transfers petroleum resources to 
another extractor is exempt from paying royalty if the petroleum resource is transferred 
between registered extractors and both extractors agree in writing that this rollover 
provision applies to the transfer.104  The transferee must be treated as the person who 
wins or recovers the resources.105  Were it not for this clause, a possibly immense 
royalty liability would exist for any company wishing to exit the petroleum sector.106   
A disposal of petroleum resources by an extractor to another extractor that forms part of 
the disposal of a going concern is not deemed to be a disposal.  The same applies to 
disposals forming a part of a going concern which is capable of separate operation.107  
The MPRRA states specific examples of transactions that are not deemed to be 
                                                          
97  Section 7(2)(c) of the MPRRA. 
98  Section 7(2)(d) of the MPRRA with section 4 of the MPRRAA. 
99  Section 8 of the MPRRA. 
100  Section 8 of the MPRRA. 
101  Section 8A of the MPRRA. 
102  Section 9 of the MPRRA. 
103  Moolman (note 1) at 52. 
104  Section 8A(1) of the MPRRA.  This rollover relief does not apply where the transferee is 
voluntarily elects to register for payment of royalty instead of being obliged to register in terms of 
the MPRRAA. 
105  Section 8A(2) of the MPRRA. 
106  Moolman (note 1) at 62. 
107  Section 9(1) of the MPRRA. 
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disposals.108  The person who acquires the resources in terms of such a disposal is 
deemed to be the extractor that won or recovered the resource.109 
The MPRRA provides for the conclusion of fiscal stability agreements.  This is 
particularly important in the light of the fact that petroleum operations may carry on for 
many years and may be subjected to fiscal regime changes.  The Minister of Finance 
may conclude a fiscal stability agreement with an extractor in respect of the extractor’s 
exploration or production rights or in anticipation of the extractor acquiring such a 
right.110  This agreement may guarantee certain terms and conditions which protects the 
extractor from increases in royalty rates.111   
An extractor who holds an exploration right may assign its rights in terms of a fiscal 
stability agreement if it disposes of the exploration right.112  However, if the extractor 
holds a production right, it may only assign its rights under the fiscal stability 
agreement if the entity to whom the right is disposed to forms part of the same group of 
companies than the extractor.113 
The provisions relating to fiscal stability agreements in the MPRRA operate more in the 
favour of the extractor than the state.  So, for example, an extractor who is party to a 
fiscal stability agreement may unilaterally terminate the agreement at any time.114  The 
same right is not granted to the state.  Furthermore, if the state fails to comply with the 
terms and conditions of a fiscal stability agreement and the failure has a material 
adverse economic impact on the determination of the royalty payable by the extractor, 
the extractor is entitled to compensation in respect of the increase in the royalty caused 
by the failure or an alternative remedy that eliminates the full impact of the failure.115  
The extractor is also entitled to interest on the compensation.116 
                                                          
108  Section 9(1A) of the MPRRA. 
109  Section 9(2) of the MPRRA. 
110  Section 13(1) of the MPRRA. 
111  Section 13(1) and section 14(1) of the MPRRA. 
112  Section 13(3) of the MPRRA. 
113  Section 13(4) of the MPRRA. 
114  Section 13(5) of the MPRRA. 
115  Section 14(2) of the MPRRA. 
116  Section 14(2) of the MPRRA. 
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The effect of relief in the form of fiscal stability agreements is that a binding agreement 
may be entered into between the Department of Mineral Resources and the petroleum 
company.  This would result in a flexible system by providing a guarantee to the 
petroleum company that adverse changes by the state in the rate of royalty to be 
imposed would not affect the petroleum company.117 
The Namibian Petroleum Act contains some provisions relating to investor relief and 
incentives in respect of royalty.  Unlike South Africa, however, no provision is made in 
the Petroleum Act for anti-avoidance, fiscal stability agreements or payment in foreign 
currency.  The only relief provided for in Namibia is remission and deferment of 
royalty.118   
Remission and deferment of royalty, unlike the exemption in South Africa, are not 
limited to small businesses but can be used by any production licence holder.  To this 
extent, the Petroleum Act states that the Minister of Mines and Energy, in concurrence 
with the Minister of Finance, may on application to him by a production licence holder, 
by notice in writing remit wholly or partly any royalty payable or defer payment of 
royalty.119  The Minister may also, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance and 
on application to him by the licence holder, refund wholly or partly any royalty paid.120  
A remittance, deference or refund must be granted on such conditions as may be 
determined by the Minister and specified in the notice.121  The Minister is under no 
obligation to grant the application for remittance, deference or refund.122 
In adhering to the principles of transparency and accountability, the Minister must on or 
before 30 June in each year lay a report upon the table of the National Assembly, which 
must consist of the names of holders of licences in respect of whom royalty was 
remitted or refunded or of whom payment of royalty was deferred during the financial 
year which ended in that year.  The report must also state the amounts involved and the 
                                                          
117  Van der Zaan and Nel (note 34) at 98. 
118  Section 63 of the Petroleum Act. 
119  Section 63(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act. 
120  Section 63(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act. 
121  Section 63(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
122  Section 63(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
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reasons for such remission, refund or deferment.123  The fact that reasons are required 
ensures that the Minister also acts openly, fairly and reasonably.   
3.3 Comparative Assessment 
Both South Africa and Namibia provide for the payment of petroleum royalty.  In South 
Africa, the royalty is paid on the first transfer of the petroleum.  In Namibia, it is 
payable quarterly on the market value of the petroleum produced and saved.  Another 
difference between the two regimes is that South Africa calculates petroleum royalty on 
the gross sales of petroleum, while Namibia bases it on the market value.  Both 
systems, however, base their royalty on the value of the petroleum.  One result is that a 
higher return rate for the state is achieved than if it was based on, for example, net 
smelter return instead of the gross sales or petroleum produced and saved.124  A further 
result is that royalty is payable whether the petroleum company is operating at a loss or 
for profit.125  The benefit gained by the state is therefore not subject to the performance 
of the company as with income tax.  In South Africa, the interests of the petroleum 
company is, however, protected in that the formula used for determining the rate of 
royalty takes into account the profitability of the company, but a minimum royalty is 
still payable.  In Namibia, this is not the case.  The downside for the state where royalty 
is payable on the value of the petroleum, however, is that the royalty recovered will be 
affected by commodity prices.126  
In South Africa, the royalty rate is not fixed but is determined based on a formula 
prescribed by the MPRRA.  Namibia, on the other hand, prescribes a fixed rate.  While 
this may provide more certainty, the formula contained in the MPRRA provides more 
flexibility as it is influenced by earnings before interests and taxes and gross sales.   
Both countries provide certain investor relief in respect of royalty.  So, for example, in 
Namibia a holder may apply for remission and deferment of royalty.  In South Africa, 
the holder may apply for exemption from paying royalty.  This, however, only applies 
to small businesses, whereas in Namibia any company may apply for remission and 
                                                          
123  Section 63(2) of the Petroleum Act. 
124  Moolman (note 1) at 61. 
125  Otto et al (note 25) at 52. 
126  Otto et al (note 25) at 52. 
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deferment.  South Africa provides for further relief in the form of fiscal stability 
agreements, which may be negotiated with the state and which will provide proper 
protection for the investor against changes in legislation.  Similar relief is not available 
in Namibia.  
The table below above briefly compares the South African and Namibian royalty 
regimes in respect of petroleum.  Both systems generally operate in the same manner, 
but there are major differences between the two, especially regarding how royalty is 
determined and what relief and incentives are offered for investors.  Both systems have 
a favourable royalty rate compared to other jurisdictions.127  South Africa, however, has 
more provisions in place providing relief and incentives for the investors than Namibia.   
 Obligation to Pay Royalty Investor Relief and 
Incentives 
 Basis for Determination 
When 
Payable 
Royalty Rate  
South 
Africa 
Gross sales On first transfer 
Determined 
using formula 
for refined and 
unrefined 
petroleum 
1. Exemption for small 
businesses 
2. Rollover relief for transfers 
between extractors 
3. Rollover relief for transfers 
as going concern 
4. Fiscal stability agreements 








(5% for current 
licencees) 
1. Remission and deferment of 
royalty 
Figure 6: Petroleum Royalty in South Africa and Namibia 
 
4. Petroleum Taxation 
In addition to the levy of royalty on petroleum, both South Africa and Namibia also 
levy specific taxes on petroleum operations.  The way in which resources are taxed can 
have a powerful impact on the political and economic fate of resource-rich countries.128  
                                                          
127  See for example Moolman (note 1) at 60.  
128  Daniel P, Keen M and McPherson C "Introduction" in Daniel P, Keen M and McPherson C (eds) 
The Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice (2010) London 
Routledge at 1. 
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As stated above, the taxation of petroleum production is an effective way of ensuring 
that the host nation benefits from the exploitation of its petroleum resources.  In theory, 
petroleum taxation is the means by which rewards from petroleum is divided between 
the investor and the government.129 
Despite the above, over-taxation may scare off investors, causing the resources to 
remain unexploited and no benefit being received from it.  Investors interested in 
exploiting the petroleum resources must also get something in return for their 
investments.  A balance must therefore be struck between the right of the investors and 
the right of the people of the host country.    
4.1 Direct Taxes 
Petroleum exploitation in South Africa attract various taxes.  These taxes may be 
grouped under two categories, namely direct taxes and indirect taxes.130  Direct taxes 
are income tax, withholding tax and capital gains tax.131  Indirect taxes are Value-
Added Tax and customs duties or import tariffs.132  In Namibia as in South Africa, 
petroleum operations attract various taxes.  The taxes in Namibia may also be divided 
under the headings direct and indirect taxes.  Indirect taxes in Namibia are the same as 
for South Africa except that Namibia also imposes stamp duties on certain transactions.  
The applicable direct taxes in Namibia are only income tax and withholding tax. The 
focus here is only on direct taxes.   
4.1.1 Income Tax 
In South Africa, there is no separate legislation dealing with the taxation of income 
derived from petroleum operations.  The over-all taxation of income of petroleum 
companies is dealt with in terms of the general income tax legislation of South 
Africa.133  The taxable income of any oil and gas company must be determined in 
accordance with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, but subject to the provisions of 
                                                          
129  Nakhle (note 7) at 7.   
130  Here I follow the grouping of Eastwood W and Rawoot N “South Africa” 2013 Oil and Gas Tax 
Guide for Africa 2013 http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/oil-gas-energy/publications/pdfs/ 
pwc_oil_and_gas_tax_guide_for_africa_2013.pdf [accessed 02.02.2014].   
131  See Eastwood and Rawoot (note 118) at 105–107.   
132  See Eastwood and Rawoot (note 118) at 107–108.   
133  Dale et al (note 29) at MPRD-22.   
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the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act.134  The Income Tax Act and the Tenth 
Schedule also provides for certain incentives for investors.   
Before the Tenth Schedule came into operation on 2 November 2006, the main body of 
the Income Tax Act applied to the taxation of income derived from the production of 
natural oil.135  The section dealing with this, however, was amended or deleted and 
replaced by the Tenth Schedule, which aims at providing for a more favourable 
treatment of oil and gas companies and which is aimed at encouraging investment.136  
The state’s intention with the Tenth Schedule is to provide more deductions, stability 
and greater transparency.137  The discussion in this part is only focused on the specific 
provisions of the income tax regime in South Africa on petroleum companies.  The 
Tenth Schedule, however, is not the only instrument imposing a tax obligation on 
petroleum companies.  Other tax obligations will not be discussed.138 
The Tenth Schedule does not apply to all income of oil and gas companies,139 but only 
to that part of the income attributed to oil and gas income.  “Oil and gas income” mean 
the receipts and accruals derived by an oil and gas company from exploration, 
production or the leasing or disposal of any oil and gas right.  Other income derived by 
an oil and gas company is taxed in terms of the general provisions of the Income Tax 
Act.  The rate of tax on taxable income attributed to oil and gas income of any oil and 
                                                          
134  Section 26B(1) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
135  Olivier L, Engels R, Roeleveld J, Wessels H, Davis D and Urquhart G Juta's Income Tax (2012 
Revision Service 17) Claremont Juta & Co Ltd at Sch 10-1.   
136  Olivier et al (note 123) at Sch 10-1. 
137  Moolman (note 1) at 56. 
138  For a full discussion, see Moolman (note 1). 
139  An “oil and gas company” for purposes of the Act refers to any company that holds any oil and 
gas right.  An “oil and gas right” in turn refers to any right to petroleum issued under the MPRD 
Act or any interest in a right to petroleum.  Therefore, any company that holds a reconnaissance 
permit, technical co-operation permit, exploration right or production right is an oil and gas 
company for purposes of the Income Tax Act.  In terms of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax 
Act, any company that engages in exploration or production in terms of any oil and gas right is 
also an “oil and gas company” for purposes of the Income Tax Act.  This may either refer to a 
company holding an oil and gas right and conducting exploration or production operations, or a 
company that does not hold an oil and gas right, but is entitled to explore for or produce oil and 
gas in terms of any oil and gas right.  This right may be obtained in any of the methods 
contemplated in the MPRD Act.  This part of the definition of oil and gas companies is limited to 
companies conducting exploration or production operations in terms of any exploration or 
production right only.  Since it is not possible to transfer any interest in a reconnaissance permit, 
no company can conduct reconnaissance operations in terms of a reconnaissance permit held by 
another company.  As regards technical co-operation permits, no exploration or production may 
be conducted in terms of any technical co-operation permit.  See section 1 of the Tenth Schedule 
to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
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gas company may not exceed 28 cents on each rand of taxable income,140 which is the 
normal rate for companies in South Africa.141  Despite the fact that the Tenth Schedule 
provides more favourable treatment for petroleum companies, the rate at which oil and 
gas income is taxed is still similar to other companies, thus there is no favourable 
treatment with regard to the rate at which income is taxed.142  As such, it does not 
operate to attract investors.143  Other income derived by an oil and gas company not 
attributable to its oil and gas income is taxed in terms according to normal corporate tax 
rates laid down in the Income Tax Act. 
The Tenth Schedule also sets out certain rules regarding thin capitalisation.  The 
purpose of thin capitalisation provisions is to prevent taxpayers from deducting 
interests in respect of excessive amounts of “connected party” debt in certain 
circumstances.144  When calculating the taxable income of an oil and gas company 
during any year of assessment, the Commissioner may not refuse to allow a deduction 
of an expenditure in respect of loans, advances and debts or any other financial 
assistance on the grounds that they are excessive in relation to the market value of all 
the shares in the oil and gas company.145  If, however, an interest-bearing loan, advance 
or debt was owed during the year of assessment by the oil and gas company to any 
entity that is not connected to the company and these loans, debts and advances in the 
aggregate exceed an amount equal to three times the market value of all the shares in 
the company, then the Commissioner may refuse to allow the company to deduct these 
loans, advances or debts.146  In short, a safe harbour is provided for oil and gas 
companies in terms whereof no adjustment should be made provided that the interest-
bearing debt in question does not exceed three times the market value of the shares of 
the South African borrower.147  This safe harbour is, however, replaced with effect from 
01 January 2014 with an arm’s-length test.148 
                                                          
140  Section 2 of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
141  Moolman (note 1) at 45. 
142  Moolman (note 1) at 45. 
143  Moolman (note 1) at 45. 
144  Eastwood and Rawoot (note 118) at 107. 
145  Section 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
146  Section 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
147  Eastwood and Rawoot (note 118) at 107.   
148  Eastwood and Rawoot (note 118) at 107; the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 22 of 2012.   
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As with the South African income tax legislation, the taxation of petroleum companies 
in Namibia used to be dealt with in terms of the Income Tax Act 24 of 1981.  However, 
when the Petroleum (Taxation) Act came into operation, it removed or amended all 
provisions in the Income Tax Act specifically dealing with the taxation of petroleum 
companies and in turn consolidated the taxation of petroleum income in a separate act.  
The Income Tax Act does not apply to income taxable under the Petroleum (Taxation) 
Act.149  The Namibian approach is in line with the approach in other jurisdictions, such 
as the UK,150 where a separate act deals with the taxation of petroleum operations.151   
The Petroleum (Taxation) Act provides for two types of taxes, namely a petroleum 
income tax (“PIT”) and an additional profits tax (“APT”).152  A PIT is payable in 
respect of taxable income153 received by or accrued to or in favour of any person from a 
licence area in connection with exploration operations, development operations or 
production operations carried out in any tax year in such licence area.154  When the 
Petroleum Tax Act was first implemented, the rate of PIT to be levied was 42% of the 
taxable income.  This rate applied to licensing rounds one and two.155  The Petroleum 
Tax Act was amended in 1998 and the new rate, namely 35% of the taxable income, 
applies to licensing rounds three and four.156  The Petroleum (Taxation) Act provides 
comprehensively for the determination of gross income and157 allowable deductions.158  
It furthermore provides for expenditures incurred outside Namibia,159 double 
                                                          
149  Section 2(a) of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act 3 of 1991.   
150  Oil Taxation Act of 1975. 
151  Alramahi M Oil and Gas Law in the UK (2013) West Sussex Bloomsbury Professional Limited at 
§2.37. 
152  APT is also levied in Algeria and Papua New Guinea.  See Ernst & Young Global Oil and Gas 
Tax Guide 2014 Ernst & Young (available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-
Global-oil-and-gas-tax-guide-2014/$FILE/EY-Global-oil-and-gas-tax-guide-2014.pdf [accessed 
13.01.2015] at 1 and 419. 
153  “Taxable income” means the amount remaining after deducting from the gross income of any 
person all allowable deduction and all allowable losses.  See section 1 of the Petroleum (Taxation) 
Act. 
154  Section 5(1) of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
155  These were the first two licensing rounds before 1998.   
156  Section 6 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
157  Section 7 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act. 
158  Sections 8 to 13 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
159  Section 14 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.  
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deductions,160 expenditure incurred in connection with agreements between persons 
associated with each other161 and allowable losses.162 
APT is determined in accordance with the provisions of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act 
using a “complex formula”.163  It is determined in respect of the first, second and third 
“accumulated net cash positions”, which are three cumulative cash flow positions after 
normal tax, based on net cash receipts from petroleum operations in each licence area 
separately.  In short, it is levied on after-tax net cash flows from petroleum 
operations.164  APT will only be paid if the petroleum operations in a licence area earn 
an after-tax real rate of return of 15%.  The second and third tiers of APR become 
payable once the profitability level exceeds 20% and 25% respectively.165  It is 
therefore an additional tax payable on profitable companies.   
The first rate of APT is established at 25% (for the existing Kudu licence it is 33%).  
However the incremental second and third tier APT rates are biddable and negotiable 
with each prospective investor consortium and the agreed rates will be set out in the 
respective Petroleum Agreement.166 
It is possible to vary or modify the formula for determining APT.167  This may be done 
in the petroleum agreement in relation to production sharing or participation by 
Namcor.168  Here, the legislature provides an incentive for licence holders in exchange 
for local participation through the state petroleum company Namcor or a share in the 
produced petroleum.  It may also be done in any agreement entered into between the 
holder of a licence and the Government which provides for the development of a 
discovery of petroleum in gaseous form.169   
                                                          
160  Section 16 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
161  Section 17 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
162  Section 18 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.  
163  Clegg D and Kotze C LexisNexis Practical Guide to Tax in Namibia 8 ed (2012) Durban 
LexisNexis at 74.   
164  Ernst & Young (note 152). 
165  See sections 19 to 21 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act and Clegg and Kotze (note 175) at 74–75. 
166  Section 21 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
167  Section 22 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
168  Section 22(a) of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
169  Section 22(b) of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
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In terms of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act, the majority of the provisions of the Income 
Tax Act 24 of 1981 apply to petroleum companies insofar as they relate to returns, 
assessments, objections and appeals payment and recovery of tax, representative 
taxpayers, refunds and other miscellaneous matters.170  Furthermore, the provisions 
relating to the administration of the Income Tax Act applies to the Petroleum 
(Taxation) Act as well.171 
4.1.2 Withholding Tax 
In South Africa, various withholding taxes are payable by oil and gas companies.  A 
royalty withholding tax of 15% is levied for the benefit of the National Revenue Fund 
on the amount of royalty payable by any person to a non-resident for the use of certain 
intellectual property.172  The same applies to payments for certain scientific, technical, 
industrial or commercial knowledge or information or related assistance.173  Similarly, a 
withholding tax of 15% is levied for the benefit of the National Revenue Fund on South 
African sourced interest payable to non-residents on certain debt instruments.174 
The Income Tax Act also provides for the payment of a withholding tax on any 
dividend paid by a company.175  Normally, the withholding tax on dividends is 
calculated at 15% of the amount paid, but in terms of the Tenth Schedule, the rate may 
not exceed 5% of the amount of any dividend paid by an oil and gas company out of 
amounts attributable to its oil and gas income.176 
The Income Tax Act applicable in Namibia provides for various withholding taxes.  
These provisions are made applicable to petroleum companies by the Petroleum 
(Taxation) Act.177  The first type of withholding tax is a withholding tax on interest.  In 
terms of the Income Tax Act, a withholding tax on interest at a rate of 10% of any 
                                                          
170  Section 23 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act. 
171  Section 4 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
172  Section 49B(1) of the Income Tax Act; Eastwood and Rawoot (note 118) at 109. 
173  Section 49A of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962; Eastwood and Rawoot (note 118) at 109. 
174  Section 37J of the Income Tax Act; Eastwood and Rawoot (note 118) at 109. 
175  Section 64E of the Income Tax Act. 
176  Section 3(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
177  Section 23 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
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amount of interest from a banking institution or unit trust scheme is payable for the 
benefit of the State Revenue Fund.178   
Aside from withholding tax on interest, there is also a non-resident shareholder tax 
(“NRST”).  In terms of the Income Tax Act, a NRST is payable for the benefit of the 
State Revenue Fund in respect of the amount of any dividend which has been declared 
by any company to a non-resident shareholder.179  The rate of the NRST is 10% if the 
beneficial owner of the shares is a company which holds directly or indirectly at least 
25% of the capital of the company paying the dividends.180  In all other cases the rate is 
20%.181  The Petroleum (Taxation) Act, however, states that notwithstanding the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act, there is no withholding tax levied on the dividends 
paid out of oil and gas revenues.182  This is one example where the legislature has 
created a more favourable position for petroleum companies in respect of its taxation 
obligations.   
As with South Africa, a withholding tax on royalty is also payable.  The Income Tax 
Act states that any person liable to pay a royalty on intellectual property to a foreign 
person or company must deduct a royalty tax of 30% from the amount payable.183 
Finally, a withholding tax of 25% is payable on the payment of management fees, 
consultancy fees, entertainment fees or directors’ fees by a Namibian resident to a non-
resident.184  This withholding tax has caused concern to petroleum operators, as most of 
the services used by petroleum companies are sources from outside Namibia.185 
                                                          
178  Section 34A(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
179  Section 42(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
180  Section 45(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
181  Section 45(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
182  Section 2(b) of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
183  Section 35(2) of the Income Tax Act. 
184  Section 35A of the Income Tax Act.   
185  Radiowave “Petroleum Operations Concerned with Tax Proposals” available at 
http://www.radiowave.com.na/index.php/news/dailynews/2879-petroleum-operators-concerned-
with-tax-proposals [accessed 02.02.2014].   
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4.1.3 Capital Gains Tax 
Capital gains tax (“CGT”) is a form of income tax introduced in South Africa in 2001 
in order to bring the South African tax regime in line with international benchmarks.186  
Namibia does not have CGT.   
A capital gain arises when a company disposes of an asset for proceeds that exceed its 
base costs.187  “Base cost” in essence consists of the costs of acquisition of the asset 
plus certain categories of other expenditure, for example transfer costs, stamp duties, 
transfer duties or similar costs.188  South Africa’s CGT system applies to the world-
wide assets of a South African resident.189 
CGT are determined in accordance with the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 
although this Schedule does nto expressly refer to CGT.190  In terms of the Income Tax 
Act, there must be included in the taxable income of a person the capital gain of that 
person for the year of assessment.191  As a result, the taxable capital gain is aggregated 
with other taxable income and taxed according to ordinary income tax rates.192  It is 
therefore onerous on the petroleum company in that is it taxed on this gain.   
Only a certain portion of a person’s net capital gain is included in the taxable income.193  
The taxable capital gain for the year of assessment for a company is 50%.194  An 
assessed capital loss, however, cannot be set-off against ordinary income, but is ring-
fenced and can only be set-off against capital gains arising during future years of 
assessment.195 
                                                          
186  Croome B, Oguttu A, Muller E, Legwaila T, Kolitz M, Rilliams RC and Louw C Tax Law: An 
Introduction (2013) Cape Town Juta & Co Ltd at 334.   
187  See SARS “Capital Gains Tax” available at http://www.sars.gov.za/TaxTypes/CGT/Pages/ 
default.aspx [accessed 02.02.2014].   
188  Olivier et al (note 123) at Sch 8 overview-3.   
189  Croome et al (note 186) at 336. 
190  Section 26A of the Income Tax Act; Croome et al (note 186) at 335. 
191  Section 26A of the Income Tax Act. 
192  Olivier et al (note 123) at 26A-1.   
193  Olivier et al (note 123) at Sch 8 para 10-1. 
194  Section 10(c) of the Eight Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
195  Olivier et al (note 123) at 26A-1. 
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4.2 Investor Relief and Incentives 
The Tenth Schedule to the South African Income Tax Act specifically provides for 
fiscal stability and allowable deductions for petroleum companies.  These measures act 
in favour of the investor.  
A fiscal stability provision is important to facilitate future investment196  Not only does 
it grant the necessary protection of the the interests of the petroleum company,197 it also 
operates in favour of the host state, which will have certainty as to the revenue that will 
be collected.198  Stability is “an intangible yet crucial attribute of a fiscal regime”.199  
Fiscal stability is central to a petroleum company’s confidence in the host country,200 
especially in the light of the company’s long-term exposure to the risks involved in 
petroleum exploitation.201  Under regimes whereby access to petroleum resources is 
granted through a concession or production sharing contract, stabilization clauses are 
usually incorporated into the relevant agreement and enforceable under international 
law.202  The absence of fiscal stability, although often damaging to a petroleum 
company’s confidence in the host country, is not necessarily a deal-breaker.  Where 
fiscal stability cannot be guaranteed and fiscal regimes are unstable, the petroleum 
company may instead be compensated by the host country in other ways, such as 
competitive tax levels, as is the case in the United Kingdom.203  In Norway, on the 
other hand, the fiscal regime is much more stable, but the tax levels are high.204 
In South Africa, fiscal stability is left to the discretion of the Minister of Finance.  In 
terms of the Tenth Schedule, the Minister of Finance may enter into a binding 
agreement with any oil and gas company in respect of an oil and gas right held by that 
company, which agreement must guarantee that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule as 
at the date of conclusion will apply in respect of that right for as long as the right is held 
                                                          
196  Moolman (note 1) at 54.  See also Onorato WT Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum 
Development (1995) Washington The World Bank at 16. 
197  Onorato (note 196) at 20. 
198  Nakhle (note 7) at 115. 
199  Nakhle (note 7) at 114. 
200  Nakhle (note 7) at 114. 
201  Coale (note 19) at 219. 
202  Coale (note 19) at 222; Nakhle (note 7) at 115. 
203  Nakhle (note 7) at 114. 
204  Nakhle (note 7) at 114. 
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by the company.205  The Minister may also enter into a fiscal stability agreement on the 
same terms before the right is granted, provided that the oil and gas company is granted 
the right within one year after date of execution of the agreement.206 
If an oil and gas company who is party to a fiscal stability agreement decides to dispose 
of its exploration right, it may as part of that disposal assign all of its fiscal stability 
rights in terms of the agreement to the other oil and gas company.207  The same only 
applies in respect of the disposal of a production right if the other oil and gas company 
is a company within the same group of companies.208 
An oil and gas company party to a fiscal stability agreement may at any time 
unilaterally terminate the agreement.209  For example, should the actual tax rates be less 
than guaranteed in terms of the fiscal stability agreement, the petroleum company may 
cancel the agreement to benefit from the lower, prevailing rates.  The same termination 
right is not granted to the state, probably because the provisions of such an agreement 
operate in favour of the oil and gas company and not the state.  If the state, however, 
fails to comply with the terms of the agreement and the failure has a material adverse 
economic impact on the taxation of income or profits of the company, the company is 
entitled to compensation for the loss of the market value caused by the failure of the 
state or to other appropriate relief.210 
The Petroleum (Taxation) Act does not provide for any fiscal stability.  The rate at 
which PIT is levied is stated in the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.  As a result, it may be 
amended by unilateral decision of the state.  The rate at which APT as levied, however, 
is fixed in terms of the petroleum agreement which the company must enter into with 
the state.   
Aside from fiscal stability, the Income Tax Act and the Tenth Schedule makes 
provision for specific allowable deductions when determining the taxable income of an 
                                                          
205  Section 8(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
206  Section 8(1)(b) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
207  Section 8(2)(a) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
208  Section 8(2)(b) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
209  Section 8(4) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
210  Section 8(6) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
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oil and gas company.211  All expenditure and losses actually incurred (other than 
expenditure or loss actually incurred in respect of the acquisition of any oil and gas 
right) may be deducted.212  In addition, an oil and gas company may also deduct one 
100% of all expenditure of a capital nature actually incurred in respect of exploration 
during the year of assessment and 50% of all expenditure incurred in respect of 
production.213  This acts as an incentive for petroleum companies to incur significant 
amounts of high-risk capital expenditure that probably represents long-term sunken 
capital.214 
Assessed losses in respect of exploration and production may be set off against the oil 
and gas income and the income derived from the refining of gas derived in respect of 
any oil and gas right held by that company, but only to the extent those assessed losses 
do not exceed that income.215  If any assessed losses remain after set-off, an amount 
equal to 10% of those remaining assessed losses may be set-off against any other 
income derived by that company.216  If any assessed losses still remaining after the set-
off against the other income of the company, those losses must be carried forward to 
the succeeding year of assessment.217 
The Petroleum (Taxation) Act also provides for deductions.  Aside from general 
deductions typically allowed, the Petroleum (Taxation) Act specifically provide for the 
deduction of petroleum royalty, interest on borrowings employed in connection with 
the licence area concerned and restoration and rehabilitation expenditure to the extent 
specified in terms of a licence.218  Under certain circumstances, exploration and 
development expenditure may be written off.219 
                                                          
211  See in detail Moolman (note 1) at 46–50. 
212  Section 5(1) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
213  Section 5(2) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
214  Moolman (note 1) at 46. 
215  Section 5(3) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
216  Section 5(4) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
217  Section 5(5) of the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
218  See section 8 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
219  Section 9 of the Petroleum (Taxation) Act.   
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4.3 Comparative Assessment 
The distribution of benefits from natural resources is at the centre of many natural 
resource taxation policies.220  This also shows in the taxation of petroleum income in 
both South Africa and Namibia.  At first, the general income tax legislation of these 
two countries (in South Africa the main body of the Income Tax Act) dealt with the 
taxation of income derived from petroleum activities.  However, in an attempt to 
encourage investment and to provide more favourable treatment for petroleum 
companies, the treatment of petroleum taxation was removed from the general income 
tax legislation.  In South Africa, the Tenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act is now 
dedicated solely to the taxation of oil and gas income.  Namibia has gone one step 
further and enacted entirely separate legislation to deal with petroleum taxation.   
Despite generally providing for a more favourable taxation regime in respect of 
petroleum companies, the South African and Namibian governments still recognise the 
importance of imposing taxes on the income derived from petroleum operations.  To 
this effect, a petroleum income tax is levied in both countries.  Aside from petroleum 
income tax, both countries also levy various withholding taxes.  Furthermore, in South 
Africa CGT are also levied on the transfer of certain assets.  Namibia does not have 
CGT.  However, Namibia imposes a further tax on petroleum operations, namely APT.   
Certain measures are, however, put in place for the benefit of the investor.  So, for 
example, the Tenth Schedule in South Africa provides for a maximum rate at which 
petroleum income may be taxed, namely 28%.  Namibia also fixes the PIT rate at 35%.  
This is, however, a small comfort.  Because these rates are fixed in legislation, it can be 
changed again by the legislature.  To counter this possibility, the Tenth Schedule 
provides for the possibility of negotiating a fiscal stability agreement to protect the 
investor.  Fiscal stability is a very important incentive to attract investors, who need to 
be sure that they will not be subject to changes in legislation at the whim of the host 
state.  No similar provision is made in Namibia.   
Another measure put in place for the benefit of the investor relates to the withholding 
tax on dividends payable to non-residents of Namibia and South Africa.  In the Tenth 
                                                          
220  Nakhle (note 8) 8.   
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Schedule, a reduced rate of 5% is provided for.  Namibia is even more favourable and 
states that no withholding tax on dividends is payable in respect of dividends paid out 
of oil and gas revenues.   
Finally, the petroleum taxation legislation recognises the distinctiveness of petroleum 
operations.  Various deductions and set-offs unique to petroleum operations are allowed 
in both South Africa and Namibia.  For example, exploration and development costs are 
allowable deductions.   
Despite the above, there are measures that do not operate in favour of the investor.  So, 
for example, the withholding tax on services in Namibia (set at a very high 25%) will 
have serious consequences on petroleum operators, who make use mostly of foreign 
services.  One may argue that this withholding tax will encourage petroleum operators 
to use local services.  However, as stated on a number of occasions throughout this 
thesis, the petroleum industry requires highly skilled services that may not be available 
in the host country.  It is, however, still too early to measure the effect of this tax on 
petroleum operations.  It also appears as if South Africa is intending to impose a similar 
withholding tax.221 
  
                                                          
221  KPMG “Update on South Africa Withholding Taxes” available at 
http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/tax-and-legal-
publications/pages/update-on-south-africa-withholding-taxes.aspx [accessed 02.02.2014].   
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Figure 7: Petroleum Taxes in South Africa and Namibia 
 
Despite the fact that South Africa’s income tax rates for petroleum companies are 
similar to other companies and thus not favouring petroleum companies, the general 
income tax rate is still more favourable than other countries.222  In Angola, for example, 
petroleum income tax is levied at a rate of 50% under production sharing agreements 
and 65.75% under partnerships and risk service contracts.  The income tax rate in 
Brazil is 34% and in Mozambique it is 32%, while in Denmark a hydrocarbon tax rate 
of 52% applies.  In Ghana, upstream petroleum activities are taxed a corporate income 
tax at a rate of 50%.  In Australia, the corporate income tax rate is 30%, but a resource 
rent tax is levied at a rate of 40%.  In New Zealand, corporate income tax at a rate of 
                                                          
222  Moolman (note 1) at 45. 
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28% applies, while a rate of 27% applies in Norway.  In some countries, the income tax 
rates are much lower.  For example, in Canada, the federal income tax rate is 15%, 
while in the Netherlands it is 25% (but the first €200,000 of taxable income is taxed at a 
rate of 20%).223 
From the above, it is clear that for developing countries, the tax rates in South Africa 
and Namibia are competitive.  Figure 7 above shows, however, that the South African 
tax regime in respect of petroleum is much more favourable than the Namibian regime.  
Not only are tax rates much lower, but the South African framework makes provision 
for the entering into of fiscal stability agreements.  This protects investors against 
unilateral changes by the state of the tax rates.  While Namibia does not have capital 
gains tax, its tax rates are high compared to South Africa and it does not provide 
sufficient investor protection.  Furthermore, the new withholding tax rates are very high 
and may be crippling to investors, who rely on foreign services.   
5. Petroleum Revenue Potential 
The above discussion focuses on how petroleum revenue is created in South Africa and 
Namibia.  However, an unwanted result of a petroleum discovery is often that the host 
country becomes overly dependent on the petroleum revenues, which may result in a 
volatile state GDP and related adverse macroeconomic effects.224  This is exacerbated 
by the fact that, once the resource is depleted, the revenue generated from this resources 
ceases.225  How governments spend the funds raised from petroleum exploitation have 
far-reaching effects on their political and economic well-being.226  Revenue from 
petroleum resources can be used in a number of ways to ensure that the public directly 
benefits from these resources over the long run.  In Alaska, royalties, severance taxes 
and other petroleum-related payments make up 90% of the state’s budget, which in turn 
enabled the state to abolish income tax and sales tax and to make an annual dividend 
                                                          
223  All figures from Ernst & Young (note 152).   
224  Gilbert OT “Global Analytical Lessons for Evaluating a Myanmar Sovereign Wealth Fund” 
(2014) Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 579 at 581. 
225  Hunter T Legal Regulatory Framework for the Sustainable Extraction of Australian Offshore 
Petroleum Resources: A Critical Functional Analysis (unpublished PhD-thesis, University of 
Bergen, 2010) at 64. 
226  Ross (note 8) at 5. 
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payment to each of its residents.227  It has also been able to build the largest permanent 
fund in the USA, used to generate future value.228  Texas has used its petroleum 
revenues to establish and maintain two educational funds, one of which injects over a 
billion US dollar into Texas precollege education.  In late 2013, the funds were valued 
at a combined value of approximately US$46,5 billion.229  
One way to use the revenue generated from petroleum to ensure a continued benefit for 
the host country is to use the revenue to fund sovereign wealth funds (“SWFs”)230 to try 
and curb prevent the resource curse.231  A SWF is an investment fund owned or 
controlled by the state and consist of financial assets (such as real estate, stocks, bonds, 
natural resources, currencies, commodities or other financial instruments).  SWFs are 
normally funded by foreign exchange assets or reserves, such as revenue from the sale 
of natural resources .232  Some SWFs have gone so far as to invest in airports and 
hospitals.233  Kuwait established the first SWF in 1953 with the object of investing 
surplus oil revenues to reduce reliance on non-renewable oil reserves.234  Some, 
however attribute the origin of SWFs to Kiribati, a Pacific Island Nation, which 
established one to manage its phosphate revenues.235   
The purpose of SWFs is to allow nations (especially resource-rich nations) to build up 
endowments to replace non-renewable resource assets.236  The International Monetary 
                                                          
227  McArthur JB “Stewarding Public Oil, Gas and Hard Minerals: The Express and Implied 
Development Rights that Protect Public Resources” (2013-2014) Texas Journal of Oil, Gas and 
Energy Law 215 at 219.   It should be kept in mind, though, that Alaska only has a population of 
approximately three-quarters of a million.    
228  McArthur (note 227) at 219 – 220. 
229  McArthur (note 227) at 220 – 221. 
230  Sarkar R “Sovereign Wealth Funds as a Development Tool for Asean Nations: From Social 
Wealth to Social Responsibility” (2009-2010) Georgetown Journal of International Law 621 at 
622 and 623.   
231  Gilbert (note 224) at 581. 
232  Sarkar (note 230) at 622; Ghahramani S “Sovereign Wealth Funds, Transnational Law, and the 
New Paradigms of International Financial Relations” (2013) Yale Journal of International Affairs 
52 at 54.   
233  Ghahramani (note 232) at 52.  
234  Sarkar (note 230) at 623; Ghahramani (note 232) at 52. 
235  Keller A “Sovereign Wealth Fund: Trustworthy Investors or Vehicles of Strategic Ambition?  An 
Assessment of the Benefits, Risks and Possible Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds” (2009) 
The Georgetown Journal of Law & Public Policy 333 at 336.   
236  Keller (note 235) at 337 – 338. 
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Fund (“IMF”) has highlighted several distinct SWF types.237  One type, usually 
employed by resource-rich countries, is a stabilization fund.  Its purpose is “to insulate 
the budget and economy from volatile commodity prices (usually oil).”238  Savings 
funds, on the other hand, are also employed by resource-rich countries to share wealth 
across generations.  These funds “transfer non-renewable assets into a diversified 
portfolio of international financial assets to provide for future generations, or other 
long-term objectives.”239   
Development funds allocate resources to fund vital socioeconomic projects, such as 
infrastructure or government pension plans.240  For example, Angola’s petroleum-
funded Fundo Soberano de Angola is designed to make targeted investments in the 
infrastructure and hospitality industries.241     
SWFs are, however, not beyond criticism, despite its apparent benefits.  For one, there 
is limited information available regarding SWFs, which is caused by a lack of 
transparency in respect of their structure, objectives and investment management.242  
SWFs, where they are regulated, are not required to disclose relevant information to 
stakeholders, such as fund performance or investment strategy.243  The lack of 
regulation of SWF may even give rise to corruption.244  The state, through various state 
actors, is placed in control of vast financial assets, without proper control.245   
Namibia and South Africa do not provide for or use SWFs.  It is suggested that SWFs 
are convenient tools to ensure that the benefit of petroleum resources is spread out over 
the long run, even once the petroleum resources run out.246  For example, when 
Myanmar recently discovered petroleum resources, leading international experts 
strongly advise the country to establish a SWF “to better manage anticipated petroleum 
                                                          
237  International Monetary Fund Global Financial Stability Report: Financial Market Turbulence, 
Causes Consequences and Policies (2007) at 46, available at 
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2007/02/pdf/text.pdf (accessed 07.02.2015). 
238  International Monetary Fund (note 237) at 46. 
239  International Monetary Fund (note 237) at 46. 
240  International Monetary Fund (note 237) at 46; Keller (note 235)  at 338. 
241  Gilbert (note 224) at 593.   
242  Keller (note 235) at 342.  See also Gilbert (note 224) at 620 -621. 
243  Keller (note 235) at 342.   
244  Keller (note 235) at 343.   
245  Keller (note 235) at 343. 
246  Gilbert (note 224) at 581: “…global commentators suggest that at-risk countries should deposit 
resource revenues into a SWF with ‘watertight governance and clear investment rules’”. 
Chapter Seven 






revenues and enable Myanmar to avoid problems generally associated with the 
‘resource curse’”.247  However, if these two countries elect to use SWFs, proper 
regulation of these funds needs to be in place to ensure transparency in how these funds 
are constituted and managed.   
6. Conclusion 
A proper framework for petroleum royalty and taxation is vital for various reasons.  
Primarily, royalty and taxes on petroleum operations ensures that the host country 
benefits from the exploitation of its petroleum resources.  Royalty and taxation are 
inevitable but the framework therefore must be attractive for investors.  On a secondary 
level, by imposing royalty and taxes on petroleum operations, a transparent system with 
government accountability is promoted.  The imposition of royalty and taxes also 
ensure accountability on the side of state.  Since the royalty and taxes are imposed and 
collected by the state on behalf of the nation, the state does so only as agent of its 
people and has a duty to use the income for the benefit of the people.  Where it fails to 
do so, the citizens can hold the state liable for failure to exercise its duties.     
The framework for royalty and taxation in respect of petroleum resources in South 
Africa and Namibia goes to some length to attempt to balance the right of the nations to 
benefit from their petroleum resources with the right of the petroleum companies to 
enjoy a return on their investments in the host country.  On the one hand, petroleum 
royalty is levied.  In South Africa, the rate of royalty is influenced by the profitability 
of the petroleum company, whereas in Namibia it is not.  Direct taxes are also imposed 
on the income generated form petroleum operations.   
There are some measures in both fiscal regimes that strive to provide some protection 
and incentives for investors.  For example, South Africa provides for the possibility of 
concluding a fiscal stability agreement with the Minister of Finance.  This is, however, 
not guaranteed as it is left to the discretion of the Minister to conclude the agreement.  
Aside from the possibility of negotiating a fiscal stability agreement, neither South 
Africa nor Namibia makes any other provision for protection from changes in 
legislation.  The only recourse a petroleum company may have, is to attempt to obtain 
                                                          
247  Gilbert (note 224) at 580 – 581. 
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the necessary relief in a court.248  While fiscal stability is desirable, the reality is that 
one cannot expect any fiscal regime to be set in stone – changes are inevitable.249   
The lack of the possibility of actual stability adds to the investment risks association for 
petroleum resources.250  Other, more sound relief and incentive measures should be 
provided for and relied upon, such as lower tax rates, more allowable deductions and 
the possibility of set-offs.  This is achieved in both South Africa and Namibia.251  
However, from the assessments above, it is clear that the South African regime is much 
more favourable to investors than the Namibian regime.  Not only is income taxed at a 
much lower rate in South Africa, more investor relief and incentives are available in 
South Africa than in Namibia.   
A transparent petroleum regulatory framework should disclose to the public its 
petroleum revenue, as is the case in Brazil, New Zealand, Norway and Alaska.252  Not 
only will public disclosure of petroleum revenue ensure greater transparency, it will 
also ensure greater accountability for the state and will curb the possibility of corrupt 
practices.  This in turn will ensure a greater benefit for the host country as a whole.  
Although South Africa and Namibia are not major petroleum producing countries and 
as a result do not have express policies regarding petroleum revenue disclosure, both 
countries generally have open budgets.  The International Budget Partnership, which 
measures transparency in respect of national budgets, has in 2012 given Namibia an 
average rating of 55, while South Africa was rated 90, the second-highest rating after 
                                                          
248  This may be done either on the basis that the legislation is invalid or unconstitutional or that any 
action in terms of the legislation amounts to unfair or unjust administrative action.  See Chapter 
Nine for the review of administrative actions.  
249  Nakhle (note 7) at 115; Nakhle (note 8) 15. 
250  Nakhle C Petroleum Taxation (2008) New York Routledge at 15. 
251  Other relief may include, for example, relief from royalties, as was done in the United States 
through the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995, in terms whereof companies would not have 
to pay royalty in respect of certain leases in the Gulf of Mexico.  See Bergstrom JT “The Gift that 
Keeps on Giving: An Examination of the Growing Problem of Offshore Oil and Gas Royalty 
Relief” 2009-2010 West Virginia Law Review 509 at 511.  This measure would, however, be 
premature, given the infant nature of the industries in South Africa and Namibia. 
252  Ross (note 8) at 59 and 60 for a discussion of countries where petroleum revenue were kept secret.   
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New Zealand.253  Both countries are, therefore, transparent when it comes to their 
budgets.254 
Where both countries are lacking, however, is any discussion as to how petroleum 
revenues should be employed to ensure a continued benefit for the host country, even 
after the resource is depleted.  In order to avoid falling victim to the resource curse, a 
producing country inter alia needs to have proper structures in place to ensure a 
continued benefit from the petroleum production operations.255  For example, in a 
number of countries SWFs have proven to be very successful in ensuring that the 
revenue generated from petroleum exploitation is used in a sustainable manner, by 
investing these funds in other sectors, such as infrastructure and education.  
 
                                                          
253  International Budget Partnership Open Budget Survey (2012) at 7, available at 
http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf [accessed 
11.04.2015]. 
254  Ross (note 8) at 81. 
255  Hunter (note 225) at 70. 
 
 
Chapter Eight:  




There is a constitutional mandate for reform in South Africa and Namibia.1 The 
mandate is general, but it relates specifically too, and affects, land and natural 
resources. The minerals industry, especially in South Africa, has been at the forefront 
of reform. This is to be expected in view of this constitutional mandate and the 
importance of this industry for South Africa.2  There are also provisions put in place to 
ensure that the petroleum industry is reformed as well.3  In Namibia, on the other hand, 
although the country’s Constitution precedes the South African Constitution by six 
years, reform in general and in the minerals and petroleum industries in particular has 
been very slow.   
Payment of royalty and taxes as benefits for the host nation, discussed in the previous 
chapter, is not the only way of ensuring benefit for the people of Namibia and South 
Africa.  Various measures are also put in place to ensure that there is socio-economic 
reform in South Africa and Namibia.  This includes measures aimed at achieving 
employment equity, ownership in companies and preferential procurement.  These 
provisions may apply generally in these two countries, or specifically to the petroleum 
industry.  The primary function of socio-economic reform measures is to ensure that 
that the people of South Africa and Namibia are empowered and benefitted in their own 
economies.  To a certain extent, however, socio-economic reform measures also 
promote accountability and transparency, as discussed below. 
                                                          
1  See paragraph 2 below.   
2  See Chapter Four above for references to past discriminatory practices in South African minerals 
industry.  See also Dale M, Bekker L, Bashall F, Chaskalson M, Dixon C, Grobler G, Loxton C, 
Ash M and Cox A South African Mineral and Petroleum Law 1 ed (2005, Service Issue 16 2014) 
Durban LexisNexis Butterworths at MPRDA-9. 
3  See Badenhorst PJ and Mostert H Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1 ed (2004, 
Revision Service 10 2014) Wetton Juta at chapter 23, where the reformation of the mineral and 
petroleum industry is discussed in detail.   
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2. The Constitutional Mandate for Reform  
One of the primary intentions of effects of the apartheid regime in South Africa was to 
prevent black economic empowerment.4  The South African Constitution responds 
hereto by aiming to redress past discriminatory practices.5  This is evident from the 
Preamble to the South African Constitution, which states that the people of South 
Africa recognise the injustices of their past.6  The Preamble further confirms that the 
Constitution of South Africa is adopted as the supreme law of South Africa to “heal the 
divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice 
and fundamental human rights.”7     
The South African Constitution states that the Republic of South Africa is a sovereign, 
democratic state founded on various values, including human dignity, the achievement 
of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.8  To achieve equality, 
the South African Constitution provides that all persons are equal before the law and 
entitled to equal protection and benefit of the law.9  Neither the state nor any person 
may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and 
birth.10  Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To 
promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect 
or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination 
may be taken.11  The reference to “legislative and other measures” in the South African 
                                                          
4  Benjamin P, Raditapole T and Taylor M Black Economic Empowerment: Commentary, 
Legislation & Charters (2005, Revision Service 8 2014) Claremont Juta & Co Ltd at 1-3. 
5  Benjamin, Raditapole and Taylor (note 4) at 1-4. 
6  See the Preamble to the South African Constitution. 
7  See the Preamble to the South African Constitution. 
8  Section 1(a) of the South African Constitution. 
9  Section 9(1) of the South African Constitution.  In the light of this section of the Constitition, 
remedial measures must be used as a means to achieve equality, not as an exception to the 
principle of equality.  See Benjamin, Raditapole and Taylor (note 4) at 1-4. 
10  Section 19(3) and section 19(4) of the South African Constitution.  
11  Section 9(2) of the South African Constitution. 
Chapter Eight 






Constitution is where the “thrust of transformative legislation” in South Africa is 
rooted.12 
The Preamble to the Namibian Constitution recognises the fundamental rights of all 
persons and also recognises that these rights have for long been denied to the people of 
Namibia through colonialism, racism and apartheid.  The Namibian Constitution is 
centred on redressing past wrongs and pursuing fundamental rights such as equality and 
fraternity.13  As a result, the Namibian Bill of Rights entrenches the right of equality by 
providing that all persons are equal before the law.14  No person may be discriminated 
against on the grounds of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or 
economic status.15   
The Namibian Bill of Rights also directly addresses the issue of apartheid and 
affirmative action. The Namibian Constitution prohibits the practice and ideology of 
apartheid and provides that the propagation of apartheid practices may be rendered 
criminally punishable.16  The entrenchment of the right to equality does not prevent 
Parliament from enacting legislation providing directly or indirectly for the 
advancement of persons within Namibia who have been socially, economically or 
educationally disadvantaged by past discriminatory laws or practices, or for the 
implementation of policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, economic or 
educational imbalances in the Namibian society arising out of past discriminatory laws 
or practices, or for achieving a balanced structuring of the public service, the police 
force, the defence force, and the prison service.17  When enacting this legislation, 
Parliament may have regard to the fact that women in Namibia have traditionally 
suffered special discrimination and that they need to be encouraged and enabled to play 
a full, equal and effective role in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the 
nation.18 
                                                          
12  Balshaw T and Goldberg D Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment: Amended Codes and 
Scorecards (2014) Cape Town Tafelberg at 69. 
13  See the Preamble to the Namibian Constitution. 
14  Article 10(1) of the Namibian Constitution. 
15  Article 10(2) of the Namibian Constitution. 
16  Article 23(1) of the Namibian Constitution. 
17  Article 23(2) of the Namibian Constitution. 
18  Article 23(3) of the Namibian Constitution. 
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Aside from the entrenched right to equality, the Constitution also states that it is a 
principle of state policy that the state actively promote and maintain the welfare of the 
people by adopting, inter alia, policies aimed at the enactment of legislation to ensure 
equality of opportunity for women, to enable them to participate fully in all spheres of 
Namibian society.19  In particular, the government must ensure the implementation of 
the principle of non-discrimination in remuneration of men and women.20  The problem, 
however, is that principles of state policy are not justiciable, which makes them less 
effective than say, for example, the provisions contained in the Bill of Rights.  
By constitutionalising the mandate of the state to promote transformation, the 
instructions by the state are clear.  This promotes transparency with regard to socio-
economic reform measures in general and in respect of petroleum.  It is further clear 
what the duties of the state are and the state may be held accountable should it fail to 
exercise these duties.   
3. The Broad Empowerment Framework 
In the light of the constitutional guarantee of equality, the South African legislature has 
imposed various measures to promote equality and redressing past discriminatory 
practices.  To this effect, legislation dealing specifically with broad-based black 
economic empowerment framework has been adopted.  This legislation applies in 
general in South Africa and not only to the petroleum industry.  However, the MPRD 
Act specifically includes objects relating to socio-economic empowerment, as the 
following discussion shows.   
Despite the fact that the Namibian Constitution acknowledges the past discriminatory 
practices, very few steps have been taking in respect of redressing historical wrongs in 
Namibia.  In fact, shortly after Independence legislation was passed promoting foreign 
investment in Namibia.21  The Foreign Investment Act states that a foreign national 
may invest and engage in any business activity in Namibia which any Namibian may 
undertake.22  It specifically provides that no foreign national engaged in a business 
                                                          
19  Article 95(1)(a) of the Namibian Constitution. 
20  Article 95(1)(a) of the Namibian Constitution. 
21  Foreign Investment Act 27 of 1990.   
22  Section 3(1) of the Foreign Investment Act.   
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activity or intending to commence a business activity in Namibia shall be required to 
provide for Namibian participation (either by the Namibian Government or a Namibian 
citizen) as shareholder or as partner in such business.  Similarly, no foreign national 
shall be required to provide for the transfer of such business to the Government or any 
Namibian.23  There is, however, an exception: it may be a condition of any licence for 
natural resources (including) petroleum that the Government must be entitled to or may 
acquire an interest in any enterprise to be formed for the exploitation of such rights 
granted in terms of the licence.24  It is clear from this section that the Act only envisages 
Government to hold an interest in the licence, not Namibian citizens.       
Notwithstanding the above and unlike South Africa, Namibia does not have general 
legislation dealing with black economic empowerment.  A transformation document 
called the The New Equitable Economic Empowerment Framework has been published, 
but is not binding.  Steps have, however, been taken to ensuring equity within the 
workplace through affirmative action measures.25  Furthermore, the legislation dealing 
with petroleum contains certain measures towards achieving socio-economic 
empowerment.26   
3.1 South Africa 
At the heart of the initiative of the South African government to transform the manner 
in which the country’s economy operates is the notion of broad-based economic 
empowerment, or BEE in short.27  BEE is “a government initiative to promote 
economic transformation … to enable meaningful participation in the economy by 
black people”.28   
South Africa’s broad-based black economic empowerment initiative commenced with a 
strategy document entitled South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A Strategy for 
                                                          
23  Section 3(3) of the Foreign Investment Act.   
24  Section 3(3) of the Foreign Investment Act. 
25  The Affirmative Action (Employment) Act 29 of 1998. 
26  See 4.2. below.   
27  Southall R “The ANC and Black Capitalism in South Africa” 2004 (31) Review of African 
Political Economy 313 at 315.   
28  Balshaw and Goldberg (note 12) at 13.   
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Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (“Empowerment Strategy”),29 followed 
by framework legislation dealing with black economic empower, the Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment Act (“BEE Act”).30  The BEE Act is further 
supplemented by the BEE Code and a Scorecard.  Each one of these is now discussed in 
more detail.31   
3.1.1 The Empowerment Strategy 
The Empowerment Strategy recognises that a response from government is required in 
the light of “the systemic dispossession and disempowerment of black people that 
defined South Africa”.32  South Africa needed a focused BEE strategy to achieve the 
broad-based economic empowerment of black persons to facilitate growth, 
development and stability in the South African economy.33   
“Black persons”, in terms of the Empowerment Strategy, is a generic term which means 
indigenous South Africans, coloureds and Indians.34  The Empowerment Strategy 
defines BEE as “an integrated and coherent socio-economic process that directly 
contributes to the economic transformation of South Africa and brings about significant 
increases in the numbers of black people that manage, own and control the country’s 
economy, as well as significant decreases in income inequalities”.35   
The BEE process includes elements of human resource development, employment 
equity, enterprise development, preferential procurement as well as investment, 
ownership and control of enterprises and economic assets.36  The successful 
implementation of the BEE strategy will be evaluated against various policy 
objectives.:37 
                                                          
29  Department of Trade and Industry “South Africa’s Economic Transformation: A Strategy for 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment” available at https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_ 
empowerment/bee-strategy.pdf [accessed 02.02.2014]. 
30  Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. 
31  See in general Balshaw and Goldberg (note 12) at 70.   
32  Empowerment Strategy, par 2.7.1.  See also Benjamin, Raditapole and Taylor (note 4) at 1-3. 
33  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.1.1. 
34  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.1.1. 
35  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.2.2. 
36  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.2.3. 
37  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.3. 
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(i) There must be a substantial increase in the number of black people who 
have ownership and control of existing and new enterprises.  
(ii) There must be a substantial increase in the number of black people who 
have ownership and control of existing and new enterprises in the priority 
sectors of the economy that government has identified in its microeconomic 
reform strategy.38   
(iii) There must be a significant increase in the number of new black enterprises, 
black-empowered enterprises and black-engendered enterprises.39   
(iv) There must be a significant increase in number of black people in executive 
and senior management of enterprises.40   
(v) The proportion of the ownership and management of economic activities 
vested in community and broad-based enterprises and co-operatives must 
increase.41   
(vi) Ownership of land and other productive assets must increase, access to 
infrastructure must be improved, acquisition of skills must be increased, as 
must participation in productive economic activities in under-developed 
areas.42   
(vii) An accelerated and shared economic growth is also expected.43   
(viii) Income levels of black persons must increase and income inequalities 
between and within race groups must decrease.44 
The Empowerment Strategy sets out various policy instruments to achieve BEE.  
Government will utilise these policy instruments to achieve its objectives in respect of 
BEE.45  The policy instruments include legislation and regulation dealing with broad-
based black economic empowerment.46  In terms of the Empowerment Strategy, the 
government will use a “balanced scorecard” to measure progress made in achieving 
                                                          
38  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.3. 
39  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.3. 
40  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.3. 
41  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.3. 
42  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.3. 
43  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.3. 
44  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.3. 
45  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.1. 
46  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.2. and par 3.5.3. 
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BEE by enterprises and sectors.47  The scorecard will measure three core elements of 
BEE, namely direct empowerment through ownership and control48 of enterprises and 
assets, human resource development and employment equity and indirect 
empowerment through preferential procurement and enterprise development.49     
The Empowerment Strategy recognises the policy instrument of preferential 
procurement as an effective instrument to promote BEE in the South African 
economy.50  Enabling legislation must provide that all government departments, state-
owned enterprises and public agencies must take into account any code of practice 
issues in terms of the legislation in determining and implementing their preferential 
procurement policy.51  
Another policy instrument is institutional support and a BEE Advisory Council.52  
Government must establish a BEE Advisory Council to advise on the implementation 
of the BEE strategy.53  This Council must advise the President on BEE and review 
progress in achieving BEE.54  The Council must also provide advice on new 
programmes and instruments to achieve the agreed objectives, promote partnerships to 
enhance the implementation of BEE, advise on sector and enterprise charters and advise 
on codes of practice and guidelines.55   
In the Empowerment Strategy, government recognises that its BEE strategy will not be 
effective if government acts alone without the support of the private sector.  As such, 
partnerships between government and the private sector represent a key vehicle for the 
formulation and implementation of BEE programmes at different levels and in different 
sectors of the economy.56  One such form that partnership can take is sector- and 
                                                          
47  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.3.1. 
48  Control means: (a) the right or the ability to direct or otherwise control the majority of the votes 
attaching to the shareholder’s issued shares; (b) the right or ability to appoint or remove directors 
holding a majority of voting rights at meetings of the board of directors of that shareholder; and 
(c) the right to control the management of that shareholder.  See the Empowerment Strategy, App 
A under the heading Core Components of BEE.   
49  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.3.1. 
50  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.5. 
51  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.5.  
52  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.6. 
53  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.6.2.  
54  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.6.2. 
55  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.6.2. 
56  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.7.2. 
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enterprise-based charters.57  Government must issue a code of good practice outlining in 
detail the core elements that should be incorporated into sector- and enterprise-based 
charters.58      
The Empowerment Strategy proposed the promulgation of legislation and the use of a 
balanced scorecard as a code of good practice under the legislation to determine 
progress in the achievement of BEE goals by various industry sectors and enterprises.59  
It was the first document to make reference to a scorecard and identified the various 
elements to BEE.60  The Empowerment Strategy gained legislative recognition in the 
BEE Act.61  
3.1.2 Framework Legislation 
The BEE Act sets out the framework legislation for the government’s BEE initiative.62  
It follows in the wake of the Empowerment Strategy.63  The primary objective of the 
BEE Act is to facilitate broad-based black economic empowerment.64  In terms of the 
BEE Act, broad-based black economic empowerment means the economic 
empowerment of all black people (Africans, coloureds and Indians) including women, 
workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas through diverse 
but integrated socio-economic strategies.65  These strategies include, but are not limited 
                                                          
57  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.7.4. 
58  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.7.8. 
59  Empowerment Strategy, par 3.5.  See also Badenhorst and Mostert (note 3) at 23-2. 
60  Kleynhans EPJ and Kruger MC “Effect of Black Economic Empowerment on Profit and 
Competitiveness of Firms in South Africa” (2014) Acta Commercii 1 at 2.   
61  Section 11 of the BEE ACT. 
62  Benjamin, Raditapole and Taylor (note 4) at 1-3. 
63  Badenhorst and Mostert (note 3) at 23-4.   
64  This is to be achieved by: (a) promoting economic transformation to enable meaningful 
participation of black people in the economy; (b) achieving a substantial change in the racial 
composition of ownership and management structures and in the skilled occupations of existing 
and new enterprises; (c) increasing the extent to which communities, workers, cooperatives and 
other collective enterprises own and manage existing and new enterprises and increasing their 
access to economic activities, infrastructure and skills training; (d) increasing the extent to which 
black women own and manage existing and new enterprises and increasing their access to 
economic activities, infrastructure and skills training; (e) promoting investment programmes that 
lead to broad-based and meaningful participation in the economy by black people to achieve 
sustainable development and general prosperity; (f) empowering rural and local communities by 
enabling access to economic activities, land, infrastructure, ownership and skills; and (g) 
promoting access to finance for black economic empowerment.  See section 2 of the BEE ACT. 
65  See section 1 of the BEE ACT, sv “broad-based black economic empowerment”.  The rationale 
for referring to “broad-based black economic empower” rather than just to “black economic 
empowerment” is to emphasise that empowerment is not only for an elite few, but for all black 
persons.  See Benjamin, Raditapole and Taylor (note 4) at 1-6.   
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to, increasing the number of black people that manage, own and control enterprises and 
productive assets, facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and productive 
assets by communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises and 
human resource and skills development.66  The strategies also include, but are not 
limited to, achieving equitable representation in all occupational categories and levels 
in the workplace, preferential procurement and investment in enterprises that are owned 
or managed by black people.67   
As provided for in the Empowerment Strategy, the BEE Act provides for the 
establishment of the Black Economic Empowerment Advisory Council.68  It also 
provides for the composition, constitution and rules of the Council as well as 
remuneration and reimbursement of expenses incurred by Council members.69  The Act 
also sets out the functions of the Council.70  The Council must advise government on 
BEE and review progress in achieving BEE.71  The Council must further advise of 
drafts codes of good conduct and on the development, amendment or replacement of 
the Empowerment Strategy.72  If requested to do so, the Council must advise on draft 
transformation charters and facilitate partnerships between organs of state and the 
private sector that will advance the objectives of the BEE Act.73 
The BEE Act specifically makes provision for codes of good practice, as envisaged in 
the Empowerment Strategy.74  The Minister of Trade and Industry may, to promote the 
purposes of the BEE Act, issue codes of good practice on BEE.75  The codes “underpin 
a regime designed to redress the wrongs suffered by Black people during the apartheid 
                                                          
66  See section 1 of the BEE ACT, sv “broad-based black economic empowerment”. 
67  See section 1 of the BEE ACT, sv “broad-based black economic empowerment”. 
68  Section 4 of the BEE ACT. 
69  Section 6, 7 and 8 of BEE ACT. 
70  Section 5 of the BEE ACT. 
71  Section 5(a) and (b) of the BEE ACT. 
72  Section 5(b) and (c) of the BEE ACT. 
73  Section 5(e) and (f) of the BEE Act.  
74  Section 9 of the BEE Act.  
75  Section 9(1) of the BEE Act.  The codes may include the further interpretation and definition of 
broad-based BEE and the interpretation of definition of different categories of black 
empowerment entities.  It may also include qualification criteria for preferential purposes for 
procurement and other economic activities as well as indicators to measure broad-based BEE.  
The codes of good practices may further include the weighting to be attached to broad-based BEE 
indicators and guidelines for stakeholders in the relevant sectors of the economy to draw up 
transformation charters for their sectors.  Finally, they may include any other matter necessary to 
achieve the objectives of the BEE Act. 
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years.”76  The codes revolve around scorecards, which are used to measure BEE 
compliance by using defined elements, namely ownership, management control, 
employment equity, skills development, preferential procurement, enterprise 
development and socio-economic development and sector-specific contributions.77 
When preparing a code of good practice, the Empowerment Strategy must be taken into 
account.78  A code of good practice may specify targets consistent with the objectives of 
the BEE Act and the period within which those targets must be achieved.79  To promote 
the achievement of equality of women, a code of good practice may distinguish 
between black men and black women.80  A code issued by the Minister must be taken 
into account by every organ of state and public entity.81  Organs of state and public 
entities must take the codes into account when determining qualification criteria for the 
issuing of licences, concessions or other authorisations in terms of any law.82  This is 
particularly relevant for the petroleum industry.  The BEE Act effectively obliges the 
Minister of Mineral Resources to take the codes of good practice into account when 
granting and issuing rights in respect of petroleum.  Organs of state and public entities 
must also take the codes into account when developing and implementing preferential 
procurement policies, determining qualification criteria for the sale of state-owned 
enterprises and developing criteria for entering into partnerships with the private 
sector.83 
Aside from the codes of good practice, the Minister must publish and promote a 
transformation charter for a particular sector of the economy.84  The Minister must only 
publish the transformation charters if the Minister is satisfied that the charter has been 
developed by major stakeholders in that sector and advances the objectives of the BEE 
Act.85  A Charter therefore represents a collaborative effort of stakeholders within a 
                                                          
76  Scholtz W and Van Wyk C BEE Service Empowermentor (2005, Issue 12 2013) Durban 
LexisNexis at 1-1. 
77  Scholtz and Van Wyk (note 76) at 1-1. 
78  Section 9(2) of the BEE Act.  
79  Section 9(3) of the BEE Act.  
80  Section 9(4) of the BEE Act.  
81  Section 10 of the BEE Act. 
82  Section 10(a) of the BEE Act.   
83  Section 10(b) to (c) of the BEE Act.   
84  Section 12 of the BEE Act.  
85  Section 12 of the BEE Act.  
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particular industry, rather than an instrument imposed by the state.86  To this effect, a 
Charter for the South African Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Industry on Empowering 
Historically Disadvantaged South Africans in the Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Industry 
was published for the petroleum industry.  This Charter is discussed below.87 
3.1.3 The BEE Code and Scorecard 
The BEE Act is accompanied by a Code of Good Practice, the latest version of which 
was published in 2013 (“Code”).88  This Code applies to all organs of state and public 
entities.89  It is therefore applicable to the Minister of Mineral Resources, who must 
take this Code into account when granting rights in respect of petroleum.  The Code 
also applies to all Measured Entities90 that undertake any economic activity with all 
organs of state and public entities, as well as any other Measured Entity that undertakes 
any economic activity (direct or indirect) with any other Measures Entity that is subject 
to measurement under the Code.91     
The Code contains a broad-based BEE generic scorecard (“Scorecard”).92  One of the 
key principles of the Code is that, when measuring BEE compliance, substance takes 
precedence over legal form.93  Furthermore, misrepresentation of a company’s BEE 
status may lead to a disqualification of the entire scorecard.94 
Micro-enterprises, meaning enterprises with a total revenue95 of less than R10 million, 
are Exempt Micro-Enterprises.96  This effectively means that, upon proof of revenue, 
they are exempt from the BEE regime and is accorded an automatic Level 4 status.97  A 
Level 4 status means the entity is considered to have a BEE recognition level of 
                                                          
86  Benjamin, Raditapole and Taylor (note 4) at 1-12. 
87  See paragraph 3.3. below.   
88  Government Notice 1019 of Government Gazette 36928 of 11 October 2013 (“Code”).   
89  Code, Statement 000, par 3.1.1. 
90  A “Measured Entity” means an entity (including organ of state or public entity) subject to 
measurement under the Code and in respect of which a sector code has been issued in terms of the 
BEE Act.  See See Schedule 1 to the Code and Code, Statement 000, par 3.2.3. 
91  Code, Statement 000, par 3.1.2. and par 3.1.3. 
92  Code, Statement 000, par 8. 
93  Code, Statement 000, par 2.1. 
94  Code, Statement 000, par 2.4. 
95  “Total Revenue” means the total income of an entity from its operations as determined under 
South African Generally Accepted Accounting Practices.  See Schedule 1 to the Code.   
96  Code, Statement 000, par 4.1. 
97  Code, Statement 000, par 4.2; Scholtz and Van Wyk (note 76) at 1-3. 
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100%.98  If the Exempt Micro-Enterprise is wholly black-owned, it qualifies for an 
elevation to Level 1 status, meaning it will have a BEE recognition level of 135%.99  If 
the Exempt Micro-Enterprise is at least 51% black-owned, it qualifies for an elevation 
to Level 2 status, which means it will have a BEE recognition level of 125%.100   
Measured entities with a total revenue of between R10 million and R50 million qualify 
as Qualifying Small Enterprises.101  These entities must comply with all of the elements 
of BEE for the purpose of measurement,102 but is measured against a different 
scorecard.  A Qualifying Small Enterprise which is wholly black-owned qualifies for a 
Level 1 status, while a Qualifying Small Enterprise which is at least 51% black-owned 
qualifies for a Level 2 status.103 
Start-up enterprises, regardless of the expected turnover, must be measured as an 
Exempt Micro-Enterprise for the first year after its incorporation.104  If, however, it 
tenders for a contract with a value of higher than R10 million but less than R50 million, 
it must use the Qualifying Small Enterprise scorecard.105  If the value of the contract 
exceeds R50 million, it must use the generic scorecard to measure its compliance.106  
Importantly for start-up enterprises in the petroleum industry, is that the same 
provisions that apply to tendering for contracts must also be applied where the Minister 
of Mineral Resources determines qualification criteria for the issuing of rights to 
petroleum.107  The preferential treatment given to start-up enterprises therefore does not 
apply to start-up enterprises who apply for rights to petroleum.   
In terms of the Scorecard, empowerment rests on five pillars: ownership, management 
control, skills development, enterprise and supplier development and socio-economic 
development.108  Each pillar carries a specific weighting.  Ownership contributes 25 
points, management control 15 points, skills development 20 points, enterprise and 
                                                          
98  Code, Statement 000, par 8.2.1. 
99  Code, Statement 000, par 4.3.1. and par 8.2.1.  
100  Code, Statement 000, par 4.3.2. and par 8.2.1. 
101  Code, Statement 000, par 5.1. 
102  Code, Statement 000, par 5.2. 
103  Code, Statement 000, par 5.3.  
104  Code, Statement 000, par 6.1. 
105  Code, Statement 000, par 6.3. 
106  Code, Statement 000, par 6.3. 
107  Code, Statement 000, par 6.4 read with section 10(a) of the BEE Act.   
108  Code, Statement 000, par 8. 
Chapter Eight 






skills development 40 points and socio-economic development 5 points.109  A Measured 
Entity requires 100 points to be fully compliant.  Since the different pillars add up to 
105 points, it is possible to be fully compliant without meeting all the criteria.   
In terms of the pillar of ownership, an entity receives points for participation by black 
people in its rights of ownership.110  Ownership is measured using the ownership 
scorecard.111  Black people may hold their rights of ownership in a Measured Entity as 
direct participants or as participants through some other form as entity, such as a 
company, close corporation, co-operative, trust, employee share ownership programme 
or partnership.112 
As with the ownership pillar, the management control pillar of empowerment uses a 
management control scorecard to measure the criteria used for deriving a score for 
management control.113  The management control pillar envisages participation on 
board level, other executive management, senior management, middle management, 
junior management and employees with disabilities.114  A Measured Entity receives 
point by meeting the targets for participation of black people and black women at each 
level.115    
In terms of the pillar of skills development, compliance with this pillar is measured by 
using the skills development scorecard.116  This scorecard sets out various categories of 
compliance targets.117  These compliance targets are based on the overall demographic 
representation of black people.118  When determining a Measured Entity’s score, the 
targets should be further broken down into specific criteria according to the different 
race sub-groups.119 
                                                          
109  Code, Statement 000, par 8. 
110  Code, Statement 100, par 3.1.1. 
111  Code, Statement 100, par 3.1.1. 
112  Code, Statement 100, par 3.1.1. 
113  Code, Statement 200, par 2. 
114  Code, Statement 200, par 2. 
115  Code, Statement 200, par 3.1. 
116  Code, Statement 300, par 2.1. 
117  Code, Statement 300, par 2.1. 
118  Code, Statement 300, par 2.2. 
119  Code, Statement 300, par 2.3. 
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The enterprise and supplier development pillar consists of preferential procurement and 
enterprise development and supplier development.120  The enterprise and supplier 
development scorecard sets out the criteria for deriving a score for the enterprise and 
supplier development pillar.121   
With regard to the socio-economic development pillar, Measured Entities receive 
recognition for any socio-economic development contributions that are quantifiable as a 
monetary value.122  The criteria and method for deriving a score for the socio-economic 
development pillar is set out in the socio-economic development scorecard.123 
3.2 Namibia 
In 2011, Cabinet adopted the New Equitable Economic Empowerment Framework 
(“NEEEF”).124  The NEEEF was drafted in accordance with the Constitutional right to 
equality and the principle of state policy aimed at equality.125  The aim of the NEEEF is 
to provide a clear, overarching policy framework into which all other policies for 
transformation will slot.126  The idea is that the NEEEF will be in place for a period of 
twenty-five years from 2011 to 2036 and the eventual success of the NEEEF in 
achieving its goals will mean that beyond 2036, no such framework will be 
necessary.127   
The NEEEF is designed to be an incentive-driven set of policies that encourage 
businesses to take transformation more seriously as opposed to a penalty-driven 
                                                          
120  Code, Statement 400, par 3.1.1. and 3.1.2.  
121  Code, Statement 400, par 2. 
122  Code, Statement 500, par 3.1.1. 
123  Code, Statement 500, par 2.3. 
124  Available at Government of the Republic of Namibia “The New Equitable Economic 
Empowerment Framework” available at http://209.88.21.36/opencms/export/sites/default/grnnet/ 
OPMv2/DocArchive/StatutesBills/NEEEF_final.pdf [accessed 02.02.2014].  See also Stritter A 
“Namibia” in Richer la Flèche E (ed) The Mining Law Review 3ed (2014) London Law Business 
Research Ltd at 204. 
125  Article 23(2) and article 95(1)(a) of the Article 95(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Namibia of 1990. 
126  NEEEF, under the heading Rational. 
127  NEEEF, under the heading Sunset Clause. 
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initiative.128  Non-compliant companies will not be penalised, but will not be eligible to 
tender for government tenders or to receive fishing, telecoms or other licences.129   
As with the South African BEE framework, the NEEEF envisages sector-specific 
charters.130  The sector-specific charters will deal with the broader issues within the 
empowerment framework.131  Charters may not change the targets and weightings of the 
NEEEF, but will only complement the overall objectives of the NEEEF by addressing 
specific indicators that should be adopted within the various sectors within the given 
guidelines.132 
As with South Africa, the objectives of the NEEEF are very wide.  In Namibia, 
however the objectives stated in NEEEF are not a closed list.  The primary purpose of 
NEEEF is, however, socio-economic development.133  
In terms of the NEEEF, government will establish a Commission for New Equitable 
Economic Empowerment Framework (“NEEEF Commission”) to promote and 
administer the NEEEF.134  The NEEEF Commission is to be made up of representatives 
of government, business, trade unions and other organisations.135  The NEEEF 
Commission must be established as a key mechanism of providing guidance and overall 
monitoring on the state of transformation and empowerment in the entire economy.136  
The NEEEF provides for the composition of the NEEEF Commission.137  It also 
                                                          
128  NEEEF, under the heading Compliance, Enforcement and Penalties. 
129  NEEEF, under the heading Compliance, Enforcement and Penalties. 
130  NEEEF, under the heading Sector Specific Charters. 
131  NEEEF, under the heading Sector Specific Charters. 
132  NEEEF, under the heading Sector Specific Charters. 
133  NEEEF, under the heading Objectives.  They include: (a) ensuring the sharing of Namibian 
resources in an equitable and sustainable basis by the people by the people of Namibia; (b) 
creating a socially just society; (c) implementation of measurable policies of redress and 
redistribution; (d) creating vehicles for empowerment; (e) removing barriers of socio-economic 
advancement to enable previously disadvantaged persons to access productive assets and 
opportunities for empowerment; (f) actively guarding against the repugnant tendencies of 
window-dressing, favouritism, nepotism and self-enrichment; (g) providing measurement of 
empowerment targets; and (h) ensuring that an empowering act is meant to launch individuals to 
empower themselves in the future using the basis of their initial empowerment. 
134  NEEEF, under the heading Commission for Equitable Economic Empowerment Framework. 
135  NEEEF, under the heading Commission for Equitable Economic Empowerment Framework. 
136  NEEEF, under the heading Commission for Equitable Economic Empowerment Framework. 
137  NEEEF, under the heading Composition. 
Chapter Eight 






provides for the functions and powers of the NEEEF Commission.138  With regard to 
the powers of the NEEEF Commission, it will have all the powers necessary to enable 
it to fulfil its functions.139   
The NEEEF, as with the South African BEE legislative framework, uses a scorecard to 
measure compliance.140  The NEEEF intends to promote transformation in business 
through five empowerment pillars.141   The scorecard measures each empowerment 
pillar.  Businesses that need to comply with the NEEEF will be expected to provide 
audited proof that they have achieved the NEEEF targets.142  The pillars are ownership, 
management control and employment equity, human resources and skills development, 
entrepreneurship development and community investment.  
With regard to ownership, the NEEEF aims to promote more equitable and balanced 
ownership of business in Namibia, while at the same time recognising the 
Constitutional protection of private property and the promotion of foreign 
investment.143  The NEEEF envisages the transformation of corporate ownership in the 
economy to be steadily changed through a two-pronged approach.  First, assistance will 
be provided to previously disadvantaged Namibians to buy into existing businesses on 
commercial or near-commercial terms.144  Second, assistance will be provided to enable 
                                                          
138  NEEEF, under the headings Functions of the Commission and Powers of the Commission.  The 
functions of the NEEEF are: (a) reporting to government on the NEEEF; reviewing progress in 
achieving the NEEEF; (c) advising on principles of good governance and good practice; (d) 
advising on the development, amendment or replacement of the strategy; (e) advising on draft 
transformation charters if requested to do so; (f) facilitating partnerships between organs of state 
and the private sector that will advance the objectives of the NEEEF; (g) overseeing the 
implementation of the NEEEF; (h) ensuring that there is consistency in the implementation of the 
NEEEF; (i) providing direction to the executive resource over the life of the NEEEF; (j) taking 
decisions affecting the NEEEF and its implementation; (k) deciding on how funds for the 
Commission will be raised; (l) reporting on the state of transformation and empowerment in the 
economy; and (m) maintaining a database of transformation and empowerment in the economy 
and enablers and obstacles of implementing the NEEEF. 
139  NEEEF, under the heading Powers of the Commission.  These powers include: (a) conducting 
research or commissioning research to be conducted; (b) requesting information from organs of 
state or private bodies; (c) publishing reports of the NEEEF; (d) establishing sub-committees to 
deal with specific matters as and when required; (e) co-opting experts to serve on, or advise, sub-
committees; (f) establishing relations and seeking cooperation from the various sector charter 
councils; and (g) carrying out accredited functions. 
140  NEEEF, under the heading Summarised NEEEF Scorecard. 
141  NEEEF, under the heading Rational.  
142  NEEEF, under the heading Compliance, Enforcement and Penalties. 
143  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
144  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
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previously disadvantaged Namibians to establish new businesses.145  In addition to the 
above, Namibia’s foreign investment legislation must clarify the role that foreign 
investment will play in the economy and provide guidelines for foreign investors with 
the aim to enhance certainty and investor confidence.146 Previously disadvantaged 
Namibians must be given financial and other assistance through state-owned financial 
institutions to buy into existing Namibian businesses on commercial terms to be 
negotiated between buyers and sellers.147  Special assistance must be given to assisting 
women, youth and people with disabilities.148  New business growth financed by state-
owned financial institutions must prioritise the promotion of businesses owned by 
previously disadvantaged Namibians.149  Again, special emphasis must be given to 
assisting women, youth and people with disabilities.150  In sectors where previously 
disadvantaged Namibian individuals do not have the resources to participate in a 
meaningful way, the Namibian government may choose to participate as a 
transformation partner.151  This must, however, take place on commercial terms and 
must be clearly laid out in legislation.152  A business will score a minimum of ten points 
if it is 25% owned by previously disadvantaged Namibians.153  For every additional 
7½%  owned by previously disadvantaged Namibians, a business will score one 
additional point up to a maximum of 100%, giving a total of twenty points.154           
The NEEEF aims that the management structures and workforces of businesses in 
Namibia should more accurately reflect the demographics of the Namibian 
population.155  Legislation must be introduced within the NEEEF framework (but on a 
sector by sector basis) to require boards of directors and top management in certain 
categories of companies above a certain size to reflect fully Namibia’s demographic 
make-up.156  These requirements must take into account the shareholding structure of 
                                                          
145  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
146  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
147  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
148  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
149  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
150  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
151  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
152  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
153  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
154  NEEEF, under the heading (a) Ownership. 
155  NEEEF, under the heading (b) Management Control and Employment Equity. 
156  NEEEF, under the heading (b) Management Control and Employment Equity. 
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the company.157  A business will score a minimum of ten points if its combined board 
and top management structures are 50% filled by previously disadvantaged 
Namibians.158  For every additional 10%, a business will score two additional points up 
to a maximum of 100%, giving a total of 20%.159   
Practical training and skills development are key to empowerment and transformation 
in the business sector.160  Encouraging Namibian businesses to play a greater role in 
training and skills development is one of the most effective ways of promoting human 
capital formation in the country as a whole.161  The NEEEF envisages a training levy to 
be introduced by the National Training Authority.162  The levy will amount to 1.5%  of 
a company’s gross wage bill and will be payable by companies above a certain size.163  
A business will score a minimum of ten points for devoting the equivalent of 1.5% of 
its gross wages to training.164  For every additional 0.1% of gross wages spent on 
training, a business will score two additional points up to a maximum of 2% of gross 
wages, giving a total of twenty points.165   
The NEEEF aims at enhancing entrepreneurship among previously disadvantaged 
Namibians.166  Business opportunities created by existing Namibian businesses through 
their procurement programmes represent an important area for stimulating local 
entrepreneurship.167  A business will score points in proportion to the value of its 
procurement spending allocated to businesses owned by previously disadvantaged 
Namibians up to a maximum of 50%.168  Additional points may be made available for 
other support given by businesses to previously disadvantaged Namibians, including 
mentorship programmes, joint ventures and other initiatives.169      
                                                          
157  NEEEF, under the heading (b) Management Control and Employment Equity. 
158  NEEEF, under the heading (b) Management Control and Employment Equity. 
159  NEEEF, under the heading (b) Management Control and Employment Equity. 
160  NEEEF, under the heading (c) Human Resources and Skills Development. 
161  NEEEF, under the heading (c) Human Resources and Skills Development. 
162  NEEEF, under the heading (c) Human Resources and Skills Development. 
163  NEEEF, under the heading (c) Human Resources and Skills Development. 
164  NEEEF, under the heading (c) Human Resources and Skills Development. 
165  NEEEF, under the heading (c) Human Resources and Skills Development. 
166  NEEEF, under the heading (d) Entrepreneurship Development. 
167  NEEEF, under the heading (d) Entrepreneurship Development. 
168  NEEEF, under the heading (d) Entrepreneurship Development. 
169  NEEEF, under the heading (d) Entrepreneurship Development. 
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The NEEEF believes corporate social responsibility has become part and parcel of the 
modern business environment.170  Good corporate citizenship requires social investment 
in communities.171  This is particularly important for businesses that derive their income 
from communities or community resources.172  The NEEEF will require businesses 
above a certain size to devote at least 1% of after-tax profits to community 
investment.173  A business will score a minimum of ten points for devoting 1% of after-
tax profits to community investment.174  For every additional 0.2% spent on community 
investment, a business will score two additional points up to a maximum of 2% of 
after-tax profits, giving a total of twenty points.175 
The NEEEF, unlike the BEE Act, is a policy document.176  It is therefore not binding.  
Because it is not binding, there are no measures of ensuring accountability in respect of 
the NEEEF.  It is also applied inconsistently in practice, which does not promote 
transparency.  The NEEEF therefore does not operate in favour of the people of 
Namibia.  It needs to be legislated to promote socio-economic empowerment. 
4.  Specific Examples of Empowerment 
In the light of the previous discussion and the constitutional mandate for reform, both 
South Africa and Namibia have introduced measures aimed at employment equity 
(referred to in Namibia as affirmative action) and skills development in an attempt to 
provide previously disadvanted citizens equal employment opportunities.  South Africa 
furthermore specifically deals with community empowerment specifically within the 
minerals and petroleum industries, which Namibia has to date failed to do.     
4.1 Employment Equity and Skills Development 
In the light of the history of apartheid and the fact that many persons were excluded 
from certain offices or never had the opportunity to develop skills, the South African 
legislature promulgated legislation aimed at redressing these past wrongs.  The right to 
                                                          
170  NEEEF, under the heading (e) Community Investment. 
171  NEEEF, under the heading (e) Community Investment. 
172  NEEEF, under the heading (e) Community Investment. 
173  NEEEF, under the heading (e) Community Investment. 
174  NEEEF, under the heading (e) Community Investment. 
175  NEEEF, under the heading (e) Community Investment. 
176  Stritter (note 124) at 204. 
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equality guaranteed by the South African Constitution is repeated (albeit in other 
words) in the Employment Equity Act (“EEA”).177  The EEA obliges every employer to 
take steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by eliminating unfair 
discrimination in any employment policy or practice.178  It also expressly prohibits 
unfair discrimination, either directly or indirectly, on a number of grounds.  These 
grounds are: race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic 
or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, 
conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and birth.179 
Prohibiting unfair discrimination is the EEA’s first approach towards achieving 
employment equity.180  Therefore, in terms of the Constitution and the EEA, no 
employer may discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment on any 
of the listed grounds.  The other, “inherently more controversial”181 approach is to 
compel designated employers to give preference to categories of persons previously 
discriminated against, through affirmative action measures.182  The EEA expressly 
states that affirmative action measures taken in accordance with the Act does not 
amount to unfair discrimination.   
On the one hand, therefore, the EEA prohibits unfair discrimination.  On the other 
hand, it seeks to encourage employment of those who were previously discriminated 
against.  Through these two approaches, the EEA effectively dismantles an earlier 
system of social engineering and replaces it with a new system.183   
                                                          
177  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998.   
178  Section 5 of the EEA.   
179  Section 6(1) of the EEA.   
180  See Grogan J Dismissal, Discrimination and Unfair Labour Practices 2ed 2007 Wetton Juta & Co 
Ltd at 163.   
181  Grogan (note 97) at 163. 
182  Chapter III of the EEA; Grogan (note 98) at 163.  According to section 12, the affirmative action 
measures apply only to designated employees.  A “designated employer”, in terms of section 1 of 
the EEA, means “(a) an employer who employs 50 or more employees; (b) an employer who 
employs fewer that (sic) 50 employees, but has a total annual turnover that is equal to or above the 
applicable annual turnover of a small business in terms of Schedule 4 to this Act; (c) a 
municipality, as referred to in Chapter 7 of the Constitution; (d) an organ of state as defined in 
section 239 of the Constitution, but excluding local spheres of government, the National Defence 
Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service; and (e) an 
employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of section 23 or 31 of the Labour Relations 
Act, which appoint it as a designated employer in terms of this act, to the extent provided for in 
the agreement.”     
183  Grogan (note 97) at 163. 
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Aside from promoting equality and encouraging employment of persons previously 
discriminated against, South Africa also encourages skills development as well.  To this 
effect, the Skills Development Act184  was promulgated to provide an institutional 
framework to devise and implement national, sector and workplace strategies to 
develop and improve the skills of the South African workforce.185  The purposes of this 
Act are couched in very wide terms, but is ultimately aimed at skills development.  The 
purposes of the Skills Development Act are to be achieved through an institutional and 
financial framework,186 encouraging partnership between the public and private sectors 
of the economy to provide learning in and for the workplace187 and co-operating with 
the South African Qualifications Authority.188   
The Skills Development Act is accompanied by the Skills Development Levies Act.189  
In terms of this Act, every employer must, as from 01 April 2001, pay a skills 
development levy at a rate of 1% of the leviable amount.190  The leviable amount means 
the total amount of remuneration, paid or payable, or deemed to be paid or payable, by 
an employer to its employees during any month,191 subject to certain exclusions.192  This 
                                                          
184  Skills Development Act 97 of 1998. 
185  See the Preamble to the Skills Development Act.  It includes developing the skills of the South 
African workforce: (a) to improve the quality of life of workers, their prospects of work and 
labour mobility; (b) to improve productivity in the workplace and the competitiveness of 
employers; (c) to promote self-employment; and (d) to improve delivery of social services.  It also 
includes increasing the levels of investment in education and training in the labour market and 
improving the return on that investments.  Furthermore, the purpose of the Act is to encourage 
employers to use the workplace as an active learning environment, providing employers with the 
opportunities to acquire new skills, providing opportunities for new entrants to the labour market 
to gain work experience and employing persons who find it difficult who find it difficult to be 
employed.  The purpose of the Act also includes encouraging workers to participate in learning 
programmes, improving the employment prospects of persons previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination and to redress those disadvantages through training and education  end ensuring 
the quality of learning in and for the workplace.  Finally, its purpose is to assist work-seekers to 
find work, retrenched workers to re-enter the labour market, employers to find qualified 
employees and providing and regulating employment services. 
186  Section 2(2)(a) of the Skills Development Act.  The institutional and financial framework 
comprises: (a) the National Skills Authority; (b) the National Skills Fund; (c) a skills development 
levy-financing scheme as contemplated in the Skills Development Levies Act; (d) sector 
education and training authorities; provincial offices of the Department of Labour; (e) labour 
centres of the Department of Labour; (f) accredited trade test centres; (g) skills development 
institutes; (h) the Quality Council for Trades and Occupations; (i) a skills development forum for 
each province; (j) a national artisan moderation body; and (k) Productivity South Africa. 
187  Section 2(2)(b) of the Skills Development Act. 
188  Section 2(2)(c) of the Skills Development Act. 
189  Skills Development Levies Act 9 of 1999. 
190  Section 3(1)(b) of the Skills Development Levies Act. 
191  Section 3(4) of the Skills Development Levies Act. 
192  Section 3(5) of the Skills Development Levies Act. 
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levy is payable by all employers as contemplated in the Fourth Schedule to the Income 
Tax Act,193 but excludes certain employers.194   
The EEA applies to all employees, excluding independent contractors.195  As such, any 
petroleum company which employs persons are bound by the EEA.  Furthermore, any 
petroleum company (to which the exclusions discussed above do not apply) will also be 
liable to pay the skills development levy as contemplated by the Skills Development 
Levies Act.  In this way, petroleum companies contribute towards the socio-economic 
development of South Africa, thus ensuring that the people of South Africa also benefit 
from their operations.   
To address and rectify discriminatory policies and practices in Namibia, the 
Affirmative Action (Employment) Act196 (“AAA”) was promulgated.  The AAA 
outlines measures that relevant employers are required to adhere to to ensure that 
persons in designated groups enjoy equal opportunities and are fairly represented in the 
various positions of employment.  The designated groups include racially 
disadvantaged persons, women and person with disabilities.  In filling positions of 
employment a relevant employer must give preferential treatment to suitably qualified 
persons of designated groups.197  The AAA only applies to “relevant employers”.  In 
terms of the AAA, relevant employers must submit affirmative action reports to the 
Commission.198  A relevant employer is an employer who employs at least 25 
persons.199   
                                                          
193  See section 1 of the Skills Development Levies Act, sv “employer”. 
194  It excludes any public employer in the national or provincial sphere of government, any public 
benefit organisation, any national or provincial public entity if 80% or more of its expenditure is 
defrayed directly or indirectly from funds voted by Parliament and any municipality in respect of 
which a certificate of exemption has been granted on such conditions and for such period as the 
Minister of Higher Education and Training may prescribe by regulation, acting in consultation 
with the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Provincial and Local Government.  It also 
excludes employers in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds for believing that the total 
amount of remuneration paid or payable by that employer to all its employees during the 
following twelve month period will not exceed R500,000.00.  See section 4 of the Skills 
Development Levies Act. 
195  Section 1 of the EEA, sv “employee”.   
196  Affirmative Action (Employment) Act 29 of 1998, hereinafter referred to as “the AAA” 
197  Section 19(1) of the AAA. 
198  Section 27 of the AAA. 
199  GN 95 in Government Gazette 3658 of 01 July 2006. 
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Where two or more suitably qualified candidates from designated groups qualify for a 
position of employment, the employer must give priority to a candidate who is a 
Namibian citizen, or, if all such candidates are Namibian citizens, to the candidate who 
belongs to more than one designated group.200  A relevant employer must train a 
Namibian citizen as the understudy of every non-Namibian citizen employed by him.201 
On 2 June 2008, the Vocational Education and Training Act 1 of 2008 came into 
operation.202  The purpose of this Act is to establish the Namibian Training Authority, 
the board of the Namibia Training Authority and the National Training Fund.  The 
purpose is furthermore to regulate the provision of vocational education and training 
and to provide for the funding of vocational education and training.  It also provides for 
the position of vocational education and training levies.203 
“Vocational education and training” means education and training which provides 
learners with occupational or work related knowledge and skills.  In terms of Section 35 
of the Act the Minister of Education may impose a levy to be paid by employers in 
general or specific categories of employers for the purpose of facilitating and 
encouraging vocational education and training.  Before imposing such a levy the 
Minister must by notice in the Government Gazette inform affected employers of such 
intention by specifying the details of the proposed imposition, the reasons for the 
proposed imposition and the proposed date or dates of commencement of the proposed 
imposition of levies.  The Minister must also invite affected employers to make 
representations to the Minister within 30 days of publication of the notice.  
On 11 April 2013 the Minister of Education published a notice in the Government 
Gazette informing employers of the intention to impose a vocational education and 
training levy.204  This levy is intended to be payable by every employer with an annual 
payroll of N$350 000.00 or more.205  The intended levy will therefore be binding on all 
employers in Namibia who have an annual payroll in excess of N$350 000.00.  The rate 
                                                          
200  Section 19(2) of the AAA. 
201  Section 19(3) of the AAA. 
202  Vocational Education and Traning Act 1 of 2008. 
203  See the Preamble to the Vocational Education and Traning Act. 
204  GN84 in Government Gazette 5171 of 11 April 2013.   
205  Section 3 of GN 84 in Government Gazette 5171 of 11 April 2013. 
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of the proposed levy is 1.5% of the annual payroll of the employer concerned.206  The 
reason for the proposed imposition of the levy is to utilise the funds to provide financial 
and technical assistance to employers, vocational education and training providers, 
employees, learners and other persons or bodies, to promote vocation education and 
training and to fund education, training programmes and projects.207  The date of 
commencement of imposition of the levy is 1st September 2013 and levies are payable 
on or before the 20th day of the following month and every other month.208 
The affirmative action and skills development measures are legislated and therefore 
transparent.  The AAA and the Vocational Training and Education Act are clear on 
what is to be expected of employers and what the consequences of non-compliance are, 
thus is promotes accountability as well.  Furthermore, they contain clear, direct ways of 
ensuring that the people of Namibia are benefitted by obliging employers to use local 
employees and to contribute towards skills development.  
4.2 Community Empowerment 
Many countries have to deal with claims by indigenous communities for mineral or 
petroleum resources and for greater involvement in the exploitation of these 
resources.209  Given Namibia and South Africa’s history of colonialism and apartheid, 
this issue should be treated as particularly relevant.  Despite this, the Namibian 
Petroleum Act does not contain any special treatment in respect of communities, as is 
the case with its South African counterpart.  Furthermore, there has been no noticeable 
discussion or examination in Namibia of the rights of communities in respect of mineral 
or petroleum resources.210  In South Africa, however, the rigths of communities in 
respect of mineral and petroleum resources has received some prominent discussions – 
also in the Constitutional Court – and the legislative framework for petroleum 
recognises the rights of communities. 
                                                          
206  Section 5 of GN 84 in Government Gazette 5171 of 11 April 2013. 
207  Section 6 of the GN 84 in Government Gazette 5171 of 11 April 2013. 
208  Section 7 of GN 84 in Government Gazette 5171 of 11 April 2013. 
209
  Barma NH, Kaiser K, Le TM and Viñuela L Rents to Riches?  The Political Economy of Natural 
Resource-led Development (2012) Washington The World Bank at 87. 
210  Whether communities have any claim in respect of petroleum resources in terms of international 
law is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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The well-known trilogy of cases concerning the Richterveld-community211 illustrates 
how claims by indigenous people in respect of their land and mineral wealth have been 
disregarded by colonial powers.212  The Richterveld is a large stretch of land in the 
north-western part of the Northern Cape Province.213  This area has been inhabited by 
the Richterveld Community for centuries.214  A part of the Richterveld along the Gariep 
(Orange) River, registered in the name of Alexkor (Pty) Ltd, formed the subject of the 
claim.215  The Community’s claim was based on the Restitution of Land Rights Act.216  
The Constitutional Court found that the Richterveld Community had communal 
ownership of the land in question under indigenous law.217  The right of the Community 
includes the right to exploit natural resources.218  The annexation by the British Crown 
in 1847 did not change the rights that the community held over the land219 and as at 19 
June 1913, the indigenous law ownership of the Richterveld Community in respect of 
the land in question remained unchanged.220  Nevertheless, the Precious Stones Act221 
promulgated in 1927 did not recognise the rights of those who were owners of land 
under indigenous law as their rights were not registered and therefore treated as 
unalienated Crown land..222  The effect this the seemingly neutral Precious Stones Act 
rendered the occupation of the land by the Community unlawful and subsequently 
dispossessed it of the rights it had as indigenous owner.223  The Court therefore held 
that the Richtersveldt Community was entitled to restitution of its land.224  The 
Richtersveld claim “demonstrates that discrimination was so ingrained in the fabric of 
                                                          
211  Richtersveld Community v Alexkor (Pty) Ltd 2001 (3) SA 1293 (LCC); Richtersveld Community v 
Alexkor (Pty) Ltd 2003 (6) SA 104 (SCA); Alexkor (Pty) Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 (5) 
SA 460 (CC).   
212  Mostert H Mineral Law: Principles and Policies in Perspective (2012) Cape Town Juta and Co. 
Ltd. at 32. 
213  Alexkor / Richtersveld (note 211) at [4]. 
214  Alexkor / Richtersveld (note 211) at [4]. 
215  Alexkor / Richtersveld (note 211) at [5]. 
216  Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994.  In terms of section 2(1) of this Act, a person shall be 
entitled to restitution of a right in land if it is a community or part of a community dispossessed of 
a right in land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices and 
the claim for restitution is lodged no later than 31 December 1998.   
217  Alexkor / Richtersveld (note 211) at [62] and [64]. 
218  Alexkor / Richtersveld (note 211) at [62] and [64]. 
219  Alexkor / Richtersveld (note 211) at [65]. 
220  Alexkor / Richtersveld (note 211) at [81]. 
221  Precious Stones Act 44 of 1927. 
222  Alexkor / Richtersveld (note 211) at [89]. 
223  Alexkor / Richtersveld (note 211) at [90]. 
224  Alexkor / Richtersveld (note 211) at [102]. 
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South African society that even laws that on the face of it may have been racially 
neutral could have had a discriminatory result.”225 
The MPRD Act acknowledges the right of communities in respect of minerals and 
petroleum.226  It provides specific measures in respect of communities by granting 
communities a preferent right to explore for and produce petroleum on land registered 
or to be registered in the name of the community.227  The preferent right (regardless of 
whether it is an exploration or production right) is valid for a maximum period of five 
years, but may be renewed further periods of five years each.228  It is subject to 
prescribed terms and conditions.229  It is not possible to obtain a preferent 
reconnaissance permit.   
Any community who wishes to obtain a preferent exploration or production right must 
lodge an application for an exploration or production right with the Minister.230  The 
Minister must grant the application if all the requirements have been met.231  Most of 
the general requirements for applications for exploration and production rigths must be 
met.232  However, to accommodate communities, when applying for a production right 
two of the communities need not be met.233  The first is that it is not necessary for the 
community to provide financially or otherwise for the prescribed social and labour 
plan.234  Secondly it is also not necessary for the application to show that granting 
thereof will promote the socio-economic objectives of the MPRD Act.235   
                                                          
225  Mostert (note 211) at 33. 
226  See for example the preamble, where it is stated that the MPRD Act recognises “the need to 
promote local and rural development and the social upliftment of communities affected by 
mining”. 
227  Section 1 of the MPRD Act defines a community as “a group of historically disadvantaged 
persons with interest or rights in a particular area of land on which the members have or exercise 
communal rights in terms of an agreement, custom or law: Provided that, where as a consequence 
of the provisions of this act, negotiations or consultations with the community is required, the 
community shall include the members or part of the community directly affect by mining on land 
occupied by such members or part of the community.” 
228  Section 104(3)(a) of the MPRD Act.   
229  Section 104(3)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
230  Section 104(1) of the MPRD Act.   
231  Section 104(2) of the MPRD Act.   
232  See Chapter Five above.   
233  Section 104(2)(e) of the MPRD Act.   
234  Section 104(2)(e) read with section 23(1)(e) of the MPRD Act.   
235  Section 104(2)(e) read with section 23(1)(h) of the MPRD Act. 
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Notwithstanding the accommodation made by the Minister, three additional 
requirements have to be met.  The first requirement is that the right must be used to 
contribute towards the development and the social upliftment of the community.236  The 
second requirement is that the community must submit a development plan, indicating 
the manner in which the right is going to be exercised.237  The third requirement is that 
the envisaged benefits of the exploration or production project will accrue to the 
community in question.238   
The preferent right may not be granted if another right under the MPRD Act has 
already been granted over the area.239  In Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others 
v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others240 the Constitutional Court held that it 
appears that the MPRD Act creates a special category of rights for communities.241  It 
held that an application for a prospecting right might have the effect of disentitling a 
community of its preferent right, thus materially and adversely affecting the right of the 
community.242  As a result, before a prospecting right (or mining right, exploration right 
or production right) is granted over an area registered or to be registered in the name of 
the community, the community must be given an opportunity to make representations 
or, in appropriate cases, to make an application for the relevant right.243   
5. Transformation and Empowerment of the Petroleum 
Industry 
The MPRD Act states that the South African Minister of Mineral Resources must, 
within five years from the date on which the MPRD Act comes into force, develop a 
code of good practice for the minerals industry in the Republic and, after consultation 
with the Minister for Housing, develop a housing and living conditions standard for the 
                                                          
236  Section 104(2)(a) of the MPRD Act.  
237  Section 104(2)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
238  Section 104(2)(c) of the MPRD Act.   
239  Section 104(4) of the MPRD Act.   
240  Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (4) 
SA 113 (CC). 
241  Bengwenyama / Genorah (note 240) at [73]. 
242  Bengwenyama / Genorah (note 240) at [73]. 
243  Bengwenyama / Genorah (note 240) at [73]. 
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minerals industry.244  In line with this, the Minister developed a housing and living 
condition standard and code of good practice for the minerals industry.245   
The obligation on the Minister to develop a housing and living condition standard and 
code of good practice applies to the petroleum industry as well.246  Despite this, 
however, no separate standard and code has been developed for the petroleum 
industry.247  Furthermore, the existing housing and living conditions standard for the 
minerals industry and mining code of good practice are silent as to whether they apply 
to the petroleum industry as well.248  The leading commentaries on mineral and 
petroleum law in South Africa, while acknowledging that the Minister is obliged to 
develop a housing and living conditions standard and code of good practice for the 
petroleum industry as well, is silent as whether the existing documents in respect of the 
minerals industry apply to the petroleum industry as well.249  For purposes of this thesis, 
it will be assumed that these documents apply only to the minerals industry.250   
Notwithstanding the fact that the housing and living conditions standard and the code of 
good practice only apply to the minerals industry, a Charter for the South African 
Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Industry on Empowering Historically Disadvantaged 
South Africans in the Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Industry (“Petroleum Charter”) was 
signed prior to the enactment of the MPRD Act.251  It was reproduced as Schedule 1 to 
the Petroleum Products Amendment Act,252 which gives “teeth to the Charter”.253  
Government's regulatory framework and industry agreements must strive to facilitate 
the objectives of the Petroleum Charter.254   
The Petroleum Charter was developed to provide a framework for promoting the 
empowerment of historically disadvantaged South Africans (“HDSA”) in the liquid 
                                                          
244  Section 100(1) of the MPRD Act.   
245  Badenhorst and Mostert (note 3) at 23-10. 
246  Section 69(2) of the MPRD Act.   
247  Badenhorst and Mostert (note 3) at 23-10. 
248  Badenhorst and Mostert (note 3) at 23-10. 
249  Badenhorst  and Mostert (note 3) at 23-10; Dale et al (note 2) at MPRDA-590. 
250  This is supported by the fact that these documents themselves only refer to the minerals industry.   
251  See Badenhorst P, Mostert H and Dendy M "Minerals and Petroleum" in WA Joubert (ed) The 
Law of South Africa Vol 18, 2 ed (2007) Durban, LexisNexis Butterworths at 136; Badenhorst  
and Mostert (note 3) at 23-38.   
252  Petroleum Products Amendment Act 58 of 2003.  See Badenhorst  and Mostert (note 3) at 23-38. 
253  Benjamin, Raditapole and Taylor (note 4) at 1-12. 
254  Petroleum Charter under the heading Regulatory Framework and Industry Agreements. 
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fuels industry.  HDSA is defined in the Petroleum Charter as “all persons and groups 
who have been discriminated against on the basis of race, gender and/or disability”.255  
Despite the fact that the Petroleum Charter was reproduced in an act dealing with the 
downstream petroleum industry, it applies to the privately owned parts of the industry 
and to all parts of the value chain, including the upstream (exploration and production) 
petroleum industry as well.256     
The success of the Petroleum Charter depends on the disposition of those who have 
responsibility for managing the process.257  In terms of the Petroleum Charter, member 
companies and Government undertake to appoint to such positions managers who will 
understand the spirit and background under which the policies of the Petroleum Charter 
were conceived to create a supportive and enabling environment for business success.258  
Member companies undertake to foster a supportive culture with regard to all aspects of 
the Petroleum Charter when dealing with HDSAs.259  Companies further subscribe to 
incorporating and driving a process of transformation and a change of culture in their 
statements of business principles.260 The Petroleum Charter acknowledges that the 
South African labour market does not produce enough of the skills required by the 
petroleum industry, especially the HDSA oil companies.261  Organized industry and 
government must work together in addressing this skills gap.  In its bilateral relations 
with relevant countries, the South African Government endeavours to secure training 
opportunities for HDSA companies' staff, as well as exchange opportunities with oil 
companies operating outside of South Africa.262  The petroleum industry furthermore 
undertakes to build the skills of its employees and report on progress annually in an 
agreed format.263  The industry, through the standing consultative arrangements, 
                                                          
255  See the Petroleum Charter under the heading Interpretation. 
256  See the Petroleum Charter under the heading Scope of Application; Badenhorst  and Mostert (note 
3) at 23-39.  
257  Petroleum Charter under the heading Supportive Culture. 
258  Petroleum Charter under the heading Supportive Culture. 
259  Petroleum Charter under the heading Supportive Culture. 
260  Petroleum Charter under the heading Supportive Culture. 
261  Petroleum Charter under the heading Capacity Building. 
262  Petroleum Charter under the heading Capacity Building. 
263  Petroleum Charter under the heading Capacity Building. 
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interfaces with statutory bodies (such as sectoral education and training authority) in 
the development of skills development strategies.264   
The Petroleum Charter also deals with employment equity.  In terms of the Petroleum 
Charter, companies publish their employment equity targets and achievements and 
subscribe to the following: (a) South African subsidiaries of multinational companies 
and South African companies focus their overseas placement and/or training 
programmes on HDSAs; (b) identifying a talent pool and fast-tracking it; (c) ensuring 
inclusiveness of gender; (d) implementing mentorship programmes; and (e) setting and 
publishing "stretch" (i.e. demanding) targets and their achievement.265   
Similar to the BBE Act, the Petroleum Charter promotes procurement.  Participants in 
the petroleum industry subscribe to and adopt supportive procurement policies to 
facilitate and leverage the growth of HDSA companies.266  These policies include 
criteria that favour procurement companies.267  The scope of procurement must include 
supplies, products and all other goods and services.268  HDSA companies are accorded 
preferred supplier status as far as possible.269  Government will engage with State 
Tender authorities to draw their attention to the Energy Policy White Paper milestones 
with respect to economic empowerment of HDSAs, with the aim of giving effect to 
supportive procurement policies within this sector.270      
The Petroleum Charter attempts to reform the petroleum industry in respect of access to 
and ownership of joint facilities.271  Access to large infrastructure for the movement and 
storage of crude oil and petroleum products is acknowledged as a critical weakness.272  
In this regard owners of such facilities must provide third parties with non-
discriminatory access to uncommitted capacity.  HDSA companies are to be given fair 
                                                          
264  Petroleum Charter under the heading Capacity Building. 
265  Petroleum Charter under the heading Capacity Building. 
266  Petroleum Charter under the heading Private Sector Procurement. 
267  Petroleum Charter under the heading Private Sector Procurement. 
268  Petroleum Charter under the heading Private Sector Procurement. 
269  Petroleum Charter under the heading Private Sector Procurement. 
270  Petroleum Charter under the heading Private Sector Procurement. 
271  Petroleum Charter under the heading Access and Ownership of Joint Facilities. 
272  Petroleum Charter under the heading Access and Ownership of Joint Facilities. 
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opportunity to acquire ownership in such facilities.273  Access to refining capacity also 
represents a key weakness in HDSA companies' supply chain.274   
In respect of the upstream petroleum industry, the activity of oil and gas exploration 
and production is acknowledged as a high-risk activity that provides limited 
opportunities for new entrants.275 Government must continue to make licences subject 
to the following conditions: (a) all rights for exploration and production in the country's 
offshore area reserve must make at least 9% available for buy-in;276 and (b) all right 
holders must contribute funds toward the "Upstream Training Trust" to fund skills 
development at various levels and as discoveries are made, further skills development 
strategies must be devised to empower HDSAs in this sector.277  While these provisions 
ensure that the interests of the people of South Africa are protected, they may operate to 
dissuade investors, who may not be willing to make a percentage of their petroleum 
rights available for buy-in.      
Finance is also a serious constraint for HDSA companies in terms of the Petroleum 
Charter.278  In the light of this, the South African government must assist industry in 
explaining the milestones in the White Paper on Energy Policy as well as explaining the 
needs and characteristics of the industry to financing institutions, both private and 
public.279  Companies must investigate and implement internal and external financing 
mechanisms for giving HDSA companies access to equity ownership within the South 
African context.280  Companies must also consider engaging HDSA companies in viable 
strategic partnerships.281  Industry participants also acknowledge that terms of credit are 
important to HDSA companies and agree to take this into account in bilateral 
activities.282 
                                                          
273  Petroleum Charter under the heading Access and Ownership of Joint Facilities. 
274  Petroleum Charter under the heading Access and Ownership of Joint Facilities. 
275  Petroleum Charter under the heading Upstream. 
276  Petroleum Charter under the heading Upstream. 
277  Petroleum Charter under the heading Upstream. 
278  Petroleum Charter under the heading Financing. 
279  Petroleum Charter under the heading Financing. 
280  Petroleum Charter under the heading Financing. 
281  Petroleum Charter under the heading Financing. 
282  Petroleum Charter under the heading Financing. 
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It is recognized in the Petroleum Charter that the achievement of the objectives set out 
in the Petroleum Charter entails an ongoing process.283  The Department of Minerals 
Resources must conduct an annual survey of the industry to evaluate progress in 
achieving the objectives of the Energy Policy White Paper.284  Companies must submit 
such data as is required at the end of each year, including employment equity data and 
procurement targets.285  The aggregated information must be published and forms the 
basis of the annual forum.286       
The Petroleum Charter is therefore very clear on how empowerment in the petroleum 
industry is to be achieved, which operates in favour of the people of South Africa.  The 
openness of the Charter furthermore provides transparency not only for the actors 
within the upstream petroleum industry, but also for the general public.  The Petroleum 
Charter is unique in a sense in that it is incorporated as a schedule to an existing Act, 
which gives it more force than other charters.287   
The Petroleum Charter envisages that, within ten years after the date of the Charter (ie 
by 2010), at least 25% ownership and control of all facets of the petroleum industry 
must be transferred to HDSAs.288  The due date has passed, and the achievement of the 
objectives has been mixed – it is clear that the primary objective of 25% ownership and 
control has not been met.289  A comprehensive audit carried out by the Department of 
Energy has found that only 50% of companies to which the Petroleum Charter is 
applicable has met the 25% obligation.290  Compliance with management control was 
good, but companies were not all fully compliant.  The average compliance with 
supportive culture was rated “medium”, while company performance in capacity 
building was high in some indicators, but there was low performance in identifying a 
talent pool and fast tracking, implementing mentoring programs and overseas 
                                                          
283  Petroleum Charter under the heading Consultation, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting. 
284  Petroleum Charter under the heading Consultation, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting. 
285  Petroleum Charter under the heading Consultation, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting. 
286  Petroleum Charter under the heading Consultation, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting. 
287  Benjamin, Raditapole and Taylor (note 4) at 1-12. 
288  Petroleum Charter under the heading Interpretation. 
289  Dale et al (note 2) at RFLS-7. 
290  Department of Energy Petroleum and Liquid Fuels Charter Final Audit Report (2011) at 104, 
available at http://www.energy.gov.za/files/media/Pub/PetroleumAndLiquidFuelsCharter_ 
AuditReport.pdf [accessed 21.02.2015].   
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placement programs.291  The companies measured generally scored low on the 
employment equity element and only two made palpable strides in crude 
procurement.292  Companies have performed well in terms of providing finance to 
HDSA’s for ownership deals and the majority of companies are also doing well in 
terms of offering HDSA customers terms of credit.293 
Despite the above, it should be noted that the Petroleum Charter is merely a statement 
of intent and does not create binding obligations.294  However, after the Petroleum 
Charter was published, the BEE Act was promulgated which does contain binding 
provisions.  These obligations apply to petroleum companies as well and is discussed 
above in detail.     
Aside from the Petroleum Charter, there are various provisions within the MPRD Act 
which deals specifically with transformation and empowerment in the petroleum 
industry.  To this effect, the preamble to the MPRD Act reaffirms the state’s 
commitment to reform to bring about equitable access to the country’s mineral and 
petroleum resources.  It further expresses its commitment to eradicating all forms of 
discriminatory practices in the mineral and petroleum industries and takes into 
consideration the state’s obligation under the South African Constitution to take 
legislative and other measures to redress the results of past racial discrimination.295   
The statements made in the preamble to the MPRD Act are reiterated in section 2, 
which sets out the objects of the Act.  The objects, however, are stated in more detail, 
especially insofar as they relate to socio-economic empowerment.  First, the MPRD Act 
seeks to promote equitable access to the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources to all 
the people of South Africa.296  This object of the MPRD Act is intended to give effect 
to Parliament’s constitutional obligation to provide redress through legislative means 
for the discrimination which took place in the mining industry in the past.297  Secondly, 
the objects of the MPRD Act include substantially and meaningfully expanding 
                                                          
291  Department of Energy (note 290) at 104. 
292  Department of Energy (note 290) at 104. 
293  Department of Energy (note 290) at 104. 
294  Dale et al (note 2) at RFLS-7. 
295  Preamble to the MPRD Act.   
296  Section 2(c) of the MPRD Act.   
297  Dale et al (note 2) at MPRDA-117. 
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opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons, including women and 
communities, to enter into and actively participate in the mineral and petroleum 
industries and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation's mineral and petroleum 
resources.298  Thirdly, the objects include promoting employment and advance the 
social and economic welfare of all South Africans.299  These two objects are of 
particular importance, especially in view of the fact that the objects must be kept in 
mind when interpreting the provisions of the MPRD Act.300  A number of other 
provisions – dealing with applications for and granting of rights to petroleum –refer 
back specifically to these objects.301  Finally, the objects of the MPRD Act include 
ensuring that holders of mining and production rights contribute towards the socio-
economic development of the areas in which they are operating.302   
In the light of the preamble and the socio-economic objectives set out in section 2, the 
MPRD Act itself contains various empowerment provisions.  So, for example, under 
the MPRD Act applications for exploration and production rights received by the 
designated agency on the same day must be treated as received at the same time, but the 
Minister must give preference to applications by historically disadvantaged persons.303     
When considering an application for an exploration right, the Minister must grant the 
application inter alia if granting the licence will promote employment and advance the 
social and economic welfare of all South Africans304 and will substantially and 
meaningfully expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons (including 
women) to enter the petroleum industry and to benefit from the exploitation of the 
nation’s petroleum resources.305  The same applies when the Minister considers an 
application for a production licence,306 with the added requirement that the granting of 
                                                          
298  Section 2(d) of the MPRD Act.   
299  Section 2(f) of the MPRD Act.   
300  See section 4(1) of the MPRD Act.  See also Dale et al (note 2) at MPRDA-118. 
301  This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five above.   
302  Section 2(i) of the MPRD Act.   
303  Section 69(2) read with section 9(1)(a) and section 9(2) of the MPRD Act.  Applications received 
on different dates must be treated in the order in which they are received.  See also Badenhorst 
and Mostert (note 49) at 23-42. 
304  Section 80(1)(g) read with section 2(f) of the MPRD Act.   
305  Section 80(1)(g) read with section 2(d) of the MPRD Act.   
306  Section 84(1)(i) read with section 2(d) and section 2(f) of the MPRD Act.    
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the production licence must be in accordance with the Petroleum Charter and the 
prescribed social and labour plan.307   
Namibia does not have a specific policy document dealing with the transformation of 
the petroleum industry.  However, as with the South African legislation dealing with 
the upstream petroleum industry, the Namibian upstream petroleum industry contains 
various measures aimed at socio-economic reform.  So, for example, it is a standard 
term of every exploration and production licence that the licence holder will, in the 
employment of employees, give preference to Namibian citizens who possess 
appropriate qualifications for purposes of the operations to be carried out in terms of 
such licence.308  Holders must also carry out training programmes to encourage and 
promote the development of such citizens in such person's employment.309  For this 
purpose, the Minister may enter into agreements with licence holders providing for the 
implementation of training programmes referred to in that paragraph and the 
contribution of moneys to the trust known as the Petroleum Training and Education 
Fund, for promoting the objects of that trust.310   
After due regard being had to the need to ensure technical and economic efficiency, 
holders must make use of products, equipment and services which are available in 
Namibia.311  Finally, it is a standard term that a holder co-operate with other persons 
involved in the petroleum industry to enable such citizens to develop skills and 
technology to render services in the interest of such industry in Namibia.312   
The Petroleum Act therefore contains further measures of ensuring a benefit or the 
Namibian people.  Because these measures are made conditions of licences, they 
provide for accountability as the Namibian state is obliged to ensure that the conditions 
are met, failing which the licence may be cancelled.  The Act is also clear on what 
exactly the conditions in respect of socio-economic empowerment are, unlike the 
NEEEF.  It therefore provides greater transparency.   
                                                          
307  Section 84(1)(g) of the MPRD Act.   
308  Section 14(1)(a) of the Petroleum Act. 
309  Section 14(1)(b) of the Petroleum Act. 
310  Section 14(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
311  Section 14(1)(c) of the Petroleum Act. 
312  Section 14(1)(d) of the Petroleum Act.   
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6. Comparative Assessment and Concluding Remarks 
In terms of the Namibian and South African Constitutions, the state is obliged to put 
measures in place to ensure that past discriminatory practices are abolished and 
replaced with a new, equitable system that redresses past wrongs.  This is done through 
various provisions in the regulatory framework for petroleum, additional legislation and 
policy documents dealing with empowerment and legislation dealing with affirmative 
action, employment equity and skills development.   
South Africa has implemented various measures to promote socio-economic 
empowerment in the country as a whole, as well as in the petroleum industry.  
Framework legislation has been passed to deal with black economic empowerment, 
which is applicable to the petroleum companies as well.  The BEE Act and the 
accompanying Code and Scorecard obliges companies, including petroleum companies, 
to pursue certain socio-economic goals.  These instruments must be taken into account 
by the Minister of Mineral Resources when she grants rights to petroleum.  The 
Petroleum Charters adds on to these empowerment measures and contains certain 
directs ways of empowerment, including buy-ins.  The MPRD Act itself also contains 
various measures aimed at empowerment.  Finally, South African legislation deals with 
employment equity and skills development.  The EEA on the one hand prohibits 
discrimination in the labour context and the other hand promotes affirmative action.  
The Skills Development Act furthermore obliges employees to contribute towards skills 
development in South Africa.  
BEE in South Africa has, however, been faced with problems right from the start.  The 
empowerment programme appeared to benefit only a small number of former ANC 
activists.313  The cronyism and corruption that accompanied BEE has lead Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu to condemn BEE, claiming it only benefits a small “recycled elite”.314  
The criticism for BEE has led to attempts to promote more “broad-based” BEE, which 
is contained in the current framework.315  Despite this, BEE remains subject to 
                                                          
313  Schneiderman D “Promoting Equality, Black Economic Empowerment, and the Future of 
Investment Rules” (2009) SAJHR 246 at 252.   
314  Schneiderman (note 313) at 253. 
315  Schneiderman (note 313) at 253. 
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criticism, with some claiming that it is used to enrich already prominent and empower 
black people who are politically well-connected.316   
Namibia has not achieved the same as South Africa when it comes to socio-economic 
empowerment.  As with South Africa, Namibia prohibits unfair discrimination in the 
labour context and promotes affirmative action and skills development.  However, 
Namibia does not have the framework legislation that South Africa has in respect of 
BEE.  This may result in positive discrimination associated with BEE principles being 
applied on an ad hoc and arbitrary basis.317  The NEEEF is the second policy document 
to set out Namibia’s policy in respect of BEE, but to date no further steps have been 
taken towards legislating NEEEF.  To ensure transparency and accountability, it needs 
to be legislated.  Finally, as with South Africa, however, Namibia’s Petroleum Act 
contains various measures aimed at empowerment and binding on petroleum licence 
holders.   
Both countries attempt to establish a proper framework for socio-economic 
development, which is applicable to petroleum companies as well.  This is not only 
necessary to ensure that the people of South Africa and Namibia benefit from the 
petroleum resources in these countries through the activities of petroleum companies, 
but it is also necessary for transparency and accountability to have a proper framework 
for socio-economic development.  The danger is, however, that imposing socio-
economic obligation throughout various statutes and policy documents creates 
uncertainty and makes it difficult to impose.  The legislature and the executive must be 
careful in not over-regulating socio-economic development, thereby discouraging 
investors.    
   
                                                          
316  Sibanyoni M “BEE Cake Only for Elite Few – Banker” Sowetan Live 25 October 2014, available 
at http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/business/2014/10/25/bee-cake-only-for-elite-few---banker 
[accessed 21.02.2015]; Collins M “Opinion – A New Kind of Apartheid: Analysing South 
Africa’s ‘Class Struggle’” RNews 19 December 2014, available at 
http://www.rnews.co.za/article/2212/opinion-a-new-kind-of-apartheid-analysing-south-africa-s-
class-struggle [accessed 21.02.2015]; Sergeant B “Mines for the Taking” Noseweek 1 January 
2015, available at http://www.noseweek.co.za/article/3353/Mines-for-the-taking [accessed 
21.02.2015].  
317  Hopwood G Namibia’s New Frontiers: Transparency and Accountability in Extractive Industry 
Exploration (2013) Windhoek Institute for Public Policy Research at 6. 
 
 
Chapter Nine:   
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY: 





Hitherto in this thesis the focus was on the state’s power to control petroleum resources 
in South Africa and Namibia.  However, a proper regulatory framework must ensure 
that a state is accountable to its citizens and to petroleum companies in exercising its 
right to control petroleum resources.  The purpose of this chapter is discuss the 
limitations imposed on a state in exercising its control over petroleum resources to 
ensure that the element of accountability is present in the regulatory framework.  This 
in turn ensures that the petroleum regulatory framework operates for the benefit of both 
the citizens of the host country and the petroleum company.  This chapter specifically 
looks at how the state’s power as adminsitratrive body is limited in terms of the 
provisions of administrative justice and how corruption is controlled.   
2. Limitations on the Regulation of Petroleum 
Rights to petroleum are regulated by statute and allocated by public authorities.  This 
public law character of petroleum law invokes the principles of fair and reasonable 
administrative justice.  The state, in its relationship with an applicant applying for rights 
to petroleum or a holder of a right to petroleum, has a duty towards the applicant or 
holder to act within the confines of administrative law and the constitutional guarantee 
of just administrative action.1   
Whereas the discussion above concerns the role of the state in the regulation of 
petroleum resources, and pays attention to the functionaries involved in allocating 
rights to petroleum, the second part of this chapter focuses on the measures put in place 
                                                          
1  See Article 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990 (“Namibian Constitution”) 
and section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“South African 
Constitution”). 
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in Namibia and South Africa to promote just administrative action, access to 
information and the prevention and combating of corruption. These are some of the 
main mechanisms for limiting the powers of the states in respect of petroleum 
resources.  This part of the chapter focuses on means to achieve just administrative 
action and promote access to information, and how to prevent or combat corruption. 
These aspects are crucial to any attempts at ensuring accountability, transparency and 
interest-balancing as the trilogy of elements necessary to create a sound regulatory 
structure.2 
In the first instance, this part of the chapter deals with how the right to just 
administrative action ensures transparency of a petroleum regulatory regime and 
accountability of the state as against the nation.  This is achieved by limiting the powers 
of the state, acting through the elected government, in respect of the control it exercises 
over petroleum resources.3  The right to just administrative action is, however, not 
enough to ensure a sound regulatory framework.  Corrupt practices, ingrained in the 
business of oil,4 pose a serious challenge and pervade the industry especially as 
governments have to contend with bribery of officials in charge of controlling access to 
petroleum resources5 and determining below market-related prices for such access.6 It 
is therefore important for a regulatory framework for petroleum resources to prevent 
and combat corruption as well. 
2.1 The Right to Just Administrative Action 
The introduction of the concept of custodianship over mineral and petroleum resources 
in South Africa marked a transition from privately-held mineral and petroleum rights to 
a system of state-granted mineral and petroleum entitlements.7  In Namibia, on the 
                                                          
2  For further detail about these elements, see Chapter One above.   
3  See paragraphs 2.2. below with reference to the common law right of just administrative action 
and paragraph 2.2.2.4. below with reference to procedural fairness.   
4  Humphreys M, Sachs JD and Stiglitz JE "Introduction: What is the Problem with Natural 
Resource Wealth?" in Humphreys M, Sachs JD and Stiglitz JE (eds), Escaping the Resource 
Curse (2007) New York Columbia University Press at 11.   
5  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 4) at 10–11. 
6  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 4) at 11. 
7  Dale MO “Comparative International and African Mineral Law as Applied in the Formation of the 
New South African Mineral Development Legislation” in Bastida E, Wälde T and Warden-
Fernández J (eds) International and Comparative Mineral Law and Policy: Trends and Prospects 
(2005) The Hague Kluwer Law International at 823. 
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other hand, mineral and petroleum resources are vested in the state.8  In both 
jurisdictions, however, it is clear that the state control petroleum resources.   
2.1.1 The Framework for Just Administrative Action 
While petroleum law is primarily administered under the MPRD Act, it must be 
administered against the backdrop of the constitutional guarantee for just administrative 
action.9 Petroleum administration therefore takes place within a wider framework 
determined by the South African Constitution,10 the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act11 (“PAJA”) and the MPRD Act.  The MPRD Act states that, subject to 
PAJA, any administrative process conducted or decision taken under the MPRD Act 
must be conducted or taken within a reasonable time and in accordance with the 
principles of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness, thus invoking the 
elements of just administrative action.12   
The right to just administrative action in South Africa is entrenched in the Bill of Rights 
and must be seen against the background of a history of abuse of governmental powers 
in South Africa, which was briefly referred to above.13  In terms of the South African 
Constitution, every person has the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.14  Everyone whose rights have been adversely 
affected by administrative action has the right to be given written reasons.15  The 
Legislature is tasked with a duty to enact national legislation to give effect to the right 
to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action.16    
                                                          
8  Article 100, Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990.   
9  Badenhorst PJ and Mostert H Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1 ed (2004, Revision 
Service 10 2014) Wetton Juta at 2-1.    
10  South African Constitution.   
11  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”). 
12  Section 6(1) of the MPRD Act 28 of 2002. 
13  Currie I and De Waal J Bill of Rights Handbook 5 ed (2005) Cape Town Juta & Co at 642.   
14  Section 33(1) of the South African Constitution. 
15  Section 33(2) of the South African Constitution. 
16  Section 33(3) of the South African Constitution.  This legislation must provide for the review of 
administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, and independent and impartial tribunal.  
The legislation must further impose a duty on the state to give effect to the right of everyone to 
administrative justice that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and the right to be given 
reasons for an administrative decision that adversely affects his rights.  Finally, the legislation 
must promote an efficient administration.   
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The legislature, in response to the constitutional mandate to enact national legislation 
dealing with administrative justice, adopted and promulgated PAJA.  The purpose of 
PAJA is to give effect to section 33 of the South African Constitution,17 in other words, 
to give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair, as well as the right to be given written reasons for administrative 
actions.18   
The Minister, together with the Deputy-Director, Regional Managers and other officers 
of the Department, therefore administer petroleum resources under the MPRD Act.  
This Act, and the functions and duties ascribed to these persons in terms of the Act, 
does not exist in isolation but must be seen against the backdrop of the constitutional 
guarantee of just administrative action and the provisions of PAJA, which operate to 
control and limit the powers, functions and duties of the Minister, Deputy-Director, 
Regional Managers and other officers. 
As in South Africa, the regulation of petroleum in Namibia must take place against the 
backdrop of the constitutional guarantee of the right to fair and reasonable 
administrative justice.19  This right must be respected and upheld by the Executive, 
Legislature and Judiciary and all organs of Government and its agencies and, where 
applicable to them, by all natural and legal persons.20       
The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia21 (“Namibian Constitution”) 
incorporates the common law principles of administrative law which have crystallised 
over many years.22  The Namibian Constitution requires that administrative bodies and 
administrative officials must act fairly and reasonably.  Furthermore, they must comply 
with the requirements imposed upon them by common law and relevant legislation.  
                                                          
17  Klaaren J and Penfold G "Just Administrative Action" in Woolman S and Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Revision Service 5, 2013) Cape Town Juta & Co. Ltd. at 
63-1.   
18  Long title of the PAJA.   
19  Article 18 of the Namibian Constitution. 
20  Article 5 of the Namibian Constitution.   
21  Article 18 of the Namibian Constitution. 
22  Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Finance and Others v Ward 2009 (1) NR 314 (SC) at par 
[25]. 
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Any person aggrieved by the exercise of administrative acts and administrative 
decisions has a right to seek redress before a competent court or tribunal.23 
Therefore, in Namibia the Minister, Commissioner and Chief-Inspector administers 
petroleum resources under the Petroleum Act.  As with South Africa, however, this Act 
and the powers, functions and duties ascribed to these persons in terms of the Act do 
not exist in isolation but must be seen against the backdrop of the constitutional 
guarantee of just administrative action, which controls and limits the powers, functions 
and duties of the Minister, Commissioner and Chief-Inspector. 
The right to just administrative action in South Africa and Namibia is available to all 
persons and not just citizens of these countries.24  The principles of administrative 
justice can therefore be relied upon by the petroleum companies engaging with the state 
to obtain access to petroleum.  The right to just administrative action may also be used 
by any other person to hold the state accountable for its actions, provided that this 
person is aggrieved in some way by a decision made by the state in respect of 
petroleum.25   
In terms of the South African Constitution, the right of just administrative action must 
be respected and upheld by the executive, legislature and the judiciary, as well as all 
organs of state.26  It must also be respected and upheld by natural and, where 
applicable, juristic persons.27  The common law remains applicable as long as it is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution.28  In Namibia, neither Parliament nor any 
subordinate legislative authority may make any laws and which abolishes or abridges 
the fundamental rights and freedoms conferred by the Bill of Rights.  The Executive 
and agencies of Government may also not take any action which abolishes or abridges 
                                                          
23  Article 18 of Namibian Constitution.   
24  See the wording of this right in section 33 of the South African Constitution (“Everyone has the 
right…”) and article 18 of the Namibian Constitution (“…persons aggrieved by the exercise of 
such acts…”). 
25  See Chapter Four above.  
26  Section 8(1) of the South African Constitution and article 5 of the Namibian Constitution.   
27  Section 8(2) of the South African Constitution and article 5 of the Namibian Constitution.   
28  Section 8(3)(a) of the South African Constitution and Article 66 of the Namibian Constitution.   
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the fundamental rights and freedoms conferred by the Bill of Rights.29  Any law or 
action in contravention of the aforesaid is invalid to the extent of the contravention.30 
The constitutional guarantee of just administrative action does not mean that a court 
will hear any application for review merely because it is based on this right.31  Firstly, 
the person bringing the application must have the necessary standing.  Standing in 
terms of the South African Constitution is framed very widely.  Any person acting in 
his own interest, on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own interest, as a 
member of or in the interest of a group or class of persons or in the public interest, or an 
association acting in the interest of its members has the right to approach a competent 
court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened.  The 
court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights.32 
In Namibia, any aggrieved persons who claim that a fundamental right or freedom 
guaranteed by the Namibian Constitution has been infringed or threatened is entitled to 
approach a competent Court to enforce or protect such a right or freedom, and may 
approach the Ombudsman to provide them with such legal assistance or advice as they 
require.33  A court has the power to make all such orders as shall be necessary and 
appropriate to secure such applicants the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
conferred on them under the provisions of the Namibian Constitution, should the Court 
come to the conclusion that such rights or freedoms have been unlawfully denied or 
violated, or that grounds exist for the protection of such rights or freedoms by 
interdict.34  The power of the court includes the power to award monetary 
compensation in respect of any damage suffered by the aggrieved persons in 
consequence of such unlawful denial or violation of their fundamental rights and 
                                                          
29  Article 25(1) of the Namibian Constitution. 
30  A competent court, however, instead of declaring the law or action invalid, has the power and the 
discretion in an appropriate case to allow Parliament, any subordinate legislative authority, or the 
Executive and the agencies of Government to correct any defect in the impugned law or action 
within a specific period of time, subject to such conditions as may be specified by it.  In such 
event and until such correction, or until the expiry of the time limit set by the Court, whichever be 
the shorter, such impugned law or action shall be deemed to be valid.  See article 25(1)(a) of the 
Namibian Constitution.  
31  See Currie and De Waal (note 13) at 79. 
32  Section 38 of the South African Constitution. 
33  Article 25(2) of the Namibian Constitution. 
34  Article 25(3) of the Namibian Constitution. 
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freedoms, where such an award is considered appropriate in the particular 
circumstances.35 
What is clear from the concept of standing is that the applicant must be aggrieved, i.e. 
the applicant must show that his rights have been injured or wronged.36  The Namibian 
legal system generally does not allow class actions or public interest litigation.  The 
South African Constitution, however, allows public interest litigation by stating that a 
person acting in the public interest has standing under the South African Constitution.37  
Any of the rights or fundamental freedoms contained in the Bill or Rights or any other 
common law right can be infringed.  The list is endless, and includes e.g. the right to 
human dignity, the right to a fair trial, the right to life, the right to freedom of speech, 
the right to freedom of association and the right to practise any profession, or carry on 
any occupation, trade or business. 
Aside from standing, other potential impediments to an application for review of an 
administrative action are ripeness and mootness.38  The doctrine of ripeness prevents 
any person from seeking relief from a court before that person has been subject to 
prejudice or the real threat of prejudice.39  This also aligns with the concept of an 
aggrieved person, discussed above.   
The doctrine of mootness, on the other hand, requires an affected person not to wait for 
too long to bring a case to court, as this might result in the underlying dispute being 
somehow resolved, rendering an application to court moot.40  Courts may also dismiss 
an application where the applicants have waited too long to bring the matter before 
court, resulting in the respondent being prejudiced.  For example, in the Namibian case 
of Samicor Diamond Mining (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mines and Energy and Others,41 
the applicants applied to the High Court to have the granting and issuing to Baobab 
                                                          
35  Article 25(4) of the Namibian Constitution. 
36  See the discussion of “aggrieved person” in Claassen RD Dictionary of Legal Words and Phrases 
Vol 1 (2008, Service Issue 11) Durban LexisNexis Butterworths at A-81–A-82.   
37  Section 38 of the South African Constitution.   
38  Currie and De Waal (note 13) at 79; Loots C "Standing, Ripeness and Mootness" in Woolman S 
and Bishop M (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Revision Service 5, 2013) Cape 
Town Juta & Co Ltd at 7-14–7-22.   
39  Loots (note 38) at 7-14. 
40  Loots (note 38) at 7-18. 
41  Samicor Diamond Mining (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mines and Energy and Others 2014 (1) NR 1 
(HC).   
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Equity Management (Pty) Ltd of two exclusive prospecting licences in respect of 
minerals reviewed and set aside.  The court dismissed the application, despite good 
merits, because the applicants waited too long in approaching the Court, during which 
delay Baobab invested a considerable amount in the licences.  The Court held that 
Baobab would be prejudiced or at least potentially prejudiced if the application was 
granted.42  The Court held that it is “in the interest of the administration of justice and 
in the public interest that finality in relation to the granting or refusal of mineral 
licences be reached within a reasonable time.”43 
In conclusion, any person who wants to take a decision by the Minister on review in 
respect of a right to petroleum must show standing.  For example, if a person’s right or 
licence is refused and application is granted to a competing applicant, that person will 
have standing as its rights were directly affected.  Similarly, if application for renewal 
or amendment of a right or licence is refused, the holder will have standing.  The 
person intending to take the decision on review must, however, ensure that its right is 
not affected by the doctrines of ripeness and mootness.  For example, application 
cannot be brought until a decision has actually been made.  An applicant also cannot 
bring the application after such a long period has passed that application to court will be 
moot or the respondents will be prejudiced by the delay. 
2.1.2 The Role of the Common Law of Just Administrative Action 
As stated earlier,44 South Africa and Namibia share the same common law.  This 
extends to the common law principles relating to administrative law.  In the pre-
constitutional eras in both South Africa and Namibia, courts relied on their inherent 
jurisdiction to review the exercise of public power.45  By reviewing the exercise of 
public power, courts have developed and applied a set of judge-made rules of review 
with which entities exercising public power had to comply.46   
Common-law grounds of review include, inter alia, if the decision maker arrived at the 
decision arbitrarily or capriciously; or through bad faith; or through unwarranted 
                                                          
42  Samicor / Minister of Mines (note 41) at [47]. 
43  Samicor / Minister of Mines (note 41) at [48]. 
44  See Chapter One above.  
45  Klaaren and Penfold (note 17) at 63-1. 
46  Klaaren and Penfold (note 17) at 63-1. 
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adherence to a fixed principle; or to further an ulterior or improper purpose.47  A 
misconception of the discretion conferred upon an administrative body or official was 
also grounds for review under common law, as was gross unreasonableness to such an 
extent as to warrant an inference that the administrator failed to apply his mind to the 
matter.  Finally, failing to apply the rules of natural justice (such as nemo iudex in re 
sua and audi alteram partem) was also a ground for review under the common law.48   
Notwithstanding the common law power of courts to review exercise of public power, 
parliamentary sovereignty was the governing principle of state organisation in South 
Africa and Namibia49 and so the will of the Parliament reigned supreme.50  The 
application of the principles of judicial review was subject to the whim of Parliament 
and as a result, “…South Africa’s history of administrative law and practice is littered 
with instances of abuses of power…”51  This was particularly visible with regard to 
segregatory laws,52 but also with regard to mining and petroleum laws.53 
A radical break came with the adoption of the principle of constitutional supremacy,54 
first in Namibia after it gained political independence. Soon thereafter South Africa 
followed suit and both countries now acknowledge the right to just administrative 
action in their respective Constitutions.55  Constitutional entrenchment of just 
administrative action has transformed an ordinary right into a fundamental human right 
protected by the Constitution.56  South Africa has gone on step further and promulgated 
legislation dealing specifically with administrative law to give effect to this 
                                                          
47  Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Another v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd and Another 1988 (3) SA 
132 (A) at 152.   
48  Johannesburg Stock Exchange (note 47) at 152; Klaaren and Penfold (note 17) at 63-1. 
49  Through the Mandate that South Africa had over Namibia.  See Chapter One above.   
50  Klaaren and Penfold (note 17) at 63-2. 
51  Klaaren and Penfold (note 17) at 63-2. 
52  Klaaren and Penfold (note 17) at 63-2. 
53  The primary ones being the Black Land Act 18 of 1936 and the Group Areas Act 63 of 1975.  In 
Alexkor Ltd and Another v The Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) at 
[86]–[91], the discriminatory (dispossessory) effect of the Precious Stones Act 44 of 1927 is 
discussed.  See also Mostert H Mineral Law: Principles and Policies in Perspective (2012) Cape 
Town Juta and Co. Ltd. at 30–35 and 51–53.    
54  See with regard to South Africa Klaaren and Penfold (note 17) at 63-2. 
55  See section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and article 18 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1990.   
56  Parker C "The 'Administrative Justice' Provision of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia: a 
Constitutional Protection of Judicial Review and Tribunal Adjudication under Administrative 
Law" 1991 (24) The Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 88 at 89; 
Currie and De Waal (note 13) at 644–645.   
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constitutional right, namely PAJA.  The common law of just administrative action has 
been subsumed by the South African Constitution57 and, as a result, there are no two 
separate systems of administrative law in South Africa.58  This does not mean that the 
South African Constitution has done away with the common law relating to 
administrative law.59  The common-law rules relating to administrative law are used to 
inform and supplement the South African Constitution and PAJA.60  In Namibia, the 
common-law principles of just administrative action are still applicable.  These 
common-law principles are not replaced by the Namibian Constitution, but are used to 
supplement and interpret the constitutional guarantee of just administrative action.  
2.1.3 Principles of Just Administrative Action 
In South Africa, petroleum is primarily regulated by the Department of Mineral 
Resources, while this function is fulfilled in Namibia by the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy.  The administration of rights to petroleum is accompanied by a myriad of 
decisions that administrators may take.  These decisions may relate to the granting of 
access to petroleum, suspending or cancelling or rights to petroleum or imposing 
certain conditions on rights to petroleum.  These decisions are taken either by the 
Minister responsible for administering rights to petroleum, or someone who has 
delegated authority from the Minister to act on his behalf.  Some action may also be 
taken by other Ministers (for example the Minister responsible of the environment or 
the Minister responsible for finance).61   
The administration of the MPRD Act in South Africa and the Petroleum Act in 
Namibia therefore takes place within the framework of the Constitutional guarantee to 
just administrative action and the common-law right to administrative justice.  The fact 
that the regulation of petroleum is performed by administrative bodies or administrative 
agents and therefore constitutes administrative action in respect of petroleum is further 
                                                          
57  Specifically, section 33 of the South African Constitution. 
58  Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA, In Re: Ex Parte Application of the President of 
the RSA 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at par 44.  See also Burns Y and Beukes M Administrative Law 
under the 1996 Constitution 3 ed (2006) Durban LexisNexis Butterworths at 286.   
59  Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) Wetton Juta & Co Ltd at 29.   
60  Burns and Beukes (note 58) at 286.  See also Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at par 22.  See also Hoexter 
(note 59) at 29.    
61  See Chapters Five, Six and Seven above.   
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supported by the fact that the MPRD Act specifically mentions any administrative 
process conducted or decision taken under the MPRD Act must be conducted or taken 
within a reasonable time and in accordance with the principles of lawfulness, 
reasonableness and procedural fairness.62  As a result, the administration of petroleum 
must be lawful and reasonable and proper procedure must be followed.  This includes 
failure to take decisions in respect of petroleum.  PAJA specifically contemplates the 
review of action which consists of a failure to take a decision.63 
So, for example, in Namibia and South Africa the granting or refusal to grant a right to 
minerals or a renewal of a right to minerals has been a ground for review in a number 
of cases.64  Similarly, in South Africa, attaching certain conditions to a surface right 
permit has also been a ground for review.65  The primary decisions in respect of 
petroleum resources (awarding and refusing rights to petroleum and attaching 
conditions to rights to petroleum) constitute administrative actions because of the 
nature of these decisions and the fact that they are taken in terms of empowering 
legislation.  Other decisions taken in respect of petroleum resources have to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis with reference to the principles set out in case law.  
The measure of discretion awarded to a functionary in respect of each decision depends 
on the relevant statutory provision in terms of which the decision is based.  Discretion 
when taking decisions is discussed next under the concept of lawfulness.   
The right to just administrative action is therefore applicable to the regulation of 
petroleum.  In may only be limited in accordance with the provisions set out in the 
Constitutions of South Africa and Namibia.  By entrenching the right to just 
administrative action, providing fixed methods of limiting this right and ensuring that 
this right may be enforced in a competent and independent court, the legislative 
framework for just administrative action in South Africa and Namibia provides 
                                                          
62  Section 6(1) of the MPRD Act. 
63  Section 6(2)(g) of PAJA.   
64  See for example Minister of Mines and Energy and Another v Black Range Mining (Pty) Ltd 2011 
(1) NR 31 (SC); Auas Diamond Co (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mines and Energy 2006 (2) NR 406 
(HC); Otjozondu Mining (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mines and Energy and Another 2007 (2) 469 
(HC); Lebowa Granite (Pty) Ltd v Lebowa Mineral Trust and Another 1999 (4) SA 375 (T); 
Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (4) 
SA 113 (CC); Meepo v Kotze and Others 2008 (1) SA 104 (NC). 
65  Kloof Gold Mining Co Ltd v Mining Commissioner, Johannesburg, and Others 1981 (4) SA 509 
(T). 
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transparency and accountability for persons operating within this industry and for 
persons affected by this industry.66 
The classification of decisions taken in respect of petroleum triggers various elements 
of just administrative action.  The MPRD Act specifically requires that decisions in 
respect of petroleum must be taken within a reasonable time, must be lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.  Persons affected by decisions taken under the MPRD 
Act are also entitled to written reasons.67  Although not expressly stated in the 
Namibian legislation, all these principles apply to decisions taken in respect of 
petroleum in Namibia as well, by virtue of the common-law right of just administrative 
action, entrenched in the Namibian Constitution.  Other principles that are also 
applicable are the duty to consult with interested and affected parties and the right of 
access to information.  All these elements are now discussed in the context of the 
administration of petroleum resources.   
2.1.3.1 Reasonable Time 
The element of “reasonable time” in the MPRD Act reflects a similar provision in 
PAJA.68  In terms of PAJA, a court or tribunal has the power to review an 
administrative decision if the action concerned consists of a failure to take a decision.69  
An applicant may bring an application for review on the ground of failure to take a 
decision in two instances.  First, where an administrator has a duty to make a decision, 
the empowering statute states no time periods within which the administrator must 
make a decision and the administrator fails to take a decision, then the applicant may 
institute review proceedings on the ground that the administrator failed to take a 
decision.70  Secondly, where the administrator has a duty to make a decision, the 
empowering statute prescribes a time period within which a decision must be taken and 
the administrator fails to make a decision within this time period, then the application 
may institute review proceedings on the ground that the administrator has failed to take 
                                                          
66  Hughes T “South Africa: A Driver of Change” (2012) Working Paper Series, Revenue Watch 
Institute at 6. 
67  Section 6 of the MPRD Act.   
68  Section 6(2)(g) read with section 6(3) of PAJA.   
69  Section 6(2)(g) of PAJA.   
70  Section 6(3)(a) of PAJA.   
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a decision within the prescribed time period.71  Important in both instances is that there 
must be an obligation on the administrator to make a decision – an administrator, for 
example, cannot be taken on review as a result of his indecisiveness in planning on 
policy issues.72  Determining what is reasonable will depend on each specific case 
according to the nature and complexity of the decision or process concerned.73   
Under common law, an aggrieved person has a similar remedy in the form of a 
mandamus, which is an order compelling a public authority to comply with a statutory 
duty imposed upon it.74  In an application for a mandamus, a court does not concern 
itself with reason why the administrator has failed to carry out its statutory duty, but 
rather that it has failed or refused to exercise a statutory power and the applicant has 
been aggrieved by the failure.75  Importantly, as with the application to compel an 
administrator to make a decision under PAJA, the applicant in a mandamus application 
also has to show that there is a duty on the administrator to perform the act in 
question.76  The common law mandamus serves two purposes.  The first is to compel 
the performance of a specific duty.  The second is to remedy the effects of unlawful 
action already taken.77  So, for example, the mandamus can be used against an 
administrator responsible for issuing licences who refuses to take a decision to issue a 
licence.78  This includes situations where an administrator who has to take a decision to 
grant a right to petroleum refuses or unreasonably delays in granting such a right.  
Similarly, a mandamus can also be used to compel a decision-maker to correct a 
decision that was unlawfully taken, provided that it is possible to correct the decision.79 
                                                          
71  Section 6(3)(b) of PAJA. 
72  Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development Corporation and Others 2010 (4) 
SA 242 (SCA) at [43].   
73  Dale M, Bekker L, Bashall F, Chaskalson M, Dixon C, Grobler G, Loxton C, Ash M and Cox A 
South African Mineral and Petroleum Law (2005, Service Issue 16 2014) Durban LexisNexis 
Butterworths at MPRDA-152. 
74  Thusi v Minister of Home Affairs and Another and 71 Other Cases 2011 (2) SA 561 (KZP) at 
[42]; Tumas Granite CC v Minister of Mines and Energy and Another 2013 (2) NR 383 (HC) at 
[6]. 
75  Tumas / Minister of Mines (note 74) at [6]. 
76  Thusi / Minister of Home Affairs (note 74) at [43]; Baxter L Administrative Law (1984) Cape 
Town Juta & Co Ltd at 691. 
77  Baxter (note 76) at 687 and 690; Tumas / Minister of Mines (note 74) at [6]. 
78  Baxter (note 76) at 690. 
79  Baxter (note 76) at 691. 
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The second element of just administrative action is lawfulness.  It is a well-recognised 
principle of common law that persons are entitled to lawful administrative action.80  
This is a fundamental principle of the Rule of Law81 upon which both South Africa’s 
and Namibia’s Constitutions are based.82  The inclusion of lawfulness as a requirement 
for just administrative action in the South African and Namibian Consitutions may 
seem unnecessary at first, but it provides a greater measure of protection because 
common-law principles of administrative legality was applied inconsistently.83  In fact, 
this is particularly important in the natural resources industry.  As we have seen from 
the introduction, states, through the elected governments, often control access to natural 
resources to promote their own interests, rather than the interests of its people.  Even in 
Namibia, the promise of the extractive industry is overshadowed by allegations of 
corruption.84  Corruption in the petroleum industry is discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter.     
Lawfulness entails that the functionary taking the administrative decision must be duly 
authorised by law (either statutory or common law) and must comply with any 
applicable statutory requirements or conditions.85  In other words, the administrative 
body or administrative official must act within the boundaries imposed upon them by 
statute or common law.86  Any action performed by a functionary without lawful 
authority is illegal or ultra vires.87  PAJA reiterates this by allowing judicial review of 
                                                          
80  Burns and Beukes (note 58) at 50.   
81  Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council and Other 1999 (1) SA 374 (CC) at par 56; De Ville J Judicial Review of Administrative 
Action in South Africa Revised 1 ed (2005) Durban LexisNexis Butterworths at 90.   
82  See section 1(c) of the South African Constitution and article 1(1) of the Namibian Constitution. 
83  Burns and Beukes (note 58) at 50. 
84  See for example Asino T “Corruption Tarnishes Extractive Sector” 10 September 2012 New Era, 
available at http://www.newera.com.na/articles/47564/-Corruption-tarnishes-extractive-sector- 
[accessed 12.08.2013]; Brandt E “IPPR Calls for More Accountability in Extractive Sector” 24 
June 2013 New Era, available at http://www.newera.com.na/articles/47564/-Corruption-tarnishes-
extractive-sector- [accessed 12.08.2013]; Khobetsi L “Lack of Transparency in Mining Creates 
Opportunity for Corruption” 07 December 2011 The Economist, available at 
http://www.economist.com.na/2011-12-07-11-05-31/speak-your-mind/28-mining/3424-lack-of-
transparency-in-mining-creates-opportunity-for-corruption [accessed 12.08.2013]. 
85  Hoexter (note 59) at 253. 
86  Hoexter (note 59) at 255; Baxter (note 76) at 355; Burns and Beukes (note 58) at 50. 
87  Hoexter (note 59) at 255 – 256. 
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administrative action where the administrator was not authorised by an empowering 
provision to take the decision.88   
Of particular importance for the principle of lawfulness is the delegation of powers: 
where functionaries act on delegated authority, this authority must be properly 
delegated.89  This is in line with the principle delegatus delegare non potest, or a 
delegate may not delegate.90  Where an administrator’s authority is granted to it by 
enabling legislation, it must exercise that authority itself.  It may only delegate its 
authority if the enabling statute provides for such delegation.91  Delegation may either 
take place by means of decentralisation or deconcentration of public powers.92  A 
decentralisation of public power is where the powers of a functionary are transferred to 
an independent organ or body, which carries out these functions and powers in its own 
name.93  Any decision taken by the delegate must be regarded as a decision of that 
delegate.  Deconcentration, on the other hand, refers to a situation where the delegate 
exercises powers on behalf of a functionary and any decision by the delegate must be 
regarded as a decision of the delegans, or functionary.94  It is important for giving effect 
to the principle of lawfulness and the administration of justice to have a proper 
appreciation of any delegation of authority and to know who is regared as taking a 
decision.  This is also important for exhausting internal remedies, discussed later in this 
chapter.   
Lawfulness further requires administrators remain within the bounds of their power and 
do not misconstrue their powers.95  Administrators must work out their own jurisdiction 
to act in a certain circumstances.96  Judicial review, however, allows courts to consider 
whether administrators have exceeded or misconstrued their powers.97  A 
                                                          
88  Section 6(2)(a)(i) of PAJA.  There are a number of instances where an administrator may not have 
proper authority to act.  It may be that the administrator is not properly constituted, qualified or 
appointed when he took the decision.  Hoexter (note 59) at 256. 
89  De Ville (note 81) at 139. 
90  De Ville (note 81) at 139. 
91  De Ville (note 81) at 139. 
92  Global Pact Trading 207 (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Minerals and Energy and Others [2007] JOL 
21122 (O) at [6].   
93  Global Pact / Minister of Minerals and Energy (note 92) at [6]. 
94  Global Pact / Minister of Minerals and Energy (note 92) at [6]. 
95  Hoexter (note 59) at 281; Baxter (note 76) at 452. 
96  Baxter (note 76) at 452; Hoexter (note 59) at 259. 
97  Hoexter (note 59) at 281. 
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misinterpretation of functions by a functionary responsible for administering petroleum 
or granting authorisations incidental to petroleum operations is reviewable.  The 
reviewability of such decisions ensures greater transparency and accountability in the 
regulation of petroleum. 
Lawfulness finally entails that an administrator not abuse his discretion.  Abuse of 
discretion as a ground for review deals with the courts’ power to interpret and define 
the ambit of the authority conferred by legislation upon an administrator.98  Under 
common law, three grounds for abuse of discretion have become well established and 
have also assumed statutory form in PAJA in South Africa.  These grounds are mala 
fides, ulterior motive and failure to apply the mind.99  Where a court finds that power 
has been used for unauthorised purposes or purposes that were not contemplated at the 
time when the powers were conferred, it will hold that the action or decision is 
unlawful.100  The purpose envisaged in enabling legislation is binding on the 
administrator acting pursuant to this legislation.101  PAJA also states that action taken 
for a reason not authorised by the empowering provision102 or for an ulterior purpose or 
motive103 may be reviewed.  So, for example, if an administrator issues a right to 
petroleum in exchange for personal financial reward, this will render the decision 
unlawful.104  Similarly, suspending or cancelling a right to petroleum because of 
personal differences between the administrator and the holder will also be unlawful.  
These actions may also be mala fide.   
Administrative action not authorised by law is invalid.  Invalidity is an “axiomatic 
consequence of the principle of legality.”105  So, for example, when awarding 
exploration or production rights or licences or attaching conditions or renewing or 
suspending these rights or licences, the relevant Minister must act lawfully, meaning he 
must act within the boundaries of the empowering legislation and common law, where 
                                                          
98  Hoexter (note 59) at 306. 
99  Hoexter (note 59) at 307. 
100  Hoexter (note 59) at 309. 
101  Hoexter (note 59) at 308. 
102  Section 6(2)(e)(i) of PAJA. 
103  Section 6(2)(e)(ii) of PAJA. 
104  It may also lead to criminal sanctions for corruption, which is discussed later in the chapter.   
105  Baxter (note 76) at 355. 
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applicable.106  In Namibia, for example, the Minister is imposing socio-economic 
obligations on holders of petroleum licences without there being a proper framework 
therefore.107  The government’s policy in respect of socio-economic empowerment is 
imposed haphazardly and this leads to “uncertainty, confustion and anxiety”.108  This is 
contrary to the right of just administrative action and the principles of transparency and 
accountability.   
The petroleum resources of South Africa and Namibia are regulated primarily by the 
Minister of Mineral Resources and the Minister of Mines and Energy respectively.109  
Other entities may only exercise rights in respect of petroleum if authorised to do so by 
an enabling statute or if these powers are properly delegated to these entities.  So, for 
example, the MPRD Act enables the Minister to delegate any power conferred upon 
him (except the power to make regulations and to deal with an appeal) to the Director-
General, Regional Manager or any officer, provided that the delegation is done in 
writing.110  The Petroleum Act in Namibia, on the other hand, does not contain such a 
delegation clause, but instead makes special provision for the appointment of further 
officers and sets out their powers, duties and functions.111  The Act also grants the 
Minister the power to prescribe any power, duty or function.112  When exercising 
control over petroleum, the functionaries charged with doing so must have proper 
authorisation.  They cannot, for example, impose socio-economic obligations without 
there being a proper framework for it.113 
                                                          
106  See Chapter Five below which discusses rights to petroleum.   
107  See Chapter Eight above, which discusses socio-economic development in the Namibian 
petroleum industry.  
108  Koep PF and Van den Berg HM “Current Issues in the Namibian Petroleum Industry” 2010 The 
Chambers Magazine 111 at 111.  
109  Section 3(2) of the MPRD Act states that, as the custodian of South Africa’s mineral and 
petroleum resources, the state, acting through the Minister of Mineral Resources, may grant, 
issue, refuse, control, administer and manage rights in respect of and in consultation with the 
Minister of Finance, prescribe and levy, any fee payable under the MPRD Act.  Similarly, section 
12(4)(a) of the Petroleum Act authorises the Minister of Mines and Energy in Namibia to issue 
petroleum licences.  
110  Section 103(1) of the MPRD Act.   
111  Section 3(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
112  Section 3(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
113  See Koep and Van den Berg (note 108) at 111. 
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The requirement of acting reasonably deals with the substance of the decision or action 
taken.114  It overlaps with lawfulness, because unreasonable administrative action in 
general relates to abuse of discretionary power or the unreasonable exercise of 
discretionary power.115  Reasonableness permits the courts to go beyond the procedural 
requirements and examine the nature of the act, to determine whether the administrator 
acted mala fide or from improper motives or on extraneous considerations or under a 
view of the facts or the law which could not reasonably be entertained.116 
When the Constitutions of Namibia and South Africa came into operation in 1990 and 
1996 respectively, a major step was taken towards a single requirement of 
reasonableness.  Both the Namibian and the South African Constitutions now require 
administrative action to be reasonable, thus incorporating a unified standard of 
reasonableness.117  Although it is still difficult to provide a single, simple meaning of 
the concept of reasonableness, one can fairly say that reasonableness consists of two 
elements, namely rationality and proportionality.118 
PAJA introduces a four-pronged rationality test119 in terms whereof administrative 
action is reviewable if there is no rational connection between the action itself and the 
purpose for which it was taken, the purpose of the empowering provision, the 
information before the administrator or the reasons given for it by the administrator.120  
A mere rational connection is required, not an ideal or perfect rationality.121   
The purpose of this four-pronged rationality test is to ensure that the administrative 
action has a sound and rational basis.122  An irrational decision is one that is not based 
on reason generally but on an abuse of discretionary power or a failure by the 
                                                          
114  Erastus Tjiumdikua Kahuure and 10 Others v Mbanderu Traditional Authority and 2 Others 
(unreported judgment delivered on 13 April 2007, case number A 114/2006) at par [64]. 
115  Burns and Beukes (note 58) at 390.   
116  Kahuure (note 114) at par [64]. 
117  Section 33 of the South African Constitution, 1996 and article 18 of the Namibian Constitution.   
118  Hoexter (note 59) at 340. 
119  Burns Y (original text by Wiechers M) “Administrative Law” in Joubert WA (ed) Law of South 
Africa Vol 1 2ed (2003) Durban LexisNexis Butterworths at par 140. 
120  Section 6(2)(f)(ii) of PAJA.   
121  Hoexter (note 59) at 342.   
122  Burns (note 119) at par 136. 
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administrator to apply his mind.123  Rationality is closely linked to the reasons for the 
decision.124  Administrative action is justified by the reasons that support the action.125  
Under the common law, no clear cut right existed as to the right to reasons for decisions 
taken by administrators.126  Where the administrator had wide discretion to make its 
own decisions, reasons for such decisions was not usually necessary.  However, in 
some instances, for example where a statute provided for the right to appeal or some 
right of recourse to a higher body or tribunal, the courts deduced ulterior or improper 
motives and even mala fides where the administrator refused to furnish reasons.127  
While there was no obligation on an administrator to furnish reasons for his or her 
decisions under common law, refusal to give reasons might lead to distrust in the 
administrator and might impact negatively on the administration as a whole.   
The importance of reasons for administrative action is highlighted by the South African 
Constitution and PAJA.  The Constitution states that every person whose rights have 
been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given written 
reasons for the decision.128  Furthermore, PAJA states that any person whose rights 
have been materially or adversely affected by an administrative decision is entitled to 
reasons for the decision.129      
There have been various attempts by Namibian courts to define reasonableness in the 
light of the Constitution.  In the Mostert-case,130 the court held that reasonableness, in 
the court’s opinion, means that the decision of the administrator must be rationally 
justified.131  Rationality implies that a decision of an administrator must be supported 
by the evidence and information before the administrator, as well the reasons given for 
the decision.  Furthermore, the decision must also be objectively capable of furthering 
                                                          
123  Burns (note 119) at par 136.  Burns mentions the example of arbitrary decisions; decisions 
unsupported by evidence; a decision where there is no connection between the decision and the 
reasons provided for the decision; or where the reasons themselves are unintelligible.   
124  Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 853 (SCA) at par 42, where the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in South Africa stated that “[t]he right to be furnished with reasons for an 
administrative decision is the bulwark of the right to just administrative action.” 
125  Burns (note 119) at par 139. 
126  Burns and Beukes (note 58) at 251. 
127  Burns and Beukes (note 58) at 251 and the authorities cited there.   
128 Section 33(2) of the South African Constitution.   
129  Section 5(1) of PAJA. 
130  Mostert v The Minister of Justice 2003 NR 11 (SC).   
131  Mostert (note 130) at 28H.   
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the purpose for which the power was given and for which the decision was purportedly 
taken.132  The duty to give reasons is, according to the Court, implicit in the 
constitutional right of just administrative action.133  It is therefore clear that the 
Namibian law with regard to rationality of administrative decisions is practically 
similar to South African law under PAJA. 
Despite the position under common law, it is beyond doubt that modern South African 
and Namibian law requires written reasons as an important element of just 
administrative action.  This is recognised in the MPRD Act – any administrative 
process conducted or decision taken in terms of this Act must be in writing and must be 
accompanied by written reasons for such decision.134   
The right to be given reasons for an administrative decision is limited to those persons 
who have been adversely affected by the decision.  Any person requiring written 
reasons for a decision must show that he has been adversely affected by the decision.  
For example, an applicant for a right to petroleum whose application is refused would 
be in a position to apply for written reasons, as he is adversely affected by the decision.    
Reasonableness does not consist only of rationality.135  Another aspect of 
reasonableness is proportionality.  The purpose of proportionality, succinctly 
summarised by Hoexter, is to strike a balance between the adverse and beneficial 
effects of administrative action and to encourage the administrator to consider the need 
for the action and the possibility of using less drastic or oppressive means to achieve 
the desired end.136 Proportionality has been accepted as an essential requirement in 
administrative law.137  Under common law, it was used in a wide and narrow sense.  In 
its widest sense, it served as a general rubric for the requirements of reasonableness, 
fairness and good administration.138  In a more narrow sense, it expressed the idea that 
                                                          
132  Hoexter (note 59) at 307. 
133  Immigration Selection Board v Frank 2001 NR 107 (SC) at 174. 
134  Section 6(2) of the MPRD Act.   
135  Hoexter (note 59) at 343.   
136  Hoexter (note 59) at 344.  See also Burns and Beukes (note 58) at 408 where the authors state as 
follows: “Generally speaking, proportionality is a principle that requires a reasonable and 
justifiable relationship between the objectives of the administrative decision and the facts and 
circumstances which were taken into consideration by the administrator in reaching the decision.” 
137  Hoexter (note 59) at 345. 
138  Baxter (note 76) at 528. 
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the extent to which the action of public authorities may infringe individual rights should 
not go beyond the degree necessary for serving the public interest.139     
Proportionality has three essential elements: balance, necessity and suitability.140  This 
means in essence that there must be a balance between the adverse and beneficial 
effects, the administrator must consider the need for the action as well as consider less 
invasive means to accomplish the goal, and the administrator must use lawful and 
appropriate means to reach this goal.141 
PAJA does not specifically refer to proportionality.  Instead, it states that a court may 
review an administrative action if the exercise of the power or the performance of the 
function authorised by the empowering provision, in terms of which the administrative 
action was purportedly taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have 
so exercised the power or performed the function.142  This section therefore in essence 
requires proportionality between the decision and the effect of the decision. 
2.1.3.4 Procedural Fairness 
In his seminal work on administrative law, Baxter stated that “[t]he duty to act fairly is 
nothing other than the duty to observe the principles of natural justice expressed in 
more fundamental terms.”143  The rules of natural justice are summarised in the two 
maxims audi alteram partem144 and nemo iudex in sua propria causa.145  The first 
principle is concerned with giving persons an opportunity to have a say in decisions 
that affect them and thereby be able to interfere in the outcome thereof.146  The second 
principle is often also called the rule against bias.147  It implies that decision-makers 
ought to be impartial.  It further implies that the decision is made in good faith.148  Bona 
fides is a requirement for both fairness and reasonableness.  Sources of bias can be 
financial interest, personal interest, bias on the subject matter (eg where the decision-
                                                          
139  Baxter (note 76) at 528.   
140  Hoexter (note 59) at 344. 
141  Hoexter (note 59) at 344. 
142  Section 6(2)(h) of PAJA.  See also Hoexter (note 59) at 345. 
143  Baxter (note 76) at 595.   
144  “Listen to the other side.”  See Burns and Beukes (note 58) at 318.   
145  “No one may be a judge in his own case.”   
146  Hoexter (note 59) at 363. 
147  Hoexter (note 59) at 451. 
148  Kahuure (note 114) at par [62]. 
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maker has openly associated himself or herself with one side) or official or institutional 
bias (eg bias as a result of your office).149  This is particularly relevant in the petroleum 
industry in the light of the reputation of corruption that is attached to this industry.150 
Fairness and natural justice are concerned with procedure.151  The common-law 
principles of natural justice are now reinforced by the Constitution insofar as it is not 
inconsistent with the Constitution.152  The right to procedurally fair administrative 
action is stated explicitly in the Constitutions of South Africa and Namibia.  The South 
African Constitution states that everyone has the right administrative action that is 
procedurally fair,153 while the Namibian Constitution states that administrative bodies 
and administrative officials must act fairly.154   
PAJA states that fair administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each 
case.155  To give effect to the right to procedurally fair administrative action, the 
administrator must give a person whose rights or legitimate expectations are materially 
and adversely affected by the action adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the 
proposed administrative action.156  The affected person must also be given a clear 
statement of the administrative action157 and must be given reasonable opportunity to 
make representations.158  Where applicable, the affected person must be given adequate 
notice of any right of review or internal appeal159 and must be given adequate notice of 
the right to request reasons for the decision.160  The administrator may, however, if it is 
reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances, depart from any of these 
requirements.161  The administrator may also, in his own discretion, give an affected 
                                                          
149  Hoexter (note 59) at 454 – 459. 
150  See paragraph 4 in this Chapter.   
151  Kahuure (note 114) at par [64]. 
152  Viljoen and Another v Inspector-General of the Namibian Police 2004 NR 225 (HC) at 241.   
153  Section 33(1) of the South African Constitution. 
154  Article 18 of the Namibian Constitution.   
155  Section 3(2)(a) of PAJA.   
156  Section 3(2)(b)(i) of PAJA.   
157  Section 3(2)(b)(iii) of PAJA. 
158  Section 3(2)(b)(ii) of PAJA. 
159  Section 3(2)(b)(iv) of PAJA. 
160  Section 3(2)(b)(v) of PAJA. 
161  Section 3(4)(a) of PAJA.  In determining whether a departure is reasonable and justifiable, an 
administrator must take into account all relevant factors.  This includes: (i) the objects of the 
empowering provision; (ii) the nature and purpose of, and the need to take, the administrative 
action; (iii) the likely effect of the administrative action; (iv) the urgency of taking the 
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person an opportunity to obtain assistance and, in serious or complex cases, legal 
representation,162 to present and dispute information and arguments163 and to appear in 
person.164 
It is clear that the duty to act fairly is concerned only with the manner in which 
decisions are taken and not whether the decision itself is fair or not.165  Namibia does 
not have a statute dealing specifically with administrative justice, so in determining 
what the duty to act fairly demanded of the public official or body concerned, the 
Namibian High Court has quoted with approval the elements of procedural fairness as 
stated in the English case of Doody v Secretary of State for the Home Department and 
Other Appeals:166  Firstly, where an Act of Parliament confers an administrative power 
on a functionary, there is a presumption that it will be exercised in a manner which is 
fair in all the circumstances.  Secondly, the standards of fairness are not immutable.  
They may change with the passage of time, both in the general and in their application 
to decisions of a particular type.  Thirdly, the principles of fairness are not to be applied 
by rote identically in every situation.  What fairness demands is dependent on the 
context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all aspects.167  Fourthly, 
an essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards 
both its language and the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the 
decision is taken.  Finally, fairness will very often require that a person who may be 
adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations on 
his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable 
result, or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification, or both.   
                                                                                                                                                                         
administrative action or the urgency of the matter; and (v) the need to promote an efficient 
administration and good governance. 
162  Section 3(3)(a) of PAJA. 
163  Section 3(3)(b) of PAJA. 
164  Section 3(3)(c) of PAJA. 
165  Viljoen (note 152) at 240. 
166  Doody v Secretary of State for the Home Department and Other Appeals [1993] 3 All ER 92 (HL) 
at 106d-h.   
167  See Immigration Selection Board (note 133) at 174:  “This rule embodies various principles, the 
application of which is flexible depending on the circumstances of each case and the statutory 
requirements for the exercise of a particular discretion.”  See also Namibia Tourism Board v Tjino 
Kauapirura-Angula (unreported judgment delivered on 21 November 2008 and reasons provided 
on 27 March 2009, case number LCA 48/2007) at par [14].     
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An important element in ensuring that a fair procedure is followed in considering 
applications for rights to petroleum, is to require the administrator who has to decide 
whether to grant or refuse an application to consider applications in the order in which 
they were received.  The MPRD Act recognises the need for this procedural fairness 
and requires the Regional Manager to consider applications in the order in which they 
were received.168  Where applications are received on the same day, they must be 
treated as being received at the same time, provided that preference must be given to 
applications from historically disadvantaged persons.169   
In Namibia, the Petroleum Act does not contain a similar provision, despite a similar 
provision appearing in the Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act 33 of 1992.170  The 
reason for this is probably because of the way licences were granted when the 
Petroleum Act came into operation.  When the Petroleum Act came into operation, 
licences were not granted based on an open-licencing system.  Instead, licencing rounds 
were held during which applicants had to apply for licences.  In 1999, the system for 
awarding licences was changed to an open-licencing system.171  It may be argued, 
however, that based on the elements of fair procedure discussed above, the Minister of 
Mines and Energy must consider licences in the order in which they were received. 
The right to procedural fairness – more specifically the audi alteram-principle – is 
further contained in the Namibian Petroleum Act where this Act deals with application 
for renewal of exploration and production licences.  The Petroleum Act states that the 
Minister may not refuse to grant an application for the renewal of an exploration or 
production licence, unless the Minister has given the application written notice of his 
intention to refuse the application, which notice must set out the reasons for the of the 
alleged failure in the application and must require the holder holder to make 
representations to the Minister in relation to the alleged failure or to remedy such 
failure on or before a date specified in such notice.172  The Minister must take the 
representations into account before making a final decision.173  The same provision, 
                                                          
168  Section 9(1)(b) read with section 69(2) of the MPRD Act.   
169  Section 9(1)(a) and section 9(2) read with section 69(2) of the MPRD Act.   
170  Section 125 of the Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act 33 of 1992.   
171  See Chapter Five for more detail.   
172  Section 33(3)(b) and section 47(3) of the Petroleum Act.   
173  Section 33(3)(b) and section 47(3) of the Petroleum Act. 
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however, does not apply in respect of an application for the renewal of a reconnaissance 
licence.  The reason why the same provision does not apply to a reconnaissance licence 
is unclear – it may just be an oversight by the legislature.  In the light of the right to 
procedural fairness, the same should apply to a reconnaissance licence as well.   
A similar provision is contained in the Petroleum Act in respect of the cancellation of a 
licence.  The Petroleum Act authorises the Minister to cancel a petroleum licence where 
the holder fails to comply with the Act or with the conditions of the licence.174  This 
power of the Minister is, however, subject to the requirement that the Minister first 
gives the holder written notification of his intention to cancel the licence.  The notice 
must set out the particulars of the alleged failure and must call upon the holder to make 
representations to the Minister within a period prescribed in the notice.175  The Minister 
must, before cancelling the licence, take into account these representations, as well as 
any steps taken by the holder to remedy the failure in question or to prevent any such 
failure from being repeated during the currency of the licence.176  This provision 
relating to the cancellation of licences is of particular importance for investors, who 
would want to know under what circumstances the Minister may cancel a licence and 
what rights they have in the event of an impending cancellation. 
The Petroleum Act does not impose the same obligation on the Minister in respect of a 
new application for a petroleum licence.  The reasoning for this may be that the 
applicant for a new licence only has an expectation for the licence to be granted, while 
in the event of a renewal the applicant has vested rights coupled with a legitimate 
expectation for the rights under the licence to be continued.  This does not mean that an 
applicant for a new licence cannot take the Minister on review if the application for a 
new licence is not granted – the applicant still has a right to just administrative action, 
which includes the right to be heard in any administrative decision that will affect the 
applicant.   
                                                          
174  Section 19(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
175  Section 19(2)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
176  Section 19(2)(b) of the Petroleum Act.  Where the alleged failure relates to non-payment of any 
amount payable by the holder, the Minister may not cancel the licence if the holder pays the due 
amount plus interest before the termination of the period specified in the notice.  See section 
19(2)(c) of the Petroleum Act.   
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In respect of an application for a new right under the South African legislation, the 
MPRD Act requires the designated agency to notify the applicant if the application does 
not comply with the prescribed requirements, which notification must contain 
reasons.177 The MPRD Act does not, however, state that the Minister must give the 
applicant an opportunity to remedy the application or to make representations.  The 
MPRD Act also does not contain any provisions to this effect in respect of renewals of 
rights.  Nevertheless, the MPRD Act does contain a general provision that requires all 
decisions to be in writing and to be accompanied by reasons.178  Dale et al also seem to 
hold the view (correctly) that there is nothing in the MPRD Act which prevents an 
applicant from remedying the application and resubmitting it.179 
The MPRD Act, like the Petroleum Act, also authorises the Minister to cancel or 
suspend a petroleum right or permit if the holder conducts any operations authorised by 
his right or permit in contravention of Act, breaches any material term of the right or 
licence, contravenes the approved environmental management programme or has 
submitted inaccurate, false, fraudulent, incorrect or misleading information for the 
purposes of the application or in connection with any matter required to be submitted 
under the Act.180  Before cancelling a right or permit, however, the Minister must give 
written notice to the holder of his intention to cancel the licence.181  The written notice 
must set out the reasons why the Minister intends to cancel or suspend the right or 
permit and must afford the holder a reasonable opportunity to show why the right or 
permit must not be cancelled or suspended.182  The Minister must direct the holder to 
take specified measures to remedy any contravention, breach or failure.183  If the holder 
fails to comply with the direction given by the Minister, the Minister may cancel or 
suspend the right or permit, but only after having given the holder a reasonable 
opportunity to make representations and having considered the representations.184  In 
the event that the Minister suspended a right or permit, the Minister may lift such 
suspension if the holder complies with a directions given by the Minister or if the 
                                                          
177  Section 74(3), section 76(3), section 79(3) and section 83(3) of the MPRD Act.   
178  Section 6(2) of the MPRD Act.   
179  Dale et al (note 73) at MPRDA-212.   
180  Section 90 read with section 47(1) of the MPRD Act.   
181  Section 90 read with section 47(2)(a) of the MPRD Act.   
182  Section 90 read with section 47(2)(b) and (c) of the MPRD Act.   
183  Section 90 read with section 47(3) of the MPRD Act.   
184  Section 90 read with section 47(4) of the MPRD Act.   
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holder has furnished the Minister with compelling reasons why the suspension should 
be lifted.185  Once again, it is important for the holder of a right or permit to know when 
a right or permit may be cancelled and what rights he has.  This also promotes 
transparency of the regulatory regime for petroleum.   
Despite the fact that the MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act fails to give an applicant for 
a right or licence the opportunity to make representations or remedy an application in 
all instances, the general principles of just administrative law and specifically fair 
procedure discussed above, require the Minister or designated agency to give the 
applicant an opportunity to be heard.  The Minister or designated agency is obliged to 
consider the representations before making a final decision.   
2.1.3.5 Duty to Consult 
The High Court in South Africa has held that the granting of a prospecting right in 
respect of minerals results in serious inroads into the property rights of private 
landowners.186  The same can be said for mining, exploration and production rights as 
well.  “The consultation process and its result are an integral part of the fairness process 
because the decision cannot be fair if the administrator did not have full regard to 
precisely what happened during the consultation process to determine whether the 
consultation was sufficient to render the grant of the application procedurally fair.”187 
For this reason, the legislature has provided for due consultations between landowners 
and holders of rights to minerals and petroleum to alleviate these consequences.188  So, 
for example, when the designated agency accepts an application for a reconnaissance 
permit, exploration right or production right, it must notify the applicant inter alia to 
notify and consult with any affected party.189  The Act is, however, silent as to whether 
                                                          
185  Section 90 read with section 47(5) of the MPRD Act.   
186  Meepo v Kotze and Others 2008 (1) SA 104 (NC) at [13.1].   
187  Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (4) 
SA 113 (CC) at [66]. 
188  Meepo v Kotze and Others 2008 (1) SA 104 (NC) at [13.1]. 
189  Section 74(4)(b), section 79(4)(b) and section 83(4)(b) of the MPRD Act.  These sections are 
substituted by section 53(d), section 57(d) and section 61(d) of the MPRD Amendment Act 49 of 
2008 respectively.  The substituted sections come into force on 7 December 2014.  In terms of the 
substituted subsections, the designated agency must notify the applicant in writing inter alia to 
consult in the prescribed manner with the landowner, lawful occupier and any interested and 
affected party and include the result of the consultation in the relevant environmental reports 
required in terms of Chapter 5 of the National Environmental Management Act, 1998.   
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or not the results of the consultations must be submitted to the designated agency.190  It 
may be argued, however, that in the light of the purpose of consultations, the results of 
the consultations must be submitted to the designated agency.   
In addition to the obligation on the applicant to notify and consult with interested and 
affected parties, the designated agency must also, within 14 days after accepting an 
application for a reconnaissance permits or exploration or production right, call upon 
interested and affected persons to submit their comments regarding the application, 
which comments must be submitted within 30 days of the date of the notice.191  If a 
person objects to the granting of a permit or right, the designated agency must refer the 
objection to the Regional Mining Development and Environmental Committee to 
consider the objections and to advise the Minister thereon.192 
Before the MPRD Amendment Act 2008 amended the MPRD Act, the latter provided 
for a another set of consultations by requiring the holder of a permit or right again to 
notify and consult with the landowner or lawful occupier of the land in question before 
conducting reconnaissance operations, exploration operations or production operations 
or commencing any incidental work.193  The MPRD Act, before amendment, therefore 
effectively envisaged three sets of notification and/or consultations.   
The first two sets of consultations are much wider and requires notification to and/or 
consultations with any “interested” and “affected parties”.194  The MPRD Act does not 
define what is meant by “interested” or “affected party”.  The Supreme Court of Appeal 
in South Africa has held, however, that “affected parties” appear to refer to any person 
whose socio-economic conditions might be directly affected by the operations, which 
includes for example any person who earns a livelihood in the immediate environment 
                                                          
190  Compare with section 16(5), which states that an applicant for a prospecting right must submit the 
results of the consultations to the Regional Manager.   
191  Section 69(2)(a) read with section 10(1)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
192  Section 69(2)(a) read with section 10(2) of the MPRD Act.   
193  Section 5(4)(c) of the MPRD Act, before amendment.   
194  In respect of prospecting rights or mining permits, the MPRD Act requires the applicant to consult 
with landowners, lawful occupiers or affected parties.  See section 16(4)(b) and section 27(5)(b).  
In respect of mining rigths, the MPRD Act requires the applicant to consult with interested and 
affected parties.  See section 22(4)(b).   
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where the operations are to take place.195  “Interested parties” on the other hand refers 
to any person with a lawful interest in the land, such as the owner or lawful occupier.196  
The third set of consultation requires the holder only to consult with the owner or 
lawful occupier and is thus much narrower than the first set of consultations.   
The Constitutional Court in South Africa has stated that the various different 
requirements of notification and consultations are indicative of “a serious concern for 
the rights and interests of landowners and lawful occupiers”.197  After the amendment, 
however, the MPRD Act has done away with the third set of consultations.  Now, once 
an applicant has been awarded a permit or right, he may not conduct any 
reconnaissance operations, explorations operations or production operations or 
commence with any work incidental thereto on any area without giving the landowner 
or lawful occupier in question at least 21 days’ written notice.198  The first set of 
consultations – those by an applicant with affected parties – and the second set – 
notification to interested and affected parties – remain in place.   
In Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd and 
Others, the Constitutional Court held that one of the purpose of consultations with the 
landowner “must surely be to see whether some accommodation is possible between 
the applicant for a [right to minerals or petroleum] and the landowner insofar as the 
interference with the landowner’s rights to use the property is concerned.”199  The 
purpose of the consultations is further to provide landowners or occupiers with the 
necessary relevant information on everything that is to be done on the property so that 
the landowners can make an informed decision in relation to the representations to be 
made, whether to use internal appeal procedures or whether to take the administrative 
action on review.200   
Given the purpose of consultations, the Constitutional Court in Bengwenyama  set out 
various criteria with which the first consultation process (consultation by the applicant 
                                                          
195  SA Soutwerke (Pty) Ltd v Saamwerk Soutwerke (Pty) Ltd and Others [2011] 4 All SA 168 (SCA) 
at [31].   
196  SA Soutwerke / Saamwerk Soutwerke (note 195) at [30]. 
197  Bengwenyama Minerals / Genorah (note 187) at [63]. 
198  Section 5A(c) of the MPRD Act.   
199  Bengwenyama Minerals / Genorah (note 187) at [65]. 
200  Bengwenyama Minerals / Genorah (note 187) at [66]. 
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with affected parties) must comply.  These criteria apply to rights to petroleum as well.  
First, the applicant must inform the landowner in writing that his application for a 
permit or right which affects the owner’s land has been accepted for consideration by 
the designated agency.  Secondly, the applicant must inform the landowner in sufficient 
detail of what the operations on the land will entail, for the landowner to ssess what 
impact the operations will have on the landowner’s use of the land.  Thirdly, the 
applicant must consult with the landowner with a view to reach an agreement to the 
satisfaction of both parties in regard to the impact of the proposed operations.  Finally, 
the applicant must submit the results of the consultation process to the designated 
agency.201  
In Namibia, there is no express obligations to consult with landowners on either an 
applicant for or holder of a right in respect of petroleum.  It merely requires the holder 
of a petroleum licence to give the owner or occupier of the land affected by the licence 
prior written notice before commencing any operations.202  Similarly, under the 
Namibian Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act 33 of 1992, there is also no duty to 
consult with landowners.  However, the holder of a prospecting or mining licence may 
not exercise any rights in terms of its licence before entering into an agreement with the 
landowner setting out provisions relating to access and compensation.203  No similar 
provision exists in the Petroleum Act, although there are indications that the legislature 
may have intended the holder to enter into some time of arrangement with the owner.  
For example, the Petroleum Act states that where it is reasonably necessary for the 
holder of a production right to enter onto private land to carry out any lawful operations 
or other authorised activities but the holder is prevented from doing so by the owner, 
the holder may apply to the Petroleum Ancillary Rights Commission for access. The 
same applies if the owner makes unreasonable demands in exchange for access.204  The 
Commission must then inquire into the matter.205  Any person whose rights may be 
affected by a decision by the Commission is entitled to be heard at a hearing of the 
                                                          
201  Bengwenyama Minerals / Genorah (note 187) at [67]. 
202  Sectoin 60(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
203  Section 52(1)(a)(i) of the Minerals (Prospecting and Mining) Act 33 of 1992.   
204  Section 56(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
205  Section 57(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
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Commission.206  If the parties cannot agree on compensation to be paid to the owner, 
the Commission may determine compensation.207 
Under the Petroleum Act, therefore, there is a very limited scope where interested 
parties are heard – only when there is a dispute between the holder and landowner in 
respect of access.  Nevertheless, no petroleum licence may be issued before the holder 
obtains an ECC.  Part of the application for an ECC requires consultation with 
interested and affected parties.  This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
2.1.3.7 Right of Access to Information 
Access to information is key in just administration,208 and “is one of the most effective 
ways of upholding the constitutional values of transparency, openness, participation 
and accountability.”209  As a central element of transparency, it may also curb 
corruption,210 which is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.  Disclosure of 
information held by the government is also believed to enhance citizen confidence in 
government as it promotes government accountability towards its citizens.211 
Access to information is particularly important for the petroleum industry of South 
Africa.  Because of the historic economic sanctions in South Africa, its petroleum 
industry was shrouded in secrecy.212  This situation was maintained by the fact that the 
state traditionally reserved the entitlements to petroleum for itself, with the state 
                                                          
206  Section 57(2) of the Petroleum Act.   
207  Section 59(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
208  See for example Baxter (note 76) at 233, where the learned author states that “[s]ecrecy is an 
undoubted cause of maladministration…”.   
209  Hoexter (note 59) at 94. 
210  Stiglitz J "What Is the Role of the State?" in Humphreys M, Sachs JD and Stiglitz JE (eds) 
Escaping the Resource Curse (2007) New York Columbia University Press at 26.   
211  Maina H “Disclosure vs Secrecy: What is the Right Balance” Briefing Paper: Access to 
Information as a Tool for Socio-Economic Justice [available at 
http://www.ippr.org.na/sites/default/files/ATI%20Disclosure%20v%20Secrecy%20Briefing%20P
aper.pdf, accessed 11 April 2015] at 1.   
212  Cawood F “Can South Africa Improve its National Petroleum Strategy?” (2008) Research Paper 
presented as part of LLM, Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, University 
of Dundee at 3.   
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petroleum company (PetroSA) mainly producing petroleum and allowing very few 
companies to compete with it.213   
The right to be given reasons for administrative decisions has already been discussed 
above as part of procedural fairness.  This right, however, only vests in the person in 
respect of whom a decision is made.  To promote transparency, a wider right of access 
to information needs to be recognised.   
Before the South African Constitution came into operation, there was general support 
for maintaining secrecy in government.214  Now, the South African Constitutes 
recognises that everyone has a right of access to information held by the state and any 
information held by any other person that is required for the exercise or protection of 
any rights.215  The South African Constitution therefore guarantees transparency 
through the free flow of information.216 As with the right to just administrative action, 
national legislation must be enacted to give effect to the right of access to 
information.217  To this effect, the legislature passed the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act (“PAIA”).218   
The Preamble of PAIA recognises that, before 27 April 2004, the system of government 
in South Africa resulted in a secretive and unresponsive culture in public and private 
bodies which often led to an abuse of power and human rights violations.219  The 
purpose of PAIA is foster a culture of transparency and accountability in public and 
private bodies by giving effect to the right of access to information.220  The emphasis of 
PAIA is on access to information rather than data protection or privacy.221   
PAIA applies to any “record”, which is defined as any recorded information, regardless 
of form or medium, which is in the possession or under the control of a public or 
                                                          
213  Cawood F “Allocation of Petroleum Development Rights in South Africa: A Comparison with 
Current International Practices” (2006) Research Paper presented as part of LLM, Centre for 
Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, University of Dundee at 3. 
214  Hoexter (note 59) at 95. 
215  Section 32(1) of the South African Constitution.   
216  Hughes (note 66) 4. 
217  Section 32(2) of the South African Constitution.  The legislation may provide for reasonable 
measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state.   
218  Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (“PAIA”). 
219  Preamble to the PAIA. 
220  Preamble to the PAIA. 
221  Hoexter (note 59) at 96.   
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private body and irrespective of whether it was created by that body.222  When the 
record came into existence is irrelevant.223  It does not, however, apply to records 
requested for criminal or civil proceedings after commencement of the proceedings.224  
For this, the normal rules of discovery in procedural law still apply.225 
Part 2 of PAIA deals with access to records of public bodies.  Any person requesting 
information from a public body must be given access to that information if the 
requester complies with the procedural requirements of PAIA and access to that record 
is not refused in terms of any ground for refusal contemplated in PAIA.226 A “public 
body” means any department of state or administration in the national or provincial 
sphere of government or any municipality in the local sphere of government.227  It also 
includes any other functionary or institution when exercising a power or performing a 
duty in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution or exercising a public 
power of performing a public function in terms of any legislation.228  Records from 
certain public bodies or officials are excluded from the provisions of the PAIA.229   
Part 3 of PAIA deals with access to records of private bodies.  Any person requesting 
information from a private body must be given access to the record if that record is 
required for the exercise or protection of any rights, the requester complies with the 
formal procedural requirements in terms of PAIA and access to that record is not 
refused in terms of any of the grounds of refusal contemplated in PAIA.230 
PAIA is an important step towards transparency and ultimately accountability.  The 
right of access to information, however, is facing a serious challenge in the form of the 
                                                          
222  Section 1 of the PAIA; Hoexter (note 59) at 97. 
223  Section 3 of the PAIA; Hoexter (note 59) at 97.  
224  Section 7(1) of the PAIA. 
225  Hoexter (note 59) at 97. 
226  Section 11(1) of the PAIA. 
227  Section 1 of the PAIA. 
228  Section 1 of the PAIA. 
229  Section 12 of the PAIA.  This includes records of the Cabinet and its committees, records relating 
to the judicial functions of a court referred to in section 166 of the Constitution, a Special Tribunal 
established in terms of section 2 of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act 74 
of 1996 or a judicial officer of such court or Special Tribunal.  It also includes records of an 
individual member of Parliament or of a provincial legislature in that capacity or relating to a 
decision regarding the nomination, selection or appointment of a judicial officer or any other 
person by the Judicial Service Commission in terms of any law. 
230  Section 50(1) of the PAIA. 
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Protection of State Information Bill,231 colloquially referred to as the “Secrecy Bill”.  
This Bill inter alia confers upon organs of state very wide powers to classify and to 
withhold information on security grounds.232  In its current form, the Bill is “hopelessly 
flawed and unlikely to pass constitutional scrutiny.”233 
The MPRD Act also deals with disclosure of information.  Any information or data 
submitted by holders of reconnaissance permits, exploration rights and production 
rights to the designated agency may be disclosed to any person to promote certain goals 
of the MPRD Act.  These goals pertain to the promotion of equitable access to 
petroleum resources. Their purpose is to expand substantially and meaningfully 
opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons to enter into and actively 
participate in the petroleum industry.  The purpose of these goals is further allow 
historically disadvantaged persons to benefit from the exploitation of the petroleum 
resources of South Africa and to promote economic growth and petroleum resources 
development in South Africa.234  The information may also be disclosed to any person 
to give effect to the constitutional right of access to information.235  If the information 
is already publicly available, it may also be disclosed to any person.236  Finally, the 
information may also be disclosed to any person once the relevant right or permit has 
lapsed or been cancelled or the area to which the right or permit relates has been 
abandoned or relinquished.237  Any information or data supplied in confidence may not 
be disclosed.238 
Unlike the South African Constitution, the Namibian Constitution contains no right to 
access of information.  There is also no act dealing with access to information.  In this 
respect, Namibia is far behind South Africa when it comes to transparency.  For 
example, the former Apartheid-era’s Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982 is still 
                                                          
231  Protection of State Information Bill, B6-2010.  See Hoexter (note 59) at 102. 
232  Hoexter (note 59) at 102. 
233  Hoexter (note 59) at 102. 
234  Section 30(1)(a) read with section 69(2) and section 2(c)–(e) of the MPRD Act.   
235  Section 30(1)(b) read with section 69(2) of the MPRD Act.   
236  Section 30(1)(c) read with section 69(2) of the MPRD Act.   
237  Section 30(1)(d) read with section 69(2) of the MPRD Act. 
238  Section 30(2) read with section 69(2) of the MPRD Act.   
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applicable in Namibia.  This Act seeks to promote the protection of state information in 
respect of prohibited places.239   
Contrary to the access of information provided for in the MPRD Act, the Petroleum Act 
promotes secrecy.240  The Commissioner, the Chief Inspector and any other officer 
employed in the Ministry of Mines and Energy, whether or not involved in carrying out 
the provisions of the Petroleum Act, must preserve and aid in preserving secrecy in 
relation to all matters that may come to his knowledge in the exercise of his powers or 
the performance of his duties and functions in connection with those provisions.241  He 
may not communicate any such matter to any other person or permit any person to have 
access to any documents in his possession or custody, except in so far as any such 
communication is required by or may be made under the Petroleum Act or any other 
law or by order of a competent court.242  Failure to comply with this provision is a 
criminal offence.243 
Notwithstanding the above, there are few measures still available to gain access to 
information.  Firstly, when an administrative decision is taken on review, it is done in 
terms of Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of the High Court of South Africa and Rule 76 
of the Namibian High Court Rules.  A review application is brought by way of Notice 
of Motion, which must call on the administrator to despatch, within 15 days after 
receipt of the Notice of Motion, to the Registrar of the High Court the record of the 
proceedings sought to be corrected or set aside.244  It must be accompanied by reasons 
                                                          
239  A “prohibited place” is defined in section 1 of the Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982 as 
“(a) any work of defence belonging to or occupied or used by or on behalf of the Government, 
including-(i) any arsenal, military establishment or station, factory, dockyard, camp, ship, vessel 
or aircraft; (ii) any telegraph, telephone, radio or signal station or office; and (iii) any place used 
for building, repairing, making, keeping or obtaining armaments or any model or document 
relating thereto; (b) any place where armaments or any model or document relating thereto is 
being built, repaired, made, kept or obtained under contract with or on behalf of the Government 
of the government or of any foreign State; (c) any place or area declared under section 14 to be a 
prohibited place”. 
240  Hopwood G Namibia’s New Frontiers: Transparency and Accountability in Extractive Industry 
Exploration (2013) Windhoek Institute for Public Policy Research at 5, where the author states 
that “…there are aspects of Namibia’s management of its oil, gas, and mineral resources that are 
at best opaque and at worst highly secretive.”   
241  Section 5(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
242  Section 5(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
243  Section 5(2) of the Petroleum Act. 
244  Rule 53(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of the High Court of South Africa and Rule 76(2)(b) of the 
Namibian High Court Rules.   
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for the decision.245  The administrator must make available all information on which his 
decision was based.  Furthermore, the rules of discovery in criminal and civil 
proceedings also apply.246  The right to discovery in review proceedings only arise, 
however, once review proceedings have been instituted, which proceedings are often 
expensive and time-consuming.  Furthermore, a review may only be instituted by a 
party with the required locus standi, so this right of discovery is only afforded to an 
applicant with the necessary standing, and not the broader public or citizenry of a 
country.   
Disclosure of information relating to petroleum revenue specifically is “central to the 
discourse of transparency in revenue management.”247  Mismanagement of extractive 
revenues, coupled with corruption, is becoming a obstinate social problem that many 
developing countries are confronting.248  Transparency in revenue management can be 
facilitated by disclosing basic information on the revenue distribution from petroleum 
resources and making this information public.249  Ensuring that information about 
extractive industry revenues is released will enable all stakeholders to monitor and 
ensure that people benefit from petroleum resources.250  While South Africa and 
Namibia do not expressly require disclosure of petroleum revenue, they generally have 
open budgets compared to international standard, as discussed in Chapter Seven above. 
2.1.3.6 Administrative Appeal and Judicial Review 
Under common law, the right to seek judicial review may be suspended or deferred 
until the applicant has exhausted internal remedies which may have been created by the 
legislature.251  This, however, depended on whether or not the statute intended internal 
remedies to be exhausted before approaching a court.252   
                                                          
245  Rule 53(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules of the High Court of South Africa and Rule 76(2)(b) of the 
Namibian High Court Rules. 
246  See for example S v Angula and Others; S v Lucas 1996 NR 323 (HC). 
247  Al Faruque A “Transparency in Extractive Revenues in Developing Countries and Economies in 
Transition: A Review of Emerging Best Practices” (2006) Journal of Energy and Natural 
Resources Law 66 at 86.   
248  Al Faruque (note 247) at 66. 
249  Al Faruque (note 247) at 68. 
250  Hopwood (note 240) at 6.   
251  Baxter (note 76) at 720.  See for example Shames v South African Railways and Harbours 1922 
AD 228 at 235–236, where the Appellate Division stated as follows:  “But the question still 
remains at what stage of the proceedings is it competent for an aggrieved servant to have recourse 
 
Chapter Nine 






On the other hand, the existence of special statutory remedies under common law has 
sometimes been regarded as replacing or excluding the common-law remedy of 
review.253  The possibility of special statutory remedies “ousting” the jurisdiction of the 
courts may under modern South African and Namibian law not pass constitutional 
muster, especially in the light of the fact that the right to just administrative action is 
entrenched as a fundamental right in both countries.254   
Both the Constitutional Court in South Africa and the Supreme Court in Namibia 
support the common-law view that internal remedies may defer or suspend the right to 
seek judicial redress, depending on how the relevant statute is constructed.255  
Sometimes a statute expressly requires that internal remedies be exhausted before 
approaching a court.  It is, however, more common that the statute does not expressly 
require an applicant to exhaust internal remedies before approaching a court and one 
therefore has to determine whether it implicitly requires exhaustion of internal 
remedies.256   
Even if a statute provides for internal remedies, it is not to say that the statute requires 
that these remedies must be exhausted before redress is had to court.257  For example, 
an applicant cannot be expected first to exhaust internal remedies where these remedies 
would not be effective or whether their pursuit would be futile.258  This is also the case 
where the appeal tribunal has developed a rigid policy which renders exhaustion of 
internal remedies futile.259  PAJA supports this view and states that internal remedies 
must first be exhausted, unless under exceptional circumstances and on application by 
                                                                                                                                                                         
to a court of law. Is he entitled to do so at the initial stage, so soon as a penalty has been inflicted 
upon him, or only at the final stage when he has exhausted all the remedies which under the Act 
are open to him? This is a question which has not been dealt with in any of the decided cases, so 
far as I am aware, but I am clearly of opinion that it is only if the irregularity or illegality has been 
persisted in up to the final stage that it is competent to the servant to take legal proceedings.” 
252  Baxter (note 76) at 720. 
253  Hoexter (note 59) at 581.  See for example Shames (note 251) at 233–234.     
254  See also Hoexter (note 59) at 582. 
255  See Koyobe and Others v Minister for Home Affairs and Others (Lawyers for Human Rights as 
Amicus Curiae) 2010 (4) SA 327 (CC) at [38] and  Namibian Competition Commission and 
Another v Wal-Mart Stores Incorporated 2012 (1) NR 69 (SC) at [43]–[66]. 
256  Namibian Competition Commission (note 255) at [45]. 
257  Namibian Competition Commission (note 255) at [45]; Koyobe (note 255) at [38]. 
258  Namibian Competition Commission (note 255) at [47]; Koyobe (note 255) at [39]. 
259  Koyobe (note 255) at [39]. 
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the person concerned such person is exempted from the obligation to exhaust internal 
remedies if the court deems it to be in the interest of justice.260          
The MPRD Act provides for internal appeal process.  It states that any person whose 
right or legitimate expectations have been materially or adversely affected or who is 
aggrieved by any administrative action under the MPRD Act, may take the decision on 
appeal within 30 days of becoming aware of the decision.261  The appeal must be 
lodged in the prescribed manner.262  Where a decision was taken by a Regional 
Manager or any person to whom the power has been delegated or a duty has been 
assigned to under the MPRD Act, the decision must be taken on appeal to the Director-
General.263  Where a decision was taken by the Director-General or the designated 
agency, the decision must be taken on appeal to the Minister of Mineral Resources.264  
A decision taken on appeal is not suspended unless the Director-General or Minister 
suspends the decision and any subsequent application under the MPRD Act must be 
suspended pending finalisation of the appeal.265 
The seemingly clear position on internal appeals depends, however, becomes slightly 
more complicated where the Regional Manager or Director-General takes a decision on 
delegated authority.  Here, the question whether the authority was delegated by a 
decentralisation or deconcentration of public power comes into play again.  For 
example, in Global Pact Trading 207 (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Minerals and Energy and 
Others266 the Director-General took an administrative decision based on authority 
delegated to through a deconcentration of public power.  The decision was therefore 
taken by the Director-General on behalf of the Minister and the court found that no 
internal appeal was possible as the decision was considered to be a decision of the 
Minister.267 
                                                          
260  Section 7(2) of PAJA.   
261  Section 96(1) of the MPRD Act.   
262 Section 96(1) of the MPRD Act.  Regulation 74 of the MPRD Regulations deals with the manner 
of lodging appeals.   
263  Section 96(1)(a) of the MPRD Act. 
264  Section 96(1)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
265  Section 96(2) of the MPRD Act.   
266  Global Pact / Minister of Minerals and Energy (note 92). 
267  Global Pact / Minister of Minerals and Energy (note 92) at [8]. 
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The MPRD Act explicitly requires that the internal appeal process be followed before a 
person applies to court for the review of the administrative action.268  As we have seen 
above, the South African courts will defer or suspend an application for review of an 
administrative decision under the MPRD Act until the internal remedies have been 
exhausted.  Under exceptional circumstances, and in terms of PAJA, an applicant may 
be allowed to proceed with a review application before exhausting his internal remedies 
under the MPRD Act.   
The Petroleum Act in Namibia also provides for internal remedies.  So, for example, 
the Petroleum Act provides for the general powers of the Commissioner and Chief-
Inspector with regard to inspections, investigations, inquiries, searches and seizures.269  
Any person who feels aggrieved by a direction, order or restriction issued to or imposed 
upon him by the Commissioner, Chief-Inspector or any officer engaged in carrying out 
these powers may appeal in writing, in the case of a direction, order or restriction issued 
or imposed by the Commissioner or the Chief Inspector, to the Minister of Mines and 
Energy or, in the case of any other direction, order or restriction, to the Commissioner 
against such direction, order or restriction.270  The Minister or Commissioner, whatever 
the case may be, must as soon as practicable hear and dispose of the appeal.271  A 
decision by the Minister or Commissioner on an appeal is final.272  The direction, order 
or restriction in question is not suspended pending finalisation of the appeal.273 
Further to the above, the Petroleum Act also contains a general right of appeal.274  Any 
person who feels aggrieved by a decision of the Commission has the right to appeal to 
the High Court of Namibia, which appeal is to be treated similar to an appeal from the 
magistrates’ court.275  This clause does not apply to appeal decisions taken by the 
Commissioner, as the Petroleum Act clearly states that these decisions are final.  This 
clause, however, applies to all other decisions of the Commissioner.   
                                                          
268  Section 96(3) of the MPRD Act.   
269  Section 4 of the Petroleum Act.   
270  Section 4(3)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
271  Section 4(3)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
272  Section 4(3)(a) of the Petroleum Act.   
273  Section 4(3)(b) of the Petroleum Act.   
274  Section 61 of the Petroleum Act.   
275  Section 61 of the Petroleum Act.   
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The right of a person to take an appeal decision of the Commissioner or Minister on 
review to the High Court is ousted by the Petroleum Act, which states that this decision 
will be final.  It is doubtful, however, whether this clause is constitutional in the light of 
the constitutional right to just administrative action.  The constitutionality of this 
section has, however, not been tested by the courts in Namibia.     
Aside from the above, the right to approach a court on judicial review is not excluded, 
nor is there any indication in the Petroleum Act that internal remedies must first be 
exhausted.  In cases of decisions by the Commissioner, courts may require an applicant 
first to exhaust the internal right of appeal, provided that this will be an effective 
remedy.  For decisions by the Minister, there are no internal remedies. 
2.1.4 Assessment of the Right to Just Administrative Action 
All persons have the right to petroleum being administered lawfully, reasonably and 
procedurally fair.  This is guaranteed by the Constitutions of both South Africa and 
Namibia.  South Africa has gone one step further and enacted legislation specifically 
dealing with the enforcement of the common-law and constitutional right of just 
administrative action.  
When the state, through its designated agents and officers, administers petroleum 
resources, it is performing administrative functions and its actions must be lawful.  
Administrators must be properly authorised to deal with and make decisions in respect 
of petroleum.  This is particularly important where the administrator taking the decision 
has delegated authority to act.  The administrator must also have the proper jurisdiction 
to make decisions in respect of petroleum.  While the administrators often have 
discretion to make decisions in respect of petroleum, this discretion must be exercised 
within the confines of the right to just administrative action.  Any administrato who 
fails to do so whil be acting contrary to the principles of just administrative action and a 
person affected by the decision may apply to court for the necessary relief.  Therefore, 
by requiring a functionary to act lawful, the framework for just administrative action 
ensures accountability should the functionary fail to do so. 
Lawfulness aside, the decisions taken in respect of petroleum must be reasonable.  This 
means firstly that there must be a rational connection between the action itself and the 
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purpose for which it was taken, the purpose of the empowering provision, the 
information before the administrator or the reasons given for it by the administrator.  
For this reason, persons affected by the decision are entitled to be given reasons by the 
administrator for the decision.  The right to be given reasons not only promotes 
transparency by divulging the reasons for which a decision was taken, but also 
promotes accountability.  By forcing an administrator to give reasons for his decision 
and making it possible to take the administrator on review if he fails to do so or if the 
reasons reflect unreasonableness, the administration is held accountable for its action.  
Lawfulness also requires proportionality, which means that a balance must be struck 
between the adverse and beneficial effects of administrative action and to encourage the 
administrator to consider the need for the action and the possibility of using less drastic 
or oppressive means to achieve the desired end.      
The final element of just administrative action is procedural fairness.  It requires 
administrators inter alia to grant persons affected by a decision to make 
representations.  Procedural fairness also requires administrators to be impartial and act 
in good faith in making their decisions.  Procedural fairness therefore ensures that 
interests of persons affected by an administrative decision is protected.  By establishing 
fundamental principles of a fair procedure, transparency in the administration of 
petroleum is ensured.  Furthermore, failure to adhere to fair procedure renders an 
administrative decision subject to review, thus ensuring accountability. 
The limitations placed on the state in terms of just administrative action and access to 
information operate within clearly set parameters, and hence are, in themselves, 
restricted. Often the functioning of these limits depend on actions expected to be taken 
by those parties in whose interests they function. For instance, before approaching a 
court for review, an aggrieved person is advised (and under some circumstances 
required) to exhaust all available internal remedies, depending on how the statutory 
provisions are formulated.  The MPRD Act explicitly requires a person affected by a 
decision taken in terms of the Act to use internal remedies before approaching a court.  
The Petroleum Act does not contain similar provisions.   
Another example may be taken from recent developments around the right of access to 
information in South Africa. As illustrated, this right is important in ensuring 
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transparency and accountability in the regulatory framework for petroleum resources 
and increases the presence of these elements greatly within the petroleum industry.276  
In South Africa, this right is entrenched in the Constitution and legislation in the form 
of PAIA has been passed to give effect to this right.  While this has been an important 
step towards ensuring transparency and accountability, this right is under threat in the 
form of the Secrecy Bill.277 
In Namibia, there is no explicit right of access to information.  In fact, the regulatory 
framework for petroleum resources in Namibia seems to promote secrecy rather than 
transparency.  There are few instances where a person may establish and exercise a 
right of access to information, for example through discovery procedures.  What is 
clear, however, is that more is required to ensure a right of access to information.              
The right of just administrative action and the right of access to information not only 
give content to regulatory framework for petroleum resources, but go further to ensure 
greater transparency and accountability.  However, the civil remedies provided by the 
right to administrative justice and the right to information cannot by themselves 
promote transparency and accountability.  Corrupt practices, which are prevalent in the 
petroleum industry, need to be combated and punished as well.  The sudden (and 
sometimes short-lived) financial success resulting from an oil find increases the 
opportunity for corruption in the host government, where officials could use this 
opportunity and their control over the flow of funds to keep themselves in power.278  
Corruption related to natural resources, particularly oil and gas, takes many forms, 
including bribery of officials in charge of controlling petroleum resources to obtain 
access to petroleum or to purchase petroleum at below market-related prices.279  The 
analysis above has shown that corruption needs to be addressed.  Both South Africa and 
Namibia criminalises corrupt practices.  But merely prohibiting it is not enough.  
Measures must also be put in place to combat corruption actively, thereby promoting 
transparency and accountability.  In Namibia, the Anti-Corruption Commission has 
shown some success in combating corruption and educating the public on corruption.  
                                                          
276  Hughes (note 66) at 4. 
277  See paragraph 3 above. 
278  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 4) at 10–11. 
279  Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz (note 4) at 11. 
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No similar body is established in South Africa, but there are indications that 
government is looking at reintroducing such a body.  Furthermore, private organisations 
have taken it on themselves to follow and report on corruption in both South Africa and 
Namibia, which goes great lengths in promoting transparency and accountability.280 
The right to just administrative action, including the right to access to information, 
ensures that the regulatory framework for petroleum resources is transparent and that 
the state is held accountable to its citizens and to stakeholders in the industry.  A proper 
framework for just administrative goes a long way to ensure that the petroleum industry 
operates on a transparent basis in that all affected parties have recourse in the event of 
maladministration of these resources.   
The South African and Namibian regulatory regimes have reached a point where a 
proper administrative framework promoting just administrative action is in place.  
Petroleum companies and affected persons can call upon the principles of just 
administrative action to enforce their rights and ensure that petroleum resources are 
administered properly.   
There is, however, room for improvement.  The current situation in Namibia insofar as 
it relates to access to information is untenable and not conducive towards a transparent 
and accountable regulatory regime for petroleum exploitation.281  The same applies to 
the lack of regulation of extractive revenue in both South Africa and Namibia.282  These 
two countries may do well to learn from their African counterpart, Ghana, who adopted 
the Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2011, which ensures that petroleum 
revenue is made available to finance the development of other sectors, such as 
agriculture health and education.283    
2.2 Control over Corruption 
The right to just administrative action and the right of access to information go far to 
promote transparency and accountability in the regulation of petroleum.  However, 
                                                          
280  See paragraph 4.4 above. 
281  Hopwood (note 240) at 6 – 7. 
282  See also Cameron P “Drafting Oil and Gas Laws: Current Issues” September 2014 Oil and Gas 
Law Newsletter 8 at 9.   
283  See the Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2011 (Act 815) of Ghana.  See also Hopwood 
(note 240) at 22. 
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corrupt practices are at the core of underdevelopment284 and have become a major issue 
in the petroleum industry and one of the greatest threats to accountability and 
transparency in the sector.  Post-colonial Africa is one of the hardest-hit victims of 
corruption.285  Corruption is a reality in South Africa and Namibia.  According to the 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 (the CPI 2012), published by Transparency 
International, South Africa ranked 69th and Namibia 58th on the corruption scale, with 
respective scores of 43 and 48.286 
Corruption is a “complex phenomenon” and often the consequence of more deep-rooted 
problems of policy distortion, institutional incentives and governance.287  The High 
Court in South Africa, quoted in the Supreme Court of Appeal,288 has in no uncertain 
terms stated quite clearly what its view on corruption is and has likened it to a cancer 
“eating away remorselessly at the fabric of corporate probity and extending its baleful 
effect into all aspects of administrative functions, whether State official or private- 
sector manager.”289  
Merely criminalising or prohibiting corrupt practices is not sufficient; effective efforts 
to combat corruption must be put in place.290  Also, there must be better understanding 
of the underlying causes of the corruption.291   
                                                          
284  Wokoro JNE “Beyond Petroleum Production to Community Development: International Oil 
Companies as Proxy Governments” 2009-2010 (5) Texas Journal of Oil, Gas and Energy Law 
323 at 344; Al Faruque (note 247) at 66. 
285  Van der Walt B "Corruption: A Many-headed Monster" 2001 (66) Koers 691 at 691, where the 
author also states that “[d]espite great assets, Africa makes slow progress because of the slow 
bleeding of the festering wound of corruption.” 
286  With zero being highly corrupt and 100 being very clean.  See Transparency International 
“Corruption Perceptions Index” available at http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/ results [accessed 
02.02.2014].   
287  Schloss M "Combating Corruption - Moving from Words to Deeds" 2003 (I) Oil, Gas and Energy 
Law Intelligence 2 at 2. 
288  S v Shaik and Others 2007 (1) SACR 247 (SCA) at [50]. 
289  S v Shaik and Others 2007 (1) SACR 142 (D) at 239.  The Court continued as follows: “If it is not 
checked, it becomes systemic and the after-effects of systemic corruption can quite readily extend 
to the corrosion of any confidence in the integrity of anyone who has a duty to discharge, 
especially a duty to discharge to the public, leading eventually, and unavoidably, to a disaffected 
populace. One can, hopefully, discount the prospect of it happening in this country. But it is that 
sort of increasing disaffection which leads, and has led in other parts of our continent and 
elsewhere, to coups d'état or the rise of Populist leaders who, in turn, manipulate politics for even 
greater private benefit.” 
290  Schloss (note 287) at 2. 
291  Schloss (note 287) at 3. 
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A culture of openness and accountability will not develop on its own, but needs to be 
underpinned by appropriate legislative measures.292  To ensure transparency and 
accountability, the regulatory framework for petroleum resources needs to address 
corruption.  However, corruption also has a significant effect on the contribution that 
the petroleum industry to the broader economy, since the misallocation of government 
resources and efforts is the unavoidable result of corruption.293  It is therefore important 
that a general regulatory framework combating and punishing corruption is in place.  
Proper control over corruption is vital in ensuring that the people benefit from the 
exploitation of petroleum resources.  But it is not only necessary to criminalise corrupt 
practices.  Measures must also be put in place to ensure that corruption, and attempts at 
corruption, are combatted and punished. 
2.2.1 The Framework for Corruption Control  
Modern South African and Namibian legislation punish corrupt practices, which is 
much wider than and includes bribery.  In South Africa, corrupt activities are regulated 
by the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (“Corrupt 
Activities Act”).  This Act repeals the Corruption Act 94 of 1992.  Before the 1992-
Act, however, corruption was dealt with in terms of the Prevention of Corruption Act of 
1918 and the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1958, which existed alongside the 
common-law relating to bribery294 and corruption.295 The Corrupt Activities Act is a 
                                                          
292  Hopwood (note 240) at 6. 
293  Lokanc M The Extractive Industries as a Primer for Economic Growth – Getting Around the 
Resource Curse (unpublished MSc-thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 2008) at 79. 
294  Nathan M The Common Law of South Africa Volume 4 (1907) Grahamstown African Book 
Company, Limited at 2464 defines bribery as follows: “All persons who give or promise anything 
by way of gifts, presents or rewards to officers of Government, Judges and officers of the superior 
and inferior Courts of justice, to magistrates, or to the wives, children or other near relatives of 
such officers, Judges, or magistrates, with the intent to induce such officers, Judges or magistrates 
to perform any act or to abstain from doing any act, or otherwise to influence them in their official 
or judicial capacity, or with the intent to obtain any office, whether for the benefit of the person 
giving or promising the same or for other reasons, are guilty of bribery.”  See however Rex v 
Vaunson 1919 TPD 16 at 18 where the court found that a gift to the daughter of a public official 
did not amount to bribery.  The court did acknowledge, however, that this may open the door “to 
something rather allied to bribery”, but that this is a matter for the Legislature and not for the 
courts. 
295  The common-law crime of bribery is committed by both the person tending the advantage and the 
person accepting the advantage. Nathan (note 294) at 2464. S v Benson Aaron 1893 H 125 at 129 
to 131 and the authorities cited there. Bribery as a form of corrupt practices was punishable under 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The basic principles of bribery as applied in Roman law and 
developed under Roman-Dutch law were received in South Africa and Namibia as well.  The 
common-law crime of bribery as applied in South Africa and Namibia may be defined as “the 
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drastic (and by some described as draconic) deviation from the previous statutes.296  It 
provides for the strengthening of measures to prevent and combat corruption and 
corrupt activities.297   
The Anti-Corruption Act 8 of 2003 (“Anti-Corruption Act”) in Namibia intends to 
provide for the prevention and punishment of corruption in Namibia.298  This Act 
provides for the prevention and punishment of corruption.299  It repeals the Prevention 
of Corruption Ordinance 2 of 1928 and the Prevention of Corruption Amendment Act 
21 of 1985. 
Both the Corrupt Activities Act in South Africa and the Anti-Corruption Act in 
Namibia create a general offence of corruption.300  This offence is generally committed 
by any person who directly or indirectly and corruptly301 receives or agrees to receive 
any gratification as an inducement or reward for doing or omitting to do anything.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                         
practice of tendering (and accepting) a private advantage as a reward for the performance of a 
duty.” Burchell J and Milton J Principles of Criminal Law 3 ed (2005) Lansdowne Juta and 
Company Ltd at 889. 
296  Lambrechts D, "The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act as an Ivestigative 
Instrument Pertaining to Bribery and Corruption" 2004 (17) Acta Criminologica 106 at 117. 
297  See the long title to the Corrupt Activities Act. 
298  Long title to the Anti-Corruption Act. 
299  Long title to the Anti-Corruption Act.   
300  Section 3 of the Anti-Corruption Act and section 3 of the Corrupt Activities Act.  This section 
reads as follows: “Any person who, directly or indirectly (a) accepts or agrees or offers to accept 
any gratification from any other person, whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the 
benefit of another person; or (b) gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any 
gratification, whether for the benefit of that other person or for the benefit of another person, to 
act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner (i) that amounts to the (aa) 
illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, or biased; or (bb) misuse or selling of information or 
material acquired in the course of the, exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, duties 
or functions arising out of a constitutional, statutory, contractual or any other legal obligation; (ii) 
that amounts to (aa) the abuse of a position of authority; (bb) a breach of trust; or (cc) the 
violation of a legal duty or a set of rules, (iii) designed to achieve an unjustified result; or (iv) that 
amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do or not to do anything, is guilty 
of the offence of corruption.” 
301  In terms of section 3 of the Corrupt Activities Act, it activity amounts to corruption if the person 
receives the gratification as an inducement to act in a manner (i) that amounts to the (aa) illegal, 
dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, or biased; or (bb) misuse or selling of information or 
material acquired in the course of the, exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, duties 
or functions arising out of a constitutional, statutory, contractual or any other legal obligation; (ii) 
that amounts to (aa) the abuse of a position of authority; (bb) a breach of trust; or (cc) the 
violation of a legal duty or a set of rules, (iii) designed to achieve an unjustified result; or (iv) that 
amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do or not to do anything.  Section 
32 of the Anti-Corruption Act defines “corruptly” as “in contravention of or against the spirit of 
any law, provision, rule, procedure, process, system, policy, practice, directive, order or any other 
term or condition pertaining to (a) any employment relationship; (b) any agreement; or (c) the 
performance of any function in whatever capacity”. 
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offence is also committed by the person corruptly giving or agreeing to give the 
gratification.302  The ambit of the general crime of corruption in both countries is very 
wide and includes attempts at corruption as well.  It is also not limited to dealings with 
public officials only, but includes commercial corruption as well.303   
Both the Corrupt Activities Act and the Anti-Corruption Act create specific crimes of 
corruption as well.  These crimes follow the basic structure of the general offence of 
corruption.  Specific crimes are created in respect of particular persons.304  In South 
Africa, these persons are public officers,305 foreign public officials,306 agents,307 
members of the legislative authority,308 judicial officers,309 members of the prosecuting 
authority,310 parties to an employment relationship311 and witnesses and evidential 
material during certain proceedings.312  In Namibia, these persons are agents,313 public 
officers,314 witnesses315 and foreign public officials.316 
The Corrupt Activities Act and the Anti-Corruption Act also identifies particular forms 
of corruption in respect of certain activities.317  In South Africa, these relate to 
contracts,318 procuring and withdrawal of tenders,319 auctions,320 sporting events321 and 
gambling games or games of chance.322  In Namibia, these activities are tenders,323 
                                                          
302  Section 3 of the Corrupt Activities Act and section 34 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
303  This is supported inter alia by the references to agreements in section 3 of the Corrupt Activities 
Act and section 32 of the Anti-Corruption Act.   
304  Section 4 to section 11 of the Corrupt Activities Act and section 35, section 36, section 38, section 
39 and section 40 of the Anti-Corruption Act.  See Burchell and Milton (note 295) at 893.   
305  Section 4 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
306  Section 5 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
307  Section 6 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
308  Section 7 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
309  Section 8 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
310  Section 9 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
311  Section 10 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
312  Section 11 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
313  Section 35 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
314  Section 36 and section 38 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
315  Section 39 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
316  Section 40 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
317  Section 12 to section 16 of the Corrupt Activites Act and section 37 and section 41 to section 47 
of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
318  Section 12 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
319  Section 13 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
320  Section 14 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
321  Section 15 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
322  Section 16 of the Corrupt Activites Act. 
323  Section 37 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
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auctions,324 giving assistance in relation to contracts,325 corruptly using office or 
position for gratification,326 sporting events,327 dealing with, using, holding, receiving 
or concealing gratification in relation to any offence,328 attempts and conspiracies329 
and fraudulent concealment of offence.330 
While the two Acts of these two countries are for the most part similar, there is one 
major difference.  The Namibian Anti-Corruption Act establishes an Anti-Corruption 
Commission to investigate alleged corrupt practices and to educate and inform the 
public.331  The South African Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act does not 
create a similar body.  An anti-corruption unit did exist until 2002 as part of the South 
African Police Force, when it was closed down by former National Police 
Commissioner Jackie Selebi.332  There are, however, talks of reintroducing such a 
unit.333  This will be an important step ensuring accountability. 
2.2.2 The Control over Corruption and the Petroleum Industry  
As mentioned earlier, corruption, together with mismanagement of extractive revenues, 
contribute to a large extent to under-development and poverty in resource-rich 
countries.334  Corruption is one of the major contributing factors to the resource 
curse.335  For a petroleum regulatory framework to be transparent, a proper framework 
addressing corruption or attempts at corruption must exist alongside the petroleum 
regulatory framework.  This will also promote the accountability of the state in that 
state actors can be held accountable for attempts at corruption, which curbs the benefit 
that the citizens are entitled to.   
                                                          
324  Section 41 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
325  Section 42 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
326  Section 43 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
327  Section 44 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
328  Section 45 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
329  Section 46 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
330  Section 47 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
331   Section 2 and section 3 of the Anti-Corruption Act.   
332  Barnard DK “South Africa: DA Welcomes Re-Establishment of Anti-Corruption Unit” available 
at http://allafrica.com/stories/201307121113.html [accessed 02.02.2014]. 
333  Barnard (note 332); SAPA “Anti-Corruption Unite Should be ‘Secure’” 22 August 2013 News24 
available at http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Anti-corruption-unit-should-be-secure-
20130822 [accessed 02.02.20140]. 
334  Al Faruque (note 247) at 66. 
335  Al Faruque (note 247) at 68. 
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In South Africa, debates about corruption within the extractive industries have 
identified this issue as an area of concern.336  Similarly, the Namibian petroleum 
industry has especially been plagued with allegations of corruption.  Of particular 
concern in Namibia is the way in which petroleum licences have been awarded to local, 
who have have proceeded to sell these licences to foreign companies for millions of 
Namibian Dollars.337  The beneficiaries of petroleum licences consists predominantly of 
rich businessmen, politicians and their family and friends.338  
Although corruption is not specifically a petroleum-industry problem but more a 
societal problem in general, it does exert a major influence over the petroleum industry.  
Given the potential that a petroleum-producing industry may have for a host country, 
the prevention and combating of corruption should be one of the dominant factors in a 
regulatory framework for petroleum.  This will not only promote transparency and 
accountability in the petroleum industry, but will ensure greater protection for the 
interests of the host country by channeling the petroleum wealth down to the people, 
instead of into the hands of an elite few.      
2.2.3 Assessment of the Prohibition on Corrupt Practices 
There are three important aspects of the above discussion that have a bearing on the 
petroleum industry in South Africa and Namibia.  First, the common law crime of 
bribery still applies in Namibia and some scholars are of the view that it still applies in 
South Africa as well.  The common-law crime of bribery is committed by both the 
person tending the advantage and the person accepting the advantage.  The crime 
applies to the bribery of state officials and employees, as well as judicial officers.   
Second, in Namibia and South and Namibia, there is a general crime of corruption.  
This crime applies to commercial and business practices as well and the bribery of 
private persons.  This is of particular importance in the petroleum industry, as the 
exploitation of petroleum relies largely on contractual arrangements between parties.  
                                                          
336  Hughes (note 66) at 11. 
337  Staff Reporter “A Mine of Different Outlooks” Insight: Mining in Namibia 2014 at 3; Immanuel S 
“Oil Fields for Friends” The Namibian 15 August 2014 at 1. 
338  Immanuel (note 337) at 1. 
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By criminalising corruption in the private sector as well as the public sector, greater 
transparency is given to the regulation of petroleum.    
Third, the bribery of a public officer is a specific crime of corruption in South Africa 
and Namibia.  A public officer refers to a person who is a member, an officer, an 
employee or a servant of a public body.339  This includes any department of state in 
South Africa or a ministry in Namibia.340  In South Africa, a public body also includes 
any functionary or institution exercising a public power or performing a public duty or 
function in terms of any legislation.341  In Namibia, it includes any corporation, board, 
council, institution or other body, whether incorporated or unincorporated, or any 
functionary exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
law or the common law.342 
South Africa and Namibia have taken great strides in promulgating legislation dealing 
extensively with corruption.  The framework for combating corruption in Namibia and 
South Africa is influenced by the international conventions and protocols to which 
these two countries are signatories.  The UN Convention, AU Convention and the SADC 
Protocol apply to Namibia and South Africa.  The domestic legislation of these two 
countries must therefore reflect its obligations in terms of these international 
documents.  This is achieved through the legislation discussed above.   
However, as stated in the introduction, mere legislation prohibiting corruption is not 
enough.  Effective measures must be taken to combat corruption within the framework 
of this legislation.  To this extent, both South Africa and Namibia have taken steps 
towards tracking and publishing on corrupt practices.  So, for example, Insight 
magazine in Namibia, which is published monthly, contains a “Corruption Tracker” 
column.  Here, the magazine discusses resolved cases, new cases and talking points.  
Similarly, South Africa’s Corruption Watch is an online platform that tracks and 
                                                          
339  Section 1 of the Corrupt Activities Act and section 32 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
340  Section 1 of the Corrupt Activities Actand section 32 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
341  Section 1 of the Corrupt Activities Act. 
342  Section 32 of the Anti-Corruption Act. 
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discusses corruption.343  South Africa also has the National Anti-Corruption Forum, 
which was launched in 2001, which plays more of an advisory role.344 
Endeavours such as Corruption Watch, the National Anti-Corruption Forum and 
Insight’s Corruption Tracker are important in informing and educating the public about 
corruption.  For anti-corruption legislation to be applied effectively, members of the 
public and government officials need to know when conduct will amount to corruption 
or will constitute bribery.  Aside from educating the public, it also ensures greater 
transparency by reporting on corruption.  However, even these attempts at greater 
transparency are not sufficient.  The framework for corruption in South Africa and 
Namibia must also ensure accountability.  In other words, those guilty of corruption 
(including the state as bribee) must be held accountable for their actions.   
3. Implications of the Regulatory Framework on the 
Ownership of Petroleum Resources 
Chapter Four above discusses the methods that a state, which assumes access over 
petroleum resources, can employ to grant access to these resources to petroleum 
companies.  Whatever the correct interpretation of ownership of minerals in South 
Africa is, it is clear that the state in both South Africa and Namibia exercises control 
over petroleum resources.  However, as we have seen above, both the South African 
and Namibian governments have to exercise their control over petroleum resources for 
the benefit of the respective nations.   
This places the Namibian and South African states in a peculiar situation.  On the one 
hand, the state controls access to the resources.  In this sense, the state is a “regulator” 
through which private petroleum companies can gain access to the petroleum resources 
of South Africa and Namibia.  As regulator, the state may grant rights to petroleum 
companies to search for and to extract petroleum resources.   
In South Africa, the state is assisted in this role by the Petroleum Agency SA.  The 
Minister of Mineral Resources, together with the Petroleum Agency SA, acts as 
                                                          
343  See their website at http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/ [accessed 27 October 2013].   
344  See their website at http://www.nacf.org.za/ [accessed 28 October 2013]. 
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administrative body in charge of the granting, issuing, refusing controlling, 
administering and managing the rights to exploit mineral and petroleum resources.345  
The Minister, acting on behalf of the State, also has a discretion to determine and levy, 
in consultation with the Minister of Finance, any fee or consideration payable in terms 
of any relevant Act of Parliament.346  Any person who wishes to search for and extract 
mineral and petroleum resources must apply to the State, represented by the Minister of 
Mineral Resources, for the necessary right.347   
In Namibia, the Minister of Mines and Energy, assisted by the Petroleum 
Commissioner, acts on behalf of the state and may grant reconnaissance, exploration 
and production licences to petroleum companies to authorise them to search for and 
extract petroleum.348  The Minister must also enter into a petroleum agreement with the 
holder of a licence.  This agreement is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven below.    
The state’s role, however, is not limited to that of regulator.  In exercising control over 
petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia, the states also act as “agents” of 
their people.349  As such, the states have to ensure that, in acting as regulator, the 
interests of the people of South Africa and Namibia are protected and that they enjoy 
the ultimate benefit of the exploitation of the petroleum resources of these two 
countries.  The state in South Africa and Namibia therefore fulfils a dual function in 
respect of petroleum resources.  On the one hand, through its control over these 
resources, the states act as regulators, granting access to petroleum resources.  On the 
other hand, the states act as agents of their people and have to ensure that petroleum 
resources are exploited for the benefit of their people. 
4. Conclusion 
The states in South Africa and Namibia act as regulator and control access to the 
petroleum resources located within the boundaries of these two countries.350  However, 
when acting as regulator and granting access to petroleum resources, states fulfil a 
                                                          
345  Section 3(2)(a) of the MPRD Act. 
346  Section 3(2)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
347  Section 5(4)(b) of the MPRD Act. 
348  Section 9(1) of the Petroleum Act.   
349  Soros G "Foreword" in Humphreys M, Sachs JD and Stiglitz JE (eds) Escaping the Resource 
Curse (2007) New York Columbia University Press at xii.   
350  This is discussed in Chapter Six below.   
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second function: it acts as agent of the nation and must ensure that the nation ultimately 
benefit from the exploitation of the petroleum resources of South Africa and Namibia.   
This creates a difficult situation for the states. On the one hand, they have to ensure that 
the petroleum company is given the best deal possible, as the states are dependent on 
the financial and technical capabilities of these companies to ensure that petroleum 
resources are exploited optimally.  On the other hand, states have to ensure that the 
nation ultimately benefits from the exploitation of “its” resources.  
As regulator on the one hand and agent on the other hand, the South African and 
Namibian states have to ensure that a balance is struck between the interests of the 
petroleum company and the interests of the nation.  This can only be achieved if the 
regulatory framework for petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia is designed 
in such a way to allow the states to achieve this balance.  The legislation cannot be 
designed either just around the interests of the petroleum company or around the 
interests of the nation.  The interests of both parties have to be acknowledged and 
pursued. 
The state as regulator has to administer petroleum resources within the confines of the 
principles of just administrative action.  This limits the powers of the state, while 
promoting transparency and accountability.  The framework for just administrative 
action is, however, not perfect.  In Namibia especially, the framework tends to protect 
the state by not promoting access to information, which reduces state accountability 
while at the same time does not promote transparency.  In both countries, petroleum 
revenues are not regulated, which not only goes against transparency, but also 
negatively affects the right of the citizens of these two countries from benefitting from 
petroleum resources.  As regulator, the state should have clear and transparent policies 










PART C:  
CONCLUSION 
 
In Part A above, the general aspects of petroleum is discussed.  In that part, the 
terminology used internationally in the petroleum upstream petroleum industry is 
discussed, as well as the general principles of ownership of and control over petroleum 
resources.  In Part B, the general principles of ownership of and control over petroleum 
resources in South Africa and Namibia is discussed.  The focus is on the role of the 
state and the dual function that the state fulfils in respect of petroleum resources.  The 
measures for limiting state control over petroleum resources are also discussed, as are 
the measures for determining access to petroleum resources in South Africa and 
Namibia.  Part B deals with the upstream petroleum legislation in these two countries, 
as well as the environmental legislation which gives further content to petroleum 
resources.  It includes an evaluation of the measures for ensuring that the host country 
benefits from petroleum resources (through taxation, royalties and socio-economic 
empowerment).   
The last part of the thesis, Part C, is the conclusion.  Here, the conclusions drawn from 
the previous parts are summarised.  Specifically, the conclusion casts light on how the 
elements of transparency, accountability and balance of interests are reflected in the 









Chapter Ten:   
CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
INTEREST-BALANCING IN PETROLEUM 
LAW 
 
1. A Proper Regulatory Framework for Upstream 
Petroleum Resources 
The foundation of any petroleum regulatory regime is the model of ownership chosen 
by a state in respect of petroleum resources.1  Flowing from this is the choice of what 
authorisations are used to grant access to petroleum and how these authorisations are 
allocated.2  These three elements make up the basic structure of a regulatory framework 
for petroleum resources.  In the light hereof, Namibia and South Africa have both opted 
for a regime in terms whereof the state controls petroleum resources and is responsible 
for granting access to these resources.  The basic petroleum laws of these two countries 
have also identified what authorisations should be used to grant access to petroleum 
resources and how these authorisations are allocated.   
Having a basic petroleum regulatory regime in place is, however, not enough.  
Petroleum can be a curse for a country, rather than a blessing.3  Whether it is a curse 
depends on whether a proper regulatory framework for petroleum exploitation is in 
place.  In designing this framework, a country is faced with a difficult dilemma.  On the 
one hand, a state has an obligation to ensure that it gets the most out of these resources 
                                                          
1  See for example Barma NH, Kaiser K, Le TM and Viñuela L Rents to Riches?  The Political 
Economy of Natural Resource-led Development (2012) Washington The World Bank at 79; 
Onorato WT Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development (1995) Washington 
The World Bank at 5. 
2  Barma et al (note 1) at 79; Onorato WT Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum 
Development (1995) Washington The World Bank at 6. 
3  Chapter One above.   
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for the benefit of its citizens and national economic growth.  On the other hand, a state 
(especially a developing one such as Namibia and South Africa) relies on petroleum 
companies to assume responsibility for exploring for and producing the resource and 
therefore needs to ensure that the interests of petroleum companies are protected as 
well.  This tension between interests mirrors on a domestic level the same tension that 
faced the development of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources.4  The state in South Africa and Namibia therefore assumes two roles.  The 
first is that of the regulator, responsible for regulating access to petroleum resources.  
The second role is that of agent of its citizens, responsible for ensuring the petroleum 
resources falling under its control is exploited for the benefit of its principal.   
The regulatory framework for petroleum resources is the vehicle through which the 
state exercises these roles.  In order for a legislative framework for petroleum resources 
to ensure that the state succeeds in balancing these two roles and managing the tension 
between the interests of petroleum companies and the interests of the host state, it needs 
to give effect to various policy choices by the state in respect of the regulation of 
ownership of, control over and access to to petroleum resources within a host country.   
The most important set of policies regarding natural resources are those that deal with 
increased transparency.5  Transparency must be present in all aspects of petroleum 
regulation.  To ensure transparency, there has to be an openness and availability of 
information.  This includes clear publicity on how rights to petroleum are negotiated 
and granted, what amounts are received by government in exchange for access to 
petroleum, how the government uses these amounts, how much resources are producted 
and where these resources go once produced.   
The regulatory framework within which a state exercises control over access to 
petroleum must also contain measures aimed at holding a state accountable to its people 
if it fails to exercise proper control over petroleum resources for the benefit of its 
people.  The second important policy choice with regard to the regulatory framework 
for petroleum resources therefore is how government is held accountable to its people if 
it fails to exercise proper control over petroleum resources.  Included in the principle of 
                                                          
4  Chapter Three, par 2.   
5  Chapter One, par 2.1.1.   
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accountability is how the powers of the state are limited in respect of its control over 
petroleum resources.6  Boundaries are set within which the state must exercise its 
powers in respect of petroleum.  These boundaries are legislated or well-established 
common law principles.  The measures in South Africa and Namibia for limiting state 
control over petroleum resources therefore promote accountability and transparency.   
South Africa and Namibia are not major players in the international petroleum industry.  
However, there are indications that these two countries may have viable petroleum 
resources to become petroleum producing countries.  It is therefore the opportune time 
to examine and evaluate the current petroleum regulatory regimes for these two 
countries.  To ensure that the petroleum industries in these two countries are developed 
to their full potential, a proper regulatory framework regulating upstream petroleum 
resources must be in place that reflect and promote the elements of transparency and 
accountabity while at the same time ensuring that a balance is struck between the 
interests of the citizens of South Africa and Namibia and the petroleum companies 
doing the exploitation.    
2. South African and Namibian Regulatory Frameworks 
by Comparison 
This thesis determines and evaluates the regulatory framework for upstream petroleum 
resources in South Africa and Namibia.  It seeks to ascertain whether the South African 
and Namibian states, in fulfilling their dual functions in respect of petroleum, ensures 
that these resources are exploited for the ultimate benefit of the people of these two 
countries. 
In South Africa, petroleum resources vest in the nation and the state is custodian thereof 
for the benefit of the nation.  In Namibia, the state owns petroleum resources and has to 
ensure that it is exploited for the benefit of the people of Namibia.7  Both countries 
generally reflect the international standards on sovereignty and state control or 
                                                          
6  Chapter One, par 2.1.2.   
7  Chapter Four above.   
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ownership of petroleum resources.8  In both states, however, control over petroleum 
resources is exercised with a petroleum regulatory framework.  In order for this 
petroleum regulatory framework to operate to its full potential, it needs promote three 
essential characteristics, namely transparency, accountability and balance of interest.9 
2.1 Transparency and Accountability 
 Transparency and accountability is seen as the remedies to cure the resource curse.10  
In order to promote the elements of transparency and accountability, the petroleum 
regulatory framework in South Africa and Namibia must be characterised by openness, 
availability of information and government accountability.  These features must be 
present in the way that the state grants access to petroleum and the way the legislation 
limits the control that the state has over petroleum resources.   
2.1.1 Granting Access to Petroleum 
The states in South Africa and Namibia control petroleum resources and grant access to 
petroleum resources to petroleum companies.  Access to petroleum is granted under the 
MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act respectively.  These acts, however, only apply to 
those resources which qualify as petroleum in terms of these acts.11  The MPRD Act 
and the Petroleum Act contain statutory definitions of petroleum in line with the 
geological interpretation of petroleum.   
The MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act deal in some detail with the granting of access 
to and managing of petroleum resources.  Access is granted through different 
instruments in South Africa and Namibia.  In South Africa, the state can award 
reconnaissance permits, exploration rights and production rights to petroleum.  It is also 
possible in South Africa to apply for a technical co-operation permit, allowing the 
holder thereof to conduct certain desktop studies.  In Namibia, access to petroleum is 
granted by means of reconnaissance, exploration and production licences.12  Although 
                                                          
8  See for example Cawood F “Allocation of Petroleum Development Rights in South Africa: A 
Comparison with Current International Practices” (2006) Research Paper presented as part of 
LLM, Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy, University of Dundee at 15. 
9  Chapter One, par 2.1.   
10  Soros G "Foreword" in Humphreys M, Sachs JD and Stiglitz JE (eds) Escaping the Resource 
Curse (2007) New York Columbia University Press at xiv.   
11  Chapter Five, par 2.   
12  Chapter Five, par 3.3.1. 
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there may be some uncertainty in respect of the difference between reconnaissance and 
exploration operations, this uncertainty is cleared up by a proper understanding the 
technicalities of reconnaissance and exploration operations.  In general, both 
jurisdictions are transparent as to what types of rights to petroleum may be granted.  
The two Acts also set out the rights of holders of each type of right, although in South 
Africa these rights are set out in a more detailed fashion than in Namibia, thus ensuring 
greater clarity as to what a holder of a specific right may do.  In Namibia, the rights of 
licence holders are defined in broader terms, this creating unnecessary uncertainty.  For 
example, the Petroleum Act does not provide for the right of the holder to use water 
found in the licence area, as is the case in South Africa.   
Both the MPRD Act and the Petroleum Act are also clear as to the duration of rights to 
petroleum.13  The procedures for applying for rights to petroleum and for applying for 
renewals of these rights are also set out in detail in the Acts.14  However, an overview 
of the different provisions in South Africa and Namibia clearly indicate that the 
discretion of the Minister in South Africa is limited substantially, as opposed to 
Namibia where the Minister enjoys a much greater degree of discretion.15  In this 
respect, therefore, the South African framework is much more transparent than the 
Namibian framework.  The South African MPRD Act also ensures greater 
accountability by limiting the discretion of the Minister.  In Namibia, an applicant’s 
access to petroleum resources depend to a large extend on the discretion of the 
Minister.   
The MPRD Act sets out in some detail the obligations of holders of rights to petroleum, 
as does the Petroleum Act.16  The obligations of holders in Namibia are further 
supplemented by the petroleum agreement, which is in line with interational practice.17  
This way, applicants and holders know what is expected of them and the general public 
also know what to expect of holders.  Both jurisdictions also require holders to keep 
records and submit regular reports.18  This is important for a state to be able to comply 
                                                          
13  Chapter Five, par 3.3.2.  
14  Chapter Five, par 3.3.3.   
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with its obligation to regulate and control petroleum exploitation, thus ensure greater 
accountability.  This also promotes transparency by requiring an openness regarding the 
the activities of holders.  Although the information is not readily available to the public, 
this may be justified in the light of the interests of petroleum companies to have certain 
information of their activities to be kept confidential. 
Access to petroleum, however, is not only dealt with under the MPRD Act and the 
Petroleum Act.  Legislation and policies dealing with the environment, royalty and 
taxation and socio-economic empowerment further supplement access to petroleum.   
Namibia and South Africa generally adhere to international practice and have 
incorporated various internationally accepted environmental management tools in its 
legislation.19  Both jurisdictions follow the international trend of requiring 
environmental authorisation for petroleum operations.20  Both jurisdictions furthermore 
place various obligations on applicants for and holders of rights to petroleum in respect 
of the environment, which includes assessing environmental damage, submitting 
reports and making provision for decommissioning, rehabilitation and production 
closre.21  Where the jurisdictions differ, however, is in providing for the justiciability of 
environmental rights.22  South Africa guarantees the right to a clean environment in its 
Constitution, while the Namibian Constitution deals with it under the principles of state 
policy, which are not enforceable.  Furthermore, the EMA, unlike NEMA, does not 
provide for standing for persons who wish to enforce their rights in respect of the 
environment.  This makes it very difficult for the public to take action against holders 
of petroleum licences to comply with their obligations in terms of the EMA.  To ensure 
accountability, measures must be put in place to facilitate proper enforcement of the 
environmental right.  Although it is still possible to enforce environmental rights in 
terms of common law, the scope is much narrower.  A person can only rely on common 
law to enforce environmental rights if that person is directly affected by it.23 
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The fiscal framework for petroleum activities in Namibia and South Africa is generally 
couched in clear and certain terms, thus ensuring transparency as regards to royalty and 
taxes applicable to petroleum operations.24  In South Africa in line with the principle of 
transparency, socio-economic empowerment is also legislated, supported by various 
policy documents.  In Namibia, however, the situation regarding socio-economic 
empowerment is uncertain.  While there are specific attempts at promoting 
empowerment (especially from a labour perspective), the country’s general 
empowerment framework has not been legislated, although attempts are made at 
enforcing it.  This creates confusion and a lack of general transparency as regards the 
country’s empowerment policies and objectives.   
2.1.2 Limitation on State Control 
Rights to petroleum are regulated by statute and allocated by public authorities.  This 
invokes the principles of fair and reasonable administrative action subject to which the 
general petroleum legislative framework operates.25  In general, this entails that states, 
when exercising control over petroleum resources and allocating access to these 
resources, act lawfully, reasonably and fairly.   
The right to just administrative fairness is entrenched by the Constitutions of the 
Republic of South Africa and Namibia.26  This right may only be limited under specific 
circumstances provided for in the Constitutions.  By constitutionally entrenching this 
right, the legislatures of these two countries promote accountability and transparency in 
general and specifically for purposes of this thesis, in respect of petroleum.  Any person 
who is affected by a decision taken by a functionary in respect of petroleum may apply 
to a court for appropriate relief if this decision was not taken according to the principles 
of just administrative action.  In this way, the state is held accountable for its actions in 
respect of petroleum resources. 
In both South Africa and Namibia, various decisions in respect of minerals have been 
the subject of an application based on the right of just administrative action.27  
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Although the courts are yet to consider an application based on this right in respect of 
petroleum, the principles will be the same for decisions in respect of petroleum.  Every 
application, however, has to be considered on a case-by-case basis.  Decisions taken by 
functionaries in respect of petroleum are administrative acts and therefore must 
therefore adhere to certain basic principles.28  First, decisions must be taken in a 
reasonable time.  Secondly, decisions must be lawful.  Thirdly, decisions must be 
reasonale.  Fourthly, the functionary must act in a procedurally fair manner.  In South 
Africa, an additional requirement is imposed, namely that a consultative process must 
be followed, considering the severe inroads that the granting of rights to petroleum may 
have on the rights of certain individuals or communities.  This requirement is not 
present under Namibian law.  This reduces accountability in Namibia, in that persons 
who may be affected by certain decisions taken by the state are not consulted or heard.   
Key in just administrative action is access to information.  By promoting access to 
information, the constitutional values of transparency, openness, participation and 
accountability are upheld.29  This right is entrenched in South Africa in terms of the 
South African Constitution and given effect to by empowering legislation.30  This right 
is, however, currently under threat from pending legislation, which empowers the state 
to classify and to withhold information.31  In Namibia, on the other hand, there are very 
few measures dealing with the right of access to information and the regulatory 
framework for petroleum seems to promote secrecy rather than a culture of openness 
and availability of information.  Transparency and accountability in respect of the 
regulation of upstream petroleum resources requires access to information.  There is 
scope in both countries, especially Namibia, to develop further the right of access to 
information.  This in turn will promote transparency and accountability.  However, the 
right to information must be developed with the interests of the petroleum companies in 
mind as well.  Some information must, for commercial purposes, be treated as 
confidential.   
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Finally, a regulatory framework for petroleum needs to prevent and prosecute 
corruption to limit state control, ensure transparency and promote accountability.32  In 
South Africa and Namibia, bribery and corruption is criminalised in terms of common 
law and statutory law.  Namibia has a body in place to investigate corruption and 
bribery.  South Africa envisages re-introducing a similar body.  To ensure that effect is 
given to the states’ statutory, common law and international obligations in respect of 
bribery and corruption, states must ensure that bodies are in place to investigate and to 
prosecure corruption.  South Africa in particular must take steps in establishing a body 
to fulfil this function.  This way, it will ensure that the state control over petroleum 
resources is limited, which in turn promotes transparency and accountability in the 
petroleum regulatory framework.   
2.2 Balance of Interests 
In South Africa, petroleum resources vest in the nation and the state is the holder 
thereof for the benefit of the nation.  The state controls petroleum resources within 
South Africa for the benefit of the nation.  In Namibia, the state owns the petroleum 
resources, but is under a similar obligation to exercise its ownership of and control over 
petroleum resources for the benefit of Namibian citizens.33  In both, the people of South 
Africa and Namibia are the ultimate beneficiaries of the petroleum resources within 
these two countries.  To promote the petroleum industries of these two countries, it is 
necessary to attract investors to do the exploitation.  At the same time, however, the 
rights of investors need to be protected as well.  A regulatory framework for petroleum 
needs to balance the interests of the people of the host country with the interests of the 
petroleum company who has been granted access to the petroleum resources.   
2.2.1 Interests of the People of South Africa and Namibia 
As a starting point, both the South African MPRD Act and the Namibian Petroleum Act 
recognise that the citizens of these two countries should benefit from petroleum 
resources.  In South Africa, this is however expressed in much clearer terms, while in 
Namibia it is implied.34  The regulatory frameworks for petroleum in South Africa and 
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Namibia are determined primarily by legislation.  This way, it promotes certainty in the 
granting and managing of rights to petroleum.  Citizens have certainty on the process to 
be followed, information that must be given and the obligations placed both on the state 
and petroleum companies in respect of petroleum resources.35   
The people of South Africa and Namibia also have a right to a clean environment, 
which is protected in the South African Constitution and recognised in the Namibian 
Constitution.36  General environmental legislation has been passed in both countries 
and applies to the petroleum industry as well.37  Neither country, however, has passed 
legislation dealing specifically with the environmental impacts of petroleum operations 
on the environment.  Notwithstanding this, the general environmental framework 
incorporates various internationally accepted environmental management tools that are 
applicable in the petroleum exploitation as well.  Obligations relating specifically to the 
environment are placed on applicants for rights to petroleum as well on holders.  These 
obligations ensure a continuous assessment and evaluation of the impact of petroleum 
operations on the environment.  Provision is also made for consequences for the holder 
where it fails to comply with these obligations.38  In South Africa, provision is 
furthermore made for the enforcement of the the right to a clean environment.  This, 
however, lacks in Namibia, where there is no proper framework for enforcing 
environmental rights.39   
In South Africa, the larger public or sections of the public affected by petroleum 
exploitation are given various opportunities to consult with the state and applicants for 
rights to petroleum.40  In Namibia, however, interested and affected parties are only 
consulted when application for an ECC is made.41  As a result, there is much less 
transparency and accountability in the Namibian framework when it comes to 
consultations with interested and affected parties.  In line with the general spirit of state 
accountability, the South African and Namibian Constitutions entrench the right of its 
citizens to just administrative action.  Any person affected by a decision taken in terms 
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of petroleum has the right to take that decision on review.  Not only does this promote 
transparency and accountability,42 it ensures that measures are in place for persons of 
South Africa and Namibia to enforce their right to just administrative action.  Similarly, 
the right of access to information operates to ensure that there is openness in the 
petroleum industry, thereby adding further protection to the interests of the people of 
South Africa and Namibia.43  This is further given content to in the petroleum industry 
through the obligation on petroleum companies to keep proper records and report on 
their activities.  However, as stated above, this information is not readily available to 
the public.44   
It is, however, not enough merely to ensure that the interests of the people of South 
Africa and Namibia are protected.  Measures must also be put in place in terms whereof 
the people actually benefit from the exploitation of petroleum resources.  In South 
Africa and Namibia, the state does not actively participate in the exploitation of 
petroleum resources, but leaves it to independent petroleum companies, although co-
operation with the state petroleum companies are possible and does happen from time 
to time.  The host nations therefore do not directly benefit from the petroleum 
resources.  Other measures must be put in place to ensure that some benefit is derived 
from the activities of petroleum companies.  Developing countries now recognise that, 
given the demand for petroleum, there is an opportunity to insist on higher royalties and 
taxes and larger contribution to social and economic goals.45  To this effect, the states in 
South Africa and Namibia derive a financial benefit from petroleum companies through 
royalties and taxes.  This is the most favourable way of ensuring that the host country 
benefits from the exploitation of its resources.46  Royalties are imposed on petroleum 
produced in South Africa and Namibia and the income generated by the petroleum 
companies are taxed.47  Certain activities and transactions attract further taxes, for 
example withholding tax and capital gains tax.48  The rates of royalties and taxes in 
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Namibia and South Africa are favourable compared to other countries, yet still does not 
shift the fiscal risk onto the host state.  A balance is struck between ensuring that the 
host state benefits from its petroleum resources and investors are not overcharged and 
therefore discouraged.  Neither party is exposed to exponential financial risk.  A 
reasonable trade-off is achieved, which will encourage investment as well.49   
The regulatory framework for petroleum resources in South Africa and Namibia also 
provide for socio-economic development.50  In South Africa, provisions relating to 
socio-economic empowerment are given statutory recognition.  This ensures a more 
direct benefit for the people of South Africa.51  In both jurisdictions, petroleum 
companies are obliged to have certain local content in their dealings in these countries, 
specifically with regard to previously disadvantaged persons.52  Aside from promoting 
employment equity and local participation, the frameworks for socio-economic 
development in South Africa and Namibia also promote training and skills 
development.53  This ensures that the petroleum operations of a company are used to 
develop the South African and Namibian economies and socio-economic goals.  
Notwithstanding this, however, Namibia’s unclear black economic empowerment 
policies must be criticised as creating uncertainty and inconsistency.54  To date, 
Namibia does not have any legislation specifically addressing socio-economic 
empowerment.  Similarly, Namibia’s petroleum regulatory framework does not address 
the interests of communities.  South Africa’s MPRD Act expressly recognises the 
preferent right of communities in respect of petroleum.55   
2.2.2 Interests of the Petroleum Companies 
In determining whether the interests of petroleum companies in Namibia and South 
Africa are protected, one first has to consider the authorisation in terms of which a 
petroleum company is granted access to these countries’ petroleum resources and 
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whether this provides sufficient security of tenure to the holder.  It is vital for a 
petroleum company to have a strong right, or secure tenure, which will protect its 
interests as well.   
In South Africa and Namibia, security of tenure in respect of rights to petroleum is 
generally promoted.56  The state grants exclusive rights to petroleum companies to 
access the petroleum resources situated within the boundaries of these countries.  
Petroleum companies assume the bulk of the risks associated with petroleum 
exploitation, but also enjoy the benefits.  Once petroleum is extracted, ownership of the 
produced petroleum vests in the petroleum company, who may deal with it as it pleases, 
subject to paying the relevant royalties and taxes.57  The exclusive rights awarded to the 
petroleum companies to explore for and to produce petroleum are limited real rights.  
As such, these rights are considered property for purposes of the constitutional property 
clauses of South Africa and Namibia.58  The rights holders are therefore protected from 
expropriation, unless it is in accordance with the constitutions.   
While the activities of petroleum companies are strictly regulated by the state and 
various obligations are imposed on the companies to ensure that the interests of the 
people of South Africa and Namibia are still protected, petroleum companies enjoy 
exclusive rights and ultimately become the owners of the produced petroleum, to deal 
with as they please.  The obligations imposed on petroleum companies are generally 
described with certainty, although this is not always the case in Namibia.59Furthermore, 
in Namibia the discretion given to the Minister to grant or refuse an application for a 
licence or for the renewal of a licence does not operate in favour of a petroleum 
company, as the regulatory regime lacks certainty.  In South Africa, a petroleum 
company is assured that, if it complies with all prescribed obligations, it will be granted 
the relevant right which it applied for.  In Namibia a petroleum company does not have 
this assurance.60 
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Both countries make it possible for holders to transfer or encumber their rights, albeit 
subject to state oversight.  This is necessary if a petroleum company wishes to raise 
capital or go into partnership with another entity.   
The fiscal frameworks imposing royalties and taxes in Namibia and South Africa are 
relatively favourable for investors compared to other countries.  Nevertheless, the 
Namibian provisions in respect of royalties and taxation are more onerous that its South 
African counterpart and there is less provision made for investor relief and incentives.61  
While this may operate in favour of the state to ensure a greater benefit for the state, 
Namibia runs the risk of estranging investors.   
Finally, the lack of clarity regarding socio-economic empowerment in Namibia may be 
a concern for investors.  In South Africa, clear provisions are made as to how socio-
economic empowerment is to be achieved.  In Namibia, there is no proper framework 
for socio-economic empowerment, though the state does try to enforce its general 
policy with regard to empowerment.  This creates confusion and generally lacks proper 
transparency and accountability.62       
3. Conclusion 
The petroleum regulatory frameworks in South Africa and Namibia generally reflect 
the three basic elements of a proper regulatory framework for petroleum.  The 
petroleum regulatory frameworks are attractive for investors while at the same time 
ensuring that the state, on behalf of its citizens, also obtain some benefits from its 
petroleum resources.  
In some areas, however, the elements of transparency, accountability and interest-
balancing may still be further developed and refined to ensure an equilibrium the 
interests of the host countries and the interests of petroleum companies.  The main areas 
identified where these elements are lacking are the following:  
(i) In Namibia, a wide discretion is granted to the Minister in respect of the 
granting or refusing of applications for rights to petroleum and renewal of 
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rights.  Furthermore, the rights of licence holders are stipulated in broad 
terms, which may cause uncertainty.   
(ii) Many important provisions relating to petroleum exploitation in Namibia is 
dealt with in terms of the Model Petroleum Agreement.  Many of these 
provisions are, however, negotiable.  It is advised that the Petroleum Act 
expand on the basic conditions that must be contained in the Petroleum Act 
to provide, for example, for compulsory EIAs and consultations with 
interested and affected parties.  
(iii) South Africa does not provide for petroleum agreements.  These agreement 
fulfil an important role in expanding on the rights and obligations of holders, 
provded that they are properly supported by means of empowering 
legislation while at the same time allowing sufficient room for negotiation.    
(iv) While both countries allow for the transfer or encumbrance of rights to 
petroleum, they are unclear as to what transactions this may entail.  A better 
framework should be put in place to deal with the encumbrance of rights to 
petroleum to foster investment.   
(v) The right to a clean environment is not guaranteed under the Namibian 
Constitution and no provision made in the environmental or other legislation 
for the enforcement of environmental rights.  This issue should be 
addressed, especially given the potential impacts that petroleum exploitation 
may have on the environment.   
(vi) In Namibia, there has generally been a call for greater transparency and 
accountability in the resource extraction industries, especially insofar it 
relates to access to information, but these calls have so far gone unheeded in 
Namibia.63   
(vii) Namibia does not provide for competitive investment incentives for 
petroleum companies, compared to other jurisdictions, including South 
Africa.   
(viii) In Namibia, there is a lack of a clear, transparent and enforceable socio-
economic transformation framework.  Furthermore, Namibia does not 
recognise the rights of communities in respect of petroleum.  
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(ix) Both countries fail to make provision for measures to use petroleum revenue 
to ensure a long-term benefit from this resource.  Although it may be 
premature to have this in place already, it is advisable at least to investigate 
the different possibilities with reference to other established and emerging 
petroleum producing countries.   
(x) Both Namibia and South Africa have resisted becoming members of the 
Extractive Industrustries Transparency Initiative (“EITI”).  Namibia’s 
reasoning for not joing is unclear, whereas in South Africa the reasons 
appear to include the fact that South Africa feels it would not benefit from it, 
as it has been involved in the extractive industry for more than a century.64  
Another reason appears to be that the South African government does not 
feel that membership will be suitable, as there is a significant difference 
bweteen mineral and petroleum resource revenue.65  Notwithstanding the 
resistance from politicians, the EITI Secretariat is adamant that South 
Africa’s support for this initiative would resonate through the African 
continent and “would send a clear message that could add considerable 
impetus to the initiative globally”.66 
From the above, it is clear that the South African framework for petroleum resources in 
general goes to greater lengths to ensure that the elements of transparency, 
accountability and balance of interest are present and promoted.  In Namibia, on the 
other hand, important issues such as the right of the citizens to benefit from the 
exploitation of natural resources (including petroleum) and the need for greater 
transparency and accountability have only recently emerged.   
The difference in approaches may be explained with reference to the historical 
regulation of minerals and petroleum in the two countries.  In Namibia, the state has 
always been regarded as owner of these resources.  In South Africa, the regulatory 
regime for minerals and petroleum has gone through various different stages, resulting 
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in the current framework which is at pains to reflect the general transformation policy 
of the country as a whole.   
What can be said for the Namibian regime, however, is that it has shown remarkable 
consistency, despite its colonial and apartheid history.  In the long run, Namibia’s 
consistency and predictability in its petroleum regulatory framework may be more 
beneficial for attracting investment and enhancing wealth than its South African 
counterpart, which seems to focus more on immediate wealth-enhancing mechanisms.67  
Despite this, however, the need for transparency and accountability in the regulatory 
framework for petroleum is beyond dispute.  
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